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Abstract 
The disclosure of Corporate Governance (CG) information by firms has been found in 
prior studies to have an impact on the market value of firms.  This thesis extends the 
research by studying the impact of voluntary CG disclosure by firms in Hong Kong, a 
market which provides a strong legal investor protection but characterized by a high 
insider ownership, on company valuation, as proxied by Tobin’s q.  This thesis also 
examines the role of dividend payout on the CG of Hong Kong firms.   
Based on hand-collected data for a sample of 258 firm-years over the 2003-2005 period, 
the empirical results show that, firstly, voluntary CG disclosure is positively and 
significantly related to market valuation for small firms, but the relationship is not 
significant for large or medium firms.  Combining large firms and small firms in a pooled 
sample, as done in most previous studies, thus misses the differential value relevance of 
voluntary CG disclosure for small versus large firms.  Secondly, firms with higher CG 
disclosure are associated with lower dividend payout ratios, ceteris paribus. The evidence 
appears to suggest that CG disclosure can substitute for dividend payout. Thirdly, those 
small firms with medium levels of insider ownership are found to pay lower dividends than 
small firms with either low or very high levels of insider ownership, suggesting that 
investors would expect higher dividends from small firms that are prone to, or have either 
agency problems or entrenchment problems. Furthermore, controlling for the level of 
insider ownership, a small firm with high CG disclosure is always associated with a higher 
market valuation.  The empirical evidence suggests that voluntary CG disclosure has a 
much stronger impact on the reduction of information asymmetry between investors (i.e., 
the outsiders) and managers (i.e., the insiders) for small firms than for large firms.  Hence, 
by voluntarily disclosing more CG information, a small firm can be expected to enjoy the 
double benefits of receiving a higher market valuation and a lower demand for dividend 
payout from investors.  
 
This study contributes to the research of value relevance of CG disclosure in several ways.  
It provides clear evidence that voluntary CG disclosure enhances the valuation of small 
firms, which previous research may have overlooked.  It also shows that voluntary CG 
disclosure and the level of insider ownership jointly affect a firm’s valuation and dividend 
payout.  Voluntary disclosure of corporate governance information, even under a strong 
legal regime for investor protection, seems to be a company attribute very much 
appreciated by outside investors.  
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
This thesis is an empirical study of the value relevance of the voluntary disclosure of 
corporate governance (CG) practices by firms in Hong Kong, a market characterized with 
concentrated ownership structures but with a strong legal investor-protection jurisdiction. 
It investigates the levels of disclosure of CG information for listed firms in Hong Kong 
prior to the Corporate Governance Report became a mandatory requirement in the listed 
firms’ annual reports in 2005. The thesis also examines the market valuation of governance 
information disclosed in the annual reports of these firms, and specifically tests the 
relationship between the firms’ voluntary CG disclosure and their market valuation proxied 
by Tobin’s q. The dividend payouts of sampled firms are also analysed with respect to their 
voluntary CG disclosure and ownership structure, after controlling for other company-
specific variables such as profitability, leverage, and sales growth.  
 
The empirical findings of this study suggest that voluntary disclosure of CG practices has 
profound impact on the market valuation and dividend payout for small firms. Voluntary 
disclosure of CG practices appears to be useful in alleviating the concerns of outside 
investors for potential expropriations by the inside majority shareholders of small firms. 
However, the effect does not seem to be as obvious for large- or medium-sized firms, 
under the same level of strong investor-protection offered by the common law regime. The 
empirical evidence obtained from this study suggests that a firm’s voluntary CG disclosure 
has a much stronger impact in reducing the information asymmetry between investors and 
managers for small firms than large firms. Hence, by voluntarily disclosing more CG 
information, a more transparent small firm can enjoy the double benefit of a higher market 
valuation and a lower demand for dividend payout. Transparency, even under a strong 
legal protection regime, appears to be a company attribute very much treasured by outside 
investors.  
 
This chapter presents an overview of this study. Section 1.1 provides the motivation for 
this research, tracing its origin in appreciating the significance of CG at the firm level and 
at the capital market level. Section 1.2 presents a brief rationale for selecting Hong Kong 
listed firms as the sample for investigation (more discussion will be provided in Chapter 8). 
Section 1.3 introduces the key research questions, describes the methodology adopted in 
this research (with further elaborations in Chapter 6 and 8 respectively), and highlights 
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some of the implications of this study (to be discussed in detail in Chapter 11). Section 1.4 
provides a summary of the organization of this study.  
 
1.1 Motivation for this study  
 
The proper functioning of a market economy, according to the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OCED), needs an effective corporate governance system 
to provide a degree of confidence within an individual company and across an economy as 
a whole (OCED, 2004, p.11). The OCED posits that the corporate governance framework 
should promote transparent and efficient markets (ibid, 2004, p. 17). Regulators of the 
major capital markets tend to share this view. For instance, the former chairman of the U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission has stated that capital markets require 
comprehensive and transparent disclosures of value-relevant information by firms in order 
to function efficiently. “Without it (i.e., quality information), investor confidence erodes. 
Liquidity dries up. Fair and efficient markets simply cease to exist” (Levitt, 1999).  The 
Company Law Review Steering Group (CLRSG) in the U.K. regards the provision of the 
necessary information as the best way to facilitate effective business choices so as to 
maximise wealth and welfare in a market economy (CLRSG, 2000, Chp. 2, para. 2.4).  
 
At the firm level, value-relevant information can be broadly classified into financial and 
non-financial. Within the non-financial information category, the disclosure of the 
information on corporate governance (CG) practices has become a mainstream concern. 
Claessens (2006) attributes this heightened interest in CG disclosure to two series of events: 
(i) the wave of financial crises in 1998 in the Russian Federation, Asian economies and 
Brazil which later endangered the stability of the global financial system; and (ii) the 
collapse of leading corporations in the U.S. and Europe in 2001-2002, which led to the 
largest insolvencies in history (e.g. Enron, WorldCom, Tyco International, Adelphia 
Communications, and Global Crossing). It is widely believed that these series of events are 
triggered by the deficiencies in the country-level CG framework or due to CG scandals at 
the firm level (OECD, 2004; Claessens, 2006). More understanding about the CG of a firm 
will help investors to protect themselves from losing their investment due to corporate 
failures. This is the basic motivation for this study. 
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Recent research suggests corporate governance (CG) disclosure is critical for the 
functioning of an efficient capital market (Healy and Palepu, 2001) as well as the 
performance of the firms (Klapper and Love, 2004). Researchers of disclosure studies 
assume that the insiders (i.e., managers) of a firm have superior information to the 
outsiders (i.e., investors) on their firm’s expected future performance. To communicate 
their superior knowledge to investors, managers of firms choose to disclose the type and 
the extent of information in addition to those mandatorily required for “contracting, 
political, or corporate governance reasons” (Healy and Palepu, 2001, p. 420). On the other 
hand, investors also demand information to assess the uncertainty of current and future 
cash flows of their investments. Managers satisfy this demand by supplying voluntary 
information to enable investors to evaluate the firm value, to facilitate investors’ choices of 
portfolio of securities, and to make other investment decisions (Meek, Roberts, and Gray, 
1995). 
 
Previous studies document that voluntary disclosures of CG information are associated 
with a firm’s cost of equity capital (Botosan, 1997; Lombardo and Pagano, 2000); cost of 
debt (Sengupta, 1998); ownership structure (Lemmon and Lins, 2003); analyst coverage 
(Lang, Lins, and Miller, 2004); and stock performance (Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, 2003; 
and Cremers and Nair, 2005). Most of them use large U.S. corporations with diffused 
ownership as their samples, or a cross section of sample firms from many countries with 
different ownership structures and various investor protection jurisdictions. To further 
advance the research of voluntary CG disclosure, this study aims at exploring the extent 
that voluntary CG disclosure would influence market valuation of a firm within a single 
market. Specifically, it examines the value relevance of voluntary disclosure of CG 
practices for firms operating under a strong legal investor protection regime but having the 
characteristic of a high concentration of ownership such as Hong Kong.  
 
Strong legal protection of investors has been suggested as a central determinant of the 
development of financial markets (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny 
(henceforth LLSV), 2000a, 2002). It enhances investor rights such as those to receive 
dividends on a pro-rata basis, to vote for directors, to participate in shareholders’ meetings, 
to elect directors or to sue them and get compensation, to stop a project that benefits the 
insiders at the expense of outside investors, and to liquidate the firm and receive the 
proceeds (LLSV, 2000a, p.5). It strengthens investor confidence in the stock market and 
withstands a rapid fall in asset values in a financial crisis (Johnson, Boone, Breach, and 
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Friedman, 2000). In those capital markets where investor protection is strong, the stock 
market capitalization relative to the nations’ Gross Domestic Products (GDP) is higher 
(LLSV, 1997, 2002) and the risk-adjusted returns of firms are higher (Lombardo and 
Pagano, 2000).  
 
Concentrated ownership of firms, on the other hand, is viewed as a sign of weak protection 
for minority shareholders (Coffee, 1999a). Through concentrated ownership, the insiders 
can control corporate assets, divert resources for their personal use, commit funds to 
unprofitable projects that provide private benefits, increase their current wealth or 
perquisite consumption, and expropriate outside investors by tunnelling the firm’s assets 
and profits for the benefit of the insiders (LLSV, 2000a; Johnson, La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, and Shleifer, 2000). If a predominant shareholder exits (i.e., holding more than 
50% of equity rights), the expropriation of outside shareholders is made even easier 
because the predominant shareholder, being the majority owner, can dictate the decisions 
of the board and control the decisions of the manager. When the predominant shareholder 
is also the manager of the firm, there is greater possibility for entrenchment problems to 
arise because minority shareholders, with lesser voting rights, are incapable of disciplining 
the opportunistic behaviours of managerial owner. The minority outsiders can instigate a 
resolution on the annual general meetings to express their dissatisfaction, but they are 
powerless to remove an incapable manager because the predominant shareholder can veto 
any resolution not to his/her liking. This study, by examining empirical evidence for firms 
operating in a strong legal protection regime and in an environment characterized with 
concentrated ownership, will shed light on the impact of voluntary disclosure of CG 
practices on firm’s valuation.  
 
Investors are also concerned about the returns on their investment. As suppliers of finance 
to corporations, investors want assurance from corporate managers that some returns will 
be provided to them as dividends (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). In an environment of 
concentrated ownership, the controlling shareholders may implement policies that benefit 
themselves at the expense of minority shareholders. It is better for the minority 
shareholders to receive dividends than to face the risk of being expropriated by the 
controlling shareholders (LLSV, 2000b). As LLSV succinctly put it, “it is these minority 
shareholders who would typically have a taste for dividends” (LLSV, 2000b, p. 3). LLSV 
(2000b) point out that the dividend payout policy (i.e., how much of the earnings are paid 
out as dividends) has implications for the curtailment of agency problems that exist 
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between the insiders (i.e. the managers) and outsiders (i.e., the investors) of a firm. They 
argue that higher dividend payouts to the shareholders lead to lower retained earnings kept 
inside the firm. As a result, a higher dividend payout provides less chance for the insiders 
to divert profits for their personal use. To the outsiders, the disgorging of cash in terms of 
dividends brings more benefits than the alternative of keeping the profit as retained 
earnings if there is a danger of managers using the funds in pursuit of insiders’ private 
benefits rather than maximizing shareholders’ wealth.  
 
This study also examines the relationship between a firm’s corporate governance and 
dividend payout but from a perspective different from prior research. This study 
investigates if a firm’s voluntary disclosure of corporate governance practices has impact 
on dividend payouts.  It aims to test the arguments, as proposed by LLSV discussed above, 
that outside investors would prefer more dividend payout to more profits retained inside 
the firm in a market where strong legal investor-protection is practised but concentrated 
ownership prevails. From the corporate governance perspective, minority shareholders can 
be expected to have a preference for dividends over retained earnings. The findings of this 
study have particular implications for the minority shareholders: it explores how dividend 
policy under concentrated ownership can be affected by voluntary corporate governance 
disclosure. 
 
Previous corporate governance (CG) research generally falls into two categories: cross-
country studies and single-country studies. Cross-country studies mainly compare the 
impact of external CG mechanisms such as legal framework, regulatory requirements, and 
effectiveness of law enforcement on the performance of firms in different countries (e.g., 
LLSV, 1998, 2002; Claessens, Djankov, Fan, and Lang, 1999). As these researchers use 
leading firms in each of the countries for their studies, their sample firms are invariably 
confined to large, complex, corporations. On the other hand, single-country studies focus 
on the internal CG mechanisms of the firms within the same country while controlling for 
the macro-level legal and cultural environments  (e.g., Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Gompers, 
Ishii, and Metrick, 2003; Black, Jang, and Kim, 2006; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006). In those 
studies, a blanket approach in the selection of samples is detected whereby large, medium, 
and small firms are pooled together into their sample frames. This study adopts a different 
approach in sample selection by differentiating the small firms from the large and medium 
firms in the sample frame. By so doing, it offers a comparison of analytical test results 
amongst the three samples of small-, large-and-medium-, and pooled- firms. Small-sized 
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firms typically receive less attention from investors and financial intermediaries such as 
institutional investors and analysts. They may have a bigger information asymmetry than 
large firms do. Botosan (1997) has already shown that firms with low analyst following 
exhibit a negative relationship between voluntary disclosure and their cost of capital; but 
similar relationship is not detected for firms that receive high attention from investors (i.e., 
with high analyst following). By splitting the sampling frame into three sub-samples of 
small firms, large-and-medium firms, and pooled-sized firms, this study will help 
determine whether or not firms of various sizes, characterized with concentrated ownership, 
would differ in their voluntary CG disclosure whilst equally subject to the strong investor-
protection legal regime such as Hong Kong. 
 
1.2 Rationale for using Hong Kong listed firms as sample 
 
Hong Kong provides a unique setting for studying the effect of voluntary disclosure of CG 
practices in a market of strong legal protection.  First, the Hong Kong stock market has 
always been one of the two largest capital markets in Asia (after Tokyo Stock Exchange) 
in terms of domestic market capitalization, only surpassed by Shanghai Stock Exchange 
since 2007. Unlike Shanghai Stock Exchange, Hong Kong has no foreign currencies 
control so that foreign investors are free from any government restrictions on effecting 
capital inflows in, or outflows from, the market. It also differs from the capital market in 
Japan where, under Japanese legislations, banks and financial institutions are legally 
permitted to own much greater extent in corporations (Prowse, 1992). Compared with their 
Japanese counterparts, Hong Kong enterprises are less reliant on banks and have fewer 
bank-appointed directors sitting on the corporate boards of directors than in Japan (Kaplan 
and Minton, 1994).  
 
Second, Hong Kong has inherited from the U.K. a strong legal investor-protection regime 
based on the Anglo-Saxon common law traditions. Owner’s rights and creditors’ rights are 
well protected and the rule of law is generally upheld. Third, ownership of firms is highly 
concentrated in families. Corporations in Hong Kong are predominantly controlled by 
families (HKSA, 1997; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 1999; Claessens, Djankov, 
and Lang, 2000). Past research suggests that concentration of control in a few families 
creates powerful incentives and abilities to lobby government officials for preferential 
contracts, non-market-based financing, and may lead to crony capitalism, suppressing 
minority investors’ rights. Fourth, in Hong Kong, controlling shareholders or related 
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members of their family often manage the firms they control (Claessens, Djankov, and 
Lang, 2000; Lins, 2003).  Many family members appoint themselves as board directors and 
senior executives of the firms (Ho, Lam, and Sami, 2004). Separation of ownership and 
control in Hong Kong firms is not as clear as in the Western countries. 
 
Finally, Hong Kong presents a cultural environment suitable for testing the voluntary 
disclosure of non-proprietary corporate information. Hong Kong is dominated by Chinese 
people who exhibit relatively high levels of collectivism and power distance, and strong 
uncertainty avoidance (Chow, Chau, and Gray, 1995; Chau and Gray, 2002).  Societal 
values of high collectivism and large power distance suggest a tendency for the members 
of a society to adhere to rules and regulations, conform to peer norms, follow the guidance 
from leaders, and refrain from risk-taking due to uncertainties. Under such circumstances, 
firms would tend to be less transparent and disclose less information on a voluntary basis 
in their annual reports compared to their counterparts in the U.S. and U.K.(Chau and Gray, 
2002).  
 
In sum, Hong Kong has the following characteristics: (i) firm ownership is concentrated in 
founding families; (ii) directors/managers are often family members; (iii) firms generally 
operate with a less transparent management style due to cultural traits; and (iv) business is 
conducted under a strong legal investor-protection regime based on British style company 
law and international accounting system (Ho, Lam, and Sami, 1994; Chen and Jaggi, 2000; 
Ho and Wong 2001). The findings of this corporate governance disclosure research using 
Hong Kong firms can have significant meanings and implications for those firms operating 
in other markets outside the U.S., and in markets in which high concentration in family 
ownership is prevalent. The findings can also shed light on whether the strong legal 
protection regime alone, as posited by LLSV (2000a and 2000b), is good enough to protect 
the investors from expropriation by the majority shareholders. 
 
Despite its cultural roots lying in Chinese society, Hong Kong followed closely the U.K. in 
corporate governance regulations and accounting standards before the reunion with the 
People Republic of China in 1997 (e.g. the publication of Second Report of the Corporate 
Governance Working Group by the HKSA, 1997). Hong Kong has subsequently been 
influenced by the International Accounting Standards (IAS) after 1997 (e.g. A Guide for 
Directors’ Business Review in the Annual Report by the HKSA, 1998; the Consultation 
Paper: Corporate Governance Review (Phase I) by the Standing Committee on Company 
Law Reform (henceforth SCCLR), 2001; the Report of Standing Committee on Company 
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Law Reform by the SCCLR, 2003; and the Final Recommendations from Corporate 
Governance Review (Phase II) by the SCCLR, 2004). All these regulatory reforms indicate 
that the Hong Kong capital market is striving towards an economically international 
market rather than being succumbed to the influence by mainland China after the political 
reunion after 1997. 
 
The Hong Kong Exchange (HKEx) and the Hong Kong Society of Accountants (HKSA) 
had been promoting more transparency and higher level of corporate governance 
disclosure since the collapses of big corporations in the U.S. and U.K in the early 2000s. 
They had been offering advice and consultation on CG practices to the Hong Kong listed 
firms. Their continuous efforts over the period 2002-2004 in encouraging the listed firms 
to voluntarily disclose CG practices were codified in the Listing Rules of HKEx (2005), 
which stipulates that a formal corporate governance report for the firms listed on the HKEx 
to be included in their annual reports starting fiscal year 2005. The change in regulations 
provides a unique opportunity to study the voluntary CG disclosure behaviour of the firms 
prior and up to 2005, as the listed firms had been fully informed about the contents and 
principles of such disclosure. It enables researchers to investigate the impact of voluntary 
CG disclosure on the firm valuation. Effective fiscal year 2005, the disclosure of CG 
information would become compliance with regulations for all firms.1  
 
The analysis of this study involves an examination of 258 firms listed on the main board of 
Hong Kong Exchange (HKEx) between 2003 and 2005. These firms are the constituent 
stocks of the Hang Seng Hong Kong Composite Index (HSHKCI) and its sub-indices, 
which classify the firms into LargeCap, MidCap, and SmallCap firms according to the 
firms’ market capitalization. This classification is provided, and practised, by the Hang 
Sang Index (HSI) Services Limited, which has been responsible for computing and 
reporting the indices for the Hong Kong stock market since 1969. The HSHKCI differs 
from the Hang Seng Index (HSI) in that the former comprises constituent stocks of listed 
firms domiciled in Hong Kong, whilst the latter comprises the biggest 42 stocks by market 
capitalization that are based in Hong Kong or mainland China. Many mainland Chinese 
firms are state-owned enterprises. Their ownership structures and business policies are 
different from those of Hong Kong based firms, and therefore may exhibit different 
                                                 
1 Strictly speaking, HKEx had not enforced the full CG disclosure requirements in 2005 due to opposition 
from listed firms on the section of internal control of the Corporate Governance Report. The HKEx agreed 
that firms could, if they chose to, postpone the disclosure of their internal control practices until the listed 
firms were prepared and ready for the setting up of their internal control system. As such, no firms were 
penalized within 2005 for incomplete disclosure. 
 8
degrees/ natures of agency problems (Green, 2003). Consequently, these firms of the 
constituent stocks of HSHKCI, all of them being Hong Kong based, are more relevant to 
the research objectives of this research and are used as samples in this study. 
 
1.3  Research questions and research methodology 
 
This study seeks to answer four research questions:  
(i) Prior research (as briefly discussed above and will be discussed in detail in  
Chapter 4) has established that voluntary disclosure of non-financial 
information has value relevance. Also, information on a firm’s corporate 
governance (CG) practices helps outsiders to understand how their investments 
are being deployed. In such scenario, will the voluntary disclosure of CG 
practices by a firm affect its valuation?  
(ii) Firms vary in their sizes and complexities, which may cause variations in the 
information asymmetry between the insiders (i.e., the managers) and the 
outsiders (i.e., the investors). Would LargeCap, MidCap, and SmallCap firms 
behave differently in terms of voluntary CG disclosure? If so, to what extent do 
they differ? Will the differences, if any, affect their firm valuation, ceteris 
paribus, as well? What are the other factors that account for the differences in 
disclosure? 
(iii) Lemmon and Lins (2003) have shown that ownership structure plays an 
important role in determining the expropriation of minority shareholders (i.e., 
the outsiders) by the insiders in Asian economies. By making more voluntary 
disclosure on their CG practices, managers may reduce the outside investors’ 
concern for potential expropriation by the majority shareholders. Firms may use 
voluntary CG disclosure as a signal to communicate to the outsiders to address 
such concern. On the other hand, because a predominant shareholder (i.e., 
having >50% equity holding) is often unrivalled in decision-making contests on 
the board of directors, one could argue that there is no point in disclosing CG 
information to the minority outsiders. Given the presence of a predominant 
shareholder, would firms still voluntarily disclose their CG? Will ownership 
structure be associated with the level of voluntary CG disclosure?  
(iv) La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (LLSV, 2000a) argue that CG 
is essentially a set of mechanism through which outside investors protect 
themselves against expropriation by the insiders; and that the key mechanism is 
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the legal system which consists of investor-protection laws and their 
enforcement (ibid, 2000a, p. 4). LLSV also argue for the use of dividends as a 
means to enhance outside investor protection2. Hong Kong has a strong legal 
investor-protection system (LLSV, 1998), but is also characterized with high 
concentration of ownership. A strong legal regime may strengthen the 
protection of investors from insider’s expropriation, but a high concentration of 
ownership may weaken it. Under such scenario, in what way will the outside 
investors balance their need for a decent return on their investment (i.e., 
dividend payouts) and the need for protection from insider’s expropriation (as 
gleaned from the level of insider ownership) and other agency problems?  If 
voluntary CG disclosure is used as a signal to the market on the state of CG 
practice within the firm, can voluntary CG disclosure change investors’ demand 
on a firm’s dividend payout? Can more voluntary CG disclosure substitute for 
dividend payout? 
 
These are the key research questions to be answered in this thesis.  They will be elaborated 
in more detail in Chapter 6. Based on these research questions, testable hypotheses are 
derived, and the arguments and rationales for formulating such hypotheses will be 
discussed in the same chapter.  
 
In the course of the present study, an overview of corporate governance literature will be 
presented. The hypotheses and testing models developed in this study are based on 
previous researchers’ economic theory (i.e., the agency theory by Jensen and Meckling, 
1976) and models (i.e., the two agency models of dividends – the outcome model and the 
substitute model – by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (LLSV), 2000b). 
Together with the theories of voluntary disclosures developed by previous researchers (e.g., 
Verrecchia, 1983, 1990, 2001; Dye, 1985, 2001; Wagenhofer, 1990; Healy and Palepu, 
2001; and Core, 2001), they form the theoretical framework of this study and will be 
discussed in the following chapters. 
 
In terms of research methodology, a quantitative approach is adopted. Empirical data are 
collected from several sources. The corporate governance disclosure is measured by a 
score (CGDscore), which is computed and constructed from a checklist of 66 single-barrel 
                                                 
2 La Porta et al argue that, to the outsiders, dividends received is a ‘bird in the hand’ which is better than the 
retained earnings kept within the firm (which is tantamount to ‘a bird in the bush’) because “the latter might 
never materialize as future dividends (can fly away)” (LLSV, 2000b, p. 4).    
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questions adapted from Appendix 23 of the Listing Rules 2005 of the Hong Kong Exchange 
(HKEx). A copy of the checklist is attached in the Appendix to this study. As will be 
discussed in detail in Chapter 8, the CG disclosure of a firm is recorded and coded by 
comparing the information about the firm’s CG practices as revealed in the non-financial 
sections of the sample firm’s annual reports against the 66 questions prescribed in the 
checklist.  Following Haniffa and Cooke (2002), a dichotomous approach is adopted in the 
computation of the CGDscore: an item on the checklist scores 1 if disclosed in the annual 
report and 0 if it is not. The score is then scaled by the total number of applicable questions 
relevant to the firm and expressed in terms of percentage, thus may range from zero to 100.   
 
The market valuation of firm is measured by Chung and Pruitt’s (1994) approximate q, 
which is an accurate approximation of Tobin’s q but has the advantage of simplicity in 
computation. This approximate q, with adaptation, is commonly used in measuring a firm’s 
valuation by accounting and finance researchers (e.g. Kaplan and Zingales, 1997; Gompers, 
Ishii, and Metrick, 2003; Cremers and Nair, 2005). Company characteristics such as the 
firm’s profitability, dividend payout, sales growth, leverage are obtained from Datastream. 
Empirical data are analysed quantitatively and the relationships between the dependent 
variables (firm’s valuation as indicated by the approximate q; and dividend payouts) and 
the independent variables (CGDscore, leverage, profitability, sales growth, and other 
control variables) are explored mainly by ordinary least squares (OLS) multiple 
regressions. 
 
The results of this study show that voluntary CG disclosure has valuation relevance, 
although the effect is much stronger for the small firms than for the sub-sample of pooled-
sized firms. Voluntary CG disclosure can also substitute for dividend payout for firms with 
ownership structure susceptible to agency problems and entrenchment problems.  This 
happens under the auspice of a strong legal investor-protection in a market where the 
firms’ ownership structure seldom changes drastically over the short-term. The empirical 
results of this study demonstrate that minority investors use voluntary CG disclosure to 
guide their investment decisions for the firm’s share valuation, and that voluntary 
disclosure is useful in mitigating investors’ demand for dividend payout. 
 
The findings of this study have important implications for managers, investors, regulators, 
as well as accounting and finance researchers. For the managers, the empirical results will 
clarify if the costly exercise of voluntary disclosure of CG information can help in 
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enhancing a firm’s value. The empirical findings can affirm managers’ cognition on the 
benefits of communication of good CG practices to the investors. To the investors, the 
findings of this empirical study can add to their understanding that firms of different sizes 
are associated with different information asymmetries between the insiders and the 
outsiders. Some CG practices, if disclosed voluntarily, may have different impacts on the 
reduction of asymmetries for different firms. Similarly, the regulators may find the 
empirical evidence from this study useful in assessing the prowess of voluntary disclosure; 
so that they may take it into consideration when they are going to determine the 
appropriate levels of mandatory disclosure and compliances of regulations in future for 
different sizes of firms. Lastly, the empirical results of this research may add contributions 
to the accounting and finance literature by proffering some explanations as to why 
previous studies have ambiguous results on the value-relevance of voluntary CG disclosure.  
1.4 Organization of the research study 
The structure of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides a literature review 
on the theoretical frameworks of corporate governance, firm valuation, and dividend 
payout. A theoretical framework based on agency theory is adopted in this study. Chapter 3 
explores the relationship among corporate governance, ownership structure, and firm’s 
leverage. As Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest, ownership structure has a close 
relationship with agency problems, to which corporate governance sets out to respond. 
This is followed by Chapter 4, which examines the inter-relationships between legal 
protection, corporate governance, and voluntary disclosure.  LLSV (2002) emphasize that 
the legal protection is at the core of corporate governance. Chapter 4 thus describes 
LLSV’s legal framework and how it is related to a firm’s voluntary disclosure of corporate 
governance, as well as dual listing, in communicating to the outside investors. Chapter 5 
describes the corporate governance development and the corporate financial reporting 
environment of Hong Kong. It also presents a summary of the characteristics of Hong 
Kong stock market and Hong Kong listed firms.  
 
The development of hypotheses is the focus of Chapter 6, in which the assumptions and 
rationales for the formation of the hypotheses are presented. Chapter 7 presents the 
definitions and computations of the dependent variables, explanatory variables, and control 
variables to be tested in the empirical models in this study. The sources of information are 
described and the construction of the corporate governance disclosure score (CGDscore) is 
explained there. Chapter 8 describes the research design and explains how the sample firms 
are selected. It also gives the rationale on the selection of variables for this empirical study. 
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 In Chapter 9, the descriptive statistics and the results of univariate analyses of the data are 
presented. Chapter 10 reports the empirical test results of the regression models, and 
discusses the interpretation of the results; to be followed by some robustness tests on some 
key models selected from the previous chapter. Chapter 11, the concluding chapter, 
provides a summary of the study, a discussion of the findings, and a conclusion of this 
thesis.  It points out the limitations of this empirical study and ends by offering some 
suggestions for further studies into this research area. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review on Corporate 
Governance 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
One of the main objectives of this thesis is to explore the relationship between voluntary 
disclosure of corporate governance (CG) and a firm’s value. To provide a background on 
the research topic, this chapter reviews previous research literature on the theoretical 
frameworks of corporate governance. Section 2.2 introduces the various definitions of 
corporate governance by various research scholars, official institutions, and non-
government organizations. In Section 2.3, three major theories of the CG frameworks are 
elaborated: agency theory, transaction cost theory, and stakeholder theory. They are the 
common starting point for most CG studies. Of these three theories, the agency theory will 
be used as the primary basis that underpins this study. Section 2.4 presents the broad 
classification of CG into external (i.e., macro) mechanisms and internal (i.e., micro) 
mechanisms. While the external mechanisms apply to all firms operating in the same 
country, internal mechanisms will vary from firm to firm. To the general investor, internal 
CG mechanisms may have more relevance than external mechanisms in assessing which 
firms to invest in when determining their investment portfolio, or deciding their investment 
strategies within the same capital market. It may be argued, therefore, that investors’ 
knowledge about a firm’s internal CG mechanisms plays a crucial role in their investment 
decisions. The more knowledge investors have about a firm’s CG practices, the more 
confidence they will have about their investment decisions with regard to that firm.   
Section 2.5 provides a summary of the key issues in the literature review as examined in 
this chapter. 
 
2.2 Definition of corporate governance 
 
According to the neo-classical economists such as Alchian (1950) and Stigler (1958), 
product market competition is acclaimed to enable firms to achieve the optimum size based 
on the principles of competition and survival. Firms compete to minimize costs in order to 
survive. Due to this cost minimization, firms would have to adopt rules and evolutionary 
mechanisms to enable them to raise external capital at the lowest cost. Based on this 
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evolutionary theory of economic change, corporate governance has no role to play because 
it is subsumed by product market competition. 
 
However, once entrepreneurs have financed the capital, the investment is often highly 
specific and sunk into a business endeavour. Moreover, in the practical world, 
entrepreneurs cannot rent the capital minute by minute. They need to be assured that they 
can get back the return of this sunk capital. On the one hand, product market competition 
may reduce the returns on capital. On the other hand, it may cut the amount that managers 
(i.e., agents) can possibly expropriate, but it cannot prevent the agents from expropriating 
the competitive return after the capital is sunk. Therefore, there is a need for some forms of 
corporate governance set up to provide an assurance on top of the product market 
competition mechanism. Indeed, corporate governance can be regarded as a set of 
mechanisms through which firms operate when ownership is separated from management. 
As Sir Adrian Cadbury of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate 
Governance in the U. K. puts it: 
 
“Corporate governance is the system by which companies are directed and 
controlled.” 
(Cadbury Committee, 1992) 
 
Indeed, corporate governance deals with the mechanisms that provide investors in 
corporations with some protection in regard to their investments. Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997) defines corporate governance as follows:  
 
“Corporate governance deals with the ways in which suppliers of finance to 
corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment.”   
 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, p. 737) 
 
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) defines corporate 
governance as a set of relationships governing the various members of a corporation: 
“Corporate governance involves a set of relationships between a company’s 
management, its board, its shareholders and other stakeholders.  Corporate governance 
also provides the structure through which the objectives of the company are set, and 
the means of attaining those objectives and monitoring performance are determined.”    
 
(OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, 2004, p. 11) 
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OECD acknowledges that corporate governance is only part of the larger economic context 
in which firms operate. Such context includes macro-economic policies and the degree of 
competition in product and factor markets. The corporate governance framework depends 
on the legal, regulatory, and institutional environment as well as other factors such as 
business ethics and social responsibilities. 
 
OECD also states clearly that corporate governance is affected by the relationships among 
participants in the governance system (ibid, 2004, p.12), and that there is no single model 
of good corporate governance. The Principles are evolutionary in nature. They should be 
reviewed in light of significant changes in circumstances. Firms must innovate and adapt 
their corporate governance practices to remain competitive in a changing world in order to 
meet new demands and grasp new opportunities (ibid, 2004, p.13). 
 
Another non-government organisation, the Centre for Financial Market Integrity of the 
CFA Institute, defines corporate governance as a system of controls and procedures: 
 
 “Corporate governance is the system of internal controls and procedures by which 
individual companies are managed. It provides a framework that defines the rights, 
roles and responsibilities of different groups – management, board, controlling 
shareowners, and minority or non-controlling shareowners – within an 
organization.” 
 
           (A Manual for Investors, Centre for Financial Market Integrity, CFA Institute, 2005, 
p.7) 
 
The Centre for Financial Market Integrity explains that corporate governance, at its core, is 
the arrangement of checks, balances, and incentives that a company needs to minimize the 
conflicting interests between insiders and external shareowners. The purpose of corporate 
governance is to “prevent one group from expropriating the cash flows and assets of one or 
more other groups” (ibid, 2005, p. 7). 
 
Monks and Minow (2004) take a structural view of corporate governance. They regard CG 
as a structure within the firm and stress the importance of accountability as well as the 
checks and balances set in place within the firm’s management. They define corporate 
governance as follows: 
 “Corporate governance is the structure that is intended to make sure that the right 
questions get asked and that checks and balances are in place to make sure that the 
answers reflect what is best for the creation of long-term, sustainable value.”  
 
                                                                                 (Monks and Minow, 2004, p. 2)   
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 They attribute the origin of corporate governance to the separation of a firm’s equity 
ownership from the firm’s management and control: 
 
“It is this separation between ownership and control that has been the focus of the 
struggles over corporate governance.”  
                                                                                 (ibid, 2004, p. 111) 
 
It can be seen from the discussion above that corporate governance can be defined in many 
different ways. Some researchers would like to define it according to how corporate 
governance is put to use. For instance, Claessens  (2006) regards the definitions as falling 
into two categories: (i) corporate governance is concerned with a set of behavioural 
patterns – the actual behaviour of firms, in terms of measures such as firm performance, 
efficiency, growth, financial structure, and treatment of shareholders and stakeholders alike; 
(ii) corporate governance is concerned with the normative framework – the rules under 
which firms are operating, with the rules originating from the legal system, judicial system, 
financial markets, and factor of production (e.g., labour and product) markets.  Claessens 
suggests that, for single country studies or within-country studies, the first type of 
definition is more logical. For comparative studies or cross-country analyses, the second 
type of definition represents a more logical choice (Claessens, 2006, p. 93). As this 
research examines the voluntary corporate governance disclosure of listed firms in Hong 
Kong, it is a single country study and will take on Claessens’s first category of corporate 
governance definition, namely, to look upon a firm’s corporate governance as a set of 
behaviour in terms of firm performance and treatment of shareholders and stakeholders. 
This study also adopts the investor-protection perspective as summarized by Rahman 
(2006):  
“Corporate governance literature has two strands: one sees corporate governance as 
guiding and improving the performance of managers (Fama and Jensen, 1983b; Hart, 
1995) and the other regards it as fulfilling an investor-protection function (Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1997).” 
(Rahman, 2006, p. 362) 
 
The second strand of corporate governance definition as described by Rahman, i.e., 
corporate governance is regarded as fulfilling an investor-protection function, did not 
receive much attention in the early days of Berle and Means (1932). However, it has 
attracted more and more awareness due to the work by Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and has 
become the centre stage of contemporary corporate governance studies since the demise of 
big corporations like Enron, WorldCom, Global Crossing and the like in the early 2000s.  
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The present study falls into this second strand of CG literature, in that it will examine 
corporate governance from the perspective of investor-protection by investigating the 
relationship between corporate governance, firm value, and dividend payout. The empirical 
evidence from this study will shed light on how investors seek assurance for enhancing 
their protection by evaluating a firm’s voluntary corporate governance disclosure under a 
strong legal protection regime.  Before moving on to the likely impact of corporate 
governance on firm value and dividend payout, the following section discusses in detail the 
origin of corporate governance and the theoretical framework for it to operate within the 
business context. 
 
 
2.3 Theoretical frameworks of corporate governance: agency theory, 
transaction cost theory, and stakeholder theory 
 
2.3.1 The information economics perspective 
 
The issue of corporate governance evolves due to the problems arising from the separation 
of ownership and control of a firm’s resources.   In a market economy, business activities 
are conducted by firms. Firms are owned by shareholders (also collectively known as the 
principal) through share ownership, but are run and controlled by managers (also 
collectively known as the agent) who are paid to manage the day-to-day business of the 
firms. Berle and Means (1932) discussed the separation of ownership and control of large, 
public, corporations in the USA. They described it as a consequence of the wide dispersion 
of share holding and the doctrine of limited liability of the firm. Due to information 
asymmetry between the principal and the agent, the agency problem arises because (a) the 
principal and the agent have different goals, and (b) the principal cannot determine if the 
agent has behaved in the best interest of the principal (see Eisenhardt, 1989).  
 
Ross (1973) explored the agency problem from the perspective of the principal: given that 
the agent may possess different (better or finer) information about the states of the firm 
than the principal, how would a principal set out to determine the agent’s fee schedule at 
an optimal level? Since perfect monitoring of the agent’s actions is difficult (though 
feasible) and will not be economically viable, Ross came to the conclusion that the solution 
to the principal’s problem will not be Pareto-efficient due to a lack of perfect information. 
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His unresolved question opened up two different approaches in conceptualising the theory 
of the firm: the agency theory of the firm and the transaction economics theory of the firm, 
which are the subjects of discussion in the following sub-sections.  
 
 
2.3.2 Agency theory of the firm 
 
Agency theory evolved from the economists’ exploration of the risk-sharing problem 
among co-operating parties (i.e., manager and the risk-bearer) who have different attitudes 
towards risk and who participate in a set of bilateral contracts that facilitates efficient 
organisation of joint inputs in team production (Alchian, 1969; Arrow, 1970; Alchian and 
Demsetz, 1972). As the manager and risk-bearer have different markets for their respective 
services, there are alternative opportunities available to each party. For the manager, there 
may exist different motivations toward performance leading to opportunistic behaviour not 
necessarily beneficial to the risk-bearer. Viewed from this perspective, both Alchian (1969) 
and Alchian & Demsetz (1972) attribute the task of disciplining the manager primarily to 
the risk-bearer. 
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) formalize the concept of agency costs when they link up the 
agency theory with the theory of property rights and the theory of finance to develop a 
theory of the ownership of the firm. They describe the relationship between the principal 
and the agent in a contractual context and define the agency costs as the sum of (a) the 
monitoring expenditures by the principal, (b) the bonding expenditures by the agent, and (c) 
the residual loss. Furthermore, they look upon a firm as a nexus of contracts among many 
factors of production; each factor of production is motivated by its self-interest. They 
maintain that, as the manager’s ownership claim falls, his incentives to search out new 
profitable ventures falls. Hence, the fraction of the equity held by the manager, besides the 
conventional classification of debt and equity, is also crucial in determining the corporate 
ownership structure. They state that, for a given level of inside equity owned by the 
manager, there exists an optimal level of debt-equity ratio that results in minimum total 
agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, p. 345).  
 
Fama (1980) postulates a model to explain why the problem of separation of a firm’s 
ownership and control can be resolved in a “set of contracts” perspective by means of a 
wage revision process.  Fama suggests that the managerial labour market can resolve any 
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potential problems with managerial incentives by pricing the expected value of the 
manager’s marginal product as the manager’s wage at the beginning of the production 
period. In short, Fama presumes that the managerial labour market is capable of 
understanding fully the weight of the wage revision process.  
 
In their theoretical paper, Grossman and Hart (1983) propose a model that analyses the 
principal-agent problem. The principal-agent problem they identify is that the principal is 
not able to monitor the agent’s actions but can only observe the outcome. They break up 
the principal’s problem into the costs and benefits accruing to the principal when the agent 
takes a particular action. They come up with 17 propositions and proofs and conclude that 
it is never optimal for the incentive scheme to be such that the principal’s and agent’s 
payoff are negatively related over the whole outcome range. They also prove that a 
decrease in the quality of the principal’s information increases the welfare loss. Also, when 
there are only two outcomes, welfare loss also increases when the agent becomes more risk 
adverse (Grossman and Hart, 1983, p. 43). 
 
Fama and Jensen (1983a) attribute the cause of agency problems to the fact that contracts 
are written and enforced at a cost. As organizations compete for survival, the form of an 
organization that survives is the one that delivers the product demanded by customers at 
the lowest price while covering costs.  Fama and Jensen (1983b) develop a theory to 
explain why the diffusion and separation of residual risk-bearing from the decision-
management has survival value in complex organizations. It is because such diffusion and 
separation allow valuable specific knowledge to be used at various points in the decision 
process where it is most relevant. It is also because the diffusion and separation help 
control the agency problems of diffuse residual claims. 
 
Eisenhardt (1989) classifies Jensen, Meckling, and Fama as the positivist stream of the 
agency theorists. She summarizes their contributions into 2 propositions:  
 
(1) When the contract between the principal and agent is outcome based, the agent is 
more likely to behave in the interest of the principal. 
 
(2) When the principal has information to verify agent behaviour, the agent is more 
likely to behave in the interests of the principal. 
 
In contrast with the neo-classical economic theory that tends to look upon a firm as an 
impersonal economic unit operating in a world of perfect markets and equilibrium, agency 
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theory focuses on ex ante incentive alignment and assumes incomplete contracts between 
the shareholders and the manager. It predicts that compensation policy will be designed to 
give the manager incentives to select and implement actions that increase shareholders’ 
wealth. The issue of governance, therefore, is “essentially a contracting problem with ex 
ante equilibration in expected utilities” (Garvey and Swan, 1994, p. 142). 
 
Some researchers, on the other hand, tend to regard the firm as an organization comprising 
people with differing views and objectives. As the firms become bigger and bigger, they 
become so complex that they substitute for the market in determining the allocation of 
resources (Solomon and Solomon, 2004, p. 21). To reduce risks and uncertainties about 
future prices and quality, the firm’s managers have incentives to internalise transactions as 
much as possible. At times, these incentives may serve the managers’ private interests 
more than are rationally warranted. 
 
Indeed, managers do not necessarily behave rationally all the time. Rather, they practise 
‘bounded rationality’ – the behaviour that is intentionally rational but only limitedly so 
(Simon, 1957) due to constraints in resources and time. This will be elaborated in the 
following sub-section by means of the transaction cost economics theory of the firm. 
 
2.3.3 Transaction cost economics theory of the firm 
 
Traditional economics assume all agents to be rational and maximizing an objective 
function (usually profit). Transaction cost economics acknowledges that agents (or 
managers) as humans have a legitimate and justifiable quest for “satisficing” rather than 
“maximizing”– they simply cannot wait for complete information to be in place before 
making a perfect decision. The extent of managers’ satisficing may therefore be contingent 
upon the circumstances which are unobservable to the firm’s capital supplier. The joint 
result of practising bounded rationality and satisficing makes managers susceptible to 
opportunism: they organise transactions in their best interests, seeking self-interest with 
guile, and having a tendency to take advantage of all available means to further their own 
privileges (Crozier, 1964 as quoted in Solomon and Solomon, 2004, p. 22).  
 
While some agency theorists acknowledge that the firm may be operating within the 
context of incomplete contracts (thus the need for mechanisms to align the interests of the 
principal and the agent), transaction cost economists argue that contracts cannot be well 
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defined ex ante. Hart (1995) points out that agency theory does not by itself provide a role 
for governance structure. It is because, by default, the optimal principal-agent contracts are 
“comprehensive in the sense that a contract specifies all parties’ obligations in all future 
states of the world, to the fullest extent” (Hart, 1995, p. 679).  In such an ideal scenario, 
there are no residual decisions and therefore agency problems alone do not provide a 
rationale for corporate governance.  However, when the initial contract has not specified 
the action to be decided in the future, governance structure will come into play.  Viewed 
from this perspective, governance structure can be seen as a mechanism for decision-
making on those issues not yet specified in the initial contract. It is a mechanism that 
allocates residual rights of control over a firm’s non-human assets. Therefore, even in a 
small, closely-held, firm where the number of contracts is relatively small, governance 
structure still remains an important issue so that all parties to the initial contract shall be 
kept well aware of their rights and obligations in future. 
 
Hart (1995) also identifies three transaction costs that are particularly important: first, the 
cost of considering all possible eventualities that may occur during the course of the 
contractual relationship and of planning how to tackle them. Second, there is a negotiation 
cost with all the contractual parties about the plan. Third, there is a cost of putting down 
the plans into writing in a manner to make these plans enforceable by a third party (e.g., a 
court) in the event of a dispute. Hence, transaction cost economists tend to view the firm as 
a governance structure, rather than a nexus of contracts which provides checks and 
balances on managerial behaviour as suggested by Jensen and Meckling (1976). 
 
In reality, all complex contracts are unavoidably incomplete (Williamson, 2002, p. 174). 
Neither can all contracts be enforced without any cost by well-informed courts 
(Williamson, 2005).  As a result, contracting parties need to adapt to unanticipated 
disturbances such as gaps, errors, and omissions in the original contracts. Efforts are 
needed to craft governance structure within the firm, to mitigate contractual breakdowns, 
and to curb opportunism during the contract implementation period. The determination of 
an appropriate governance structure for a firm will therefore help align the interests of its 
shareholders and managers. The governance structure may be so designed as to impose 
some constraints on managers. Such constraints may comprise monitoring by (1) the board 
of directors, (2) large shareholders, (3) the threat of proxy fights, (4) hostile takeovers, and 
(5) the corporate financial structure.  
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While agency theory focuses on the contractual relationship between the principal (the 
shareholders) and the agents (the directors cum managers), it also upholds that 
maximization of shareholders’ value is paramount via incentives offering to the agents. 
Transaction cost economics theory regards the firm as a governance structure and 
recognises that efficient governance requires more than realignment of incentives 
(Williamson, 1984). According to this theory, corporate governance should also cover the 
relationship between the firm and other stakeholders such as employees, creditors, 
suppliers, customers, and the community; each of which has its own different set of 
interests and values. Maximization of shareholders’ interests over other stakeholders’ 
interests is justifiable merely because shareholders are the recipients of the residual cash 
flow; that is, shareholders are the last party to be entitled to the value created by the firm, 
having taken into account the interests of other stakeholders. Williamson argues that “the 
party that bears the residual risk of the firm should reasonably expect to control the actions 
of the firm” (ibid, 1984, p. 1204). 
 
In sum, transaction cost economists share more common viewpoints than differences with 
the agency theorists about the theory of the firm, and about the need for a system of 
corporate governance to regulate the relationship between two parties of a firm – the 
principal (i.e., investors) and the agent (i.e., the manager). In contrast, the followers of 
stakeholder theory consider the relationship should be covering a much broader group of 
parties, whom may be affected by the actions of the firm. This stakeholder theory is to be 
discussed in the following sub-section. 
 
2.3.4 Stakeholder theory of the firm 
 
Stakeholder theory argues that there are other groups to whom the firm is responsible in 
addition to stockholders (Freeman and Reed, 1983). Firms should pay attention to all their 
constituencies —employees, customers, suppliers, creditors, and communities alike — 
rather than stockholders alone. The word “stakeholder”, originally coined by the Stanford 
Research Institute (SRI) in 1963, refers to “those groups without whose support the 
organization would cease to exist” (SRI, 1963; quoted in Freeman and Reed, 1983, p.89). 
The list of stakeholders originally included shareowners, employees, customers, suppliers, 
lenders, and society. Yet, such a definition is found to be too general and too over-
simplistic to serve as a means to identify strategically important social interest groups to 
the firms.  Freeman and Reed offer a narrower, operational definition of stakeholder as 
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“any identifiable group or individual on which the organization is dependent for its 
continued survival”. They quote examples of stakeholders as: employees, customer 
segments, certain suppliers, key government agencies, shareowners, certain financial 
institutions, as well as others (Freeman and Reed, 1983, p. 91).  
 
Freeman and Reed (1983) recognize the influence of stakeholders on the decision-making 
process of a firm; hence it has implications for the board of directors. They suggest 
corporate directors should develop new concepts, processes, and techniques (such as the 
stakeholder grid) to analyse the stakeholders’ strategic impact on the firm. They posit that, 
at times, “stakeholders must participate in the decision-making process” (ibid, 1983, p. 95) 
and that the board must decide “not only whether management is managing the affairs of 
the corporation but indeed, what are to count as the affairs of the corporation” (ibid, 1983, 
p. 96). The board of directors of a firm is charged with the responsibility to deal with the 
stakeholder confrontation, given so many possible combinations of voting power, 
economic power, and political power available to various interested parties in the corporate 
governance realm. Their view is extended by Freeman and Evan (1990), who suggest that 
the firm is best conceptualised as a set of multilateral contracts among stakeholders. 
However, they argue that the contractual view of the firm is probably not sufficient to 
explain completely the development of the modern corporations. Other concepts and 
theories are needed to complement and strengthen the viable contract theory.  
 
Donaldson and Preston (1995) clarify that stakeholder theory has four different aspects: the 
descriptive/empirical, instrumental, normative, and managerial aspects. The 
descriptive/empirical aspect refers to the function of the theory in describing what the 
corporation is: it is a constellation of co-operative and competitive interests possessing 
intrinsic value. It explains specific corporate characteristics and how firm managers 
actually behave.   The instrumental aspect serves to identify the connections between 
stakeholder management and the achievement of traditional corporate objectives such as 
growth and profitability. This formulation of the theory is used to generate implications 
that adherence to stakeholder principles and practices will achieve conventional corporate 
performance objectives or even better than rival approaches. It purports to describe what 
will happen if firms behave in certain ways. The normative aspect is used to interpret the 
function of the corporation, including the identification of moral or philosophical 
guidelines for the corporation’s management. An example of the normative aspect is the 
concept of corporate social responsibility which essentially states: “Do (Don’t do) this 
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because it is the right (wrong) thing to do” (Donaldson and Preston 1995, p. 72).  The 
managerial aspect recommends attitudes, structures, and practices that, taken in aggregate, 
would constitute stakeholder management. By default, stakeholder management requires 
simultaneous attention to the legitimate interests of all “appropriate” stakeholders of the 
firm. Jones (1995) summarizes these four aspects as theories that address the questions of 
(a) what happens? (b) what happens if? and (c) what should happen?, respectively. 
 
Donaldson and Preston (1995) do not agree that stakeholder theory should necessarily 
imply that all stakeholders, however they may be identified, should be equally involved in 
all processes and decisions taken by the firm. The managerial aspect would ask the 
question of “Who are the legitimate stakeholders?” For instance, potential job applicants, 
though unknown to the firm, do have a stake in being considered for a job; hence can be 
broadly classified as a particular type of stakeholders of the firm.  Should the management 
treat them equally as other stakeholders then? Donaldson and Preston point out that it is 
essential to distinguish influencers from stakeholders – some actors in the corporation (e.g., 
large investors) may be both. Some recognizable stakeholders (e.g., prospective job 
applicants) have no influence, and some influencers (e.g., the media) have no stakes at all. 
Donaldson and Preston conclude that the stakeholder theory is fundamentally normative. It 
implies that other normative theories (e.g., the “management serving the shareholders” 
theory) are morally untenable. Instead, stakeholder theory is supported by other 
prescriptive theories (such as the theory of property rights).  
 
Jensen (2002) also concurs that stakeholder theory, to the extent that firms should pay 
attention to all their constituencies that can affect the firms, is unassailable.  He regards it 
as indifferent to value maximization. He states that stakeholder theory is fundamentally 
flawed because it violates the proposition that any organization must have a single-valued 
objective as a precursor to purposeful or rational behaviour.  A firm that adopts stakeholder 
theory, according to Jensen, will be “handicapped in the competition for survival because 
stakeholder theory politicises the corporation and leaves its managers empowered to 
exercise their own preferences in spending the firm’s resources” (Jensen, 2002, p. 237).  
He proposes an enlightened value maximization approach to weld with the enlightened 
stakeholder theory so that, over the long-term, a firm can choose maximization of total 
market value as the criterion to evaluate manager’s performance. In so doing, a firm may 
justify ranking stockholders above all other constituencies such as customers, employees, 
financial backers, suppliers, regulators, and communities.  
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 Jensen (2002) hypothesises that the self-interests of managers will lead them to prefer 
stakeholder theory because it increases their power. It also means they cannot be held 
responsible for their actions. Similarly, the self-interest of special interest groups who wish 
to acquire legitimacy to enhance their influence over the use of corporate resources will 
also advocate the use of stakeholder theory. If both of them are successful, it leads to the 
normative conclusion that society will be worse off. 
 
The review of the theoretical frameworks above shows that the need for corporate 
governance within the firm is always present, regardless what theoretical framework a firm 
chooses to operate with.  In agency theory and transaction cost economics theory, 
corporate governance plays an important role in regulating the contracting parties, settling 
disputes, and ensuring that alignment of interests of both the principal and the agent is 
achieved.  Within the context of stakeholder theory of the firm, corporate governance also 
plays a decisive role in enriching the firm’s capability to sustain a long-term survival goal. 
This is achieved by addressing the concerns of various stakeholders, including the 
government regulatory bodies and minority shareholders.  Each of the theoretical 
frameworks stresses on a different aspect for the firm’s insiders to interact with the firm’s 
outsiders, but the need for mechanisms to ensure effective governance of a firm remains 
unchanged.  
 
This study adopts the most common theoretical framework of the firm – the agency theory 
framework – to examine the relationship between the insiders’ voluntary disclosure of 
corporate governance and the outsiders’ valuation of the firm. Compared with the 
transaction cost economics theory and stakeholder theory, the agency theory framework is 
able to provide a clearly defined boundary for researchers to analyse the decisions made by 
just two parties: the insiders (i.e., the agents) and the responses made by the outsiders (i.e., 
the investors). It also facilitates the study of interactions between these two parties. The 
objective is to identify as to whether a relationship exists between the causes and effects of 
actions undertaken by each party. Furthermore, unlike stakeholder theory, agency theory 
focuses on what is being carried out (i.e., a positive approach) rather than what should be 
carried out (i.e., a normative approach) by the managers of a firm. It does not impart value 
judgement into the actions of the players in the interactions of the involved parties. 
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Consequently, this study adopts the perspective from the shareholders’ rather than the 
stakeholders’ in the analysis of relationships of voluntary CG disclosure, firm valuation, 
and dividend payouts. Relative to the stakeholders’ perspective, the shareholder’s 
perspective is less complex and more manageable: it assumes shareholders are mainly 
concerned with their investment’s returns and/or its appreciation in value. Other social 
goals, such as equitable redistribution of wealth among various strata of the society, social 
justice in terms of fair competition, or sub-maximisation of resources utilization due to 
inequality in employment rights, etc. are not explored in this analysis, even though they are 
important to a firm’s long-term survival, as suggested by the stakeholder theorists. This 
study focuses on the interrelationship between a firm’s valuation, as well as its dividend 
payouts, and the firm’s voluntary disclosure of its corporate governance mechanisms. The 
following section will discuss the various types of governance mechanisms applicable to 
the firm. 
  
 
2.4. Corporate governance mechanisms 
2.4.1 Ways of classifying corporate governance mechanisms 
 
When corporate governance is defined as a set of control mechanisms to govern the 
relationship between the corporation and its shareholders, there can be different ways to 
classify the mechanisms.  Luo ((2007) classifies corporate governance mechanisms into 
three categories: (a) market-based, (b) culture-based, and (c) discipline-based.  
 
The market-based governance mechanisms comprise ownership concentration, board 
composition, market discipline, board chairmanship, board size, management remuneration, 
interlocking directorate, and inbreeding. The culture-based mechanisms include 
governance culture and corporate integrity. The discipline-based mechanisms encompass 
the executive penalty, internal auditing, conduct code, and an ethics programme. While 
Luo’s classification is useful in interpreting the corporate governance systems in an 
international business setting, in particular the relationship between the parent company 
and its subsidiaries all across the globe, the classification itself incorporates broad 
components which can be grouped under two categories: (1) internal mechanisms and (2) 
external mechanisms to the firms (Bushman and Smith, 2001; Cremers and Nair, 2005; 
Gillan, 2006).  
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Broadly speaking, internal mechanisms govern the relationship between the board of 
directors and management. The board of directors is regarded as representatives of the 
principal, and management as the agent. External mechanisms, arising from the firm’s 
need for raising capital, cover the laws, rules, and factors that influence the operations of a 
firm from the perspective of capital providers who are the shareholders and the debt-
holders vis-à-vis the capital managers. The capital providers are collectively regarded as 
the outsiders while the directors and managers (i.e., the capital managers) are collectively 
addressed as the insiders (as per Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Gillan and Starks, 2003).  
 
It must be pointed out that the distinction between internal and external mechanisms does 
not necessarily imply that each one can displace one another; nor does it imply that a firm 
is at liberty to adopt some less restrictive internal mechanisms in order to circumvent more 
severe disciplinary actions or penalties imposed by the external mechanisms. In fact, 
Cremers and Nair (2005) find empirical evidence that suggests internal and external 
mechanisms interact and work together to affect the governance in a firm. They are 
complements, rather than substitutes, in being associated with the firm’s long-term 
abnormal returns as well as its accounting measures of profitability. The following sub-
section 2.4.2 summarizes the various practices of internal mechanisms, while sub-section 
2.4.3 is going to discuss the various types of external mechanisms. 
 
2.4.2 Internal mechanisms  
 
The following practices are some internal mechanisms of corporate governance commonly 
agreed upon by extant researchers (Gillan and Starks 2000, 2003; Gompers, Ishii, and 
Metrick, 2003; Cremers and Nair, 2005; Gillan, 2006). They form the basis of a firm’s 
internal corporate governance structure. The extent to which a firm discloses these 
mechanisms becomes the focus of research in this study.  As will be discussed in Chapter 8, 
a majority of them are considered in this study as components of the disclosure score 
(CGDscore), to be used subsequently in the analytical models in this thesis. 
i) Board of Directors 
The Board of Directors is seen as “the apex of the internal control system”. It is vested 
with the power to “hire, fire, and compensate the CEO, and to provide high-level counsel” 
(Jensen, 1993, p.862). Empirical research studies have documented that board size, board 
composition, and CEO/Chairman duality have decisive effects on the monitoring of a 
firm’s manager activities as reflected in the firm’s performance. While board size relates to 
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the group dynamics and efficiency in reaching consensus among members of the board, 
board composition focuses on the board independence from the influence of the 
CEO/Chairman, and CEO/Chairman duality is concerned with the issue of concentration 
of power in one person’s hands (Booth, Cornett and Tehranian, 2002):  
 
a) Board size  
Jensen (1993) cautioned that boards with 8 people or more are less likely to function 
effectively and are easier for the CEO to control. His postulation is supported by empirical 
studies showing that: 
i. For the large firms, the smaller the board size is, the higher is the firm valuation as 
expressed by Tobin’s q1  (Yermack, 1996). Firms with small boards are more 
effective in monitoring and efficient in decision-making. They have higher market 
values, stronger financial ratios, and greater CEO incentive scheme with higher 
threat of dismissal of the CEO than firms with larger boards. 
ii. For the small firms, the larger the board size is, the lower is the profitability. 
Eisenberg, Sundgren and Wells (1998) find a board-size effect in 900 small Finnish 
firms and document a negative correlation between firms’ board size and firms’ 
profitability, as measured by industry-adjusted return on assets. The factors that 
influence the board size of small firms differ from those of large firms. Small firms 
are usually tightly held; they tend to have less agency problems than large firms. 
Although Eisenberg, Sundgren and Wells (1998) do not find an ideal board size, 
they posit that the ideal board size varies with firm size.  
 
In conclusion, a larger board tends to have increased problems of communication and 
coordination, and decreased ability to control management. A board with more than seven 
or eight members is less likely to function effectively and is susceptible to CEO’s inverse 
control (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992). Therefore, board size does matter in the monitoring and 
control of management (Eisenberg, Sundgren and Wells, 1998). Board size is 
quantitatively measurable. In this study, board size is classified as a firm’s corporate 
governance practice variable.  It will be employed as one of the explanatory variables in 
the structural models to explain a firm’s valuation as well as its level of voluntary 
corporate governance disclosure (to be discussed in Chapter 7). 
                                                 
1 Simply stated, Tobin’s q is a measure of a firm’s performance. It provides an estimate of a firm’s market 
value that consists of a firm’s tangible and intangible assets (e.g., goodwill, management quality, monopoly 
power, and growth opportunities) scaled by a firm’s replacement cost (Perfect and Wiles, 1994). Chapter 8 
has more discussion on the definition of Tobin’s q and its usage as a proxy for a firm’s market valuation of 
the firm’s assets. 
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 b) Board composition/ direct board monitoring
Fama and Jensen (1983b) argue that boards dominated by a greater number of outside 
directors (i.e., non-executive directors) vs. inside directors (i.e., executive directors) would 
be in a better position to monitor and control managers than would boards dominated by 
insiders because outsiders have a reputation to protect as effective, independent decision-
makers. Weisbach (1988) provides empirical support that outsider-dominated boards 
behave differently from insider-dominated boards in their decisions to remove top 
management. Firms with outsider-dominated boards are significantly more likely to fire the 
CEO on the basis of poor performance such as low earnings or stock returns. Mayers, 
Shivdasani and Smith (1997) also find empirical evidence that companies employing more 
outside directors have lower costs, particularly salary expenditures, even in a highly 
regulated industry such as the insurance industry. 
 
Jensen (1993) suggests that the only insider member sitting on the board should be the 
CEO. This is so because the possibility for animosity and retribution from the CEO is too 
great that it is almost impossible for anyone who reports directly to the CEO to engage 
openly, and critically, in the evaluation and monitoring of the CEO at the board meetings. 
However, the board members should seek opportunities regularly to meet with the senior 
executives below the CEO for two purposes: (i) to expand their knowledge of the company 
and CEO succession candidates; and (ii) to enhance communication with the top-level 
executives about the board thinking and board process. In this study, the proportion of the 
outside directors (i.e., independent non-executive directors – INEDs) of the total board is 
considered as another corporate governance practice variable. It will enter the structural 
models as one of the explanatory variables to test for the value relevance of voluntary CG 
disclosure. It will also be used as an explanatory variable to test for a firm’s level of 
voluntary CG disclosure (to be discussed in Chapter 7). 
 
c) Chairman of the board and CEO duality
Fama and Jensen (1983a) propose to control the agency problems by separating the 
ratification and monitoring of decisions (i.e., the decision control function) from initiation 
and implementation (i.e., the decision management function). The function of the chairman 
is to run board meetings and oversee the process of hiring, firing, evaluating, and 
compensating the CEO (Jensen, 1993). When the same person takes up the dual roles, 
there will be conflicts of interest and the board cannot objectively perform its key functions 
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in evaluating the management’s performance. Without an independent Chairman sitting on 
the board, it would be “extremely difficult for the board to respond early to failure in its 
top management team” (Jensen, 1993, p. 867). Therefore, for a board to be effective, the 
role of the chairman and CEO should be separate. 
 
In contrast, Brickley, Coles, and Jarrell (1997) argue that separating the Chairman and 
CEO positions may incur costs in monitoring the Chairman (the “Who monitors the 
monitor?” argument). They document empirical findings that firms with Chairman/CEO 
duality perform no worse than those that have separate roles. Their empirical study shows 
that the costs of separation of the dual roles are larger than the benefits for most large firms.  
 
The argument offered by Brickley et al is considerably weakened by the East Asian 
economic crisis (1997), the fall of Enron (2001), and the collapse of WorldCom (2002) 
during which investors incurred colossal financial losses and many market economies were 
devastated, due to the weak corporate governance caused by the failing boards of directors 
in losing control over top management’s reckless activities. Assuming the split between the 
roles provides a legitimate, bona fide, check-and-balances on the over-empowering CEO, 
the cost of separation of Chairman/CEO duality can be expected to be compensated by the 
potential benefits to the investors at large.  
 
In summary, past research shows that the board of directors may not perform its check-
and-balance role to a desirable standard as often as it should. Lipton and Lorsch (1992) and 
Jensen (1993) have criticized large boards’ performance due to the problems of poor 
communication and coordination in the decision-making process. Yermack (1996) finds 
empirical evidence to support an inverse relationship between board size and firm value. 
Bebchuk and Fried (2003) show that the board of directors is a weak monitoring 
instrument when the board is composed of members who “generally wish to be re-
appointed to the board” (because a directorship is likely to provide prestige as well as 
valuable business and social connections) (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003, p. 73). It is often the 
case that the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) dominates the board by appointing and re-
nominating directors to the board. Hence, directors (including outside directors) have an 
incentive to favour the CEO in order to “stay in management’s good graces, so that they 
can be re-elected and continue to collect their fees” (Hart, 1995, p. 682). In this research, 
duality of Chairman and CEO of the sample firms is observed and recorded by a dummy 
variable SplitRole whereby ‘1’ denotes the role of the Chairman is split from the CEO’s 
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for the firm, and ‘0’ denotes duality. SplitRole is used as one of the CG practices variables 
in the structural models (to be discussed in Chapter 7). 
 
ii) Ownership structure /ownership concentration  
Agency theory prescribes that ownership structure and ownership concentration have an 
impact on a firm’s corporate governance. Jensen and Meckling (1976) hypothesize that as 
managers increase their stock ownership of the firm, their interests become more and more 
aligned with those of the outsiders, i.e., the minority shareholders. On the other hand, the 
shareholding in both equity ownership and voting rights by the outsiders provides a strong 
mechanism of corporate governance as it shapes managerial behaviour (Agrawal and 
Mandelker, 1987) and determines the capital structure of the firm (Harris and Raviv, 1991).  
 
Concentration of ownership can range from a substantial minority ownership (e.g., 10% or 
20%) by one or several investors, to an outright control with 50%+ ownership by the same 
investor(s). In a one-share-one-vote system, control rights can be concentrated in a few 
investors when the investors collectively own a large cash flow stake. Under such a 
scenario, it is easier for the investors to take concerted action (e.g., if some preferential 
voting rights are vested in some preferential share-holders) than when the control rights are 
split among many of them. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that the concentration of 
ownership through large share holdings is a “nearly universal method of control that helps 
investors to get their money back” (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, p.774). 
  
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) point out that large minority shareholders need to make 
alliances with other investors to exercise control over a firm. Otherwise, the power of the 
managers to interfere in these alliance formations is greatly enhanced. Hence, the courts 
will have a greater burden to protect large minority shareholder rights. It follows that 
“large minority share holdings may be effective [in corporate governance] only in 
countries with relatively sophisticated legal systems, whereas countries where courts are 
really weak are more likely to have outright majority ownership” (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1997, p.755). 
 
It is therefore important to seek evidence, if any, for countries where the legal protection 
system is strong and yet there is a high concentration of family/insider ownership and a 
high possibility of expropriation of minority shareholders’ wealth. In this scenario, there 
can be an extreme case such that the outsiders, having a minority voting right, are exposed 
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to the potential expropriation of their wealth by the majority shareholder. Under such 
circumstances, the minority shareholders can form an alliance and seek protection under 
the legal and regulatory regime to safeguard their interests against the majority shareholder. 
However, their efforts in exercising effective control over the firm may be severely 
curtailed because the majority shareholder can veto against any resolutions not to his/her 
liking by exercising the majority shareholder’s rights. Suspicion of being unfairly treated 
by the insiders, therefore, may culminate and be reflected on the market valuation of the 
firm. On the other hand, if the firm installs proper corporate governance mechanisms and 
makes voluntary disclosure to the market, it may help to clear the doubts of the minority 
shareholders whose confidence in the security of their investments in the firm may increase. 
As a result, the market valuation of a firm may stay at a higher level. This study will 
examine whether ownership concentration and the voluntary disclosure of a firm’s 
corporate governance practices have any effect on the valuation of listed firms in Hong 
Kong that have a high family/insider ownership.  
 
iii) Institutional block-holders  
Cremers and Nair (2005) argue that the number of large block-holders, institutional 
stockowners (i.e., mutual funds, pension, funds, trust funds, etc.), and the proportion of 
shares they own (e.g., larger than 5%) tend to make these institutional investors active 
shareholders. These institutional investors acquire decisive influence not only in domestic 
financial markets but also across a country’s borders. By owning a significant portion of 
the capital of many firms (usually large-sized ones), these institutional investors are active 
in influencing the strategic policies of the firms if not the firms’ management practices. 
Jeffers (2005) identifies three factors why institutional investors develop their accumulated 
masses of financial assets: 
a. World deregulation of financial markets help eliminate obstacles to the 
financial capital circulation; 
 
b. Main industrialized countries budget deficits have led to more issuing of public 
bonds; and the governments’ increased resort to the financial markets for 
finance restructuring and expansion; 
 
c. The financial assets in the mid 1990s have experienced steady appreciation in 
value over a long-term period. Coupled with lower rates of taxation by 
competing financial markets, many employees have increased their savings 
plans in the retirement pensions which in turn stimulate further investment in 
the financial assets. 
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In short, there has been a clear trend for the middle class households to shift their savings 
in the direction of the stock market since the late 1990s.  Fund managers are now vested 
with more assets and responsibilities to generate decent returns on their investments to the 
pension holders, causing the rise of ‘shareholder activism’ and forming allies to coordinate 
shareholder actions in the late 1990s (Gillan and Starks, 2000; Monks and Minow, 2004). 
Gillan and Starks (2000) document empirical evidence that proposals sponsored by 
‘gadflys’ (active individual investors) garner few votes while proposals sponsored by 
institutional shareholders receive significantly more votes by the shareholders. They 
conclude that institutional investors and coordinated block-holders appear to be applying 
pressure to managers. Such actions appear to have some small but measurable negative 
impact on the firm’s stock prices (Gillan and Starks, 2000, p. 303). 
 
In this study, institutional block-holders’ ownership is not analysed for the sampled firms 
because of two reasons. First, the data on institutional block-holders’ ownership are not 
consistently disclosed in the annual reports. There is no obligation for a firm to disclose in 
its annual report if the block-holder’s shareholding does not exceed 10% (HKEx Listing 
Rules). Even if a firm knows there is an institutional block-holder as its shareholder, it can 
exercise discretion not to disclose the block-holder’s identity so long as the block-holder’s 
shareholding is below the 10% threshold. Second, a block-holder may choose not to let it 
be known its level of stock-holding to the firm’s management for various reasons 
(provided its equity holding is below 10%). Some institutional investors may invest in a 
firm for short-term (e.g., for window-dressing purposes) rather than on a long-term 
strategic basis. They may not like the idea that their shareholding in a specific investee 
firm to be disclosed to the public/competitors. Hence, a non-disclosing investee firm does 
not necessarily imply there is no institutional ownership. Conversely, a disclosing firm 
does not necessarily guarantee that the institutional investors have been long-term 
investors. Consequently, the information about the level of institutional ownership of firms 
is not complete in the sample firms’ annual reports. Hence, the presence of institutional 
investors, and the level of their ownership if they are present, is not employed as a variable 
in this empirical study.2
                                                 
2 The lack of comprehensive data on long-term institutional ownership of Hong Kong firms is one limitation 
of this empirical study. Recent investor activism movement, however, suggests institutional investors can be 
a mediator between the general shareholders and management, hence should play a significant monitoring 
role in the corporate governance of a firm (Ferreira and Matos, 2008). 
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iv) Bank ownership of equity/ bank’s influence 
Banks play an important monitoring role in a firm’s corporate governance mechanism in 
the capacity of a creditor and an investor. By making loans to a firm, banks put themselves 
in a strong position to monitor the firm’s performance in their decision to renew the loans. 
It is therefore not unusual for a bank to influence a firm’s major decisions.  In some 
countries (e.g. Germany and Japan), banks may end up holding equity as well as debt of 
the firms they invest in. Like any other large shareholders, banks that have large stakes in 
the firm may want to see the returns on their loans materialized (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1997).   
       
In Germany where the stock market is relatively small, the link between cash-flow rights 
and control rights is less paramount and is somewhat uncoupled. Gorton and Schmid (2000) 
find that banks in Germany are empowered by legislation to vote on significant blocks of 
shares, sit on boards of directors, play dominant roles in lending decisions, and operate in a 
legal environment favourable to lenders. Banks can legally face conflicts of interest over 
some ranges of bank equity holdings, proxy-voting and other non-bank shareholdings. 
Gorton and Schmid observe that German banks are large, active, informed investors that 
can exercise substantial influence over the firm’s operation and are able to effect 
management and strategic changes of the firm when circumstances warrant (ibid, 2000, p. 
30). They find evidence that the bank’s long term control rights derived from concentrated 
equity ownership significantly improve firm performance beyond what non-bank 
blockholders can achieve.  In fact, in Germany the banks are so powerful that they can 
undermine shareholders’ equity control rights. However, in Gorton and Schmid’s empirical 
study, they do not find evidence that proxy voting is used at all by banks. 
 
In Japan, Kaplan and Minton (1994) find evidence that banks as well as inter-corporate 
relationships play a very important monitoring and disciplinary role in corporate 
governance. CEOs’ turnover rate substantially increases in the year when banks appoint 
outside directors to sit on the corporation’s board of directors. Kang and Shivdasani (1995) 
also find evidence that firms in Japan with ties to a main bank are more likely to remove 
top executives for poor earnings performance than are firms without a main bank. Banks 
and the inter-corporate relationships are so strong that they can substitute other market-
based control mechanisms such as hostile takeovers, proxy fights, and public contests for 
corporate control.  
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In Hong Kong (from where the sample for this study is drawn), banks normally will not be 
interested in holding large stakes in other business corporations over a prolonged period of 
time. Unlike Germany and Japan, banks in Hong Kong need approval from the regulatory 
body (i.e., the Hong Kong Monetary Authority – HKMA) to hold significant stake-
holdings in other business entities that may in aggregate exceed 5% of the bank’s capital 
base. The Hong Kong Banking Ordinance (Cap. 155) stipulates that: 
 
 “A bank shall be subject to a condition that it shall not acquire all or part of the 
share capital of a company to a value of 5% or more of the capital base of the 
institution (i.e., the bank itself) at the time of the acquisition unless the approval of 
the Monetary Authority (HKMA) has been given to the proposed acquisition of 
such share capital.”      (Cap. 155, Sect. 87A).  
 
Furthermore, the HKMA may revoke its approval anytime as it thinks fit. As such, banks 
in Hong Kong avoid holding a firm’s equity for an unnecessarily long period of time. 
Therefore, the monitoring role of banks in a borrowing firm’s corporate governance in 
Hong Kong is only confined to ensuring the loans are not abused and that the loan-
repayment capability of the firm is well kept in place. 
 
As the incidence of bank ownership of Hong Kong firms is few and far between, it is not 
considered as an explanatory variable in this empirical study.  However, a firm’s leverage 
(defined as total debt over total assets), which is a firm-specific characteristic, is included 
in the analytical models of this study as a control variable to explain the value relevance of 
the voluntary CG disclosure (as will be discussed in chapter 7). 
v) Corporate by-laws and charters 
Corporate by-laws and charters specify the rights and duties of various members of the 
firm. These rights may range from the compensation packages for senior management to 
the rights of the minority shareholders. For example, there may be specific requirements 
governing: the formation of a staggered (or classified) board for the directors; the 
cumulative voting rights for the shareholders; the special (or extraordinary general) 
meeting rights for the minority shareholders; the procedures to conduct secret ballot for 
proxy fights; the provisions for “poison pills” for stock dilution in case there is a takeover; 
and the “golden parachutes” for compensating key personnel after a change in control, etc. 
(Gompers, Ishii and Metrick, 2003; Cremers and Nair, 2005).  
 
The presence of these corporate by-laws, the way they are written in the company charters, 
and how they are applied as and when occasions arise to demand their implementation, can 
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be expected to have an impact on investor confidence in the effectiveness of the firm’s 
corporate governance system. Such a governance system, within an individual company 
and across an economy as a whole, “helps to provide a degree of confidence that is 
necessary for the proper functioning of a market economy” (OECD, Principles of 
Corporate Governance, 2004, p. 11). 
 
Due to the unavailability of data on individual firm’s corporate by-laws and charters 
(unless the researcher is a shareholder of each sample firm), the corporate by-laws are not 
employed as an explanatory variable in this study. Nevertheless, by-laws are a significant 
mechanism that an investor can rely upon as they are often the first line of defence for 
protection from a majority shareholder’s un-equitable treatments or from the insiders’ 
expropriation.  
 
vi) Audit Committee 
The International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) defines the audit 
committee as a governance body or bodies within an entity’s corporate governance 
structure overseeing an external auditor’s independence. The audit committee that is “in 
both appearance and fact independent of management of the entity being audited and acts 
in the interests of investors should oversee both the process of selection and appointment 
of the external auditor and the conduct of the audit” (IOSCO, 2002, p.6). Although the 
external auditor is formally accountable, and commonly reports, to the shareholders, in 
practice the auditor seldom has a direct relationship with them. Therefore, the audit 
committee should serve as a proxy for the shareholders. 
 
To enhance the corporate governance standard of firms in Hong Kong, the HKEx has 
strongly recommended all listed firms in Hong Kong to set up audit committees. The 
HKEx also explicitly suggests the composition of the audit committee – the minimum 
number of members sitting on the committee as well as the qualifications of some of the 
committee members – based on the recommendations of the Hong Kong Society of 
Accountants (HKSA).3  The presence of an audit committee, therefore, is one of the 
components of the corporate governance disclosure index (CGDscore) to be constructed 
for the purpose of this study.  
                                                 
3 More discussion on the background and development of corporate governance practices for Hong Kong 
firms will be presented in chapter 5. 
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vii) Managerial compensation and incentive plans 
Agency theory postulates that agency problems can be ameliorated by manager incentives 
alignment. It implies that mechanisms such as compensation policy, bonus scheme, 
provision of perquisites and the like can be so designed as to provide the managers with 
value-increasing incentives. These mechanisms may include: salary revisions, outstanding 
stock options, stock ownership, and performance-related bonuses (or dismissal, if targets 
are not met).  
 
Consistent with the previous discussion on ownership structure and ownership 
concentration in sub-section 2.4.2 of this chapter, Ang, Cole, and Lin (2000) find empirical 
evidence from small firms that agency costs do increase as the manager’s equity ownership 
declines. They use two proxies for agency costs: the ratio of operating expenses to annual 
sales, and the ratio of annual sales to total assets. They compare the small firms managed 
by the owners with those managed by an outsider. Their findings support the implications 
of agency theory in that agency costs are significantly higher when an outsider rather than 
an insider manages the firm.  Their research, however, does not consider the entrenchment 
problem of the insiders. 
 
Jensen and Murphy (1990) do not find empirical evidence in support of a strong pay-for-
performance incentive for the chief executive officers (CEOs) based on a Forbes survey of 
2,213 CEOs from 1974 to 1986. Their empirical results show that bonuses were not highly 
sensitive to performances (as measured by changes in market value of the firm’s equity, 
accounting earnings, or sales). The average salary plus bonus for the top 25% CEOs, in 
1986 constant dollars, actually fell in the period 1974-86 when compared with the same in 
the period 1934-1938. Jensen and Murphy hypothesize that, in their sample cases, CEO 
compensation is often decided by the compensation committee comprising some outsiders 
who may not be perfect agents for the shareholders. They conclude that political and 
organizational forces (e.g., politics, regulations, media criticism, and public ignorance) 
operating both in the public sector and inside the firms are in play; and these forces limit 
large executive payoffs to exceptional performance. 
 
In Hong Kong, the HKEx encourages the listed firms to establish a remuneration 
committee to determine the firm’s policy and structure for all remuneration of directors 
and senior management. It requires a formal and transparent procedure for setting 
remuneration policy and specifies that a majority of the members of the remuneration 
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committee should be INEDs (Appendix 14, Listing Rules, HKEx, 2005, para. B.1). The 
remuneration committee is regarded as a component of a firm’s corporate governance 
mechanism. In this study, the existence of a remuneration committee is captured by the CG 
disclosure score CGDscore by adding ‘1’ to the score if it is disclosed in the firm’s annual 
report, and ‘0’ if it is not disclosed. More scores will be added if the composition of the 
remuneration committee is disclosed (as will be discussed in Chapter 7). The CGDscore, 
with other control variables, will then be used in the analytical models to test for its market 
relevance. 
 
It should be pointed out that sometimes the independent non-executive directors (INEDs), 
or minority outside directors, may not be effective in monitoring a dominant CEO because 
the latter can be powerful and influential in their own appointment as outside directors. 
Core, Holthausen & Larcker (1999) find empirical evidence that the CEO compensation is 
an increasing function of the outside directors as a percentage of the board who are 
appointed by the CEO. Moreover, the CEO compensation is a decreasing function of the 
CEO’s equity ownership. This finding is supported by Cyert, Kang & Kumar (2002) who 
find empirical evidence that the CEO compensation is strongly and negatively related to 
the largest external shareholder’s equity ownership as well as to that of the board of 
directors. In other words, firms with weaker governance structures may pay their CEOs 
more. Due to data availability, this study controls for the presence of the remuneration 
committee amongst the sample firms, but does not control for the level of the CEO 
compensation of each firm per se in the analyses of the value relevance of voluntary CG 
disclosure.  
 
To conclude, internal corporate governance mechanisms help clarify, mitigate, and 
adjudicate the risk-sharing relationship between the investors and managers. Firms can 
endogenously decide on the extent of these mechanisms and the use of governance 
provisions thereof.  Danielson and Karpoff (1998) study 513 U.S. firms in the Standard & 
Poor 500 from 1984 to 1989. On one hand, they find that the uses of governance 
mechanisms are mutually independent for some provisions (e.g., poison pills). On the other 
hand, they find some provisions are used in conjunction with others (e.g., most anti-
takeover charter amendments such as staggered board, super-majority provisions, and 
shareholder meeting requirements). In other words, the uses of some provisions of 
mechanisms are correlated and are not independent, but they have a collective impact on a 
firm’s overall corporate governance. The following sub-section 2.4.3 will discuss the 
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external mechanisms, which may also have significant impact on a firm’s corporate 
governance and the level of protection offered at large to the investors.  
 
2.4.3 External mechanisms  
 
This sub-section summarizes the various types of external corporate governance 
mechanisms as discussed by previous CG studies. External corporate governance 
mechanisms generally refer to those macro-economic and market-level factors such as 
market competition, government bodies, legal institutions, as well as other mechanisms 
that are not embedded inside the firm. Conventional theorists of the firm often consider 
these external mechanisms as powerful deterrents to gauge against corporate managers’ 
endeavours to seek self-interests (Manne, 1965; Grossman and Hart, 1980; Jensen and 
Ruback, 1983; Ikenberry and Lakonishok 1993).  Legal theorists of the firm, however, put 
emphasises on the legal framework and the enforcement of the law in providing investor 
protection to the financiers and the minority shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; 
LLSV, 1997, 2000a, 2002; Shleifer and Wolfenzon, 2002). These external CG mechanisms 
are also regarded as effective in resolving agency problems on a market-wide level. 
However, as the research objectives of this study are mainly concerned with the 
determinants of firm-level CG and their value relevance within the same market (i.e., Hong 
Kong), the external CG mechanisms are assumed to be affecting indiscriminately all 
sample firms within the market all the same. As such, this study concentrates on the 
voluntary disclosure of a firm’s internal CG mechanisms but does not explicitly control for 
the external mechanisms, which comprise the following: 
 
i) Market for corporate control  
The market for corporate control refers to the competitive forces and actions of replacing 
incompetent CEOs and/or other board members by means of takeovers (Manne, 1965; 
Jensen and Ruback, 1983). It gives shareholders both power and protection commensurate 
with their interest in corporate affairs. It may offer the following advantages: (i) a 
lessening of wasteful bankruptcy proceedings; (ii) more efficient management of 
corporations; (iii) the protection of non-controlling corporate investors; (iv) increased 
mobility of capital; and (v) a more efficient allocation of resources. In addition to the use 
of contracts in monitoring the managers in agency theory, some researchers point out that 
the market for corporate control (i.e., the takeover mechanism within the stock market) can 
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be a powerful means of disciplining a firm’s management. Manne (1965) in his seminal 
work states that: 
 
 “(T)he control of corporations may constitute a valuable asset; that this asset exists 
independent of any interest in either economies of scale or monopoly profits; that 
an active market for corporate control exists; and that a great many mergers are 
probably the result of the successful workings of this special market.”   
(Manne, 1965, p. 112) 
 
Manne identifies three basic techniques in the takeover mechanism of corporate control: (i) 
the proxy fight; (ii) the direct purchase of shares; and (iii) the merger. He maintains that 
apart from the stock market, there is no objective standard of managerial efficiency. Only 
the take-over scheme provides some assurance of competitive efficiency among corporate 
managers. Of these three devices for corporate takeovers, he concludes that mergers would 
be the most efficient. 
 
Jensen and Ruback (1983) view the market for corporate control as a market in which 
alternative managerial teams compete for the rights to manage corporate resources. The 
takeover market complements the managerial labour markets, both internal and external, 
and is therefore vital in the relationship between management teams and stockholders. 
Arbitrageurs and takeover specialists act as intermediaries in this market, facilitating 
transactions and valuation of mergers and acquisitions, tender offers, and proxy contests 
among competing management teams. The competition for the rights to manage resources 
thus helps reduce the divergence of maximization of shareholder wealth from the 
manager’s pursuit of self-interests.   
 
As pointed out in the beginning of this sub-section and like other market-wide factors that 
affect all firms operating within the same economy, this market for corporate control – 
though a powerful external CG mechanism – will not be included as a variable in this study. 
It is discussed in this section in order to illustrate that it may also impact on individual 
firm’s desirable level of voluntary CG disclosure, albeit on a market-wide basis. 
 
ii) Proxy fight 
Proxy fight/contest is a device to influence the firm’s management whereby individually 
tiny votes are collected from a vast number of shareholders (Mikami, 1999). In a proxy 
contest, shareholders are asked to give their proxies to either the incumbent or dissident 
management team to cast their votes on their behalf.  Through their voting right, 
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shareholders may exercise the control authority embedded in their equity claims (Ikenberry 
and Lakonishok 1993).  
 
Proxy fight is generally regarded as an expensive means for a dissident outsider to 
discipline incumbent management. Manne (1965) states that proxy fights are ‘the most 
expensive, the most uncertain, and the least used of the various techniques’ in the takeover 
devices (Manne, 1965, p. 114).  Outside dissidents often find it costly and burdensome to 
launch a proxy fight unless there is a genuinely strong dissatisfaction among shareholders 
about the incumbent management’s performance. Alchian and Demsetz (1972, p. 97) state 
that proxy contests enhance the probability of decisive action when the current 
stockholders or any outsiders believe that ‘management is not doing a good job with the 
corporation’. 
 
Dissatisfaction alone may not trigger off dissidents to stage a proxy fight. A free-rider 
problem is also present (Hart, 1995). Share price tends to rise when an outsider announces 
a proxy fight. By retaining their share to themselves or purchasing even more shares, other 
outsiders benefit from the free-riding. They may vote for the outsider who seeks control 
and wait for the sharing in the capital appreciation. As a result of the rise of share price, the 
shareholder wealth of the target firm usually increases at the announcement of proxy fights 
(Dodd and Warner, 1983; DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 1989). 
 
Another reason that proxy fight in infrequently used to exert control over management is 
because the small shareholders often regard their vote is unlikely to make a difference and 
have little incentive to decide whom to vote for. Moreover, a small investor may continue 
to vote for the current management because “the devil you know is better than the devil 
you don’t” (Hart, 1995, p. 683).   
 
Of the two devices used to influence management, Pound (1988) reports that in the period 
1981-1984, there were over 250 tender offers4 for publicly held U.S. firms, but only about 
100 proxy contests of which less than 60 were for control.  His cross-sectional tests 
provide support that proxy contests have systematic incentive problems that make 
                                                 
4 ‘Tender offers’ take place in a takeover battle over the control of a firm. The shareholders are invited to sell 
their stocks (referred to as a tender offer) to either the incumbent or dissident management team at an 
announced price. The management team that collects a sum of votes which exceeds a pre-determined level 
(usually 50% of the total votes) gains control rights over the firm. The major difference between the two 
devices – proxy contests and tender offers – is that tender offers are made through a financial market while 
proxy contests do not make use of it (Mikami, 1999, p.354) 
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dissidents harder to gain victory. He documents 3 types of inefficiency of proxy contests:  
(i) inefficiency in soliciting votes by the outsiders relative to the managers (insiders);       
(ii) large block-holders are more likely to support management than dissidents in proxy 
fights; and (iii) there is an adverse selection problem in proxy initiatives – dissidents with 
credible cases must spend resources to distinguish themselves from ‘crank’ insurgents. His 
views are echoed by Ikenberry and Lakonishok (1993), who carry out an empirical study 
on proxy fights in 97 U.S. firms over a period from 1968-1988.  They find that contest 
target firms exhibit significantly negative abnormal returns and deteriorating operating 
performance prior to the start of a proxy fight.  
 
The empirical findings discussed above have illustrated the difficulty faced by the 
dissidents to constrain a firm’ management by means of proxy fights. Proxy fights rarely 
happen when a predominantly shareholder owns more than 50% of the voting rights (but 
not necessarily 50% cash-flow rights). Similarly, under the circumstances when members 
of the same family own more than 50% voting rights, any dissident outsider would find it 
very difficult to launch a proxy fight to gain control of the management (unless there is a 
rift among the family members). In the case of Hong Kong firms where family ownership 
prevails, proxy fights will not be an effective external governance mechanism for the 
dissident minority investors because the majority shareholder, who is usually an individual 
or comprises members of the same family, can block the proxy contest by means of his/her 
majority votes derived from the shareholding.  
 
iii) Product market competition 
The neo-classical economists hold that the conventional view of ‘profit maximization’ 
does not make any sense wherever there is incomplete information and uncertainty. It is 
because, under the condition of uncertainty, each action that may be chosen is identified 
with a distribution of potential outcomes; and that the intention to maximize is not a 
meaningful criterion for that action (Tintner, 1941; Alchian, 1950). Rather, they uphold the 
approach of impersonal, market competition, forces where success is based on results, not 
motivation.  
 
This competitive-oriented approach embodies the principles of biological evolution and 
natural selection by interpreting the economic system as “an adoptive mechanism which 
chooses among exploratory actions generated by the adaptive pursuit of success or profits” 
(Alchian, 1950, p. 211). Market competition, pressure for profitability, and survival 
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conditions (e.g., individual adapting via imitation and trial and error) will push all 
participants to an optimal situation as a result of adaptation or adoption of actions in 
response to changes in the market environment. Moreover, the survival techniques such as 
cut-loss, outsourcing, and downsizing will guide all firms’ actions in reaching the optimum 
size, one that “meets any and all problems the entrepreneur actually faces” (Stigler, 1958, p. 
56). 
 
Hart (1983) formalises a theoretical model that shows competition in the product market 
reduces managerial slack under the polar cases of perfect competition and monopoly in the 
product market.  Nevertheless, his model does not explain how managers are disciplined in 
oligopolistic or monopolistic competitive environments. Moreover, product market 
competition is not the only source of discipline for managers; competition in the capital 
market has also an important role to play in limiting managerial slack via the take-over bid 
mechanism (Grossman and Hart, 1980). 
 
Scharfstein (1988), however, contrasts with Hart’s view. Market competition can 
exacerbate incentive problems depending on whether the firm owner is able to observe 
productivity (the entrepreneurial firm) or not (the managerial firm). In the latter case, the 
manager has self interests to under-report his productivity so as to satisfy a lower profit 
target set by the owner. Therefore, an incentive scheme must be topped up to induce the 
manager to reveal his private information about his productivity. When the manager is 
highly responsive to monetary incentives, a proliferation of managerial firms (i.e., more 
competition) may actually lead to more managerial slack. 
 
Hermalin (1992) proposes an analytical model that identifies four effects of competition on 
manager’s behaviour: (i) income effect due to reduced profits in a keener competition 
environment, (ii) risk-adjustment effect if profit risks vary with intensity of competition, 
(iii) change in the relative value of actions effect, and (iv) a change in the information 
structure effect due to more rival firms. There is no definitive theoretical relationship 
between the competition level and manager’s behaviour.  However, if agency goods (e.g., 
shirking, empire-building, perquisites) are to be construed as normal goods, then the 
income effect will push the manager to choose harder actions (i.e., will work harder and 
consume fewer agency goods) as competition increases. 
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While the relationship between product market competition and managerial incentives 
remain ambiguous, there are empirical studies confirming that more competition can lead 
to productivity growth. Nickell, Nicolitsas and Dryden (1997) investigate 580 UK 
manufacturing firms from 1982 to 1994. They identify 3 external factors in generating 
improved productivity: (i) product market competition, (ii) financial market pressure, and 
(iii) shareholder control. Nevertheless, they are unable to disentangle the reverse causality 
and the stability over time problems in their sample. For instance, keener product market 
competition can lead to improved productivity of individual firms, but it may as well be the 
result of higher output by all firms in the market.  Januszewski, Koke and Winter (2002) 
study a panel of 500 German manufacturing firms from 1986 to 1994 and find evidence 
that product market competition has a positive impact on productivity growth. Their study 
also reveals that the disciplining effect of product market competition is enhanced by 
tighter control structures. Karuna (2007) examines data from 1,579 firms over the period 
1992-2003 and finds evidence that when industry competition (as measured in terms of 
product substitutability and market size) is stronger, firms will provide their managers with 
stronger incentives. There is also empirical evidence that managerial incentive schemes are 
affected by industry characteristics. 
 
Generally speaking, product market competition, like evolution, takes time to impact on 
disciplining a firm’s management and the impact is unclear. Incompetent managers may 
also deploy various tactics (e.g. income smoothing and earnings management, hostile 
acquisitions, strategic divestments) to cover up their own failings, buy time to protect their 
entrenched positions within the firm, or shirk responsibilities to a third party. Product 
market competition may not function at all as an external corporate governance mechanism 
if the industry is oligopoly or monopolistic competition.  In conclusion, product market 
competition does not provide either a timely or a cost-effective mechanism in monitoring 
agents. It will be even less so if the agents are themselves predominant shareholders of the 
firm. Like other external mechanisms, product market competition is assumed to be present 
for all sample firms in this single-country study and is therefore not considered as an 
explanatory variable in this study. 
 
iv) External managerial labour market 
Closely related to product market competition is the external managerial labour market, 
which is often accepted as one of the monitoring means of managers. Managers have a 
need to safeguard their reputation. They rent a substantial lump of human capital to the 
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firm. The rental rates for their human capital are signalled by the managerial labour market 
and are dependent upon the success or failure of the firm (Fama, 1980). Furthermore, job 
loss due to poor manager’s performance lead to significant costs including reputation costs 
and the loss of future job opportunities (Chakraborty, Sheikh and Subramanian, 2007). 
Therefore, the current success or failure of a firm impacts the manager’s outside 
opportunity wage, thus making the manager a stakeholder in the prospects of the firm.   
 
On the other hand, firms have every reason to offer a reward system that compensates 
competent managers adequately. Provided the managerial labour market is competitive, the 
firm stands to lose managers when the firm’s reward system is not responsive to 
performance; and more often than not the best are the first ones to leave (Fama, 1980). 
Subject to the wage revision process, a firm faces the pressure to sort and compensate 
managers according to performance. 
 
However, empirical findings by Jensen and Murphy (1990) show that until the end of the 
1980s, the U.S. top managers’ compensation had on average a very low pay-to-
performance sensitivity. The relation between the pay of top-level executives and firm 
performance is small. Their empirical findings receive support from Rosen (1992) whose 
survey on the CEO compensation indicates an elasticity of pay-to-performance ranges 
between 0.10-0.15. This is contrary to early agency theory’s models of optimal contracting. 
Moreover, their findings suggest that dismissals are not an important source of managerial 
incentives because the increases in dismissal probability due to poor performance and the 
penalties associated with dismissal are both small. Their findings are contrasted by another 
study by Hall and Liebman (1998) whose 15-year panel data from 1980 to 1994 indicate 
that the pay-to-performance sensitivity of U.S. top executives’ compensation has increased 
substantially due to the widespread use of stock-related incentives such as stock option 
plans.  
 
External managerial labour market is also closely linked to the CEO turnover. Denis, Denis 
& Sarin (1997) study 1,394 firms from 1985-1988 and find that the probability of top 
executive turnover is negatively related to the equity ownership of insiders (i.e. top officers 
and directors). More importantly, when the insiders own between 5% and 25% of the 
firm’s equity, the probability of the top executive turnover is significantly less than when 
officers and directors own less than 5%. In other words, the effectiveness of the external 
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managerial labour market as an external mechanism can be mitigated by the ownership 
structure, which will be further discussed in Chapter 3.  
 
Although the external managerial labour market may serve as an influential component in 
a firm’s corporate governance structure, the lack of a reliable measurement prohibits its 
usage as an explanatory variable in this study. This study focuses on the internal CG 
mechanisms and on their disclosure rather than on the external CG mechanisms. As such, 
the external managerial labour market is not considered in this study. A literature review 
on the external managerial labour market, like other external CG mechanisms, serves the 
purpose of identifying the alternative factors that may also have an impact on a firm’s 
corporate governance structure and its CG practices. 
 
v) Anti-director rights 
LLSV (1998) define anti-director rights as those shareholders’ rights that “measure how 
strongly the legal system favours minority shareholders against managers or dominant 
shareholders in the corporate decision-making process, including the voting process” 
(LLSV, 1998, p. 6). As illustrated by Boonlert-U-Thai, Meek & Nabar (2006), these 
shareholder rights can be protected through the following six provisions, if present in the 
legislature, by the law: 
1) The country allows shareholders to mail proxy vote to the firm; 
2) Shareholders are not required to deposit their shares prior to the general shareholders’ 
meeting;  
 
3) Cumulative voting 5  or proportional representation of minorities in the board of 
directors is allowed; 
 
4) An oppressed-minorities mechanism such as the right to force the company to 
repurchase shares of the minority shareholders, or the right to challenge the directors’ 
decisions in court, is in place; 
 
5) The minimum percentage of share capital that entitles a shareholder to call for an 
extraordinary shareholders’ meeting is stipulated; 
 
6) Shareholders have pre-emptive rights to buy new stock (so as to protect shareholders 
from dilution) that can be waived only by shareholders’ vote. 
 
                                                 
5 Cumulative voting permits minority interests to elect a minority of the directors. Under a cumulative voting 
system, proxy-holders cast their votes equal to the number of shares for which proxies are held multiplied by 
the number of directors. All votes may be cast for a single director position, or they may be distributed across 
positions in any way. The nominees from both incumbents and dissidents are then ranked in descending order, 
according to the number of votes received. The required number of directors is then elected from this ranking 
(Dodd and Warner, 1983, p. 403) 
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These anti-director rights can be construed as formal legal protection of shareholders 
wherever the principle of one-share-one-vote is violated. However, if these anti-director 
rights are already stipulated in the company’s charter, the minority shareholders may not 
need to resort to external legal rules and regulations to redress their grievances against the 
insiders. Under such circumstances, these anti-director rights can be described as “internal 
mechanism”. 
 
vi) Legal rules and regulations of the stock market 
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (LLSV, 1997) attribute the size and 
effectiveness differences of capital markets around the world to the differences in investor 
protection against expropriation by insiders. Such investor protection is reflected by two 
elements: legal rules and the quality of enforcement. They argue that better legal 
protections enable the financiers to offer entrepreneurs money at better terms, hence more 
external financing will be used which in turn will lead to both higher valued and broader 
capital markets. Based on an analysis of 49 countries, LLSV find strong empirical 
evidence that the legal environment has large effects on the size and breadth of capital 
markets. In particular, LLSV also find strong evidence that stronger anti-director rights 
(and also one-share-one-vote rules) are associated with larger and broader equity markets.  
 
Stronger legal protection leads investors to be more willing to accept lower expected rates 
of return. In turn, companies are more likely to use external finance when rates are lower. 
The overall impact is that there will be higher economic growth in those countries with 
stronger investor protection. Rajan and Zangales (1998) find evidence that financial 
development facilitates economic growth. They document that industrial sectors, which 
need more external finance, develop disproportionately faster in countries that have more 
developed financial markets. Wurgler (2000) examines 65 countries, using the size of stock 
market and debt market relative to a country’s GDP as a proxy for financial development.  
He finds firms in countries with developed financial sectors increase investment more in 
growing industries and decrease it more in declining industries. This is considered as 
evidence in support of economic efficiency in allocation of capital within those countries 
where there are developed financial sectors. Johnson, Boone, Breach, and Friedman (2000) 
examine 25 countries during the Asian crisis of 1997-1998. They find that a country’s 
degree of investor protection also affects the way its economy’s capital market responds to 
adversity. They find evidence that the magnitude of the stock market decline and the 
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degree of depreciation of the exchange rate are negatively related to the degree of investor 
protection. 
 
In sum, a strong economic growth requires developed financial markets. Strong investor 
protection is a necessary condition for strong financial markets to develop (Denis and 
McConnell, 2003). As Hong Kong strives for maintaining its economic growth and its 
financial market competitiveness in Asia, it needs to provide a strong investor protection, 
strengthen the corporate governance, and maintain a level playing ground for capital 
providers and capital managers. This study employs Hong Kong firms as samples so as to 
distinguish the value relevance of voluntary CG disclosure in a high level of legal 
protection regime. It differs from other studies that use firms from low levels of legal 
protection regimes in Asian countries (which businesses are also family dominated). The 
findings of this study will help further the understanding of how concentrated ownership 
affects voluntary CG disclosure, even though the investors are being protected by a strong 
legal regime. 
 
vii) Quality of enforcement of investor-protection rules  
Even though the investor protection legislations are in place, they need to be effectively 
enforced so that investors can have confidence that their rights are protected. Enforcement 
of laws is as crucial as their contents (LLSV 2000a, p.7). This is in sharp contrast to the 
contractual school of the theory of the firm as proposed by Jensen and Meckling (1976). 
According to the contractual school of firm theory, most regulations of financial markets 
are unnecessary because financial contracts take place between well-informed issuers and 
investors who are sophisticated enough to impute the necessarily default costs into the 
contract. The entrepreneurs bear these costs when they issue securities. They have an 
incentive to bind themselves with investors to limit expropriation. As long as the financial 
contracts are enforced, financial markets do not require regulations (Stigler, 1964; 
Easterbrook and Fischel, 1991). 
 
LLSV (2000a) posit that good legal rules are the ones that a country can enforce. In the 
case of securities law reform, the strategy is “not to create an ideal set of rules, but rather to 
enact the rules that can be enforced within the existing structure” (LLSV, 2000a, p.22). 
Gillan (2006) regards litigation as an important element of the governance environment. 
Farber (2005) finds that firms charged with fraud by the SEC tend to have poor governance 
relative to a control group of firms. Haslem (2005) studies a broad range of lawsuits 
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including anti-trust, breach of contract, labour-related, patent infringement, and 
shareholder class actions.  He reports that legal cases appear to dominate settling litigation 
from a shareholder wealth perspective. He also finds that weak governance firms tend to 
settle legal suits quickly, and that the market reaction to settlements is more negative in 
firms where agency costs are seen to be greater. 
 
All these studies point out that both the rules and the quality of their enforcement are 
equally vital to investor protection.  La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999) 
establish that strong investor protection makes the equity market more attractive.  It also 
makes ownership structure less concentrated.  As pointed out by Li, Moshirian, Pham, and 
Zein (2006), large shareholdings by institutions are more prevalent in countries with 
stronger shareholder rights, greater access to voting rights, more effective legal 
enforcement, and extensive financial disclosure. 
 
Among the seven mechanisms mentioned above, the market for corporate control is 
potentially the most powerful one to bring about improvements in corporate governance 
and to ensure that companies are well managed. Fama claims that “the market for outside 
takeovers providing discipline of last resort” (Fama, 1980, p.295). However, managers and 
insiders may devise protective provisions to shield themselves from the threat of being 
expunged in the case of a takeover when they negotiate their initial contracts with the 
owner (e.g., anti-takeover amendments, poison pills, dual-class voting structure, state anti-
takeover laws, executive stock and option plans, and golden parachute contracts, among 
other means as per Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996, p. 378). Such provisions are installed and 
may be implemented to an extent that it becomes difficult to remove incapable managers, 
i.e., an “entrenchment” problem may arise. This is especially the case when the insiders 
predominantly own the firm (e.g., concentrated family ownership) and when outsiders are 
a minority on the board of directors. 
 
Starting from LLSV’s influential papers (LLSV, 1997; 1998), many empirical researchers 
have found evidence in support of the significant relation between a country’s investor-
protection against expropriation by corporate insiders and the expansion of capital markets 
and the economic development of a country (LLSV, 2000a).  Bushman and Smith (2001) 
argue that financial accounting information can play an important role in corporate 
governance. Other than the traditional role in the setting of managerial compensation plans, 
financial accounting information is extensively used in the determination of: (i) economic 
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growth of the capital market, (ii) efficiency of the market economies, and (iii) economic 
performance of the firms. In particular, they propose that studies should be carried out on 
the economic effects of disclosures of specific types of financial accounting information, 
the frequency of interim reporting, and the accounting principles used to measure the 
disclosed items. Such studies shall provide new insights into what constitutes high- versus 
low-quality financial accounting systems from the standpoint of enhancing economic 
performance. 
 
However, Cremers and Nair (2005) find that the internal and external mechanisms are 
strong complements in firms with low leverage. Their empirical findings support the 
theories that higher debt reduces the probability of a takeover as proposed by Novaes and 
Zingales (1995), Zweibel (1996), Stulz (1988), and Harris and Raviv (1988). 
 
All in all, individual mechanisms are empirically found correlated to the firm’s 
performance in terms of market valuation or accounting profitability. However, the exact 
mix of internal and external governance mechanisms that leads to the firm’s improved 
performance is unclear although the joint impact of internal and external forces seems 
pronounced (Jensen and Warner, 1988). This study does not intend to examine the optimal 
mix of internal and external governance mechanisms. Rather, it assumes that the external 
mechanisms apply to all firms – large or small – under the same legal investor-protection 
regime. It also assumes that the market for corporate control and the product market 
competition forces are applicable to all firms in Hong Kong, as it is a free and open 
economy with very few government interventions or restrictions. This study only considers 
the voluntary disclosure of a firm’s corporate governance practices as the factor that may 
vary, ceteris paribus, and examines its potential impact on a firm’s market valuation and 
dividend payout. 
 
 
2.5 Summary 
 
Corporate governance is the system by which firms are directed and controlled.  It deals 
with the ways how suppliers of finance can ensure that they will get their return on their 
investment (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).  A firm may consist of various stakeholders: the 
shareholders, the employees, customers, suppliers, creditors and the community; and in the 
widest sense, stakeholders may extend to “any identifiable group or individual on which 
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the organization is dependent for its continued survival” (Freeman and Reed, 1983).  A 
considerable amount of prior literature has been made to reveal the problems arising from 
the course of various stakeholders in pursuit of their own interest, and the means to iron 
out those problems.   
 
This chapter reviews prior literature on corporate governance.  Various theories have been 
proposed by researches to understand and to tackle the problems of corporate governance: 
Agency Theory, Transaction Cost Theory, and Stakeholder Theory.  The first two theories 
stipulate that corporate governance plays an important role in regulating the contracting 
parties, settling disputes and ensuring that alignment of interests of both the principal 
(owners) and the agent (managers who are not owners) is achieved.  The Stakeholder 
Theory differs from the first two theories in proposing that corporate governance should 
pay attention to other stakeholders who are also affected by the firm’s actions even though 
they are remotely related to the firm. As discussed in section 2.3.4, this study adopts the 
shareholders’ perspective rather than the stakeholders’ one in the analysis of relationships 
of voluntary CG disclosure, firm valuation, and dividend payouts. The shareholders’ 
perspective is relatively simpler and more clearly discernible in regards to the parties 
involved in the analysis: shareholders would like their interests to be protected while at the 
same time they delegate the day-to-day decision-making power to the managers of a firm. 
The information asymmetry thus arisen from the separation of ownership and control gives 
rise to the need of setting up proper corporate governance mechanisms. 
 
Broadly speaking, there are two categories of mechanisms – internal and external – that 
may help ensure the firm’s corporate governance is adequate to look after the interest of its 
stakeholders.  Internal mechanisms including the board of directors, the board composition, 
the chairman/CEO duality, ownership structure/concentration, the presence of institutional 
block-holders, bank ownership of equity/ bank’s influence, corporate by-laws and charters, 
and the presence of an audit committee and remuneration committee, have been found to 
have an impact on the corporate governance of the firm.  External mechanisms, such as 
corporate takeovers, proxy fights by minority shareholders, the degree of product market 
competition, the external managerial labour market and anti-direct rights, play as an 
invisible hand to help ensure that the firm exercises corporate governance to maintain a fair 
interest for all stakeholders.  The legal rules and regulations of the stock market, by 
stipulating requirements that the listed firms have to follow, also help to ensure good 
corporate governance of the firms.   
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 Corporate governance of firms in an economy/country has great impact on the social and 
economic development of that economy/country; and different theories proffer different 
solutions to the corporate governance problems that prevail across countries. As has been 
discussed in sub-sections 2.3.2 and 2.3.4, this thesis adopts the most widely accepted 
theory for corporate governance – agency theory – to examine the relationship between 
voluntary disclosure of corporate governance of a firm and a firm’s market valuation. It 
focuses on some of the internal CG mechanisms rather than the external CG mechanisms 
available to the firm, and adopts the investor-protection perspective on the role of 
corporate governance. A second aim of this thesis is to examine how dividend payout can 
be used by outside investors to monitor the insiders in the context of a concentrated 
ownership by a predominant equity holder under a strong legal protection environment 
such as Hong Kong.   
 
In the next chapter, Chapter 3, a study will be made of the impact of ownership structure 
and firm’s leverage on a firm’s corporate governance.  It examines how corporate 
governance can be affected by a firm’s ownership concentration, family ownership, and its 
leverage. The external mechanism, i.e., the legal protection of outside investors, will be the 
subject of Chapter 4 where voluntary disclosure and other firm characteristics that affect a 
firm’s corporate governance will also be discussed. Discussion of the possible influence on 
a firm’s valuation by these factors will also be provided. 
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Chapter 3:  Relationship between Corporate 
Governance, Ownership Structure, and Firm Leverage 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Agency theory posits that a firm’s corporate governance (CG) has its roots in the firm’s 
ownership structure (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Denis and McConnell (2003) state that, 
when ownership and control of corporations are not fully coincident, there is potential for 
conflicts of interest between owners (i.e., the principal) and controllers (i.e., agents). These 
conflicts of interest form the basic ideas for research on CG (ibid, 2003, p.1).  This chapter 
reviews the literature related to the theoretical arguments between corporate governance 
and two major firm-specific characteristics: the firm’s ownership structure and the firm’s 
leverage. Other firm characteristics that may be relevant to a firm’s CG such as firm size, 
firm performance, and legal protection of minority shareholders will be discussed in 
Chapter 4. The motivations for voluntary disclosure of a firm’s CG practices will also be 
discussed in the chapters that follow.  
 
Prior theoretical research has suggested that a firm’s corporate governance is related to 
ownership structure and the firm’s leverage, among other variables. However, empirical 
studies have found that the strength of the relationship is neither universal across different 
types of ownership structure (Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, 1988; McConnell and Servaes, 
1990), nor are the signs of relationships identical for firms operating in a strong legal 
protection environment and a weak environment (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and 
Vishny, 2002). Since the present study aims at exploring the relationship between 
voluntary disclosure of CG and the firm’s valuation, and since firm valuation, in part, also 
depends upon a firm’s attributes such as ownership structure, firm size, and the firm’s 
performance in terms of profitability, cross-listing, etc., an understanding of the existing 
literature on these relationships is necessary in building up the hypotheses to be 
empirically tested in this study.  
 
The organization of this chapter is as follows: Section 3.2 explains why a firm’s ownership 
structure matters in curbing its agency costs. It also reviews the extant literature on the 
varieties of ownership structure and discusses the relationship between managerial 
ownership and a firm’s control, its corporate governance, its performance, and its 
disclosure.  Section 3.3 elaborates on a special type of ownership structure – family 
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ownership and how it is related to firm value and corporate governance. Section 3.4 
explores the significance of a firm’s leverage (or capital structure) to agency costs, and 
discusses the relationship between leverage, ownership, and corporate governance. Section 
3.5 summarizes the key concepts that serve as the bases for the empirical analysis to be 
conducted in this study. 
 
 
3.2 Firm’s ownership structure and agency problems 
 
Both theories of the firm – the agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and the 
stakeholder theory (Williamson, 1984; Freeman, 1984, 1994) – acknowledge that modern 
enterprises have dispersed ownership. According to Berle and Means (1932), modern 
enterprises tend to have diverse shareholders; each of them may own a tiny fraction of the 
firm’s equity. These shareholders may not necessarily be the firms’ managers who are 
responsible for the firm’s daily operations. While the stakeholder theory posits that the 
managers are held accountable to a firm’s numerous stakeholders who are not necessarily 
confined to its shareowners alone, the agency theory looks upon the managers as agents of 
the shareholders. These managers are responsible for the daily operations of the firm. They 
possess inside information about the firm unknown to the outsiders. If un-checked or 
inadequately monitored, managers may make use of this inside information to pursue their 
self-interests at the expense of the shareholders’ who are placed at a disadvantageous 
position due to such information asymmetry. A potential conflict of interest therefore 
exists between the managers and the shareholders, as “agency costs arise when the interests 
of the managers are not aligned with those of the owners” (Ang, Cole, and Lin, 2000, p.83).  
 
In their empirical study of 1,708 small firms extracted from the National Survey of Small 
Business Finances conducted by the U.S. Federal Reserve Board in 1992, Ang et al (2000) 
compare the excessive expenses (including managerial perks consumption) of firms that 
have partial managerial ownership and those of no-outside-equity firms. They provide 
direct confirmation of Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) hypothesis that agency costs are 
indeed higher among firms that are not 100% owned by their managers and that these costs 
increase as the equity share of the owner-manager decreases. In their sample, Ang et al 
acknowledge that the agency costs take the form of preference for all job-related perks, 
shirking, and making self-interested and entrenched decisions that reduce shareholder 
wealth. 
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 In the view of Jensen and Meckling (1976), agency problems arise because no contracts 
can be written and enforced without cost. Agency costs include the structuring costs, 
monitoring costs, and the bonding costs of a set of contracts between principal and agents, 
and also among agents with conflicting interests. Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest 
several means to curb such agency problems, and managerial ownership of the firm is one 
of the means to align the interests of shareholders with those of the managers. The 
ownership structure of the firm, therefore, has impact on the corporate governance of the 
firm. As suggested by Lemmon and Lins (2003, p. 1445), ownership structure is also the 
primary determinant of the extent of agency problems between the outside investors and 
the controlling insiders. It has important implications for the valuation of the firm. 
 
The following sub-sections review the extant literature on different forms of ownership 
structure within the U. S. and outside the U. S., based on the empirical studies which adopt 
similar classification of U.S. vs. non-U.S. firms as their samples. Ownership can be 
concentrated or diverse; and may vary from country to country. It is likely that agency 
problems arising from various types of ownership will differ. In turn, the plausible 
solutions to agency problems tend to differ. A discussion is provided herewith as to how a 
firm’s ownership structure is related to its corporate governance, followed by a review of 
literature that examines the impact on firm performance by various forms of ownership 
structure. 
 
3.2.1 Studies on ownership structure of firms in the U.S. 
 
Traditional studies on firm ownership began in the U.S. Berle and Means (1932) postulate 
that modern enterprises tend to have dispersed ownership, and there is a prevalence of 
widely held corporations in the U.S. with ownership widely diffused among small 
shareholders. There are several implications. First, the control and ownership of firms tend 
to be inevitably separated. As Means (1931) puts it: “Ownership of wealth without 
appreciable control, and control of wealth without appreciable ownership, appear to be the 
logical outcome of present corporate development” (Means, 1931, p. 68). Such separation 
of ownership and control of firms gives rise to agents, who are not the owners but act in 
the capacity of managers to make decisions on behalf of the principals (i.e., the 
shareholders). Second, Berle and Means (1932) observed that top corporate executives, 
“while in office, have almost complete discretion in management” (ibid, 1932, p.139). It 
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implies that, while ownership of capital is dispersed among small shareholders, control is 
concentrated in the hands of managers. Third, diffused ownership tends to render the 
owners of shares powerless to constrain professional managers, as suggested by Demsetz 
and Lehn (1985, p.1173). Agency problems would therefore tend to arise where managers 
engage in decision-making and behaviours that may not be consistent with maximizing 
shareholder wealth (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983a), as corporate 
resources may not be used entirely in the pursuit of shareholder profit. 
 
However, some empirical studies in the 1980’s find evidence that do not support Berle and 
Means’s (1932) conception of dispersed firm ownership in the U.S. For example, Demsetz 
and Lehn (1985) find that the concentration of equity ownership of U.S. firms varies 
widely. Using a Herfindahl index1 (with an unbounded range starting from the smallest 
value zero) as a proxy for ownership concentration of 511 large U.S. corporations 
including regulated utilities and financial institutions in 1980-1981, they find that 
ownership concentration varies from 0.69 to 4952.38, with a mean equal to 402.75 and a 
standard deviation of 722.99. With such a wide range of concentration levels, and such a 
relatively large standard deviation value compared to the mean, there is evidence that 
various degrees of ownership concentration are present among U.S. corporations.  
 
Empirical evidence shows that, not only is disperse ownership not at all the most prevalent 
form of ownership structure, there exists even a slight ownership concentration for U.S. 
firms. In a wider sample of 5,240 firms sourced from a public database Spectrum, 
Holderness and Sheehan (1988) identify 663 firms (i.e., 12.7%) that have majority 
shareholders (>50% equity) in the year 1984; and 114 of them have majority shareholders 
for at least two consecutive years between 1978 and 1984. These 114 firms constitute 
approximately 5% of the firms on the New York Stock and American Stock Exchanges. 
Moreover, these 114 firms are not confined to small or obscure firms, but consist of large, 
prominent, corporations such as Shell Oil U.S.A., A&P Stores, Commodore Computer, 
Continental Airlines, Playboy Enterprises, and Turner Broadcasting, with average assets 
exceeding USD 1 billion (median: $128 million) and annual sales of USD 756 million 
(median: $132 million). 
                                                 
1 Their Herfindahl index of ownership concentration is calculated by summing the squared percentage of 
shares controlled by each of the top 5 shareholders. The percentage of shares owned by the top 5 
shareholders has undergone a logistic transformation, using the formula: log [percentage concentration/ (100- 
percentage concentration)]. For example, if the ownership is 5%, then the logistic transformation will yield –
1.28. Squaring that transformed number will give 1.64.  Such transformation is made to convert an otherwise 
bounded dependent variable into an unbounded one. Demsetz and Lehn repeated the same logarithmic 
transformation for the top 20 largest shareholders to construct an index of ownership concentration. 
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 A more recent study by Anderson and Reeb (2003) shows that, during the period 1992 
through 1999, over 35% of the 403 non-utility, non-banking firms of Standard & Poor’s 
500 Industrial firms have concentrated family ownerships2. Even if the family does not 
have predominant majority ownership, the family control of board seats is 2.75 times 
greater than the family’s equity stake would imply (ibid, 2003, p. 1302). On the other hand, 
Ang, Cole and Lin (2000) study the non-listed firms in the U.S., using the Federal Reserve 
Board’s 1997 National Survey of Small Business Finances (NSSBF). Their sample 
contains 1,708 small corporations (excluding partnerships and S-corporations)3. They find 
that 30.1% of their sample firms have 100% ownership by the primary owner. When 
ownership is relaxed to 50% or more by the primary owner, the percentage jumps to 58.6%. 
When the ownership is further relaxed to a single family (rather than the primary owner) 
that owns more than 50% of the firm, the percentage increases to 73.1%. This indicates 
that it is not rare for concentrated ownership or a significant shareholder to prevail in either 
large-capitalized or small-capitalized firms in the U.S. As regards the ownership structure 
in non-U.S. firms, it will be discussed in the following section, Section 3.2.2. 
 
3.2.2 Ownership structure of firms outside U.S.  
 
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (henceforth referred as LLS, 1999) carry out a 
comparative cross-country study covering the richest 27 countries in the world (based on 
1993 per capita income) excluding Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and some 
countries that do not have significant stock markets. From each of these 27 developed 
countries, LLS select the 20 largest publicly listed firms based on market capitalization of 
the firms’ common equity as at end 1995 and construct a sample of large firms. Similarly, 
they select the smallest 10 firms with market capitalization of common equity of minimum 
USD 500 million from each country to form a sample of medium firms. After deleting 
banks, utilities companies, affiliates of foreign firms, and those firms that are wholly 
                                                 
2 Anderson and Reeb define family firms as firms where the family continues to have an equity ownership 
stake or board seats. By such definition, they have 141 Family Firms and 262 Non-family Firms in their 
sample. Moreover, eight firms from the founding families group exit in the course of the sampling period, 
causing the firm’s designation to change from Family to Non-family. The mean family ownership (%) of 
equity in their sample for Family Firms is 17.88% (Non-family firms: 0%). The officer and directors 
ownership (less family) for Family Firms has a mean of 1.35% (Non-family firms: 1.45%).  They 
acknowledge that the level of control exerted by family owners may not be directly proportional to the level 
of ownership by the family owners. 
3 S-corporations in the U.S. are not subject to corporate taxation. The owner-managers of S-corporations may 
have incentives to compensate themselves in the form of partner distributions or dividends rather than salary 
because there is no double taxation of such earnings at the firm level (Ang, Cole, and Lin, 2000, p. 85) 
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owned by the state, LLS arrive at a sample of 691 firms (out of a possible total of 810 
firms), and measure the average ownership patterns for each country. Using a threshold of 
20% voting rights as the definition of control, LLS find that 36% of their sample firms are 
widely held, 30% are family-controlled, 18% are state-controlled, and the remaining 16% 
are controlled either by a widely-held financial institution, by a widely-held corporation, or 
miscellaneous. From their empirical finding that only 36% of the firms in the richest 
countries are widely held, LLS conclude that Berle and Means’ (1932) perception of 
diverse ownership is misleading: diverse ownership only exists in the U.S., the U.K. and, 
arguably, in Japan.  In the rest of the world, there are hardly any widely held firms. In 
contrast, concentrated ownership prevails; and among those firms with concentrated 
owners, the most common owner types are the families, followed by the state. 
 
LLS’s global investigation of concentrated ownership is consistent with the findings of 
regional but more in-depth studies. For example Faccio and Lang (2002) examine 5,232 
listed firms in Western Europe (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, 
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the U.K.) from 1996 to 1999 
(approximately 94% of the total listed firms in these 13 countries) and find that the 
ownership is polarized: firms are either widely held (37%) or family controlled (44 %). 
Broadly speaking, their findings indicate that financial firms and large firms are more 
likely to be widely held, whereas non-financial and small firms are more likely to be 
family owned and controlled. In Continental Europe (Austria, Belgium, Germany, and 
Italy), Krivogorsky (2006) reports that more than half of listed industrial firms have 
majority stockholders who own at least 50% equity of the company.  
 
In Australia, Craswell, Taylor and Saywell (1997) report that ownership varies according 
to firm size. Comparing small firms (with mean market value of A$ 2 million) and large 
firms (with mean market value A$ 1.4 billion), directors’ ownership (i.e., insiders’ 
ownership) of small firms is considerably higher (35.2% mean insider holdings) than that 
of large firms (7.1% mean insider holdings), based on a sample of 95 large firms and 91 
small firms listed on the Australian Stock Exchange as at June 30, 1989.  Craswell et al 
report that institutional ownership is a common feature for firms in Australia, which is not 
the case in other countries in Asia. In addition, it is note-worthy to report that, according to 
LLSV’s (1998) cross-country survey on the rule of law, Australia scores 10.00 (the highest) 
in both the Efficiency of Judicial System and the Rule of Law. Australia’s scores are 
higher than Singapore’s and Hong Kong’s among the English common-law legal regimes. 
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In fact, Australia’s scores are even higher than Japan’s, a country that has a German-origin 
legal system. In sum, Australia is very close to U.S. and U.K. in terms of firm ownership 
structure and external corporate governance environment, and is distinct from other East 
Asian countries which are characterised by family ownership. 
 
In East Asia, corporations are often characterized not only as family-owned but also 
family-controlled (Claessens, Djankov, Fan, and Lang, 1999; Claessens, Djankov and 
Lang, 2000). Both studies by Claessens et al report extensive family ownership and control 
in more than half of East Asian companies, and that more than two-thirds of firms as at the 
end of fiscal year 1996 are controlled by a single shareholder through cross-holdings and 
pyramid structure. Moreover, managers of closely held firms tend to be relatives of the 
controlling shareholder’s family. Claessens et al’s findings are based on 2,980 publicly 
traded companies in nine East Asian countries that include Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, 
South Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand.  
 
Other research studies confirm the concentrated ownership either by insiders, by families, 
or by the state, in Asian corporations. For instance, in the global ownership study by La 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (LLS, 1999 p. 481), they examine 4 Asian countries, 
namely, Hong Kong, Japan, Singapore, and South Korea. Based on a classification of 20% 
voting rights as effective control over a firm, LLS find that listed firms in Hong Kong are 
predominantly owned and controlled by families through pyramids, management 
appointments, cross-ownership, and the use of shares that have more votes. In Korea, the 
large corporations are controlled by chaebols (i.e., business groups) through pyramids and 
cross-holdings, even though the largest shareholder of the firms is a family who does not 
own more than 20% voting rights of the firms. In contrast, about half of sampled firms in 
Singapore are controlled by the state. Only in Japan do they find firm ownership is more 
diverse.  
 
Country by country, there are some variations in the concentration of family ownership 
within East Asian firms. For example, Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2000) report that the 
largest 10 families in Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand control half of the corporate 
assets in their sample; whereas the largest 10 families in Hong Kong and Korea control 
about one third of the corporations in their respective countries.  LLS (1999, p.481) report 
an example of the predominance of family ownership in Hong Kong by the Li Ka-Shing 
family that owns and controls three of the 20 largest companies. One of them is Hutchison 
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Whampao, which is the second largest employer in Hong Kong after the Hong Kong SAR 
Government. In Thailand, Wiwattanakantang (2001) documents that 80% of non-financial 
firms listed on the Stock Exchange of Thailand are family-owned. In Taiwan, Yeh, Lee, 
and Woidtke (2001) examine 208 listed companies in 1993 and find that approximately 
76% of the sample firms are family-controlled, 17% are widely held and the remaining 7% 
are controlled by the state, a diffusely held corporation, or a foreign investor.  A common 
characteristic among Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, Taiwan, and Hong Kong is that 
a large Chinese business community is present and is playing an influential role in each 
economy. However, only in Hong Kong is the family ownership high and a common law 
system practised. 
 
In Korea, controlling shareholders and their families own an average of 32% of the shares 
of publicly listed firms, that is, less than one third of the stockholding. By means of 
interlocking ownership and formation of business groups (chaebols), these families are 
able to maintain their control over the firms without having a majority shareholding (Lim, 
1989; Joh, 2003). On the other hand, Japan seems to have relatively the most widely 
dispersed non-family ownership among all Asian countries. Prowse (1992) reports that, 
though ownership is highly concentrated in Japan, financial institutions are by far the most 
important large shareholders because banks are legally permitted to hold substantial stakes 
of the corporations. Management shareholding is less important (ibid, 1992, p. 1126). 
 
In summary, dispersed ownership of firms is far less common outside the U.S. and U.K.  
Firms in Europe and Asia often have controlling shareholders. In Asia, except in Japan 
where banks and financial institutions are the largest shareholders, firm’s ownership tends 
to be concentrated in families or controlled by business groups interlocked with families. 
When ownership is more likely to be concentrated than diffused, the agency problems 
arising from the separation of ownership and control (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) may no 
longer be as severe as another type of problem – the entrenched management problem  – 
when the managers obtain more and more voting rights of the firm (Morck, Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1988; and Stulz, 1988). Shareholders’ concern on the corporate governance 
practices of a family-owned firm may differ from those of a firm whose ownership is 
dispersed. For instance, outside minority shareholders may be apprehensive about the 
potential expropriation by the majority shareholders (also known as tunnelling as 
suggested by Johnson, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 2000), who usually 
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appoint delegates to either sit on the board or as managers to run the day-to-day operations 
of the firm. This apprehension will be even stronger where firms are family-owned.   
 
In the case of Hong Kong where family ownership is prevalent and the duality of the CEO 
and Chairman is commonplace, the nature of the agency problem and the minority 
shareholders’ concern for corporate governance will be significantly different from those 
in other Asian countries, and hence merits investigation and analysis. On the other hand, 
the common law legal origin and the strong legal protection environment of Hong Kong 
(as reported in LLSV, 1998) makes Hong Kong a distinct market for testing how well the 
corporate governance mechanisms, installed at firm level voluntarily, can protect outside 
investors’ interest and hence affect firm valuation in the face of concentrated ownership by 
the insiders (i.e., family members). This study uses Hong Kong listed firms as the subjects 
for investigation.  
 
Section 3.2.3, which follows, will focus on the managerial ownership of a firm, and discuss 
how it is related to the control of a firm, and thus necessarily affecting the corporate 
governance of a firm in response. 
 
3.2.3 Managerial ownership and control 
 
In this study, ‘managerial ownership’, ‘management ownership’, ‘directors’ ownership’, 
and ‘insiders ownership’ are used interchangeably to mean the equity ownership of a firm 
held by the management, who are the insiders including managers and directors, either 
directly or indirectly.  
 
Direct ownership, according to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), 
means that the individual shareholder holds title to the shares, has the voting rights 
associated with the shares, and receives any pecuniary benefits of share ownership such as 
dividends and capital gains. On the other hand, indirect ownership refers to the scenario 
where the individual does not personally hold title to the shares but exercises some control 
over the voting rights associated with those shares. However, the individual may or may 
not receive any pecuniary benefits of the shares (Holderness, Kroszner, and Sheehan, 
1999). 
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Extending the theoretical work by Berle and Means (1932) and Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
on the agency theory of the firm, Fama and Jensen (1983b) argue that the key factor for 
modern firms to survive lies in the separation of ownership and control. While ‘ownership’ 
of a firm leads to the risk-bearing functions of the shareholders, the ‘control’ of a firm is 
vested in the decision-making functions of the managers who offer the benefit of 
specialization in management skills. An implication of such separation is that those who 
are in control of a firm may not necessarily bear a substantial share of the wealth effects of 
their decisions which are important to the firm’s owners (ibid, p. 301).  
 
In view that the separation of ownership and control of a firm can give rise to corporate 
governance problems, the ability to align management’s (i.e., insiders) and shareholders’ 
(i.e., outsiders) interests via the ownership of equity becomes an important topic of inquiry. 
In a survey of 4,200 public U.S. firms, Holderness, Kroszner, and Sheehan (1999) find that 
management’s ownership in the U.S. firms in 1995 is higher than it was in Berle and 
Means’s (1935) time. This is rather surprising because large share holdings – especially 
majority ownership – are relatively uncommon in the U.S. Greater management ownership 
in the 1990s is attributable to the widely used incentive-alignment devices such as 
executive stock options, pay-for-performance compensation, etc. for executives’ 
remuneration packages. It is also believed that the popularity of company options has 
contributed to the ease and increase of managerial ownership in the U.S. 
 
In contrast, large ownership is common outside the U.S.  A review study by Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997) documents that East Asian firms typically have controlling owners, who are 
often founders of the firm or their offspring (ibid, p. 755). Theoretically, large shareholders 
govern firms by exercising their voting rights as vested by their shareholding rights, which 
are grounded in the degree of legal protection in that country. Provided the 1-share-1-vote 
voting mechanism is practised and assuming the large shareholder exercises such voting 
right, a majority owner can dictate the decisions of the firm (ibid, p. 755). Such decisions 
may include appointment of family members to the board as directors and/or employment 
of family members as managers, if the large shareholder has a majority equity ownership 
(i.e., >50%).  
 
Control over a firm need not arise from concentrated ownership by a single, majority 
shareholder, however.  Concentrated control can be exercised by closely-knit families or 
affiliated parties. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999) study the control 
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structure of the largest 20 listed companies each in 27 developed countries including 4 East 
Asian ones (Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, and Singapore). They find that listed companies in 
Hong Kong are predominantly controlled by families through pyramids, management 
appointments, cross-ownership, and the use of shares that have more votes than the regular 
1-share-1-vote system.  
 
In Asia, the widespread use of pyramidal ownership structures and cross-holdings 
provides the insiders with great opportunities to exercise effective control of a firm to a far 
greater extent than the insiders’ cash flow rights may warrant (Claessens, Djankov, and 
Lang, 2000). In their study of 2,980 firms in nine East Asian countries including Hong 
Kong, Claessens et al find extensive family control in more than half of East Asian firms 
and that separation of management from ownership control is rare. Specifically, in Hong 
Kong, 73% of the largest 20 firms are under family control, while 66% of the median 50 
firms and 57% of the smallest 50 firms are controlled by family (ibid, 2000, p. 106).  
 
Lins (2003) reports that, in his sample of 1,433 firms from 18 emerging markets including 
Hong Kong, on average 50% of a firm’s control rights are held by 5% (or greater) block-
holders.4   Lemmon and Lins (2003) document that, of their sample of 800 firms across 
eight East Asian countries including Hong Kong, the average control right held by the 
insiders is 26%. However, the average of the cash-flow rights leverage is 2.175, meaning 
that the insiders can turn one cash-flow ownership into over two control rights. They 
conclude that such separation of ownership and control significantly increases the potential 
for managerial agency problems and the risks of tunnelling by the majority shareholder. 
The quality of corporate governance, in as much as it is meant for regulating the 
relationship among various stakeholders of the firm, is therefore a necessary factor in 
assessing how the ownership structure may affect the firm’s value.  
 
Hong Kong listed firms are the subjects of analysis in this study. Since a lot of Hong Kong 
firms are both predominantly owned and controlled by families (which is commonplace in 
Asia except Japan and Singapore), those firms may face different types of agency problems 
                                                 
4 The 5% ownership threshold as block-holding is commonly used by American researchers because it 
corresponds to the definition of block-holding of the U.S. Securities Exchange Act (Rule 13d-1(a)). In the 
U.K., stock holding of 5% or more (subsequently changed to 3% or more from 1990) of stock in a public 
company must be disclosed within 5 days (2 days from 1990) of the holding. Also, Denis & Sarin (1999) 
argue that changes in ownership of 5% or more are large changes and are economically meaningful. 
5 Cash-flow rights leverage is defined as the ratio of the management control rights divided by management 
cash-flow rights. If it is one-share-one-vote system, the cash-flow rights leverage should be equal to 1 
(Lemmon and Lins, 2003, p. 1451) 
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from what Jensen and Meckling (1976) postulated (see Section 3.2.4 below). To the 
minority shareholders and outside investors, the problem of manager’s shirking (Stulz, 
1988) may not be as pertinent as the problems of entrenchment of incompetent managers 
(Demsetz, 1983), or the potential risks of tunnelling by predominant shareholders (Johnson, 
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 2000). Outsiders face an information asymmetry 
problem with managers (i.e., insiders), and they may have difficulties in monitoring those 
managers who are closely related to the predominant shareholders of the firm. This conflict 
between the minority outsiders and the controlling insiders cum managers is a kind of 
agency problem different from what Jensen and Meckling (1976) had described in their 
study, hence should call for another perspective for the analysis of corporate governance. 
The following section discusses the relationship of ownership and corporate governance 
problems of a firm. 
 
3.2.4 Ownership structure and corporate governance problems 
 
When managers have only a fraction of firm ownership, agency problems seem to abound. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that more management ownership should help align 
the manager’s interest with the shareholders’ interest. However, when managers have 
predominant ownership (i.e., > 50%), other types of corporate governance problems may 
creep in.  A series of possible problems may include: excessive executive perks, 
entrenchment of incompetent managers, transfer of assets and profits out of firms for the 
benefit of the predominant shareholders (i.e., tunnelling, as posited by Johnson, La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 2000), self-dealing transactions such as lucrative executive 
compensation, empire building, loan guarantees offered to the predominant shareholders, 
and investing into projects that bring more personal benefits to the managers rather than 
those with maximum net present value. These problems – which strictly speaking are 
corporate governance problems rather than agency problems – arise as the managers are 
now closer to being the principals than the agents, and may take on other forms. For 
example, predominant shareholders can expropriate minority shareholders’ interests by 
dilutive share issues. Other CG problems may take place in minority freeze-outs, insider 
trading, or other financial transactions that discriminate against minority shareholders. 
When there is a predominant shareholder in a firm, the protection of minority shareholders’ 
right becomes the focal point of corporate governance issues. 
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Various mechanisms have been proposed in extant CG literature to curb agency conflicts 
and limit agency costs.  The mechanisms can be broadly classified into internal and 
external CG mechanisms as previously discussed in Chapter 2 of this study. While the 
external mechanisms may be applicable to all firms operating within the same economy, 
the internal mechanisms may vary from corporation to corporation. One of the objectives 
of this study is to examine whether the internal CG mechanisms of a firm, and the 
voluntary disclosure of a firm’s CG practices, would affect the firm’s valuation in the same 
economy where the external corporate governance mechanisms are assumed to apply 
equally well to all firms and investors alike.  The following section, Section 3.2.5, will turn 
to discuss the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance, which has 
been the focus of research work of many CG studies. 
 
3.2.5 Ownership structure and firm performance 
 
Empirical studies have not been able to provide unambiguous evidence on the relationship 
between ownership structure and firm performance (Andres, 2008). The following 
discussion reviews the extant literature on this relationship and aims at explaining why a 
direct linkage between ownership structure of a firm and its performance is inadequate, and 
hence leading to inconclusive findings, if the firm’s corporate governance is missed out. 
 
Demsetz (1983) argues that a firm’s ownership structure should have no relation with its 
performance. The ownership structure should be thought of as an endogenous result of 
decisions of shareholders and the trading of shares on the market. He explains that when 
shareholders of a listed firm agree to a seasoned offering, they are in effect deciding to 
alter the ownership structure of their firms. By the same reasoning, when a private firm 
decides to become a public, listed, firm through initial public offering (IPO), the owner(s) 
may have also agreed to change the ownership structure. Implicitly, an agreement to make 
the ownership structure more diffuse is present. Any subsequent trading of shares after the 
IPO signifies a desire of potential and existing owners to change the ownership stakes and 
hence the ownership structure of the firm.  
 
In Demsetz’s (1983) argument, the observed level of a firm’s equity ownership by insiders 
and firm performance is the outcome of some market forces such that each firm attains its 
own optimal ownership structure for that firm. Changes in ownership cannot be used to 
enhance corporate value. Any observed cross-sectional empirical relation between the level 
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of insider share ownership and firm performance must be spurious. Demsetz and Lehn 
(1985) and Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) use panel data studies to provide empirical 
evidence of the endogeneity of a firm’s ownership structure argued for by Demsetz (1983).  
  
In contrast, cross-countries studies have shown that ownership structure has a close 
relationship with firm performance and firm valuation. Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) 
investigate the relationship between management ownership and market valuation of the 
firm (as measured by Tobin’s q) for 371 Fortune 500 firms in 1980. They find a curvilinear 
relationship that depicts an initial increasing q as the percentage of director ownership 
increases, but a decreasing q when insiders’ ownership lies between 5% and 25%. 
However, when ownership increases further from 25% onwards, Tobin’s q rebounds as a 
positive function of insiders’ ownership. Morck et al interpret the increases of q as a 
convergence of interests between managers and shareholders, while the decline reflects 
entrenchment effect of the management. 
 
Using the results of two insider ownership surveys of U.S. firms in 1976 and 1986, 
McConnell and Servaes (1990) find that the insider ownership (defined as equity owned by 
members of the board of directors and by corporate officers) has an alignment effect which 
dominates the entrenchment effect up to 25% managerial ownership. After that, the 
entrenchment effect dominates the alignment effect and firm value begins to diminish.  
 
McConnell and Servaes’s (1990) study is extended by Short and Keasey (1999), who use 
U.K. firms to document that the entrenchment effect threshold lies at 12% of managerial 
ownership (defined as the percentage of equity shares owned by directors and their 
immediate families, and by their ownership via corporate vehicles). A non-linear 
relationship is found between managerial ownership and an accounting performance 
measure (i.e., return on equity) as well as a market performance measure (i.e., market-to-
book ratio of equity)6 of the firm. 
 
A study conducted in Australia – another country that also practises common law – by 
Craswell, Taylor, and Saywell (1997) indicates that the curvilinear relationship between 
managerial ownership and firm value is not conclusive, especially for small firms. There is 
                                                 
6 Short and Keasey use the log form of market-to-book ratio of equity to overcome the skewness in the 
distribution of such a measure. Following Leech and Leahy (1991), they name this measure as a valuation 
ratio (VAL) and argue that, in the U.K., it can be an approximation to Tobin’s q. All intangible assets are 
excluded in this measure. 
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no evidence to support either the existence of a piecewise linear relationship reported by 
Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988), or a simple liner relationship that resembles the 
findings of McConnell and Servaes (1990) for the large firms sample in 1989. Farrer and 
Ramsay (1998) find that, in some circumstances, a positive relationship exists, but the 
results differ according to some factors such as firm size, whether the managerial 
ownership is measured by dollar value, or the percentage of the shares outstanding, etc.  
 
 
Himmelberg, Hubbard and Palia (1999) conduct a panel study on 600 U.S. firms from 
1982 to 1984 to study the relationship between managerial ownership and firm 
performance.  They regard managerial ownership as a choice of contractual arrangements 
between the firm and the managers. In Himmelberg et al’s view, such choice as well as the 
firm’s performance (as measured by accounting rates of return or Tobin’s q) is 
endogenously determined by some features of the firm’s contracting environment which 
are only partly observed and exogenous (ibid, 1999, p. 381).  Their panel study shows that 
a large fraction of the cross-sectional variation in managerial ownership is explained by 
unobserved firm heterogeneity (i.e., unobserved firm common characteristics).  
Himmelberg et al suggest that the common characteristics may include exogenous changes 
in the firm’s contracting environment. Some characteristics are “unobservable to the 
researcher” (ibid, 1999, p. 356) such as a superior monitoring technology possessed by 
some shareholders, the proportion of intangible assets to a firm’s total assets, or the degree 
of market power in terms of competitive product markets which can alter the contractual 
arrangements with the manager’s compensation and may call for changes in the optimal 
level of management ownership. Himmelberg et al report no evidence that changes in 
managerial ownership affect firm performance. Their reported empirical results are not 
robust to controls for endogeneity induced by “time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity” 
(ibid, 1999, p. 381). Although they provide no evidence that changes in managerial 
ownership affect firm performance, they find a quadratic form of relation between insider 
ownership and performance when they control for endogeneity of ownership by using 
instrumental variables. They interpret their results as supporting the notion that a firm 
chooses among various mechanisms for minimizing agency costs. 
 
Himmelberg et al (1999) assume that managerial effort is a random variable that is 
dependent upon year-on-year changes in managerial ownership, which justifies their panel 
data approach. The interpretation and methodology of Himmelberg et al’s study are 
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challenged by Zhou (2001). First, Zhou points out that there are shortcomings in using a 
fixed effects estimation in their panel data study. It would be difficult to detect a 
meaningful relation between ownership and performance as the firm fixed effects have 
essentially removed all cross-sectional variations.  Although a fixed effects model controls 
for unobserved heterogeneity specific to firms, the model is actually considering changes 
in ownership versus changes in value rather than level of ownership versus level of value. 
When changes are compared and used in the model, any firm fixed effect will cancel out. 
A firm fixed effects model essentially removes all cross-sectional variations. Any relation 
that remains cannot be said to be attributable to endogeneity that arises from such an effect. 
 
Second, insider ownership typically changes slowly over years (Zhou, 2001, p. 560). For a 
typical firm in most years, there is no change in ownership at all whereas firm value can 
change dramatically over the course of a year for reasons totally unrelated to insider 
ownership. Zhou argues that it is not clear that small, one-year, changes in managerial 
ownership (e.g. due to a manager’s exercising of his options) are indicative of the changes 
in managerial incentives that will lead to substantive within-year changes in firm 
performance, given that rational managers will always maximize the long-term interest of 
the firm. For example, Firm A’s CEO owns 10% of her firm’s stock while Firm B’s CEO 
owns 0.1% of his own firm’s equity. A 10% randomly across-the-board change of 
managerial ownership will lead to an observed ownership distributed between 9% - 11% 
for Firm A’s CEO and 0.09% - 0.11% for Firm B’s CEO. The range of difference of 
managerial ownership for Firm A is 2% points but for Firm B is only 0.02% point. If 
managerial ownership provides important incentives to managers to perform, one would 
expect a notable difference in the performance between the two CEOs, which is supposed 
to be reflected in their firm’s performance (i.e., in line with the difference of 2/0.02 or 100 
times).  However, no meaningful within-year changes in either firm’s performance may 
result.  
 
Third, managers are expected to work for their firm for some years. As argued by Zhou, 
their incentive to perform is linked to the bonding between their long-term interest and the 
firm’s expected long-term performance (Zhou, 2001, p. 560).  Even if large managerial 
ownership over time does lead to better performance over time, its effect on performance 
would necessarily show up in cross-sectional tests and not necessarily discoverable by 
means of a panel data approach.  
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Fourth, Zhou states that the ownership-performance relationship observed in the ordinary 
least square (OLS) tests, while it disappears in the fixed effects regressions, becomes much 
stronger in the tests with instrumental variables (without firm fixed effects). If Himmelberg 
et al’s  (1999) methodology (i.e. fixed effects estimator and the use of instrumental 
variables) is able to solve the endogeneity problem arisen from unobserved firm 
heterogeneity, one would expect the tests with instrumental variables to improve upon the 
OLS tests estimator in the same direction as with the fixed effects estimator. However, this 
does not turn out to be the case with their results. On the contrary, when Himmelberg et al 
use instrumental variables (without firm fixed effects), they obtain results that improve 
significantly upon the OLS tests. This is at odds with their own conclusion that the 
ownership-performance relationship is likely to be a spurious correlation due to an 
endogeneity problem (Zhou, 2001, p. 563). Therefore, Zhou concludes that changes in 
managerial ownership alone do not reflect changes in total equity incentives.  Manager’s 
behaviour is not likely to change in response to small and temporary changes in ownership 
stakes and result in detectable within-year effects on firm performance. Year-to-year 
changes in ownership would not convey much information on changes in managerial 
incentives although the cross-sectional differences in CEO ownership are extremely large. 
As such, using panel study based on a firm fixed effects estimator may not be ideal for 
analysing the relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance. 
 
Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) conduct an empirical study on the corporate governance 
structure and performance of 347 Malaysian listed companies from 1996 to 2000. They 
find that there is a significant negative relationship between a firm’s managerial 
shareholding and the firm’s accounting performance in a country with high concentrated 
ownership and no separation between dominant family owners and managers. They 
interpret the result as supporting Himmelberg, Hubbard and Palia (1999) that both 
managerial ownership and firm performance are endogenously determined by common 
characteristics.   
 
In examining the factors impacting on firm performance, both Haniffa & Hudaib’s (2006) 
and Himmelberg et al’s (1999) studies have not considered the dividend payout. Dividend 
payout can be an effective corporate governance tool in monitoring the managers’ 
performance and in mitigating agency problems in a firm, as proposed by La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny’s two agency models of dividends (LLSV, 2000b). This 
thesis also examines the relationship between the dividend payout of a firm and its 
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voluntary CG disclosure. It aims to test whether LLSV’s models apply in an economy 
already benefiting from strong investor protection by a strong legal regime, but is 
characterised with concentrated ownership. A more detailed discussion of LLSV’s agency 
models of dividends will be presented in Section 3.2.6 and Chapter 4. 
 
A recent study by McConnell, Servaes, and Lins (2008) on 4,141 cases of the insiders’ 
purchases of the shares of firms (representing 1,700 different U.S. companies) from 1994 
to 1999 measures the announcement period abnormal return for each insider’s purchase.  
They find a curvilinear relationship exists between insider ownership and firm value as 
documented by McConnell and Servaes (1990, 1995).  McConnell et al (2008) interpret 
their empirical results as that insider ownership can be used to increase firm value up to a 
point, after which additional ownership actually reduces firm value. They maintain that 
their interpretation does not necessarily refute the existence of an optimal ownership 
structure but they challenge the notion that all firms are at their optimal ownership 
structure all the time. They conclude that changes in share ownership by insiders can and 
do affect firm value. 
 
The findings from the above-mentioned studies indicate that the relationship between 
managerial ownership and firm performance – both in terms of accounting and market 
measures – is not likely to be a linear one. There is an implication that aligning the diverse 
interests of management and shareholders is not a simple case of providing management 
with larger and larger stakes in equity as suggested by the agency theory. The firm’s value 
may be affected by the CG mechanisms and practices of the firm. Corporate governance 
needs to be considered when the relationship between ownership structure and firm 
performance is examined. The following section, Section 3.2.6, reviews the prior studies 
on the relationship of dividends and a firm’s ownership structure. It also discusses the roles 
that dividends can play in a firm’s corporate governance. 
 
3.2.6 Ownership structure and dividend payout 
 
If dividends are a direct result of a firm’s performance and if a firm’s performance is 
affected by a firm’s ownership structure from the corporate governance point of view 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976), then ownership structure should have an impact on dividend 
payout. Classical financial theorists often relate dividends to the market valuation of a firm 
(e.g., Lintner, 1956; Bhattacharya, 1979; Miller and Modigliani, 1961; Miller and Rock, 
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1985), which may be affected by a host of variables including the firm’s ownership 
structure and corporate governance. In contrast, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and 
Vishny (LLSV, 2000b) extend Easterbrook’s (1984) view that dividend policies can 
address agency problems. They argue that dividends have a governance role to play. They 
postulate two models for dividends: the outcome agency model and the substitution model. 
The outcome agency model suggests that in a circumstance where investors are well 
protected by the law, the shareholders are willing to accept low dividend payouts in the 
short-term from a high-growth firm in order to give the firm a high re-investment rate. 
Shareholders agree to a low dividend rate in the short-term so that when the investments 
pay off, they can extract high dividends because the law can provide assurance that this 
will be so. Firms therefore can afford to pay a low dividend payout to the investors7. 
 
On the other hand, the substitution model posits that in a weak legal protection 
environment where expropriation of shareholders can easily be achieved by insiders, the 
firms will be eager to establish a good reputation for moderation in expropriating 
shareholders in order to raise external funds from investors. Paying higher dividends is one 
way to establish such a reputation. Other things being equal, firms with better growth 
prospects tend to have a stronger desire for the reputation because they have stronger need 
for external finance. It follows that firms in a weak legal regime but with good growth 
prospects will choose to pay higher dividend payouts than firms with poor growth 
prospects (more detailed discussion on LLSV’s (2000b) dividend models will be presented 
in Chapters 4 and 6).  LLSV’s (2000b) theoretical models remain to be empirically tested, 
and one of the objectives of this study is to test whether a strong legal investor-protection 
regime is sufficient to warrant a low dividend payout, when a high concentration of 
ownership prevails. 
 
Farinha (2003) uses U.K. data and find a strong U-shaped relationship between insider 
ownership and dividend payouts. He finds that when the insider ownership reaches 30% 
and beyond, the coefficient on dividend payouts in his regression model changes signs 
from negative to positive. That means, as insider ownership reaches 30% or higher, there is 
a beneficial effect of a higher dividend payout. Farinha concludes that his findings are 
consistent with the managerial entrenchment perspective. His findings also suggest a 
critical management entrenchment level appears in the region of 30% insider ownership for 
                                                 
7 A good example to illustrate is Microsoft Corporation, which in its initial years did not pay high dividends, 
if any at all, to its shareholders despite high profitability. Microsoft is domiciled in the U.S., generally 
regarded as a country offering strong legal protection to investors. 
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U.K. firms. Below the entrenchment level, insider ownership and dividend policies can be 
seen as substitute corporate governance devices, hence leading to a negative relationship 
between these two variables. Above that critical entrenchment level, further increases in 
insider ownership are linked with additional entrenchment-related agency costs. Dividend 
policy may become a compensating monitoring force as a result. Accordingly, a positive 
relationship with insider ownership would be predicted. This entrenchment effect is 
distinctive from other competing dividend policy theories (e.g., tax clienteles theory, 
signalling-of-future-income theory) in that a U-shaped relationship between insider 
ownership and dividend payout is predicted. 
 
 Mitton (2004) finds empirical support for LLSV’s (2000b) outcome agency model of 
dividends for firms operating in emerging markets. The outcome agency model states that 
dividends are the result of the implicit demand from minority shareholders who would use 
their ownership rights and power to extract dividends from the firm. However, Jiraporn 
and Ning (2006) find empirical support for LLSV’s (2000b) substitution model of 
dividends in monitoring the agency problems in another study of 3,732 firm-years data on 
U.S. firms. They find that the strength of shareholder rights does affect dividend payouts in 
a negative way, that is, firms with more restricted shareholder rights pay higher dividends. 
Jiraporn and Ning attribute the difference of their findings from those of LLSV’s to the 
strong legal system of minority shareholders protection in the U.S, whereas LLSV’s study 
examines dividend policies across disparate legal regimes in the world.  
 
The research studies, mentioned above, attempt to find out the effect of a firm’s insider 
ownership on the dividend payout to investors. In the course of testing LLSV’s (2000b) 
two dividend models in the real world, researchers find that dividend payout can be a tool 
employed by the insiders to alleviate investors’ worries if an entrenchment problem is 
perceived to exist.  LLSV (2000b) propose the use of dividend payout as a means to curb 
agency problems and to supplement a firm’s corporate governance mechanisms.  It 
becomes an empirical issue to test how dividend payout is related to the firm’s state of 
corporate governance, subject to the various levels of ownership structure and degrees of 
ownership concentration, controlling for the impact of external corporate governance and 
other firm characteristics. The above-mentioned studies indicate that ownership structure 
and corporate governance may have different strengths of relationship, depending on the 
market’s level of legal protection and the extent of family concentrated ownership. To 
conduct an analysis of concentrated family ownership and corporate governance of firms in 
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a strong legal protection system will fill a gap in the above studies. A study on the firm’s 
ownership structure, corporate governance, dividend payouts, and their relationship with 
the firm’s valuation, using listed firms in Hong Kong where ownership is highly 
concentrated, will add to extant literature and provide informational comparison. The 
following sub-section will discuss the possible impact of ownership concentration on a 
firm’s performance. 
 
 
3.2.7 Ownership structure and firm performance 
 
Prior literature has shown that firm performance is contingent upon the country and upon 
the concentration of ownership. Empirical evidence is provided by Claesssens, Djankov, 
Fan, and Lang (1999) on firm performance and block-holder’s identity of the firm’s 
ownership in East Asia; Claessens and Djankov (1999) on the relationship between 
profitability and ownership concentration of Czech firms; and Lins and Servaes (1999) on 
the diversification value and concentrated ownership of firms in Germany, Japan, and U.K. 
Chen, Cheung, Stouraitis, and Wong (2005) study family ownership and firm performance 
based on 412 listed Hong Kong firms during 1995-1998.  They find no positive 
relationship between family ownership and market-to-book ratio (a proxy for the firm’s 
valuation). Their findings support Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and Himmelberg, Hubbard, 
and Palia (1999) that concentrated ownership is not necessarily associated with better 
operating performance or higher firm valuation.  
 
However, Chen et al’s (2005) study shows that there is a negative relationship between 
firm performance and the dual roles of Chairman/CEO, providing evidence consistent with 
managerial entrenchment problem in firms that combine the positions of CEO and 
chairperson of the board for Hong Kong firms. Their findings open a possibility for further 
research on the combined effect of ownership structure and other corporate governance 
attributes on a firm’s performance; or that a firm’s performance may be affected by the 
firm’s ownership structure subject to the operation of internal corporate governance 
structure and practices. 
 
This study focuses on Hong Kong firms, which are characterised by concentrated 
ownership by families. A family-owned firm, like all other firms, may need external capital 
to finance its future investment projects. It needs access to wider sources of capital and 
lower costs of capital for expansion.  On the other hand, outsider investors are expected to 
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avoid financing a firm that is run by the insiders when most of whom belong to the same 
family without a sound, fair, and equitable corporate governance (CG) structure being 
installed. For firms operating in an economy where there is weak legal protection for 
minority shareholders, a reputation for treating minority outside investors fairly and 
equitably is all the more valuable (LLSV, 2000b, p.7).  If a family-owned firm desires to 
establish a good reputation or protect its good name of fairness to the non-family outside 
investors, the managers will be expected to signal their intention to the market. One of the 
ways to achieve a good reputation is to implement a more comprehensive set of CG 
structure, disclose more voluntarily about their CG practices, and provide more 
information to the market than what the other firms are doing. If this is the appropriate 
strategy for a family-owned business in a weak legal regime to adopt for achieving a good 
reputation, the same strategy may arguably be applied by family-owned businesses in a 
strong legal protection regime such as Hong Kong.  It is the firm-level managerial decision 
to voluntarily disclose that matters. 
  
The empirical study by Chen, Cheung, Stouraitis, and Wong (2005), reports evidence to 
support this argument. Chen et al examine 412 listed firms in Hong Kong from 1995 to 
1998 (representing about two-thirds of all firms listed in 1998). During the period of study, 
the Listing Rules of the Hong Kong Exchange did not require firms to disclose information 
on their CG structure. Chen et al select some attributes of the firm’s internal CG structure 
and practices such as board size, the presence of Independent Non-Executive Directors 
(INEDs); setting up of audit committee; requirements of separating the roles of the 
Chairperson and CEO; and the disclosure of the attendance record of members of the audit 
committee, etc. They find a significantly negative relationship between the CEO/Chair 
duality and the firm’s market-to-book ratio. They also find a significantly positive 
relationship between the board size and the firm’s market-to-book ratio. At a time when 
information about a firm’s CG practise was scarce, such disclosure to the outsiders could 
be significant in affecting the firm’s valuation. 
 
This study aims at filling the gap in prior research such as that of Chen Cheung, Stouraitis, 
and Wong (2005) by examining how a firm’s valuation is affected by concentrated family 
ownership and voluntary disclosure of corporate governance practices, within a legal 
environment that offers a high protection to outside minority shareholders such as Hong 
Kong. The Hong Kong Exchange enforced the mandatory disclosure of CG information in 
a formal Corporate Governance Report by firms starting January 1, 2005. This study 
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differs from previous research (in particular the one by Chen et al 2005) in that it studies 
the impact of voluntary CG disclosure on the valuation of a firm. Unlike Chen et al’s 
(2005) work which examines the attributes of a firm’s CG selectively, this study is 
interested in the extent of disclosure made by the firms with regard to an overall 
recommended CG structure and desirable CG practices, which had been made known to 
the listed firms in full by the Hong Kong Exchange since 2003 and up to 2005 (more 
discussion on sample selection is presented in Chapter 8). This study covers the time 
period from 2003 to 2005, immediately before the CG disclosure was made mandatory 
under the new Listing Rules which became effective in January 2005.8  
 
This study also differs from Chen et al’s research in that it comprises listed firms 
domiciled in Hong Kong, with their sole markets being Hong Kong or their business 
activities mainly carried out in Hong Kong. In contrast, Chen et al’s sample contains firms 
with their main business activities and/or markets in mainland China, which opted to be 
listed on the Hong Kong Exchange. They are usually state-owned and are often large-
capitalized firms. They have representatives from the State Department (usually 
bureaucrats) sitting on the board of directors, and may pursue corporate goals different 
from those profit-oriented ones of publicly-owned enterprises. Because of their special 
ownership structure and firm characteristics, these firms may exhibit different types of 
agency problems and implement different CG practices. This study will exclude such firms 
from the sample so that the real impact of voluntary CG disclosure on the valuation of the 
firm can be detected. The following section, Section 3.2.8, will discuss the relationship 
between ownership structure and voluntary disclosure by the firm. 
 
                                                 
8 The consultation period for the formal Corporate Governance Report ended in September 2004. On 19 
November 2004, the SEHK (the holding company of the Hong Kong Exchange) published the Conclusions 
on Exposure of Draft Code on Corporate Governance Practices and Corporate Governance Report. For the 
purpose of implementing the Code, amendments were made to the Main Board Listing Rules which became 
effective on 1 January, 2005. However, as regards the Corporate Governance Report, there had been disputes 
between the SEHK and the listed firms on the contents of disclosure, particularly on the part of internal 
control system, on the grounds that the listed firms had insufficient expertise and time to set up the system as 
required by the new listing rules. Finally, the SEHK agreed to postpone the implementation of mandatory 
disclosure of the internal control system for six months, i.e., it became effective for accounting periods 
commencing on or after 1 July 2005 (HKEx, Analysis of CG Practices Disclosure in 2005 Annual Report, 
2007, p. 1).  Only 139 (equivalent to 27%) of the listed firms on the Main Board were found to have 
complied with the code provisions for the whole accounting period (i.e., January to December, 2005), and 
73% of the issuers on the Main Board not complying with the Code to the full (ibid, 2007, p.2). In effect, the 
disclosure in the Corporate Governance Reports by the listed firms for their 2005 fiscal year remains largely 
voluntary. 
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3.2.8 Ownership structure and voluntary disclosure 
 
Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) agency theory predicts that as the manager’s share of 
ownership falls, there is an increased likelihood that the manager will consume perks and 
maximize self-interests (rather than owner’s interests). Outside shareholders are therefore 
expected to increase their efforts in monitoring the manager’s behaviour, which will be 
costly. To reduce the monitoring costs of the outside shareholders on the firm, the manager 
is expected to make voluntary disclosure of the firm’s information to the outside 
shareholders. Leftwich, Watts, and Zimmerman (1981) apply this reasoning to analyse the 
interim reporting by U.S. firms in 1948, when interim reporting was still voluntary. They 
find associations between the firms’ use of monitoring devices (such as interim reporting) 
and their asset and capital structures, although the results are not strong.   
 
Ownership structure of a firm has been found to have influence on a firm’s practice of 
voluntary disclosure to the outside shareholders. Ruland, Tung, and George (1990) show in 
their empirical study that ownership structure, absolute errors of analysts’ forecasts, and 
new capital offerings are significant factors that motivate firms to disclose their earnings 
forecasts. Ruland et al also find that ownership structure is the most important factor that 
distinguishes firms providing voluntary disclosure of earnings forecasts from those firms 
similar in size and industry but do not disclose.  
 
Eng and Mak (2003) study the disclosure behaviour of 3 types of ownership: managerial 
ownership, block-holder ownership and government ownership. Using 158 listed firms on 
the Stock Exchange of Singapore in 1995, they find that firms with lower managerial 
ownership and firms with significant government ownership are associated with increased 
voluntary disclosure. However, total block-holder ownership is not related to disclosure. 
Furthermore, an increase in outside directors reduces voluntary disclosure.  The findings 
are consistent with the substitution effect between outside directors’ appointment and the 
need for voluntary disclosure in monitoring managers: the increased presence of outside 
directors increases the independence of the board, thus reduces the need for voluntary 
disclosure by the managers. Eng and Mak also find that larger firms have greater 
disclosure. They also document that firms with lower debt disclose more information.  
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3.2.9 Section Summary 
This section has discussed the ownership structure of firms in different parts of the world 
as reported by prior studies. Different ownership structures give rise to different agency 
problems for the firm. The empirical findings by these studies suggest that high insider 
ownership in a firm is associated with increased likelihood for entrenched management. 
On the other hand, a low insider ownership often prompts the outside investors to guard 
against the possible self-interest seeking actions by the managers instead of maximizing 
the firm’s value.  LLSV (2000b) posit that dividend payout can be used as a means for the 
outside investors to protect themselves from expropriation by the majority 
insider/managers, by exercising their voting rights for high dividend payout as a return for 
their investment under a strong legal protection regime. Dividend payout can also be used 
by good firms as a signal to assure the outside investors under a weak legal protection 
regime where minority shareholders’ rights are not strongly upheld. Empirical findings by 
other researchers have established the relationship between dividend payout and ownership 
structure. Dividend payout has a close link with the governance of a firm. 
 
Ownership concentration of a firm, specifically by members of the same family, has been a 
concern to minority outside investors due to the asymmetry of information between the 
outsiders and the insiders9. In order to reduce the worries of outside investors, managers 
are expected to use voluntary disclosure of information so that the costs of monitoring the 
insiders may be reduced. Prior research has found evidence that firm value is positively 
related to the increased voluntary disclosure of a firm’s information.  Voluntary disclosure 
of information is also found to facilitate a firm in obtaining easier access to external 
finance, more market liquidity for its securities, and a lower cost of equity capital (e.g., 
Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991; Botosan, 1997). 
 
The potential agency problems arising from ownership structure and ownership 
concentration can be alleviated through the installation of effective internal corporate 
governance mechanisms within the firm. The worries of outside investors for these agency 
problems can also be alleviated by the voluntary disclosure of the firm’s CG practices. 
This study aims at finding out if voluntary disclosure of CG information would have an 
effect on the valuation of a firm, using Hong Kong listed firms as samples.  Hong Kong 
firms are characterised with high concentration of ownership by families.  This study will 
explore the impact of CG disclosure by family owned firms on their firm value. The 
                                                 
9 La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999) state that family business is notorious for putting the 
interests of the family above the interests of other stakeholders of the firm.  
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following section, Section 3.3, discusses the characteristics of family owned firms.  It also 
reviews the prior literature on family ownership of firms, and presents a theoretical 
background to the specific corporate governance issues arising from family-owned firms. 
An understanding of these issues will shed light on how to reduce the investor’s concerns 
about their protection from expropriation by the majority shareholder, who more often than 
not is a family owner in the case of Hong Kong firms. 
 
 
3.3 Family-owned firms 
One special type of ownership structure of firms is family ownership.   In this study, family 
ownership means that the firm is mainly owned by a family and operated by the members 
of the same family (and related parties) on a day-to-day basis. Anderson, Mansi & Reeb, 
(2003) point out that family owners, being a large shareholder, have a strong incentive to 
decrease agency costs and increase firm value because usually their private wealth is 
invested in the company; and because their investments are not well-diversified relative to 
atomistic shareholders (Andres, 2008).  The following section, Section 3.3.1, discusses the 
costs and benefits of this special type of ownership structure. Section 3.3.2 presents the 
factors that affect the evolution of family-owned firms into diffusely owned firms. Section 
3.3.3 analyses the relationship between family-owned firms and their market value. Section 
3.3.4 discusses the corporate governance of family-owned firms, followed by a summary 
in Section 3.3.5.  
 
3.3.1 Costs and benefits of family ownership 
There are potential costs and benefits of family ownership. On the positive side, family 
ownership offers less drastic changes in business strategies and practices than widely 
dispersed ownership.  Family businesses tend to have a long-term commitment seeking to 
pass the firm onto their heirs; and survival of family business is usually a major concern 
for the family shareholders.  Family firms tend to establish and rely on a reputation that 
helps foster trust and loyalty in the workplace, with the customers, and with the suppliers 
(Ward, 1988). As such, suppliers of capital such as bondholders and creditors are more 
likely to deal with the same governing bodies of a family business. They are familiar with 
the family’s business practices for longer period, thereby willing to finance reputable 
family firms, especially those firms with founding-family ownership, at a lower cost of 
capital (Anderson, Mansi, and Reeb, 2003). Hence, good family-run firms tend to have 
easier access to external capital at a lower cost than firms with dispersed ownership. 
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 On the negative side, there are potential costs associated with family ownership. Fama and 
Jensen (1985) point out that the combination of ownership and control might lead to sub-
optimal investment decisions because the interests of the family are not necessarily aligned 
with outside shareholders. Entrenched family owners might have incentives to give up 
maximum profits (which benefit all shareholders) for private rents (which only the insiders 
can enjoy), thereby exploiting the minority shareholders (Faccio, Lang, and Young, 2001).  
Also, family-owned firms tend to elect family members to sit on the board of directors and 
assign executive positions to family members or their closely linked partners.  Hence, the 
labour pool, particularly at the management level, is restricted to a very small group of 
people who have close connection with the owner family. This is quite common in the case 
of Chinese family-owned firms in Hong Kong.  
 
As will be discussed further in Chapter 5 about the sample of Hong Kong firms in this 
study, 58.33% of the Small-Cap firms, 58.62% of the Mid-Cap firms, and 66.67% of the 
Large-Cap firms have two or more family members sitting on the board of directors as at 
2005. It was the year when the firms were strongly encouraged to disclose the relationships, 
if any, of their board directors and key executives in their annual reports. Senior 
management of a firm with close connection with the owner family is a significant 
characteristic of family-owned business in Hong Kong. The entrenchment of these senior 
executives, even though they may not own directly a predominant shareholding of the firm, 
can be a potential CG problem, as will be further discussed in section 3.3.4.  
 
3.3.2 Family-owned firms vs. diffusely owned firms 
Most firms start their life with high insider ownership (Helwege, Pirinsky and Stulz, 2007).  
As they develop and grow, some firms evolve to become diffuse in ownership but some 
retain a highly concentrated ownership by the insiders throughout their life span. At a 
particular point in time, insiders (or managers) own a larger fraction of shares in some 
firms than in others (Mikkelson, Partch, and Shah, 1997; Denis and Sarin, 1999). Officers 
and directors of the firm are usually members of the same family.  Using a probit model 
and a moral hazard model, Helwege et al (2007) follow all firms that completed an initial 
public offering in the U.S. from 1970 to 2001. They find that stock market variables play 
an extremely important role in the dynamics of insider ownership. First, they observe that 
firms with greater stock market turnover are more likely to have diminished insiders 
ownership and more likely to become widely held. Second, firms with high book-to-market 
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ratios are less likely to become widely held. Third, the firm’s recent stock market 
performance will significantly increase the likelihood for the insiders to reduce their 
ownership. Moreover, insiders in the U.S. firms sell shares in substantial amounts and 
insider ownership fall steadily following an initial public offering (IPO). Helwege et al 
find that, 10 years after IPO, half of the sample firms in their study have less than 20% 
insider ownership.  
 
Helwege et al’s findings are in line with a previous study by Denis and Sarin (1999), who 
conduct a time-series study to examine listed firms over a 10-year period from 1983 to 
1992 in the U.S.  Denis and Sarin (1999) find that there is a subset of the sample firms, 
which experience substantial changes in ownership and board structure in individual firm-
years. They also find that such changes are correlated with one another and represent 
discrete shifts in ownership structure and board composition. They hence conclude that 
ownership and board structure changes are part of an adjustment process that re-allocates 
assets to different uses and to different management teams in response to a change in 
business conditions. 
 
Such phenomenon in U.S. is not found in other countries, particularly in Asia where firms 
are predominantly owned, controlled, and managed by families. Even after an economic 
shock in 1997, the firms in Asian countries might experience some changes in the board 
structure but their ownership remains highly concentrated in the hands of a few families 
(Claessens, Djankov and Lang, 2000). Claessens et al’s findings show that family-owned 
firms in Asia are able to maintain their concentrated ownership, and are less inclined to 
convert to diffuse ownership, even in difficult times. 
 
3.3.3 Family-owned firms and firm value  
In view of the prevalence of family ownership in the world apart from the U.S., U.K., and 
Japan, researchers are keen to find out if family-owned firms will out-perform non-family 
owned firms in terms of their market valuation or accounting measures. This sub-section 
discusses the advantages of family ownership in contributing to firm value as uncovered by 
extant research studies. In Section 3.3.4, the effect of an additional variable, corporate 
governance in family ownership, on firm value will be discussed. 
 
Previous literature has argued both for and against the claim that concentrated family 
ownership leads to more beneficial economic performance of a firm. Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997) point out that concentrated ownership gives the owners a strong incentive to 
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monitor the managers, thus reducing agency costs connected to hired hands in management. 
Concentrated ownership may also make the task of monitoring the managers easier.  
 
Anderson, Mansi, and Reeb (2003) argue that family ownership is associated with a lower 
agency cost of debt. In their study of Standard and Poor’s (S&P) 500 firms, they find that 
one third of their sample firms have continued family ownership by the founding families 
(i.e. the founding ownership) with an average holding of 19% of the firm’s shares. Since 
most founding families have the desire to pass the firm onto the next generations and are 
concerned with the reputation of the family and the firm, they are more likely than other 
shareholders to rank firm survival above wealth maximization. Under such circumstances, 
the divergence of interests between family shareholders and bondholders will be less 
severe than between diversified, widely dispersed shareholders and bondholders. A lower 
agency cost of debt follows. Anderson et al do find empirical evidence that such is the case: 
after controlling for the industry and firm effects, they find the cost of debt financing for 
family firms is approximately 32 basis points lower than in non-family firms. Family 
ownership is therefore regarded by bondholders as a company structure that protects better 
the bond investor’ interests. With a lower cost of debt financing, family owned firms stand 
in a much more competitive position in their investment environment than do the diffusely 
owned businesses.   
 
Anderson et al’s findings are echoed in the study by Klock, Mansi, and Maxwell (2005), 
who look into how a firm’s corporate governance affects its bondholders. Using a panel 
data of 678 industrial firms from the U.S. for the years 1990, 1993, 1995, 1998, and 2000, 
Klock et al study 1,877 firm-year observations and find that firms with highest quartile of 
strong takeover defences are associated with a lower cost of debt financing. Firms in the 
lowest quartile of takeover defences, on the other hand, are associated with a higher cost of 
debt financing. Their findings suggest that when families tightly control firms so that 
takeovers are hardly likely to happen, their costs of debt financing should be lower than 
those of non-family businesses. 
 
Villalonga and Amit (2006) propose that the study of family ownership’s impact on firm 
value should be decomposed into 3 components: family ownership, family control, and 
family management.  Using samples from Fortune 500 firms in the period 1994 to 2000, 
they find empirical evidence for the differential effect of family ownership, control, and 
management on firm value. They find that different forms of family ownership, control, 
and management make family firms more or less valuable. Family ownership creates value 
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only when it is combined with certain forms of family control and management.  Their 
result shows that descendant-CEOs destroy firm value whether or not the family has 
established control-enhancing mechanisms. Their findings shed new light of analysis of 
family-owned businesses and the firms’ valuation. 
 
The research findings quoted above indicate that family-owned firms benefit from lower 
agency costs and a lower cost of debt that contribute positively to firm value. Family 
ownership, however, creates value only when it is combined with certain forms of family 
control and management. While this detailed classification of family ownership by 
Villalonga and Amit (2006) may yield insightful analysis into the relationship between 
firm ownership and firm valuation, the present study does not attempt to do likewise for 
the Hong Kong firms, as most Hong Kong firms are always owned, controlled, and 
managed by the same family. The chairman, or the CEO, is usually the founder of the firm 
who has accumulated expertise in the field over a relatively long-term horizon. If the role 
of the CEO is taken up by another person, the incumbent person usually comes from the 
same family, and in most cases is selected from the second or third generation of the 
founder’s family. The chairman remains tightly in control of the firm through his/her status 
as the head of the family.  
 
In the next section, the corporate governance problems relating to a family owned business 
will be discussed. 
3.3.4 Family-owned firms and corporate governance  
Researchers have identified two facets of the core agency problem in listed firms. The first 
is the principal-agency problem that arises from the separation of ownership and control 
(Type I agency problems). The second is the agency problem that arises between 
controlling and non-controlling shareholders, which produces the potential for private 
benefits of controls to the controlling shareholder but not provided to the non-controlling 
shareholders (Type II agency problems) (Gilson and Gordon, 2003). Ali, Chen and 
Radhakrishnan (2007) find family firms in the U.S. face less severe Type I agency 
problems but more sever Type II agency problems than non-family firms. 
 
In a firm with majority family ownership, there may be yet another corporate governance 
problem that is quite distinct from the conventional agency problems. Nepotism may take 
place when executive appointments are made based on favouritism, family relationship, or 
social networking, but not on capability. The CEO (usually a parent or head of household 
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of the controlling family) may spread a sense of entitlement among family members, and 
“uses the firm’s resources to provide family members with employment, perquisites, and 
privileges that they would not otherwise receive” (Schulze, Lubatkin and Dino, 2003,    p. 
180).  
 
When firm-level nepotism is commonly accepted and widespread, there is a high 
likelihood for cronyism to prevail at an economy level. Research findings also suggest that, 
at a macro-economic level, countries with weak legal systems are particularly vulnerable to 
a loss of investor confidence if the firms are infested with cronyism-related agency 
problems. Under a legal regime with a weak minority rights protection, outsiders cannot 
hope for the courts’ decisions to shield them from majority shareholders’ expropriation, as 
the court may not rule against any moves by the majority shareholders that have been 
already stated and allowed by the corporation’s charter. Outside investors would need to 
rely on themselves, to reassess the likelihood, and the likely extent, of expropriation by the 
insiders and adjust the amount of capital they are willing to provide. The aggregate result is 
that when the economy faces a downturn, there will be a fall in asset values in those 
countries with weak legal protection, and a collapse of the country’s exchange rate, as 
evidenced in the 1997 Asian financial crisis (Johnson, Boone, Breach, and Friedman, 
2000).  
 
In their study of the 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis, Johnson et al posit a theoretical 
model that explains the macro level impact of weak corporate governance. If expropriation 
by the insiders increases when the expected rate of return on investment falls, then an 
adverse shock to investor confidence will lead to increased expropriation, lower capital 
inflow into the country, and greater attempted capital outflow from the macro economy. 
They present evidence that a weak enforcement of shareholder rights has first-order 
significance in determining the extent of exchange rate depreciation and the stock market 
collapse in that period.  
 
If the empirical evidence is pervasive, then the logic should apply at a micro-level to all 
investors, even if an economic crisis is not looming. Prudent outside investors in the same 
country may have every reason to reassess the likelihood of expropriation by a firm’s 
insiders, and adjust the price they are willing to pay for the firm’s shares, controlling for 
the level of legal protection within the country.  In Asia, family firms are notorious for 
putting the interests of the family above the interests of other stakeholders of the firm 
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(Wiwattanakantang, 2001).  Due to immense voting power and frequent involvement in 
management, families can often implement policies that benefit themselves but are 
detrimental to the firms’ performance (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 1999). As 
a result, shareholders’ interests may suffer.  Faced with this information asymmetry and 
the potential risk of being exploited, the outside investors are expected to seek more 
disclosure from these firms to assess the risk, to look for assurance from the insiders that a 
proper CG mechanism is installed to safeguard their investments, and to enhance their 
protection. Because the insiders of family-owned firms can easily expropriate the minority 
shareholders without breaking the law, it is natural for outside investors to become more 
cautious, and prudent, about investing in family-owned firms.  In addition to the legal 
rights that the minority shareholders are entitled, the outside investors also need to find 
ways to increase the monitoring of the family-owned business in which they have invested. 
 
As discussed in Section 2.4.2 of Chapter 2, the board of directors is generally regarded as 
the apex of the internal control system, vested with the power to “hire, fire, and 
compensate the CEO and to provide high-level counsel” (Jensen, 1993, p. 862). However, 
dominance of the board by family members, and entrenchment of family members in the 
executives, will undermine the effectiveness of the board in its monitoring of a family-
owned firm’s management. The presence of independent non-executive directors (INEDs) 
is therefore a necessary condition to exert effective monitoring of a family firm.    
 
To the outsider investors, the composition of the board in a family-owned firm may 
indicate how much emphasis a family-owned business would place on addressing its 
corporate governance issues. The composition of the board means whether there are family 
members sitting on the board as well as the proportion of the INEDs on the board. In the 
worst scenario of poor corporate governance, where the independent directors are 
compromised leading to a failure to perform their fiduciary duties to the fullest extent, the 
outside investors have a high likelihood of being expropriated. Investors are expected to 
refrain from subscribing to the firm’s shares, or discount the stocks accordingly. Firm 
value will be suppressed (Claessens and Fan, 2002; Beiner, Drobetz, Schmid, and 
Zimmerman, 2006).  
 
Conversely, if investors receive adequate information about the corporate governance of 
the family owned firms, their confidence in the investment will be enhanced. Good 
corporate governance instils investor confidence (Defond and Hung, 2004), and the 
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disclosure practices of corporate governance are positively related to firm valuation 
(Durnev and Kim, 2005).  When a family owned firm takes the initiative to make voluntary 
disclosure of the composition of the board, or when the firm decides to have installed a 
relatively larger proportion of independent directors than other similar family owned firms, 
it is providing a signal about its corporate governance. Strong corporate governance has 
been found to be positively linked with better firm performance for family-owned firms in 
Asia. Yeh, Lee, and Woidtke (2001) find empirical evidence in support of this argument in 
their study of 208 listed companies of Taiwan, which is a representative sample that covers 
73% of the total listed companies on the Taiwan Stock Exchange in 1993. They find that, 
within the family-controlled firms, the higher the independent director representation on 
the board, the higher is the relative firm performance in Tobin’s q and return on assets.  
 
3.3.5 Section summary 
This section has discussed the nature of family ownership, the costs and benefits of family 
ownership, its differences as compared with diffused ownership, and its prevalence outside 
the U.S., U.K., and Japan. A description of the incidence of family members sitting on the 
board of directors for family firms (particularly for the Hong Kong firms in this study) is 
presented. The relationship between family-owned firms and firm value is explored, and 
the impact of the corporate governance issues on firm value is analysed. In the next section, 
a discussion will be presented on the leverage of the firm. Prior literature has established 
that leverage can impact on firm value, and recent researchers suggest that leverage has a 
corporate governance role to play. As such, leverage is used as a control variable in this 
study (further discussion will be in Chapter 7).   
 
3.4 Leverage of the firm and corporate governance 
 
This study is concerned with the impact of corporate governance structure and practices on 
the valuation of a firm. As there are other variables that may have impact upon a firm’s 
value such as its leverage, it is useful to explore the linkage between leverage and firm 
value, which is discussed in Section 3.4.1 that follows.  Section 3.4.2 discusses the 
relationship between leverage and agency costs and reviews the extant literature on the role 
of leverage in curbing the agency problems of a firm. Section 3.4.3 summarizes prior 
studies on the linkage of leverage and ownership structure. Because agency theory (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976) predicts agency problems will arise when the ownership and control 
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of a firm’s resources are separate, how to monitor the agents (i.e., the managers) without 
incurring strenuous costs becomes a pressing issue both to the equity-holders and bond-
holders of a firm.  Section 3.4.4 explores the relationship between leverage and the 
external corporate governance mechanisms, and discusses how creditors’ rights can be 
protected at a market level. The section ends with a brief section summary. 
 
3.4.1 Leverage and firm value 
 
Finance literature has established that a firm’s capital structure (i.e. leverage) may affect a 
firm’s investment strategies, and hence its value. Myers (1977) demonstrates that excessive 
debt will induce managers to act in shareholders’ interests to forego positive net present 
value projects, giving rise to the ‘under-investment’ problem of debt financing which 
occurs when a firm has risky debt outstanding.  The manager will follow a different 
decision rule than the one in another company who has access to risk-free debt or who has 
no debt at all. Myers bases his argument on the reasoning that most firms are valued as 
going concerns. Such going-concern value reflects an expectation of continued future 
investment by the firm. However, such investment is discretionary, and the investment 
amount depends upon the net present values of opportunities as they arise in the future. If 
the future state is unfavourable, the firm declines to invest. In other words, part of the 
value of a firm is accounted for by the present value of options to make further investments 
on favourable terms.  Hence, for firms that have growth opportunities, debt has a negative 
effect on the value of the firm. 
 
On the other hand, there is a possibility of an ‘over-investment’ problem. As suggested by 
Jensen (1986) who argues that, when firms have more internally generated funds than 
investment opportunities with positive net present value, a firm’s debt will force the 
managers to pay out funds that might otherwise have been invested in negative net present 
value projects. In this sense, the presence of debt in a firm’s capital structure is useful 
because it mitigates the firm’s agency cost and prevents the managers from rewarding 
themselves by expanding the scale of the firm – even if by doing so it is detrimental to the 
shareholders. Hence, debt has a positive effect on the value of a firm.  
 
If the under-investment problem and the over-investment problem of debt financing are 
part of the agency problems arising from the separation of ownership and control of the 
firm, then an alignment of interests between the owners and the managers may help solve 
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the problem. Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) suggest that managerial ownership of 
equity may have a positive or a negative effect on a firm’s value: the Tobin’s q of a firm 
first rises, then declines, and finally rises as the managerial ownership increases. Morck et 
al use a ratio of long-term debt to a firm’s total replacement value of its plant and 
inventories to control for the possible impact of a firm’s leverage on its market valuation. 
Their empirical test results find a small, negative, relationship between the firm’s leverage 
and q, although the coefficient is not significant.  
 
McConnell and Servaes (1995) carry out an empirical study to investigate the connection 
between the roles of equity ownership, debt, and corporate value.  In their sample of 1,943 
U.S. listed firms for years 1976, 1986, and 1988, they find that firms with few growth 
opportunities have a Tobin’s q positively correlated with the level of debt financing. For 
firms with high growth opportunities, q is negatively correlated with the level of debt 
financing. In other words, a firm’s value (as proxied by the Tobin’s q) can be affected by 
its leverage but is also mitigated by the growth opportunities the firm is facing.  
 
Myers (1984) proposes a modified pecking order theory for the capital structure of the firm. 
It is stated that as firms are unwilling to pass by any positive NPV (net present value) 
projects, or to issue stock at a price they think is too low, they will cover part of their 
normal investment outlays first with its retained earning, and if insufficient, with new 
borrowing. Since investment opportunities fluctuate relative to internal cash flow, a firm 
will from time to time use up its power to issue safe debt. When this occurs, the firm will 
issue less risky securities first (i.e., debt), then convertible bonds, and finally issuing 
common stock. A prudent firm will avoid any material costs of financial distress and try to 
maintain some reserve borrowing power as financial slack so that it can issue safe debt if it 
needs to. It follows that the average debt ratios will vary from industry to industry, because 
asset risk, asset type, and the need for external funds also vary with industry. In a similar 
vein, a long-term industry average of debt ratio will not serve a meaningful target for 
individual firms in that industry as each firm may be at different stages of development. 
Hence, Myers concludes that no target debt-equity ratio exists (ibid, 1984; 2001).  
 
If no industry-wide target debt ratio exists even for firms that belong to the same industry, 
then the analysis of a firm’s valuation should take the individual firm’s contemporary state 
of debt into consideration. Each firm’s value depends on its future profitability and 
potential risks. As the financial leverage risk is firm specific rather than conforming to an 
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industry norm, it is necessary to control for this firm-specific variable in the specification 
of the model explaining the relationship between corporate governance and firm value. In 
this study, the firm’s leverage is considered as a control variable.  
 
3.4.2 Leverage and agency costs 
 
Conventional corporate finance literature has established that a firm’s leverage has an 
impact on firm value. Extant finance researchers add to leverage’s function that debt helps 
to monitor agency costs (Grossman and Hart, 1982). Jensen (1986) proposes a free cash 
flow theory, which hypothesizes that when cash flow is high in a firm, the managers tend 
to invest in negative net present value (NPV) projects rather than pay out cash. The 
managers value investment because their perquisites increase with investment. If there is 
cash flow left over (i.e., free cash flow) after the firm has exhausted its positive NPV 
projects, it creates incentives for managers to over-invest. Jensen (1986) states that the 
proportion of debt in a firm’s capital structure helps to keep at bay the manager’s self-
serving interests in empire building.  Leverage has a role to play in mitigating a firm’s 
agency costs. In the extreme scenario of a firm’s bankruptcy (i.e., a firm being unable to 
repay its debts), managers will lose the benefits of control or suffer from a loss of 
reputation.  Debt can therefore create an incentive for managers to work harder, consume 
fewer perquisites, and make better investment decisions in order to reduce the probability 
of bankruptcy. In a similar vein, Stulz (1990) suggests that a firm’s leverage mitigates 
agency problems between outside shareholders and insiders.  
 
Such disciplinary function of debt is challenged by Zwiebel (1996), who points out that 
very often managers make financial decisions on a firm’s leverage at the beginning of each 
financial period. A ‘good’ project with positive net present value often becomes known 
later. It means that managers make investment decisions after the firm’s leverage state is 
relatively determined. Managers commonly undertake capital structure decisions without 
any apparent extraordinary external threat; and they appear to be capable of reversing 
previous financing decisions. Under such circumstances, the argument by Grossman and 
Hart (1982) that the potential threat of bankruptcy has a disciplinary effect on manager’s 
self-serving behaviour and has a function of monitoring agency cost is sound only ex post, 
not ex ante.  Zweibel (1996) proposes a dynamic model of leverage such that managers 
voluntarily choose a debt ratio that responds simultaneously to the threat of a takeover (due 
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to bankruptcy) and to the ambition of expanding their empire (also to be discussed in 
Section 3.4.4).   
 
Zweibel’s dynamic model is based on the premise that managers derive utility both from 
retaining control and from undertaking new projects (ibid, 1996, p.1199), be the projects 
good or bad. As a counter-argument, Zweibel puts forward an extreme scenario in that if 
bankruptcy is imminent regardless of what investments are undertaken, a manager will 
never refrain from bad projects.  His model assumes that the market for corporate control is 
always in action, the availability of a good project is independent across periods of time, 
and such a good project becomes known after the capital structure decisions are made 
(often at the beginning of each financial period). Some of these assumptions are tenable. 
Managers voluntarily choose the level of debt, knowing full well that there is a risk of 
bankruptcy if the debt financing is used improperly. The agency costs to the managers, 
therefore, are the likelihood of managerial replacement when a bankruptcy or takeover 
subsequently occurs, should a bad project be undertaken. Debt, as argued by Zweibel, links 
up the future retention of managers with the current as well as the anticipated future 
investments.  
 
Zweibel’s dynamic model is not yet empirically tested to the full.  Jiraporn and Gleason 
(2007) examine the strength of shareholder rights and the financial leverage of 4,638 firms 
across 5 years (1993, 1995, 1998, 2000, and 2002) and they observe a negative relation: 
firms where shareholder rights are weak carry more debt.  They interpret their findings as 
consistent with agency theory, which predicts that firms with weak shareholder rights (i.e., 
higher scores in their governance index signifying more restrictive anti-takeover 
mechanisms) incur higher agency costs and thus carry more debt.  In their conclusion, debt 
is used as a means to contain agency costs in firms where shareholder rights are restricted.  
 
In this study, a firm’s leverage is treated as a control variable in the analysis of a firm’s 
corporate governance and its market value. Leverage has a function in monitoring agency 
costs.  The level of a firm’s leverage may indicate the extent or seriousness of agency costs 
prevalent in a firm, even though it may have been determined ex ante as stated by Zweibel 
(1996).  Furthermore, when the managers themselves are predominant owners of the firm 
(such as the case of firms in Hong Kong), the potential threat of losing managerial 
entrenchment seems low even if bad investment projects are undertaken. In the presence of 
a predominant shareholder, the motivation does not seem strong for the managers to 
choose voluntarily a level of leverage as a means to commit themselves to forgo bad 
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investments so as to prevent a potential takeover. Nevertheless, leverage and agency costs 
are both influenced by the decisions of the managers, who are also subject to the 
monitoring by the board of directors, investor beliefs about firm quality, as well as the 
corporate governance mechanisms available to the external fund-suppliers. 
 
As the board of directors represents the interests of owners of the firm in monitoring the 
manager’s actions, the ownership of the firm may have an impact on a firm’s decisions on 
leverage. Section 3.4.3 below explores the relationship between leverage and ownership, in 
particular the case of concentrated ownership. Section 3.4.4 is to discuss the relationship 
between leverage and corporate governance mechanisms. 
 
3.4.3 Leverage and ownership 
 
Harris and Raviv (1991) point out that a firm’s debt financing can tackle two types of 
conflicts identified in the agency theory of Jensen and Meckling (1976), namely, the 
conflicts between shareholders and managers, and the conflicts between debt-holders and 
equity-holders. In tackling the conflicts between shareholders and managers, the use of 
debt can commit the managers to pay out cash, reduces the amount of surplus cash 
available to managers to engage in empire building, prevents excessive perquisites 
consumption, and ameliorates managers’ probabilities in identifying value-increasing 
projects.  
 
In tackling the conflicts between debt-holders and equity-holders, the presence of debt can 
restrict the ‘asset substitution effect’ whereby equity-holders become reckless and invest in 
very risky projects, hoping that the potential loss in value of the equity from poor 
investment can be more than offset by the gain in equity value captured at the expense of 
debt-holders.   Bond contracts, therefore, are expected to include features or covenants that 
attempt to prevent asset substitution by requiring some interest coverage, or prohibiting the 
firm from investing in new, unrelated lines of business.   
 
Harris and Raviv (1991) find that debt levels are higher in those industries in which 
opportunities for asset substitution are more limited, ceteris paribus (ibid, 1991, p. 301). 
The same argument can be extended to individual firms: for firms with limited 
opportunities for asset substitution, debt levels are higher, ceteris paribus. Furthermore, a 
more transparent style of management can limit opportunities for asset substitution. Hence, 
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more voluntary disclosure of a firm’s corporate governance may drive a higher level of 
leverage. For firms with a predominant family owner, they have a longer–term reputation 
to protect. They tend to be under-diversified in their portfolios and have less incentive for 
further asset substitution (see Anderson, Mansi, and Reeb, 2003; Klock, Mansi, and 
Maxwell, 2005 as discussed in Section 3.3.3). Consequently, leverage tends to be higher 
for family businesses than for firms that are diversely owned, ceteris paribus.  
 
With the prevalence of concentrated ownership in families (such as firms in Hong Kong), 
external debt-holders have yet another concern: how well will the debt-holders be 
protected in case of a default by the firm? Will the court uphold the rights of debt-holders 
prior to the rights of equity-holders?  What stance will the institutional framework take 
towards bankruptcy? Are there any governmental policies that would prohibit the market 
for corporate control from functioning? The strengths of external corporate governance (as 
discussed in Chapter 2) will come into play in determining a firm’s level of leverage. 
Section 3.4.4 below discusses the possible impact of the external corporate governance on 
a firm’s leverage. 
 
3.4.4 Leverage and external corporate governance 
 
External mechanisms of corporate governance generally refer to the legal system, the 
management labour market, and the takeover markets (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Denis 
and McConnell, 2003; Boubakri, Cosset and Guedhami, 2005). This section discusses the 
relationship between leverage and external corporate governance mechanisms in the prior 
literature. The detailed provisions of legal protection mechanisms will be presented in 
Chapter 4 below. 
 
Pressure from the takeover market may force firms to increase leverage. As has been 
discussed in Section 3.4.2, Zwiebel’s (1996) dynamic capital structure model posits that 
managers may take on debt so as to commit to paying out future cashflows. By doing so, 
the managers may make the firm unattractive to raiders and reduce the threat from the 
hostile bidders. His theory has so far not been empirically tested.  
 
For firms operating under weak legal protection of investors, Himmelberg, Hubbard, and 
Love (2002) hypothesize that weak investor protection may be the cause for the insiders to 
hold a higher proportion of the firm’s equity. Due to the conflicts between insiders and 
outsiders and the reluctance of the outsiders to finance the firms under poor legal 
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protection, the insiders may retain a larger equity share than they would in a perfect risk 
diversification strategy. Himmelberg et al predict that such a higher share of insider 
ownership, and the resulting exposure of insiders to higher idiosyncratic risk, will lead to 
under-investment and higher cost of capital for a firm in a weak investor protection 
environment. They document a negative relationship between the degree of investor 
protection and the fraction of equity held by insiders for firms in 38 countries.  
 
An implication of the results of Himmelberg et al’s (2002) study is that when weak 
investor protection goes hand in hand with high insiders’ equity share, success of takeover 
by raiders should become difficult to come by. With greater equity shares, the insiders will 
have more voting power to fence off a hostile takeover bid for fear of the loss of their 
entrenchment, even though the bidder’s offer can be beneficial to all the shareholders 
eventually. Furthermore, in a weak equity investor protection regime, the debt-holders are 
treated more favourably than the equity-holders hence a higher leverage level of firms is 
expected. 
 
Legal protection of shareholders and creditors varies with country. In countries with strong 
statutory legal rights such as the U.S., shareholders are protected by law to exercise their 
rights to vote on important corporate matters such as the mergers and liquidations. These 
include the right to appoint auditors and to vote directors into the board of directors 
(Shleifer and Vishney, 1997). In countries with weaker legal systems, shareholder-voting 
rights are violated more flagrantly (e.g., Russia).  Managers may threaten to layoff those 
employees who are also shareholders unless these shareholders agree to vote with the 
management. They may deliberate in notifying shareholders about the annual meetings, or 
try to prevent non-concomitant shareholders from voting based on technicalities (ibid, 
1997, p. 751).  
 
In terms of creditors’ rights, the variation may even be bigger across countries.  Some 
countries offer stronger creditor rights than other countries, such as the right to grab assets 
that serve as collaterals for the loans, the right to liquidate the company when the company 
fails to repay its debts, the right to vote in the decision to re-organize the company, and the 
right to remove managers in re-organization. Restrictive measures can also be built into the 
covenants to prohibit the borrowing firms from investing in negative present value projects, 
or forcing the firm to sell asserts that are worth more in alternative use.  
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In sum, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) point out that creditors are likely to be afforded more 
effective legal protection than equity holders.  The crucial feature of the creditors’ legal 
rights is that concerted action by multiple creditors is not required against a delinquent 
debtor. If any of the creditors is not repaid, the individual creditor has the right to 
investigate the accounts of the firm, and grab its collaterals. Failure to repay triggers the 
transfer of control over the assets from the borrower to the lender without the need of a 
class action, as is usually the case of diverse outside equity-holders. 
 
To conclude, the above-mentioned discussion suggests that the leverage of a firm is 
influenced by the external corporate governance mechanisms, such as the likelihood of 
takeovers and the statutory rights granted to the creditors. External corporate governance 
mechanisms can provide effective monitoring of a firm’s management. Very often, by 
enforcing investors’ rights, these external corporate governance mechanisms may 
substitute for a firm’s internal corporate governance mechanisms. However, the degree of 
legal protection of debt-holders and equity-holders varies across countries; as exemplified 
by the varied incidents such as takeovers and acquisitions for corporate control, court cases 
on commercial disputes, class actions by stakeholders, and the judicial reviews on investor 
protection regulations in different markets. Unlike a cross-country study, this thesis is a 
within-country study of listed firms in Hong Kong and the external corporate governance 
factors are not the focus of this research. They are presumed to exert the same influence on 
all sample firms without exception as all firms in this study are domiciled in Hong Kong 
and are operating in the same legal protection environment. This study analyses the sample 
firms’ market value and their voluntary disclosure of internal corporate governance 
mechanisms and practices but controls for their leverage.   
 
 
3.5 Summary 
 
This chapter discusses a firm’s ownership structure, its leverage, and how they may affect 
the firm’s corporate governance mechanisms and practices.   Empirical studies have shown 
that, in many markets, ownership of modern days’ corporations is not necessarily dispersed 
as perceived by Berle and Means (1932).  Firms with concentrated ownership are not 
uncommon.  A special type of concentrated ownership, namely, family ownership, is 
highlighted for discussion. The agency problems as posited by Jensen and Meckling (1976), 
which are derived from dispersed ownership and from the separation of ownership and 
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control, may not be applicable to firms with concentrated ownership. Entrenched managers 
and the expropriation of minority shareholders are the more pressing issues of concern for 
the investors instead.  In the case of family ownership, appointment of family members to 
the board of directors or to key managerial positions appears to weaken minority 
shareholder’s monitoring efforts of the insiders. 
 
The relationship between ownership structure and firm performance is also discussed in 
this chapter. Prior literature on this relationship has been reviewed. The findings of the 
previous empirical studies are ambiguous as to whether a linear relationship exists between 
the level of insider ownership and the performance of a firm. Research studies in recent 
years seem to suggest that the relationship between insider ownership and firm 
performance is subject to the influence of some mitigating factors such as the presence of a 
dominant family owners and the duality of chairman and CEO (e.g., Chen, Cheung, 
Stouraitis, and Wong, 2005; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006).  A section has also been dedicated 
to discussing family-ownership, as firms owned and controlled by families seem to give 
rise to different types of agency problems from those firms with diffuse ownership. 
 
This chapter has also reviewed prior studies on the relationship between ownership 
structure and dividend payout of a firm. It summarizes the findings of the salient empirical 
studies which give evidence to support LLSV’s (2000b) claim that dividends have a 
corporate governance role to play, although each of LLSV’s (2000b) two agency models of 
dividends has received its own backing. The empirical evidence so far seems to suggest 
that both dividend models are feasible, subject to the joint influence by external corporate 
governance mechanisms and the ownership structure of the firm. 
 
This thesis aims at contributing to this literature by analysing the impact of voluntary 
disclosure of corporate governance mechanisms and practices (which include, among 
others, the separation of roles of chairman and CEO) on firm value, controlling for some 
firm-specific characteristics such as insider ownership and leverage (to be further 
discussed in Chapter 7). It also explores the relationship between the voluntary disclosure 
of corporate governance and dividend payouts of firms so as to test whether voluntary 
disclosure can help reduce the information asymmetry between the insiders and the 
outsiders, thus be used as a substitute for a monitoring device of the insiders, under a 
strong legal investor protection regime.  
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The next chapter, Chapter 4, presents a discussion on extant studies on legal protection of 
minority shareholders and how it relates to a firm’s corporate governance. Particular 
attention will be drawn to how the legal system can reinforce investors’ confidence in a 
capital market. In an open economy such as Hong Kong where a strong legal protection for 
minority shareholders exists in the presence of concentrated family ownership, the 
outsiders may need to resort to additional measures of corporate governance to protect 
their rights and enhance their confidence. These measures such as voluntary corporate 
governance disclosure, cross-listing, and analyst following of a firm, will be discussed in 
Chapter 4.  The motivations for voluntary disclosure and how it affects a firm’s valuation 
will also be explained. Finally, the argument that a firm’s very act of disclosing voluntarily 
its corporate governance can affect a firm’s valuation will be introduced.   
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Chapter 4:  Relationship between Legal Protection, 
Corporate Governance, and Voluntary Disclosure  
 
4.1 Introduction 
This thesis aims to analyse the relationship between the voluntary corporate governance 
(CG) disclosure of a firm and its valuation from a shareholder’s perspective. In this study, 
any disclosure by the firm in addition to the mandatory requirements as stated by the 
market regulatory institutions is referred to as voluntary disclosure. Disclosure by a firm is 
often governed by the legal environment in which the firm operates. The legal framework 
determines the type and the level of mandatory disclosure by a firm in the annual reports. 
In theory, when a firm fully complies with all the legal disclosure requirements, it has 
fulfilled its communication obligations to its investors and regulatory institutions. There is 
no need for voluntary disclosure. Yet, in practice, many firms are observed to voluntarily 
disclose in their reports more information than what is statutorily required by the legal 
framework of their business environments (Lang and Lundholm, 1993).   
 
This chapter examines the impact of legal protection of minority shareholders on corporate 
governance (CG). Section 4.2 reviews the literature on how legal protection of investors is 
related to the CG framework of a country. It discusses the significance of a strong legal 
protection regime to the growth and development of a financial market and its usefulness 
in reinforcing investors’ confidence in that market.  The effect of culture on investor 
protection is also discussed. Section 4.2 will also suggest some indicators of the CG of a 
firm (e.g., dual listing and analysts’ following) for minority shareholders to ascertain their 
protection under a concentrated family ownership and in a strong legal protection 
environment such as Hong Kong.   Section 4.3 reviews the literature on the motivations for 
a firm to voluntarily disclose non-financial information and presents the measurement of 
voluntary disclosure. The argument that a firm’s very act of disclosing voluntarily its CG 
information can affect a firm’s valuation will be discussed. In addition to the legal 
environment, there are other firm-specific characteristics variables that may affect a firm’s 
internal CG structure. They are discussed in Section 4.4.  Section 4.5 summarizes the 
discussion in this chapter. 
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 4.2 Legal protection and the corporate governance framework 
4.2.1 Literature review of studies of legal protection and corporate 
governance 
 
The legal strand of corporate governance studies argues that the legal framework of an 
economy determines the level of legal protection that is available to the investors. La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (LLSV, 1998) posit that the legal system is a 
mechanism which is fundamentally important to the governance of firms in an economy. 
The law and its enforcement in an economy determine the rights of the shareholders, and 
how well their rights are protected.  Yet, these legal rights of shareholders differ from 
country to country, and are dependent upon each country’s jurisdiction and its general legal 
framework. As argued by LLSV, weak laws and weak protection of investors have cost 
implications for an economy in that “firms probably face difficulty raising equity finance, 
since minority investors fear expropriation by managers and concentrated owners” (LLSV, 
1998, p.1151). 
 
Studies by legal researchers support the importance of legal protection to the development 
of capital market (LLSV, 1997, 2000a; Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Roe, 2002; Stulz and 
Williamson, 2003; Claessens, 2006).  In an imaginary nation whose law poorly protects 
minority stockholders from a stock issuer who wishes to extract value from small minority 
stockholders, a potential buyer fears that the majority shareholder would later channel 
value away from the buyer. The fear becomes so great that the prospective minority 
stockholder does not pay the pro rata value for the stock. Only when the share price comes 
with a deep discount will the prospective buyer be tempted. On the other hand, if the 
discount is deep, the majority stockholder may not be willing to sell. When such impasse 
continues, concentrated ownership will persist, and stock markets do not develop (Roe, 
2002, p. 238).   Roe claims that the critical pre-condition to developing modern stock 
markets is “a foundation of solid corporate and securities laws that protect stockholders 
from over-reaching dominant majority stockholders or controlling managers” (ibid, 2002, p. 
233). Without such protection, securities markets will not arise.  
 
The legal approach to corporate governance (CG) put forward by Roe (2002) and LLSV 
(1998, 2000a) suggests that legal protection of investors from overreaching dominant 
majority stockholders is critical to the development of securities markets. They advocate 
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strongly that the legal environment of a country has a significant impact on ownership 
structure, CG, and firm performance.  Roe (2002) suggests that, to induce separation of 
ownership from control of a firm, it takes more than a high-quality corporate law such as 
strong fiduciary duties, strong doctrines against self-dealings, and a capable 
judiciary/enforcement institution. LLSV argue that variations in legal protection and law 
enforcement at country-level will lead to variations in the firms’ ownership structure, 
availability and cost of external finance, dividend payout, and market valuation of firms 
(ibid, 1997, 1998, 2000a). The legal approach to CG states that the key mechanism is the 
protection of outside investors – shareholders and debt-holders alike – through the legal 
system, which consists of both the laws and their enforcement.   
 
Subsequent empirical studies have supported their views by showing that much of the 
cross-country ownership differences and CG variations of firms are due to the differences 
in legal protection of minority shareholders (LLSV, 1997, 2000a, 2002). LLSV (2000a) 
argue that investor protection is crucial in view of the extensive expropriation of minority 
shareholders and creditors by the insiders (i.e., the managers and the controlling 
shareholders) found in many countries. Different countries have different origins of law. 
As a result, different legal systems evolve which give rise to variations in the ability of a 
country to uphold investor’s rights in five main aspects. Derived from the residual control 
rights framework by Grossman and Hart (1988), these rights are based on investors’ equity 
holding of a firm. They refer to the shareholders’ ability to exercise their CG power to (i) 
change directors; (ii) force dividend payments; (iii) stop a project that benefits insiders at 
the outsiders’ expense; (iv) sue directors and get compensation; and (v) to liquidate the 
firm and receive the residual proceeds (LLSV, 2000a, p.5). When these investor rights are 
extensive and well enforced by regulators or courts in a market, investors are willing to 
finance firms in that market. In contrast, when the legal system fails to protect outside 
investors, “corporate governance and external finance do not work well” (ibid, 2000a, p. 5). 
 
LLSV (2000a) classify the global legal systems into four main categories according to their 
legal origins: (i) the English common law system; (ii) the French civil law system; (iii) the 
German civil law system; and (iv) the Scandinavian law system. By examining the 
summary measures of an anti-director rights index (ranging from 0 to 6) and a creditor 
rights index (ranging from 0 to 4) of 49 countries, LLSV posit that stronger investor 
protection regimes offered by the English common law system are associated with more 
effective corporate governance. LLSV conclude that “the nature of investor protection is 
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deeply rooted in the legal structure of each country and in the origin of its laws” (ibid, 
2000a, p. 24). Their findings are supported by other researchers (Johnson, La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes, and Shleifer 2000; Coffee, 1999a). 
 
Johnson, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2000) study well-known court cases of 
expropriation of minority shareholders by the controlling shareholder in Western European 
countries (France, Italy, Belgium, and Germany) to identify differences in the courts’ 
approach to tunnelling1 in civil law countries and common law countries. They find that 
European civil-law courts and common-law courts approach cases of tunnelling differently. 
It is common for the courts to use two broad principles to assess insiders’ business conduct, 
namely, the duty of care, and the duty of loyalty (i.e., fiduciary duty) (Lorsch and MacIver, 
1989). The duty of care means that directors should gather necessary information before 
making decisions. The duty of loyalty means that directors should be careful to act 
appropriately when there are conflicts of interests (Smith, 2003, p.87).  Johnson et al (2000) 
find that civil law courts emphasize on the predictability of the law and rely on statutory 
rules to govern any self-dealing behaviour (as a form of tunnelling) of the majority 
shareholders.  The courts often see the expropriation of minority shareholders by the 
controlling shareholder in a business transaction as consistent with directors’ duties. Any 
suspicious self-dealing transactions are assessed in light of their conformity with statutes, 
not on the basis of their fairness to minorities. Generally speaking, Johnson et al conclude 
that courts in civil law countries are found to be more accommodating than courts in 
common law countries with respect to tunnelling behaviour, although, in most countries, 
laws prohibit certain kinds of tunnelling. 
 
In contrast, according to Johnson et al (2000), common law courts emphasize the notion of 
fairness to minority shareholders as a broad principle that goes beyond statutes. Common 
law judges tend to adopt a lesser standard of proof in conflict-of-interest situations and be 
more willing to uphold the principle of duty of loyalty to the minority shareholders. They 
often show receptive hearing to those minority shareholders who challenge the transactions 
of subsidiaries within the same business group on grounds of fairness.  Johnson et al 
conclude that civil law countries are less protective of minority shareholders than are 
common law countries.  
 
                                                 
1 Johnson et al define ‘tunnelling’ as the expropriation of minority shareholders, the transfer of assets and 
profits out of firms for the benefit of those who control them (ibid, 2000, p. 22). 
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Coffee (1999a) documents evidence using data from Polish and Czech firms that both the 
incentives to assert legal remedies and the availability of legal remedies had contributed to 
the systematic looting of companies by their controlling shareholders. He observes that 
minority shareholders are given greater protection from fraud and expropriation under 
common law systems (i.e., Poland) than civil law systems (i.e., the Czech Republic). He 
attributes such difference in investor protection to the notion that “civil law regimes leave 
public shareholders in a system of dispersed ownership exposed to a “winner-take-all” 
scramble for control, in which the losers can expect future expropriation by the winner” 
(ibid, 1999, p.38). Nevertheless, Coffee does not consider the laws within the common law 
regime countries (e.g., the U.S. and the U.K.) as homogenous. Coffee acknowledges that, 
on closer examination, there are as much the similarities in judicial style and legal 
enforcement that may separate the U.S. and the U.K. as unite them legally. 
 
Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2003a) find a robust link between legal origin and stock 
market development in their study of 73 former colonies.  French Civil Law countries are 
found to have significantly lower levels of stock market development than British 
Common Law countries after controlling for other country characteristics such as religious 
composition, degree of ethnic fractionalization, legislative competition, and years of 
independence, among other variables. In another study using data collected from 54 
countries spanning over French civil, German civil, Scandinavian civil and British 
common law origins, Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2003b) explain that an economy’s 
legal origin matters in financial development.  While the judges in civil law countries 
simply apply the law, the judges in common law countries interpret the law. The civil law 
judges emphasize on exerting rigid state control whereas the common law judges are 
granted substantial discretion in their jurisprudence. Thus, different legal origins nourish 
different legal traditions, resulting in a difference in their ability to adjust efficiently to 
ever-changing socio-economic conditions.  
 
Beck et al (2003b) also explain that an economy’s financial development is affected by a 
difference in legal origin via two channels, namely, the political channel and the 
adaptability channel. The political channel contends that legal traditions differ in the 
priority they attach to private property rights against the state rights. While the English 
common law evolved to protect private property owners against the crown, the French and 
German civil codes in the 19th Century were constructed to solidify state power by placing 
the prince above the law. Different degrees of state dominance of the judiciary gradually 
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result.  The adaptability channel is one in which the judges are empowered with substantial 
discretion to respond to unforeseen and changing conditions case-by-case. By adapting to 
new circumstances, inefficient laws are challenged in the courts. Through repeated 
litigation, outdated and inefficient laws are replaced by efficient rules. As the common law 
legal traditions adapt efficiently over time, the gap between the needs of contracting parties 
of the economy is minimized.  Common law system therefore emerges a system that 
conduces to the development of a financial market more effectively than other rigid legal 
systems. 
 
To conclude, this section reviews the literature on the relationship between legal 
environment and investor protection. Recent researchers, mainly financial economists, 
have found systematic differences among nations in investor protection, investor voting 
rights, and ownership structure. These differences seem to correlate closely with the 
strength of the legal protections given to minority investors (Coffee, 1999a, p. 2).  As 
pointed out by Coffee, the strength of legal protection varies systematically with the nature 
and origins of each nation’s legal system.  Common law legal systems seem to outperform 
civil law legal systems in terms of promoting ownership dispersion and capital market 
growth (ibid, 1999a). Hong Kong is an economy that practices common law. It has been 
recognised by researchers for its high level of investor protection compared with other East 
Asian countries. Yet, there is high concentration of ownership as well. This study will use 
Hong Kong firms as samples to study the relationship between a firm’s voluntary CG 
disclosure and firm’s valuation. The relationship is tested on firms subject to a CG 
framework supervised by common laws with a strong legal investor protection legal 
orientation. The next section, Section 4.2.2, will examine how the CG framework of an 
economy at large impacts on the development and growth of a capital market and its 
financial institutions. Understanding this linkage will help appreciate how the policy-
makers of an open economy (e.g., Hong Kong) prescribe the boundary of the legal CG 
framework for investor protection, and set the mandatory disclosure level for the firms to 
attain.  
4.2.2 Importance of corporate governance to the growth and 
development of a capital market 
 
According to a study by Claessens (2006), both institutions (i.e., banks, financial 
intermediaries, and courts) and rules (i.e., laws, regulations, and standards) matter in the 
evolution of a country’s corporate governance framework. In his opinion, institutions do 
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not arise in a vacuum, but are affected by the rules in the country or the world. On the 
other hand, laws and rules are affected by a country’s institutional set-up. Thus, both 
institutions and rules are endogenous to other factors and conditions in the country (such as 
the ownership structures, the role of the state in passing the legislations through the 
political economy process, etc.). He identifies five channels through which corporate 
governance affects a country’s financial growth and development (ibid, 2006, p. 99): 
(i) increased access to external financing by firms, which can lead to greater 
investment, higher growth, and more employment creation; 
 
(ii) lower cost of capital and associated higher firm valuation, which makes more 
investments attractive to investors and leads to growth and employment; 
 
(iii) better operational performance, through better allocation of resources and better 
management, which creates wealth; 
 
(iv) reduced risk of financial crises, a particularly important effect, as financial 
crises can impose large economic and social costs; and 
 
(v) better relationships with all stakeholders, which helps improve social and 
labour relationships and areas such as environmental protection. 
 
In order to bring about the above-mentioned effects, the rules and regulations environment 
of an economy needs to provide adequate protection to outside investors at a macro-level. 
At firm-level, individual firms also need to implement adequate internal corporate 
governance mechanisms and communicate the quality of governance to the outside 
investors.  In other words, not only do firms need to implement governance provisions, but 
they also have the incentive to communicate their state of governance (e.g., shareholders’ 
voting rights, creditors’ re-organization and liquidation rights) to the outside investors, to 
signal to outsiders that they are providing additional protection to what is being stipulated 
by the legal regime.  
 
On the other hand, potential outside investors are to a large extent willing to finance a firm 
only because their rights are protected by the law. This is so because, unlike the employees 
or the suppliers of the firm who remain continually useful and are thus placed at a lesser 
risky level of being mistreated by the insiders, the outside investors are more vulnerable to 
expropriation. Thus, the need to signal to the outsiders is especially important when firms 
are operating within a weak legal protection system where company laws, bankruptcy laws, 
takeover laws, and securities laws provide inadequate protection to outside 
investors/creditors. When the legal system does not protect outside investors, corporate 
governance and external finance simply would not work well (LLSV, 2000a, p. 5).  
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 Indeed, weak legal protection of outside investors will lead to a higher cost of equity for 
the firms. Using variables related to three dimensions of capital market governance – 
earning opacity, enforcement of insider trading laws, and short-selling – of 33 countries 
from 1969 to 1998, Daouk, Lee and Ng (2006) construct a capital market governance 
(CMG) index and examine the association between changes in that index and changes in (i) 
the cost of capital; (ii) market liquidity (i.e., trading volume and market depth of the stock 
market); and (iii) pricing efficiency (i.e., IPO under-pricing). They document empirical 
evidence that, after controlling for other influences, an increase in the CMG index is linked 
to a decrease in the cost of equity, an increase in market liquidity, and an increase in 
pricing efficiency. Specifically, improved security laws are associated with decreased cost 
of capital, higher trading volume, greater market depth, increased U.S. ownership, and 
reduced IPO under-pricing. Improved market-wide corporate governance does bring 
desirable benefits to individual firms. 
 
Daouk et al’s findings are consistent with the general view that investors associate bad 
capital market governance with increased risk: if investors are suspicious of a market’s 
governance, they will be prompted to reduce their trading activity and demand greater 
premiums for holding equity stock. Indeed, the implications of their findings can also 
apply to individual stock within an economy: when investors have heightened concerns 
over a firm’s corporate governance, they will be expected to refrain from buying the firm’s 
stock, or demand greater discounts in the stock price before they are prompted to invest in 
such a corporation. The share price of the firm will be adversely affected. Similarly, even if 
the investors have agreed to finance a firm with dubious corporate governance, they will be 
expected to look for higher dividend payouts from the firm to compensate for their 
increased risk. This thesis specifically tests for these expectations, using Hong Kong firms 
as samples and controlling for the firm-specific characteristics such as profitability, 
leverage, and sales growth. 
 
Whilst a cross-country study yields insight into which and why legal system provides 
stronger legal protection to investors, a cross-sectional, within-country analysis can be 
more pertinent than cross-country analyses in lessening the spurious effect of legal system 
on corporate governance structure and practices. Firms operating within the same country 
face the same legal protection and institutional constraints, or lack thereof. Conducting 
analysis at firm level substantially increases the power of the tests and permits the 
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researcher to compare the strength of the relation across firms in the same country, which 
controls for many economic, legal, and political variables (Lang, Lins, and Miller 2004, p. 
593). In addition, a country-specific analysis avoids endogeneity problems between 
ownership structure and institutional environments (Joh, 2003, p. 289) whereas cross-
country analyses may under-estimate the importance of country-specific laws and 
regulations.  This thesis adopts a within-country approach (i.e., within Hong Kong) to 
examine the firm’s performance of firms (measured by Tobin’s q as in many extant studies) 
operating with the same legal institutions, external corporate governance environments, 
macro-economic development stages, accounting standards, and to a large extent, similar 
ownership structure not only across firms but also across the years for individual firms.  
Chapter 5 of this thesis will summarize the overall state of corporate governance 
framework of Hong Kong vis-à-vis other East Asian countries, as described in extant 
studies by current corporate governance researchers. Meanwhile, the following section will 
discuss culture, which some researchers consider as important in determining the level of 
voluntary disclosure by firms.  
  
4.2.3 The effect of culture on disclosure and investor protection 
 
Stulz and Williamson (2003) argue that a country’s culture should not be overlooked when 
one attempts to explain the differences in investor protection that occur across countries. 
Culture, according to Stulz and Williamson, is defined as “transmission from one 
generation to the next, via teaching and imitation, of knowledge, values, and other factors 
that influence behaviour” (ibid, 2003, p.314). In their study, they use religion and language 
as proxies for a country’s culture. Furthermore, they use a country’s openness to 
international trade as a third explanatory variable to account for the differences in investor 
protection. Their empirical findings based on data on 49 countries suggest that the culture 
proxies generally have more explanatory power for how a country enforces investor rights 
than does the country’s legal origin. While language is irrelevant except for accounting 
standards, religion is correlated with law enforcement. Moreover, openness is positively 
correlated with creditor rights and with the enforcement of rights, but is negatively 
correlated with shareholder rights. Stulz and Williamson (2003) conclude that they find 
support for the view that culture does matter in investor protection, but there is also 
evidence that the impact of culture is tempered by openness.  
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This thesis uses Hong Kong firms as samples to explore the relationship between the 
voluntary disclosure of CG mechanisms and practices and the firm valuation. Hong Kong 
has most of the population (95%) being Chinese. Prior research shows that the disclosure 
orientation of firms owned by Chinese families in Asia does not encourage voluntary 
disclosure of corporate information due to high levels of collectivism and power distance, 
thus exhibit high tendency of adherence to rules but weak inclinations to voluntary disclose 
(Chau and Gray, 2002; Ball, Robin and Wu, 2000; Chow, Chau and Gray, 1995; Gray, 
1988). Stulz and Williamson’s study (2003) states that culture has more explanatory power 
on investor protection of an economy than its legal origin.  If their statement is valid, Hong 
Kong offers an all the more interesting and meaningful arena to investigate investor 
protection and corporate governance framework in view of the co-existence of a non-
disclosure culture of Chinese businessmen and a strong investor protection regime that 
encourages a high level of disclosure by firms.  Moreover, the sample firms in this study 
are selected based on the criteria that they are either domiciled in Hong Kong, or with their 
major market being Hong Kong so that the laws of Hong Kong apply in case of any legal 
disputes. Further discussion of the corporate governance framework of Hong Kong will be 
presented in Chapter 5, while the next section, Section 4.2.4, is to discuss other measures 
not related to the legal framework but may enhance investors protection, some of which 
are being used in the empirical models in this study.  
 
4.2.4 Other non-legal measures that may enhance outside investors 
protection 
 
Though legislation and legal enforcement are generally considered as the most effective 
mechanism to protect minority investors (see discussion in section 4.2.1 above), outsiders 
still face an information asymmetry problem about the quality of internal corporate 
governance mechanisms installed, implemented, and maintained by the insiders. Being not 
as much informed as the insiders, the outsiders of a firm are concerned about whether their 
interests are adequately protected. They would like to be assured that the insiders (i.e., the 
managers) would not abuse their investments in a firm. In the presence of a predominant 
and concentrated family/management ownership, the outsiders’ desire for additional 
assurance of fair treatment by the majority shareholders is even stronger, as the 
predominant shareholder has enough votes to pass any resolutions in his/her favour on the 
board meetings and the annual general meetings. With a predominant shareholding present, 
the conventional external mechanisms such as rule of law and the market for corporate 
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control may not be sufficient in providing adequate or effective protection to the minority 
shareholders. 
 
Nonetheless, in addition to the external corporate governance, there are other measures that 
can proxy for the enhanced protection of minority investors from potential expropriation 
by the controlling shareholders. Previous studies have suggested, among others, four such 
measures that can help indicate the level of investor protection offered by a firm, namely, 
analyst following; dividend payout; the extent of voluntary disclosure; and dual listing (or 
cross listing) of the firm.  Each of them will be discussed in the following sub-sections in 
turn. 
 
(i) Analyst following 
Lang, Lins, and Miller (2004) argue that analysts serve a monitoring role. Analysts provide 
relevant information to investors and act as informational intermediaries between the firm 
and the market. In the course of providing earnings forecasts, target prices, and buy-sell-
hold recommendations to their clients, analysts gather information from various sources – 
both external and internal to the firm – to assess the firm’s investment potential and 
economic viability.   
 
Using data on 2,094 firms across 27 countries, Lang et al (2004) find evidence that 
analysts are less likely to follow firms with poor internal governance, and this effect is 
more pronounced when external shareholder protection is weak.  In contrast, analysts are 
likely to follow a firm if it demonstrates progress in corporate governance (provided it is 
communicated to the analysts) because of more protection from exploitation by the 
predominant shareholders. Lang et al therefore argue that corporate governance plays an 
important role in analysts’ willingness to follow firms. They suggest that analysts play a 
potentially important role in governance because, like securities regulators and auditors, 
analysts have the ability to enhance transparency of a firm and therefore have the potential 
to provide an additional layer of oversight of the firm’s management. Their argument is 
consistent with the hypothesis of Jensen and Meckling (1976), who suggest that financial 
analysts play an additional monitoring role of the firms when agency relationship problems 
exist.  
 
Lang et al (2004) also find empirical evidence that analysts are less likely to follow firms 
that have potential incentives to withhold or manipulate information, especially when the 
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family/management group is the largest control rights block-holder.  Their evidence is 
consistent with the hypothesis that controlling shareholders and insiders may wish to 
withhold or manipulate information to conceal their private benefits of control from 
outside shareholders.  
 
Lang et al’s (2004) study also shows that increased analyst following is associated with 
higher valuations, particularly for firms likely to face governance problems. However, a 
firm’s higher valuation per se may lead to more analysts following because supply-side 
analysts are obliged to recommend their selected firms to their clients based on significant 
changes in potential market returns.  Bhushan (1989a) argues that more analysts will be 
attracted to follow a firm if the firm has a large firm size (private information about a large 
firm has more value than a small firm), a disperse ownership (generates more potential 
share transactions), varied market returns (private information is more valuable with firms 
with higher return variability), and complexity of business (leading to higher information 
acquisition costs). Therefore, the relation between analyst following and firm valuation is 
well noted by researchers, but the direction of the relation is not clear. 
 
Bushman, Piotroski, and Smith (2004) document evidence of a positive correlation 
between analyst following, disclosure, and investor protection. Based on the Centre for 
Financial Analysis and Research’s (CIFAR) International Accounting and Auditing Trends 
study of 1,000 industrial firms over 46 countries in 1995 (CIFAR 1995), Bushman et al 
(2004) document empirical evidence suggesting that analysts might be attracted to firms 
that exhibit some specific attributes (such as cross listing on U.S. markets). They conclude 
that from the governance perspective, analyst following, ownership structure, and legal 
protection appear to be complements of each other. They suggest that firms in 
environments with better legal protection of minority shareholder rights tend to have less 
concentrated ownership and more analysts following. Hence, it is possible that an indolent 
analyst may follow the crowd in recommending a firm based on the above-mentioned 
attributes even if the analyst fails to find any significant improvement in the firm’s internal 
governance standard. Therefore, the number of analyst following is only at best a 
necessary condition, but not a sufficient condition, to attest to a firm’s quality of corporate 
governance in regards to protection of shareholder rights. It does not necessarily initiate a 
better state of corporate governance on the part of the firm’s management, but it may 
reflect that the state of corporate governance is acceptable to the investors.  Because the 
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causation of analyst following to firm valuation is not clear, this study does not use analyst 
following as an explanatory variable. 
 
(ii) Dividend Payout
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (LLSV, 2000b) argue that in a world of 
severe agency problems between insiders and outsiders, dividends have a useful role to 
play in corporate governance. Dividend payout can be regarded by investors as a return of 
corporate earnings by the insiders. By paying out cash as dividends, the insiders are no 
longer able to use these corporate earnings for their own benefits.  LLSV (2000b, p. 4) 
describe vividly that dividends, regarded by investors as “a bird in the hand”, are better 
than retained earnings (i.e., “a bird in the bush”) because retained earnings might never 
materialize as future dividends (i.e., “can fly away”). Moreover, payment of dividends now 
compels firms to come to capital markets in the future to raise external funds when 
investment opportunities arise. LLSV’s view follow Easterbrook’s (1984) arguments that 
dividends can keep a firm in the capital market by “uncoupling from profits” (Easterbrook, 
1984, p.657) and at the same time “keep managers’ noses to the grindstone” (ibid, p.657) 
by adjusting shareholders’ risks without necessarily jeopardising the risks of the debt-
holders’. Through the mechanism of dividend payouts, the outside investors are given an 
opportunity to exercise some control over the insiders. Dividend payout therefore has a 
function to deal with agency problem, hence has a role to play in corporate governance.  
 
In most common law regimes such as the U.K. and Hong Kong, shareholders cannot 
directly demand a specific level of dividends. However, they can let their voice be heard 
and raise their concern for low dividend payout in the general meetings of the firm if they 
are dissatisfied with the dividend policy. Furthermore, shareholders can also collectively 
vote for a representative to sit on the board of directors to address their concern.  If they 
are disappointed about the pro-longed unsatisfactory level of dividend payout, they can 
take a final step to vote with their feet, i.e., sell off their stakes on the market. The 
collective action of these disgruntled shareholders will cause the share price of the firm to 
drop, which will not be in the interest of the managers/predominant shareholder of the firm. 
As such, dividend payout serves as a powerful measure that can offer enhanced investor 
protection, albeit indirectly manifested through the potential drop in a firm’s share prices 
(and hence its market value).  This study uses dividend payout as a dependent variable in 
examining the relationship between a firm’s dividend payout and its voluntary CG 
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disclosure, controlling for the firm-specific variables such as profitability, leverage, and 
sales growth. 
 
(iii) Extent of voluntary disclosure
It has been mentioned in Section 4.2.3 of this study that firms in Asia, where the Chinese 
businessmen dominate, operate within a cultural environment that typically does not 
encourage voluntary disclosure of information about the firms. The high concentration of 
business ownership by families and family groups reflects the importance of ‘family’ in 
traditional Chinese ideology. In a family setting, personal networking (i.e., guanxi) built on 
informal relationships plays a stronger role than formal legal contracting.  Internal, off-the-
record, communication with other stakeholders within the same family reduces the need 
for public disclosure (Ball, Robin, and Wu, 2003).   With such a pre-condition, minority 
outside investors stand the most to lose because, unlike the insiders or family members, 
they may be kept uninformed and may have to rely on public disclosure to reduce their 
information asymmetry with the firm.  If a firm is to signal to the outsiders that it is 
treating all investors fairly and equitably, it will have incentives to reduce such information 
asymmetry between the insiders and the outsiders by engaging in more voluntary 
disclosure than what is stipulated by the laws and regulations.  The extent (or 
comprehensiveness) of the voluntary disclosure is therefore a strong indicator of a firm’s 
willingness to offer shareholder protection, in particular if the disclosure is about the 
installation of corporate governance mechanisms before a firm is required by law to do so.   
 
This study uses voluntary disclosure of CG information as a proxy for investor protection. 
One may argue that the disclosure of CG mechanisms is at best measuring the extent of 
mechanisms that are put in place, not necessarily implying a better quality of the firm’s CG.   
However, a firm’s determination to install and voluntarily disclose its governance 
mechanisms earlier, and more than anybody else does, can be a valid proxy to the 
management’s commitment to a high standard of the firm’s CG. A high commitment 
should give rise to devoted actions to achieve the desired outcome; ceteris paribus, leading 
to a better quality of CG than that of other firms’ CG with a lower commitment. 
 
In measuring the extent or comprehensiveness of CG disclosure of a firm, this study 
follows previous researchers in assigning equal weighting to each provision of the CG 
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mechanism that is installed and disclosed2 by the firm.  Crude as it may appear to be, most 
equal-weighted measures apply a horizontal summation of the number of 
provisions/mechanisms that are disclosed by the firm in binary format (i.e., disclosed or 
not disclosed) to construct a composite index or score (e.g., see Bebchuk, Cohen and 
Ferrell, 2008; Beiner, Drobetz, Schmid and Zimmermann, 2006; Black, Jang and Kim, 
2006; Brown and Caylor, 2006; Cremers and Nair, 2005; Gompers, Ishii and Metrick, 
2003). A higher disclosure score thus signifies a higher extent of disclosure.  Using an un-
weighted score permits an analysis independent of the perceptions of a particular user 
group, which vary from user to user or with different purposes (Chow and Wong-Boren, 
1987). Many information users, such as analysts and minority shareholders, also rely on 
such a composite index to arrive at their assessment about the quality of the corporate 
governance, although they are aware of the risk of assessing just for form rather than 
substance (CLSA, CG Watch 2003, p.7). Further discussion of the motivations and 
limitations of the measurement of voluntary disclosure will be presented in Section 4.3.2. 
 
(iv) Dual listing (cross listing) 
When a firm elects to cross list its shares on another stock exchange in a foreign country, it 
subjects itself to both foreign and domestic listing regulations. In return, cross listing may 
secure additional, and likely, cheap, equity capital for new investment to broaden the 
shareholders’ base.  It may also enable controlling shareholders to divest on a liquid 
market, or prepare for new acquisitions, to enhance firm’s reputation (Pagano, Roell, and 
Zechner 2002). Cross listing comes with additional costs, and the management of a cross-
listed firm has to weigh the benefits against the costs of such discretionary action before 
proceeding to do so. In terms of investor protection, the choice of listing location of a firm 
has a signalling effect. For example, a firm already listed on an exchange with low 
domestic regulatory standards that decides to secure listing in a stock market with high 
regulatory standards shows a commitment to disclosure and governance standards to the 
current and potential shareholders (Fuerst, 1998).  By subjecting itself voluntarily to tighter 
standards, a firm from countries with poorer legal protection standards shows its 
determination to reduce agency cost of external finance and hence can often secure a lower 
cost of capital (Stulz, 1999).  Reese and Weisback (2002) also argue that managers of 
firms that decide to cross-list signal to the market a reduction of their private benefit.   
                                                 
2 It may be argued that a firm may have installed some CG mechanisms but may choose not to disclose.  It 
may even be suggested that a firm may disclose some CG mechanisms that it has not installed.  Though these 
possibilities may not be ruled out, in practice the likelihood of such incidents is so low in a scenario where 
disclosure is voluntary, not mandatory, that it is not considered in this study. This study assumes that a firm 
will disclose voluntarily its CG mechanisms that it has installed, no less and no more. 
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Hence, cross listing can be construed, and perceived, as an indicator of an enhanced level 
of corporate governance for a firm. It is used in this study as a control variable in the 
analyses of the empirical models.  
 
Empirical research studies have shown that firms that trade on more than one stock 
exchange are likely to have better corporate governance (Klapper and Love, 2004; Pagano, 
Roell & Zechner, 2002; Karolyi, 1998; Saudagaran, 1988). Klapper and Love argue that, 
since reporting standards and investor protection in the U.S. are much higher than in most 
other countries, firms in emerging markets would be required to improve their corporate 
governance provisions in order to list on the U.S. stock exchanges. This is because listed 
shares on a U.S. exchange are subject to many Securities Exchange Commission laws and 
regulations that protect minority shareholders. Their argument finds support from Coffee 
(1999b), Stulz (1999), and Reese and Weisbach (2002) who share the view that cross 
listing on another exchange, particularly in the U.S., provides a mechanism by which 
foreign firms can voluntarily subject themselves to some additional shareholder protection 
under that foreign jurisdiction. Because cross listing is most likely to be voluntary and 
almost invariably a costly exercise, by so doing firms signal their higher corporate 
governance quality to investors through greater disclosure and transparency, more stringent 
accounting standards, and commitment to comply with more stringent governance 
standards to protect foreign investors.  In return, cross-listed firms tap into cheaper capital, 
broader shareholder base, and higher firm visibility.3
 
 
Another argument which supports the claim that cross listing is used as a signalling device 
for good corporate governance is provided by Lang, Lins and Miller (2003) and Doidge, 
Karolyi, and Stulz (2004). Lang et al argue that firms that cross list in U.S. markets are 
“bonding” themselves to an increased level of disclosure and scrutiny (ibid, 2003, p. 318) 
because when compared to other countries, the U.S. has a more demanding litigation 
environment; the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has increased enforcement 
power; and the U.S. generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) demand enhanced 
disclosure and reconciliation. Moreover, cross- listed firms face more scrutiny from 
international investors, more pressure to provide guidance and scrutiny from international 
auditors than they would have in their home markets. Cross listing, therefore, is a credible 
                                                 
3 For instance, Ferreira and Matos (2008) document empirical evidence that foreign institutional investors 
exhibit strong preference for firms that are cross-listed on a U.S. exchange,  and have external visibility, high 
foreign sales and analyst coverage. 
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commitment to increased disclosure. A cross-listed firm cannot easily renege on its 
commitment if later on it turns out to have some undesirable bad news to hide. From a 
reputational standpoint, it would cost the firm dearly if the firm opts for de-listing from a 
foreign stock market because the firm will be alienating its international investor base.  
Moreover, a commitment to increase a firm’s disclosure level, per se, should lower the 
information asymmetry component of the firm’s cost of capital (Leuz and Verrecchia, 
2000). 
 
Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2004) point out that cross listing can offer the firm access to 
more capital markets, thus a lower cost of capital, a larger shareholder base, a higher 
liquidity of stock, and a reduction in risk premium. Cross listing in a more stringent legal 
protection regime (such as the U.S.) restricts the controlling shareholder’s ability to extract 
private benefits from the firm. The fact that a firm opts for cross listing therefore indicates 
that the controlling shareholder commits to lower consumption of private benefits of 
control. This is especially desirable when firms have valuable growth opportunities that 
cannot be exploited without raising external funds.  Doidge et al develop a model and find 
empirical evidence in support of such trade-off of giving up private benefits and 
capitalizing on the growth opportunities. They also document empirical evidence for a 
cross listing valuation premium (i.e., a higher Tobin’s q) for firms that cross list in the U.S. 
compared to firms that do not. Their findings suggest the valuation premium can be as high 
as 37% for firms that list on major U.S. exchanges, but would be smaller for over-the-
counter listings and private placements. Moreover, such premium is negatively related to 
the level of investor protection in the firm’s home country and persists after controlling for 
country-level factors and firm-specific characteristics. 
 
In the case of Hong Kong sample firms of this thesis, there is higher proportion of cross-
listing firms in the LargeCap firms group (75%) than the MidCap group (28%). The 
SmallCap firms group has the lowest proportion of cross listing (19%). This is consistent 
with the empirical evidence by Saudagaran (1988) who observes from his 223 sample 
firms from the U.S., Canada, Europe, and Japan that large firms are more likely to list 
abroad. His findings also indicate a positive correlation between the likelihood of foreign 
listing and each of the four variables, namely, the relative size of a firm in its domestic 
capital market; the proportion of its revenues generated in foreign countries; the percentage 
of its long-lived assets that are invested abroad; and the relative number of employees in 
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foreign subsidiaries. More detailed description of the characteristics of the Hong Kong 
sample firms will be presented in Chapter 5. 
 
4.2.5 Section summary 
This section has presented a review on literature discussing the inter-relationships between 
legal regime, CG framework, and the development of financial markets institutions. It has 
discussed literatures arguing that the survival of the capital market hinges upon the legal 
protection of investors. When the law does not provide minority investors with adequate 
protection from the expropriation of majority shareholders, investors will refrain from 
investing in the capital market. The capital market shrinks thus affecting the economy as a 
whole. 
 
Legal regime (i.e., the law and the quality of its enforcement) is important to minority 
shareholders because it specifies the rights the security holders have and determines how 
well these rights are protected. As stated by LLSV (2000a), investors use these rights to 
exercise their statutory power to change directors, force dividend payments, stop managers 
from indulging in self-interested projects, sue directors and get compensation, and 
liquidate the firm and receive the residual proceeds. Strong legal regime can enforce these 
rights better than weak legal regime. Hence, investor protection is higher in strong legal 
environment. 
 
Comparatively, the legal protection of minority shareholders is generally more effective in 
countries with common law origin than with civil law origin. In common law courts, the 
judges tend to interpret the laws in light of the circumstances of the law case rather than 
follow the rules doggedly. They adjust the laws with time to ever-changing socio-
economic conditions.  Prior research supports the view that differences in legal protection 
of minority shareholders account for much of the cross-country differences in ownership 
and CG variations of firms. 
 
Prior research also establishes that culture of an economy is a factor that influences the 
level of legal protection offered by that economy.  The openness of an economy to 
international trade is also positively correlated with enforcement of creditors’ rights. This 
study uses listed firms in Hong Kong as samples. Hong Kong has a common law legal 
origin mainly transplanted from the U.K.  Its population is 95% Chinese whose tradition 
and culture do not encourage high level of voluntary disclosure.  Yet, Hong Kong is the 
 114
world’s 12th largest trading economy.  It appears that the characteristics of Hong Kong 
mentioned above have both a positive and negative effect on investor protection for 
minority investors. It is against this background that this study examines the voluntary 
disclosure of CG of Hong Kong firms and its effect on firm valuation.  
  
This section also discusses other non-legal measures such as analysts following, dividend 
payout, dual listing, and voluntary disclosure of CG mechanisms that are commonly 
considered as useful in enhancing outsiders’ protection.  Analyst following helps to reduce 
the information asymmetry between the insider and outsider investors.  Dividend payout is 
used as a means by the minority shareholders to exert a demand for a reasonable return on 
their investments in the securities of a firm.  The extent of voluntary disclosure of the CG 
of a firm is a signal to the minority shareholders whether the firm is committed to treat its 
shareholders, majority or minority, in a fair and equitable manner. A firm’s determination 
to install and voluntary disclosure of information about its CG mechanisms on top of the 
mandatory requirements can serve a valid proxy to the management’s commitment to a 
high standard of the firm’s CG.  Dual listing, on the other hand, signals to the investors the 
firm’s willingness to be subjected to additional set of (and usually more stringent) 
reporting standards and disclosure requirements imposed by an extra stock exchange.  
These non-legal measures can be used as indicators of an enhanced level of investor 
protection. 
 
The following section, Section 4.3, will review previous literature on a firm’s voluntary 
disclosure, which is defined in this study as the disclosure of internal information of a firm 
not mandated by the legal regime but is made voluntarily by the corporate managers in its 
annual reports. Lang and Lundholm (1993) observe that some firms’ annual reports “go 
well beyond the required disclosures, while others are extremely stark” (ibid, 1993, p. 246). 
As its name suggests, voluntary disclosure is non-mandatory but is often costly. Section 
4.3 will explore the rationale for such behaviour by the managers by introducing the 
various theories as proposed by extant researchers, and presents the ways to measure the 
voluntary disclosure specifically related to a firm’s CG. 
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4.3 Voluntary disclosure of a firm’s corporate governance 
4.3.1 Motivations for voluntary disclosure 
 
Classic agency perspective depicts that the separation of corporate managers from outside 
investors involves an inherent conflict (Fama and Jensen, 1983b; Bushman and Smith, 
2001). Being the insiders, managers possess superior information about the firm that is 
unknown to the outsiders. When the owners of modern firms are not the managers that run 
the day-to-day business, information asymmetry arises. As discussed previously in Section 
4.2, corporate disclosure of such information is critical for the functioning of an efficient 
capital market. Therefore, the demand for information, both stipulated by regulations and 
voluntarily released by insiders, arises from information asymmetry and agency conflicts 
between managers and outside investors (Healy and Palepu, 2001, p. 406).  
 
Research studies have tried to understand the relationship between mandatory disclosure, 
voluntary disclosure and their relationship with a firm’s value. Disclosure is seen as a 
signal of firm value (Hughes, 1986). Better disclosure “can increase investor awareness of 
the firm, hence reduce the cost of capital and increase equity valuation” (Berglof and 
Pajuste, 2005, p.182).  If any disclosure beyond the mandated minimum is defined as 
“voluntary” disclosure, the study of voluntary disclosure literature “appears to offer the 
greatest opportunity for large increases in our understanding of the role of accounting 
information in firm valuation and corporate finance”(Core, 2001, p. 442).  
 
Healy and Palepu (2001) identify six motives that affect manager’s disclosure decisions for 
capital market reasons: (i) capital markets transactions hypothesis; (ii) corporate control 
contest hypothesis; (iii) stock compensation hypothesis; (iv) litigation cost hypothesis; (v) 
management talent signalling hypothesis; and (vi) proprietary cost hypothesis. Each 
hypothesis is discussed in turn as follows. 
 
(i) Capital markets transactions hypothesis 
This hypothesis suggests that managers will voluntarily disclose more if they have the need 
to make capital market transactions, e.g., to issue public debt or equity, or to acquire 
another company.  Managers do so because they want to reduce the information 
asymmetry problem, thereby reducing the firm’s cost of external financing. This 
hypothesis is supported by empirical studies by Lang and Lundholm (1993, 2000). They 
document that when firms are going to issue securities in the current and future periods, 
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there is a significant increase in disclosure beginning six months before the offering. The 
increase in disclosure relates particularly to the categories of disclosure over which the 
firms have the most discretion. Such disclosures are always welcome and would receive 
higher ratings by the analysts.  Similarly, Healy, Hutton and Palepu (1999) state that firms 
with increased analyst ratings of disclosures are found to have an abnormally high 
frequency of subsequent public debt offers.  The voluntary disclosures always seem to 
precede public offerings of either equities or debts. The above-mentioned studies lend 
support to the argument that voluntary disclosure aims at reducing the information 
asymmetry between the insiders and the outsiders. 
 
(ii) Corporate control contest hypothesis 
Either explicitly stated or implicitly implied in all managerial compensation contracts, 
boards of directors and investors will hold managers accountable for current stock 
performance. Directors’ duties are to supervise the managers, provide advice, and veto 
poor decisions. The board of directors is the investors’ “first line of defence against 
incompetent management” (Weisbach, 1988, p. 432), and by the power invested by the 
shareholders, the board has the responsibility to hire, fire, evaluate, and compensate the 
Chief Executive Officer (Jensen, 1993). It follows that the CEO turnover of a firm is linked 
to the poor performance of performance of its stock (Warner, Watts, and Wruck, 1988).  
  
However, Weisbach (1988) argues that the relation between the turnover of CEO and firm 
value may differ, depending upon whether the board of directors is dominated by insiders 
or outsiders. In the outsiders-dominated board scenario, Weisbach documents evidence to 
support a significant relationship between a rise in firm value and the resignation of CEO 
due to poor performance; whereas no similar relationship is found for boards that are 
dominated by insiders or boards that are mixed.  Weisbach reports that performance 
measures (i.e., stock returns of the firms in his study) are more highly correlated with CEO 
turnover for firms in which outsiders dominate the board than for firms in which insiders 
dominate. Based on his empirical tests, he concludes that outsiders-dominated boards 
engage in monitoring of the managers that improves firm value. His findings make it all 
the more interesting to find out whether, in family-owned firms with entrenched mangers 
who are family members of the predominant shareholders, outside directors are able to 
enhance firm value through effective monitoring of the managers. 
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According to Hermalin and Weisbach (1991), outsiders are added to the boards as external 
directors when the firms are performing poorly. Ownership and board changes are strongly 
related to subsequent top executive turnover (Denis, Denis and Sarin, 1997).  When 
managers are faced with the risk of job loss which often arises from poor stock/earnings 
performance, they are expected to adopt measures including voluntary disclosures to 
reduce the likelihood of under-valuation and to explain away poor earnings performance. 
 
This hypothesis for voluntary disclosure assumes that the board of directors will act 
diligently for all shareholders in monitoring the performance of the managers of the firm. 
In the case of family-owned firms where managers and majority shareholders also come 
from the same family, repeatedly poor firm performance may not necessarily cause 
executive turnover as frequently as expected. The risk of job loss is considerably less to the 
family-member managers than the ones who are employed professionally but have no 
family connection with the firm. Consequently, firms managed by family members may 
have weak motives for voluntary disclosure attributable to the fear of job loss. 
   
(iii) Stock compensation hypothesis 
Managers are often rewarded with stock-based compensation plans with the objectives to 
align their interests with the shareholders’ interests. These plans, which may include stock 
option grants or stock appreciation rights, may provide incentives for managers to disclose 
voluntarily. First, managers rewarded with stock-based compensation are interested in 
trading their stock holdings. They have incentives to make opportunistic voluntary 
disclosures to correct any mis-valuation of their stock prior to the expiration of their stock 
options awards (Aboody and Kasznik, 2000).  Second, by making voluntary disclosures, 
managers reduce contracting costs for new employees who are also entitled to stock 
compensations. Had there been any mis-pricing of the stock, stock-based compensation 
scheme may not be an efficient form of remuneration and the employees may demand 
additional compensation for bearing any risk associated with mis-valuation (Miller and 
Piotroski, 2000).  
 
(iv) Litigation cost hypothesis 
Voluntary disclosure by managers under this hypothesis suggests that managers do so for 
fear that various stakeholders may take legal actions against them for untimely or 
inadequate disclosures (Skinner 1994, 1997). On the other hand, litigation can potentially 
reduce managers’ incentives to provide more disclosure, particularly of forward-looking 
 118
information such as earnings forecasts. Legal system cannot distinguish effectively 
between unexpected forecast errors due to chance or due to deliberate management bias. If 
managers believe that the legal system penalizes forecasts made in good faith, they will 
tend to refrain from making voluntary disclosure.   
 
Empirical evidence on the litigation cost hypothesis is, however, mixed and inconclusive. 
Francis, Philbrick and Schipper (1994) find empirical evidence that contrasts Skinner’s 
(1994) hypothesis.  Out of 45 litigation samples, they find 28 cases (i.e., 62%) were based 
on an earnings forecast or a pre-emptive earnings disclosure, rather than on earnings 
announcement.  Out of 53 no-litigation firms, 46 firms (i.e., 87%) with comparable stock 
price declines actually announced an earnings decline in prior. Pre-disclosure does not 
seem to be a deterrent to litigation. 
  
(v) Management talent signalling hypothesis 
Trueman (1986) proposes a theoretical model which states that, by releasing an updated 
earnings forecast due to changes in the firm’s economic conditions, investors will assess 
more favourably the manager’s ability in recognizing such changes. Trueman’s underlying 
assumption is that the firm’s market value at the end of any period is a function of 
investors’ perception of the manager’s ability to anticipate future changes in the firm’s 
economic environment and adjust the firm’s production plan accordingly. It follows that 
the manager will be motivated to release earnings forecasts regardless of whether they are 
of good news or bad news. Trueman’s argument rests on the presumption that the 
manager’s disclosure is not because of the nature of the revised expectation on the firm’s 
earnings in a period but rather is the manager’s desire to inform investors that he or she has 
received new information about the period’s earnings. As commented by Healy and Palepu 
(2001), so far there is no empirical evidence to either support or refute this hypothesis. 
 
(vi) Proprietary cost hypothesis 
This hypothesis states that firms’ decision to disclose information is influenced by the 
concern that such disclosures can damage their competitiveness in the product market. If 
there is potential threat against their competitive positions, firms will have an incentive not 
to disclose proprietary information (Verrecchia, 1983; Wagenhofer, 1990; Darrough and 
Stoughton, 1990; Feltham and Xie, 1992; Darrough, 1993; Gigler 1994).  
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Proprietary cost hypothesis differs from the previous five hypotheses in that it assumes 
there are no conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders. Disclosure will 
always be credible, and therefore the costs and benefits of disclosure, and the economic 
forces that constrain full disclosure, are the focus of attention under this hypothesis.   
 
Notwithstanding the motives and incentives from the insiders in making disclosures, it can 
be concluded from empirical research findings that voluntary disclosure does have an 
impact on firms with respect to three areas: (i) improved stock liquidity (Welker, 1995; 
Healy, Hutton, and Palepu, 1999; Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000); (ii) reduced cost of capital 
(Botosan, 1997; Botosan and Plumlee, 2002) and (iii) increased information intermediation 
(Bhushan, 1989b; Lang and Lundholm, 1993; Francis, Hanna and Philbrick, 1998). 
 
In his literature review paper on disclosure, Verrecchia (2001) comments that a truly 
comprehensive theory of disclosure should recognise the roles of efficiency, incentives, and 
the endogeneity of the market process because it involves interactions among diverse 
investor agents (ibid, 2001, p.100). Information asymmetry inhibits investment, making it 
more costly for a firm to engage in business activities (ibid, 2001, p.173). Through the 
reduction in the information asymmetry component of the cost of capital, disclosure is 
linked to efficiency, incentives, and the endogeneity of the market process. A commitment 
to greater disclosure will reduce information asymmetry. 
 
4.3.2 Measurement of voluntary disclosure of corporate governance 
structure and practices 
 
Section 4.3.1 has explored the motivations for a firm’s voluntary disclosure as identified 
by various researchers. Although the subject content of these studies mainly focuses on the 
manager’s voluntary disclosure of earnings forecast and/or segment reporting, the same 
hypotheses, principles, and theories can serve the study of a firm’s voluntary disclosures of 
corporate governance (CG) equally well. Like earnings forecast or segment reporting, the 
information of a firm’s CG practices is useful to outside investors.   Unlike voluntary 
disclosure of earnings forecast or segment reporting which can be explicitly measured and 
quantitatively reported, there is a lack of consensus in the measurement of a firm’s CG 
(Bhagat and Bolton, 2008, p. 259). 
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In CG disclosure studies, it is common to use a metric to proxy the degree of disclosure. 
For instance, Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) construct an equally weighted 
governance index of 24 corporate governance provisions compiled by the Investor 
Responsibility Research Centre (IRRC). Those provisions are largely about anti-takeover 
provisions such as the presence (or absence) of poison pills (i.e., blank check preferred 
stock), golden parachutes, classified boards, cumulative voting rights, and super-majority 
rules in approving mergers. Gompers et al examine the firm’s reported profile in the IRRC 
books and code all provisions as simply “present” or “not present” (ibid, 2003, p. 113) to 
construct their governance index. For every firm, they add one point for the presence of 
every provision that restricts shareholder rights (i.e., increases managerial power). The 
governance index is then the sum of points for the existence of each provision. It has a 
possible range from 1 to 24; thus a higher index will be implying more restrictive 
shareholders’ rights. 
 
Similarly, Cremers and Nair (2005) classify the firm-level governance provisions into 
internal mechanism and external mechanism.  For example, institutional blockholders and 
the board of directors are regarded as internal mechanism. Takeovers and the market for 
corporate control are considered as external mechanism. Cremers and Nair then construct 
an alternative takeover index to proxy a firm’s governance. The index consists of 3 
components that are critical to takeovers, namely, the existence of classified boards, poison 
pill, and restrictions on shareholders to call special meetings. Cremers and Nair deduct one 
point for the presence of each component so that the index has a value ranging from 0 to 3, 
with a lower value implying higher protection against takeovers and hence a lower quality 
of external governance. Their empirical findings show that the external mechanism does 
not operate alone. Internal and external governance mechanisms work together as 
complements to affect a firm’s governance, and are empirically associated with long-term 
abnormal returns of the firm (ibid, 2005, p. 2862). 
 
The measure for corporate governance disclosure in both studies by Gompers et al (2003) 
and Cremers and Nair (2005) only captures the disclosure of a small part of a firm’s CG 
practice, namely, the anti-takeover mechanisms. Other studies tend to adopt a composite 
index approach by incorporating the disclosure of other attributes of a firm’s governance. 
For example, Ho and Wong (2001) employ a survey questionnaire and the feedback from a 
sample of 92 financial analysts and 98 Chief Financial Officers to identify 20 CG attributes 
that a firm should voluntarily disclose in the annual reports. Equal weighting is then 
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assigned to each attribute that is disclosed to come up with an “importance-adjusted 
relative disclosure index” (RDI). The RDI is computed by dividing the actual number of 
attributes disclosed by the maximum possible number of disclosure for a firm (i.e., net of 
those attributes not relevant to the firm’s business) to proxy for the overall state of 
voluntary disclosure. 
 
Not all disclosure studies assign equal weighting to each corporate governance attribute or 
provision, however. For example, Klein, Shapiro and Young (2005) adopt the governance 
index prepared by the Canadian Globe and Mail newspaper in their investigation of CG 
disclosure, family ownership, and firm value of Canadian companies. The overall index 
has a maximum value of 100, and is computed by summing four sub-indices: (a) board 
composition, (b) shareholding and compensation policies, (c) shareholder rights policies, 
and (d) disclosure policies. Weights of 40, 23, 22, and 15 per cent are assigned to these 
four sub-indices respectively. The Report on Business (ROB) section of The Globe and 
Mail claims to have developed such measures based on a “tough set of best practices culled 
from the corporate governance guidelines and recommendations of U.S. and Canadian 
regulators, as well as major institutional investors and associations” (McFarland, 2002, p. 
B6). 
 
It can be seen from above discussion that various users of annual reports may accord 
different significance to various corporate governance attributes. Moreover, the 
significance of the attributes to the same user may vary over time. There has not been a 
theoretical basis to justify unequal weights assigned to sub-indices or elements within each 
sub-index. As such, current researchers tend to assign equal weighting to each attribute in 
their corporate governance disclosure study (e.g., Black, Jang, and Kim, 2006; Bhagat and 
Bolton, 2008). Consequently, this study will adopt an equal weighting approach in 
constructing the voluntary CG disclosure score (CGDscore) to measure the sample firms’ 
disclosure in their annual reports (more description on CGDscore will be presented in 
Chapter 8). 
 
4.3.3 Section summary 
The voluntary disclosure of CG structure and practices of Hong Kong firms can best be 
studied in light of the characteristics of the firms, the overall legal and accounting regimes 
of Hong Kong, and the relationship of disclosure and the firm valuation.  It has already 
been discussed in Section 3.4.1 that the main incentive for voluntary disclosures is to 
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reduce the information asymmetry between the insiders and outsiders of the firm, thereby 
lowering the firm’s cost of external capital. It follows that, for those firms with small 
capitalization that do not have access to cheap, external capital, voluntary disclosures about 
the firms’ CG may be an easy way to obtain such funding. Even for the medium/large 
capitalization firms where cheap external funding may not be a major concern, voluntary 
disclosure of their CG practices may help alleviate the litigation risks, reduce the volatility 
of stock price fluctuations, and enhance the management talent signalling effects which 
will have an impact on the firms’ valuation.   A study of the extent of voluntary CG 
disclosure by the firms, and the variations in the CG disclosure across the firms, has 
significant economic and policy values. 
 
This concludes the discussion in Section 4.3. The following section, Section 4.4, reviews 
the literatures by prior researchers who have identified some variables that can also affect 
the internal CG of a firm. These variables are related to the firm characteristics, rather than 
the socio-economic or legal environments.  They are discussed in the next section because 
prior research has used them as control variables. Some of these variables will also be 
selected as control variables in the empirical models of this study. 
 
 
 
4.4 Other firm characteristics variables affecting internal corporate 
governance  
 
4.4.1 Firm-specific business variables 
As has been previously discussed in Section 4.2.4, researchers have identified four 
indicators of investor protection as measures to gauge a firm’s state of corporate 
governance (CG). They are, namely, analyst following, dividend payout, the extent of 
voluntary disclosure, and dual listing of the firm. Useful as they may seem to the outside 
investors, these indicators describe the state of a firm’s governance. They are not the 
factors that drive the management to achieve the state of governance within the firm.    
 
Prior theoretical CG studies have suggested other variables that may exert influence on the 
firm’s management in designing and implementing the firm’s internal corporate 
governance system. For instance, Himmelberg, Hubbard and Palia (1999) identify seven 
variables that proxy for the firm characteristics influencing a firm’s contract environment 
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with the managers and the scope for managerial discretion, which in turn affect the state of 
a firm’s CG. These variables include:  
1) firm size; 
2) capital intensity;  
3) free cash flow; 
4) R & D intensity;  
5) advertising intensity;  
6) gross investment rates; and 
7) market power.   
 
Such variables are useful in the analysis because they are observable variables that “relate 
to potential moral hazard and influence optimal managerial stakes” (ibid, p. 362). 
Himmelberg et al claim that these variables drastically improve the R2 statistic in their 
empirical models.  A brief introduction on some of the important variables is presented 
below. 
 
Firm size (proxied by the logarithm of firm sales) is included as a control variable because 
it may have an effect a priori on the scope of moral hazard (ibid, p. 364). Large firms tend 
to have greater monitoring and agency costs. On the other hand, large firms are likely to 
employ more skilled managers who are consequently wealthier and may afford a higher 
level of managerial ownership. On the other hand, large firms’ management and the rating 
agencies may enjoy economies of scale in monitoring, which leads to a lower optimal level 
of managerial ownership.  
 
The capital intensity, proxied by capital-to-sales ratio, is used to control for the relative 
importance of fixed (or ‘hard’) capital in the firm’s inputs. Gertler and Hubbard (1993) 
suggest that firms with a greater concentration of fixed capital will generally have a lower 
optimal level of managerial ownership. Gross investment rate, as measured by the ratio of 
capital expenditures to the capital stock, is to control for the possible link of high growth 
and opportunities for discretionary projects.  The ratio of operating income to sales is 
employed to measure market power. The free cash flow (being the difference between cash 
flow and spending on value-enhancing investment projects), also serves as a proxy for 
market power (Jensen (1986) suggests that the higher is a firm’s free cash flow, all else 
being equal, the higher is the desired level of managerial ownership). 
 
While the above seven variables may be pertinent to Himmelberg et al’s (1999) study, 
others researchers offer other selection of explanatory variables that account for 
differences in a firm’s performance and its corporate governance. For instance, Short and 
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Keasey (1999) classify their explanatory variables into (i) ownership variables and (ii) 
control variables in explaining the relationship between the managerial ownership and the 
performance of firms: 
(i) Ownership variables: 
a) Percentage of shares held by directors; 
b) Percentage of shares owned by institutions owning 5% or more; 
c) Percentage of shares held by other external ownership interest. 
 
(ii) Control variables (to control for other potential influences on the performance 
of firms): 
a) Firm size (proxied by the logarithm of total sales); 
b) Sales growth; 
c) Debt ratio; 
d) Research & development expenditure scaled by total assets. 
 
Firm size is a control variable because it has potential to affect a firm’s performance 
through 2 avenues: (a) financing effect and (b) entry barriers. Larger firms may find it 
easier to generate funds internally and to access funds from external sources. When the 
cost of capital is reduced, a larger firm may be allowed to invest into more profitable 
projects. On the other hand, the larger firms enjoy economies of scale which help create 
entry barriers to potential competitors. Both will lead to beneficial effects on the firm’s 
performance. 
 
Sales growth is used to control for the impact of the growth on the firm’s performance and 
for the potential linkages between the firm’s performance, financing structure, and growth 
(Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, 1988; McConnell and Servaes, 1995).   
 
The debt ratio is included to control for the possibility that the debt-holders exert influence 
over the operation and behaviour of the firm’s management (Stiglitz, 1985). Also, debt is 
often used by management to signal to the market that the managers have committed 
themselves to generating a sufficiently high level of cash flow for repayment purposes 
(Grossman and Hart, 1982; Jensen, 1986).  Debt has a corporate governance function that 
resolves conflicts between managers and shareholders in reducing management discretion 
to consume excessive perquisites, hence enhancing the firm’s value (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976; Grossman and Hart, 1982). 
 
Research and Development expenditure is suggested as a control variable to control for the 
firm’s intangibles and potential for growth in the future. However, data on Research & 
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Development expenditure, like those on Advertising expenditure, are not readily available 
or disclosed in the annual reports of the firms in some markets like Hong Kong (or the 
U.K.). Moreover, most of the market index constituent firms in Hong Kong engage in 
trading and real property development. They seldom invest in Research and Development 
activities of their own initiatives, which explains why the investment in Research and 
Development is either not disclosed or at a low level (reported as a percentage of their total 
sales). A more in-depth of the explanatory variables for this thesis will be presented in 
Chapter 7. 
 
4.4.2 Outside directors and board composition 
 
Recent corporate governance studies emphasize the internal control of the firm and suggest 
that a check and balance mechanism should be installed to counteract the influence of a 
dominant chairman/ chief executive. The presence of independent outside directors (or 
Independent Non-Executive Directors, INEDs, also referred as outside directors), and the 
proportion of these INEDs on the board of directors, is generally considered as a proxy for 
the independence of the board of directors from the influence of an all-powerful Chairman 
/CEO. For instance, Fama (1980), Fama and Jensen (1983b), and the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission (1980) acknowledge that outside directors play the role of monitors 
of management and “providers of relevant complementary knowledge” (Fama and Jensen, 
1983b, p. 315). Based on a comparative study of two leading U.S. manufacturers and two 
Japanese manufacturers, Yoshimori (2005) concludes that the independence of outside 
directors (i.e., INEDs) is a crucial aspect of the governance of a firm. He cautions that a 
self-interested CEO can undermine the independence of outside directors by means of high 
director remuneration, lucrative consulting and other pecuniary compensation. 
 
Weisbach (1988) reports that CEO turnover is more highly correlated with firm 
performance in firms where a majority of outside directors are present, than in those where 
insiders predominate. The implication is that outside directors are important in monitoring 
management. Hermalin and Weisbach (1988) find that outsiders are more likely to join a 
board after a firm performs poorly or leaves an industry. It indicates that outside directors 
are useful for providing guidance when a shift in strategy is needed. An alternative 
explanation is that the addition of an outside director signals a change in firm strategy 
rather than the benefits of outside guidance. 
 
 126
While there appears to be consensus that the independent directors have an influential role 
in monitoring the management of a firm, there has been inconclusive evidence that board 
composition will improve firm performance unilaterally.  Brown and Caylor (2004) report 
positive correlation between the Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) governance index 
and several measures of firm value and performance; and that “the sub-part of the ISS 
index that seems to be most important is the one based on board composition” (as quoted 
in Bebchuk and Cohen, 2005, p. 430). In a subsequent paper, Brown and Caylor (2006) 
argue that it is not so much as the composition of the board that is related to firm value but 
the three factors related to the behaviour of the board of directors that is empirically found 
to be linked to firm valuation, which they suggest to be: (i) all directors attended at least 
75% of board meetings or had a valid excuse for non-attendance; (ii) board members are 
elected annually; and (iii) board directors are governed by stockownership guidelines and 
other guidelines in each proxy statement.  In this study, the computation of CG disclosure 
score (CGDscore) captures the attendance of the board directors (i.e., if individual 
director’s attendance rate is disclosed in the annual reports); while the number of INEDs 
and the proportion of INEDs on the board are treated as control variables. More discussion 
of the computation of CGDscore will be discussed in Chapter 8. 
 
 
4.5 Summary 
 
This chapter summarizes and discusses the extant literature on the relationship between 
legal protection, corporate governance, and voluntary disclosure. The pioneering studies 
via the legal approach to corporate governance employed by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer, and Vishny (1997, 1998, 2000a) and Roe (2002) firmly establish that protection 
of investor rights is the cornerstone for the functioning and development of a country’s 
financial market. Legislation and the enforcement of the law are equally important to 
protect minority shareholders, bondholders, institutional investors and other suppliers of 
funds from potential exploitation by the majority shareholders. As concentration of 
ownership outside the U.S., U.K., and Japan seem to be the norm rather than the exception, 
the protection of minority outsiders from potential tunnelling by the majority shareholder 
and misuse of investors’ funds by the insiders becomes a major concern for modern day 
businesses.  
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While legal protection may help deter such wrong doings by the predominant shareholders, 
there are many ways for a predominant shareholder to legitimise the acts of serving his/her 
self-interests at the expense of minority shareholders. Particularly in the context of tightly 
controlled family business environment (such as Hong Kong), outsiders rely on the 
voluntary disclosure by the insiders to assess the state of the corporate governance that is 
installed within the firm. Other proxies that may infer the quality of corporate governance 
and thus enhance outsiders’ confidence include the number of analyst following, dual 
listing, and dividend payout. When the investors do not feel adequately protected, they will 
refrain from investing into the firm, leading to more concentrated ownership and a low 
market valuation of the firm. 
 
In this study, Hong Kong firms are used as samples to examine the relationship between 
voluntary disclosure of corporate governance and firm valuation. In the following chapter, 
Chapter 5, a discussion of the general Hong Kong corporate governance and reporting 
framework, the Hong Kong stock market, and the characteristics of Hong Kong listed 
companies will be made, prior to the presenting the hypotheses in Chapter 6. 
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Chapter 5: Corporate Governance and Corporate 
Financial Reporting in Hong Kong 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This thesis studies the impact of voluntary disclosure of corporate governance (CG) 
practices on the valuation of Hong Kong listed firms. To put this study into context, it is 
necessary to have an understanding of the historical development of the disclosure 
requirements for Hong Kong firms and the reporting regulations.  It is also necessary to 
have an appreciation of the evolvement of the CG framework in Hong Kong up to 2005, 
when the new Listing Rules of the Hong Kong Exchange (HKEx) became effective. This 
new set of Listing Rules (2005), unlike previous ones, stipulates a formal Corporate 
Governance Report to be published by all issuers of securities that are floated on the HKEx. 
  
This chapter presents the background and the historical development of the CG framework 
of Hong Kong.  Section 5.2 will first introduce the Hong Kong financial reporting 
framework. It summarizes the historical development of financial reporting standards and 
regulations since 1973, the year when the Hong Kong Society of Accountants (HKSA) was 
founded.  The HKSA was the professional organization recognised by the then Hong Kong 
Government to provide consultations and advice on accounting and auditing standards, and 
financial reporting regulations.   
 
Section 5.3 presents the legal aspect of the CG framework in Hong Kong. Two ordinances 
(i.e., laws as they are referred to in Hong Kong), namely, the Companies Ordinance and 
the Securities and Futures Ordinance, are summarized and discussed.  These two 
ordinances are the core regulations that govern the behaviour of firms that are floated on 
the HKEx.  Section 5.4 traces the evolution of the CG framework up to 2005, when the 
recommended practices of CG disclosure by the listed firms were first codified into 
provisions.  It also presents the stages of development of how the Hong Kong 
Government’s concern for the overall governance of the capital market culminated into a 
formal  ‘Corporate Governance Report’ requirement as stipulated by the HKEx Listing 
Rules (2005). The institutional framework of Hong Kong’s securities and capital market 
will be presented in Section 5.5.  Section 5.6 follows with a description of the general 
characteristics of the Hong Kong stock market, based on a review of literature by prior 
researchers.  Section 5.7 summarizes the chapter. 
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 5.2 The financial reporting framework in Hong Kong 
 
Hong Kong had been under the British rule for 150 years when it was returned to China in 
1997. It is well documented in research literature that Hong Kong has a well-developed 
and liberal financial system, modelled on the British reporting framework (Phenix, 1994, 
Wallace and Naser, 1995). Traditionally, the corporate financial reporting in Hong Kong 
was guided by two sources:  
(i) the Hong Kong Statements of Standard Accounting Practice (HKSSAPs) 1  
issued by the Hong Kong Society of Accountants (HKSA)2; and  
 
(ii) the Hong Kong Companies Ordinance (as company laws are referred to in 
Hong Kong).  
 
The HKSSAPs follow closely the financial reporting standards in the U.K.  Similarly, the 
Companies Ordinance was modelled on British company law prior to 1997 (Phenix, 1994, 
p.164-165).  Before the formation of HKSA in 1973, British influence dominated in 
accounting training, education and practices. Prospective accountants in Hong Kong 
acquired their professional qualifications through gaining membership of overseas 
professional accounting bodies of the U.K. (or other Commonwealth countries) by 
examination. From 1973 to 1982, the HKSA issued non-mandatory accounting standards, 
which were essentially re-issues of the U.K. accounting standards. From 1982 onwards, the 
HKSA was authorized to set the formal accounting standards (HKSSAPs) based on the 
U.K. standards (ibid, 1994).  
 
The HKSA has played a significant role in setting financial reporting standards for Hong 
Kong firms.  One of the HKSA committees, the Professional Standards Monitoring 
Committee, worked with the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong (SEHK)3 in reviewing the 
financial statements of Hong Kong listed firms.  The HKSA expected its members to 
comply with the HKSSAPs when preparing the accounting statements, thus exercised 
authority over its members in doing so. Such authority was reinforced by the Hong Kong 
Companies Ordinance, which requires all Hong Kong firms’ financial statements to be 
presented and audited by a Hong Kong Certified Public Accountant (HKCPA), a 
qualification conferred by the HKSA to its members who have fulfilled the requirements of 
on professional examinations and experience (Phenix, 1994, p.189). 
                                                 
1 Later known as the Hong Kong Financial Reporting Standards (HKFRSs), 
2 Renamed as the Hong Kong Institute of Certified Public Accountants (HKICPA) after September 2004. 
3 Later known as the Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Ltd (HKEx). 
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 On one hand, the U.K. accounting standards have been increasingly influenced by 
harmonization within the European Union. On the other hand, businesses in Hong Kong 
have developed close ties with Mainland China, whose national accounting standards are 
yet developing.  As a compromise, the HKSA started to shift to International Accounting 
Standards (IAS) 4 for future guidance.  In 1992, the HKSA officially switched to IAS as the 
models for future accounting standards and guidelines (Ball, Robin, and Wu, 2003, 
Appendix A).  
 
The HKEx also stipulated in its listing requirements that the annual accounts of listed firms 
should comply with the HKSSAPs or, if the company was registered outside Hong Kong, it 
must comply with the International Accounting Standards (IASs) issued by the 
International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC)5 (Phenix, 1994, p. 185).  Listed 
firms must adhere to the standards set by either of the above accounting bodies and apply 
the standards consistently and shall not change from one body of standards to the other 
(HKEx, Listing Rules 2005, Chp. 4: Accountants’ Reports and Pro Forma Financial 
Information; and Appendix 16: Disclosure of Financial Information).  
 
Appendix 16 of the HKEx Listing Rules (2005) requires all listed firms in Hong Kong to 
present financial statements in their annual reports with the following minimum financial 
information: 
(1) Balance sheet; 
(2) Income statement; 
(3) Cash flow statement; 
(4) Statement of changes in equity; 
(5) Comparative figures for the statements; 
(6) Accounting policies and explanatory notes. 
(7) A separate Corporate Governance Report prepared by the board of directors on its 
corporate governance practices. The report must, as a minimum, contain 
“information required under Appendix 23 regarding the accounting period covered 
by the annual report” (HKEx Listing Rules, para. 34); and 
 
(8) A statement of sufficiency of public float based on information “that is publicly 
available to the listed issuer and within the knowledge of its directors as at the latest 
practicable date prior to the issue of the annual report” (HKEx Listing Rules, para. 
35). 
 
Item 7 as stated above (i.e., the Corporate Governance Report) is a newly added 
requirement to the Listing Rules.  All listed firms are required to include a separate report 
                                                 
4 Later known as the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs). 
5 Later renamed as the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB). 
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on their state of corporate governance in their annual reports starting from the fiscal year 
beginning 1 January 2005 or after. Corporate governance was thus officially recognised, 
and regarded as an integral part of the minimum disclosure on the performance of the listed 
firms, by the Hong Kong capital market facilitator. This change in the significance of a 
firm’s CG as requirement in the HKEx Listing Rules from 2005 onwards, is the outcome of 
a series of consultation work with the listed firms, market participants, professional 
accounting bodies, accounting researchers, and other regulatory institutions over a decade. 
In the following section, a discussion on the involvement of the market players in setting 
the general overall corporate governance framework will be presented. 
  
5.3 The legal corporate governance framework in Hong Kong 
 
Prior to 2002, the laws and rules governing corporate disclosure of firms incorporated in 
Hong Kong were principally set out in five ordinances as stated below (the Standing 
Committee on Company Law Reform Consultation Report, SCCLR, 2001): 
(i) The Companies Ordinance which applies to all companies registered in Hong 
Kong; 
 
(ii) The Securities (Disclosure of Interests) Ordinance; 
 
(iii) The HKEx Listing Rules and the Growth Enterprise Market listing Rules which 
cover disclosure on director’s remuneration, connected transactions, equity 
shares ownership etc.; 
 
(iv) The Code on Takeover and Mergers and Share Repurchases; and  
 
(v) The Hong Kong Statements of Standard Accounting Practice (HKSSAPs). 
 
The SCCLR was formed in 1984 to advise the Financial Secretary on amendments to the 
Companies Ordinance and other related ordinances. In early 2000, three sub-committees 
were set up to review the state of corporate governance of Hong Kong firms: (i) the 
Corporate Reporting Sub-Committee; (ii) the Shareholders Sub-Committee; and (iii) the 
Directors Sub-Committee. Each sub-committee was to review the current statute law, 
administrative rules and regulations, and codes of practice relevant to its own area of 
investigation.  The objective of the review was to enhance genuine accountability, 
disclosure and transparency, and thereby further improve CG standards, shareholder 
democracy, and communications (SCCLR, 2001).  
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The sub-committees had several missions. They were to reform and strengthen the non-
statutory disclosure requirements in respect of listed companies as promulgated in the 
SEHK Listing Rules; strengthen the internal controls in companies with particular 
reference to internal audit functions; as well as define the roles and functions of Audit 
Committees (SCCLR, 2001, Terms of Reference).  The role of disclosure was one of the 
key elements in corporate governance under study by these sub-committees. In specific 
areas of their own concerns, the sub-committees commissioned research projects to acquire 
data that would support them to propose recommendations of law reform on solid 
empirical grounds.  
 
Based on the empirical findings and recommendations of the SCCLR, the Financial 
Secretary of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government (HKSAR, being 
the official name of the government in Hong Kong after 1997) introduced amendments to 
the laws that regulated the business-reporting environment of Hong Kong.  Reformations 
of the two flagship laws were made, namely, the Hong Kong Companies Ordinance (Cap. 
32) and the Securities and Futures Ordinance (Cap. 571).  The following subsections 5.3.1 
and 5.3.2 will give a brief introduction on these two ordinances respectively. 
 
5.3.1 Companies Ordinance (Cap. 32) 
Originally promulgated in 1865 with amendments in 1911 and 1933 as the Hong Kong 
Ordinance (Cap. 39), this ordinance acquired its present name as the Hong Kong 
Ordinance (Cap. 32) – Companies Ordinance – in 1950. It has been amended through the 
incorporation of many Companies (Amendment) Ordinances in 1984, 1988, 1992, 2003, 
and 2004 (HKSAR, Companies Ordinance, 2004). The Companies Ordinance (CO) 
provides the legal foundation for regulating the business behaviour of all firms in Hong 
Kong, including listed and private companies.  The CO prescribes the proper procedures 
from formation to winding up of a business entity. It specifies the power and duties of 
directors. It also prescribes the rights of the shareholders in terms of the proceedings of 
voting at the general meetings. 
 
Some sections of the CO do not apply to financial institutions and companies if the firms 
are formed under the Banking Ordinance (Cap. 155), the Insurance Companies Ordinance 
(Cap. 41), and any corporation licensed under Part V of the Securities and Futures 
Ordinance (Cap. 571).  
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Modelled on similar company law in the U.K., the CO seeks to consolidate and amend the 
law relating to companies, and govern the formation, operation, and dissolution of private 
or public companies. It specifies the duties and rights of the directors and officers of a 
company, the appointment of auditors, and the obligations of the firm to provide a copy of 
balance sheet, directors’ report, and auditors’ report to every member of the firm not less 
than 21 days before the date of the general meeting of the company.  As at 2008, the 
Companies Ordinance has 367 Sections and 24 Schedules.  
 
5.3.2 Securities and Futures Ordinance (Cap. 571) 
Another legal provision that regulates the operation of the stock market and its participants 
is the Securities and Futures Ordinance (Cap. 571), which was passed in the Legislative 
Council in March 2002 but commenced operation on 1 April 2003. This ordinance, SFO, 
consolidates all previous 10 securities and futures related ordinances (e.g., The Securities 
(Insider Dealing) Ordinance (Cap. 395); the Securities (Disclosure of Interests) Ordinance 
(Cap. 396) etc.) into one single law. It is the primary ordinance that governs the securities 
and futures market of Hong Kong. 
 
The SFO aims to establish a regulatory framework to meet international best practice and 
to enhance market efficiency and transparency (Tsui and Gul, 2002). It empowers the SFC 
to set up a Market Misconduct Tribunal (MMT) to handle some specified market 
misconduct such as false trading, price rigging, insider dealings by the firms, disclosure of 
false or misleading information inducing transactions, stock market manipulation, etc. It 
sets out penalties for their offences (Cap. 571, Sect.303). It also legislates the investors’ 
rights. Through the establishment of a compensation fund, it provides compensation to 
those investors who sustain a loss by reason of a default committed by persons or firms 
breaching the securities or futures contracts (Cap. 571, Sect. 236).  With respect to the 
disclosure requirements, this ordinance requires the directors and the chief executives of 
firms to disclose their interests in the company shares to listed firm and to the HKEx (Cap. 
571, Sect. 341). It lowers the threshold of an investor’s shareholding notifiable to the 
investee firm from 10% to 5% (Cap. 571, Sect. 315). It also reduces the time limit for 
notification from 5 days to 3 business days after the date of the relevant event occurs (Cap. 
571, Sect. 325).  
 
However, as comprehensively as it strives to protect investors in general, this ordinance 
does not provide any regulations relating to the proper governance of a firm. Prior to 2005, 
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the ways on how a listed firm should be governed were not legally stipulated, but were 
merely suggested as guideline in the Code of Best Practice incorporated in Appendix 14 of 
the SEHK (1998) Listing Rules. The Code of Best Practice, first introduced by the SEHK 
in 1993, outlined the best corporate practices in terms of the board composition, presence 
of independent non-executive directors, formation of audit committee, directors’ access to 
information, appointment and removal of directors.  It was not mandatory for the listed 
firms to adopt the Code of Best Practice, although member firms listed on the Main Board 
of the SEHK were strongly encouraged to adhere to it.  In January 2005, the Code of Best 
Practice was eventually incorporated into part of the mandatory requirements of the 
Listing Rules of the HKEx (2005). This study makes use of the disclosure by listed firms 
from 2003 to 2005 in order to investigate the relationship between the firm’s voluntary 
disclosure of its corporate governance (CG) practices and the firm’s market valuation.  The 
following section, Section 5.4, will discuss the evolvement of such corporate governance 
disclosure requirements up to 2005. 
 
5.4 Corporate governance development and implementation in Hong 
Kong 
 
Prior researchers have conducted cross-country studies on corporate governance (CG) for 
comparison.  Some of these studies include Hong Kong as one of their sample countries.  
In Section 5.4.1 below, a summary of three empirical studies by La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (LLSV, 1998), Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia (CLSA, 2003) 
and Daouk, Lee and Ng (DLN, 2006) is presented.  Although DLN’s work was published 
in 2006, their source data were collected between 1969-1998. The findings of these studies 
provide a portrait of the stage of CG that Hong Kong had attained in comparison to other 
developed or emerging markets prior to 2005. Section 5.4.2 will present a descriptive 
account of the development and implementation of CG from the 1990s to 2005. 
 
5.4.1 Corporate governance of Hong Kong prior to 2005 
Individual firm’s corporate governance practices are likely to be dependent upon the legal 
and regulatory framework of the jurisdiction within which the firm is operating, as well as 
the level of enforcement of laws and regulations on corporate governance of that 
jurisdiction. According to a cross-country legal protection and law enforcement study by 
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (LLSV) in 1998 (also repeated in 
Lemmon and Lins, 2003), Hong Kong ranks top in shareholder rights and shares the 
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highest rank with Japan and Singapore in the efficiency of judicial system in law 
enforcement compared with 8 other Asian countries: 
Shareholder rights of 9 Asian countries in LLSV’s (1998) Table 2  
(Lower scores represent lower anti-director rights; higher scores represent higher 
shareholder rights) 
 
1. Hong Kong  5 
2. Japan  4 
2. Malaysia  4 
2. Singapore  4 
5. Philippines  3 
5. Taiwan  3 
7. Indonesia  2 
7. South Korea 2 
7. Thailand  2 
 
Efficiency of Judicial System scores of 9 Asian countries in LLSV’s (1998) Table 5  
1. Hong Kong  10.00 
1. Japan  10.00 
1. Singapore  10.00 
4. Malaysia    9.00 
5. Taiwan    6.75 
6. S. Korea    6.00 
7. Philippines    4.75 
8. Thailand    3.25 
9. Indonesia    2.50 
 
Moreover, Hong Kong ranks the 4th highest in the rule of law and is placed at the middle 
in the risk of government expropriation (i.e. outright confiscation or forced nationalisation 
of business by the government). Unlike most other East Asian countries, Hong Kong 
adopts a laissez faire policy and government expropriation cases of private enterprises are 
few and far in-between over the past decades (except for banks and financial institutions 
that may cause havoc to the economy):  
 
Rule of Law scores of 9 Asian countries in LLSV’s (1998) Table 2  
(Lower scores correspond to less tradition for law and order) 
1. Japan  8.98 
2. Singapore  8.57 
3. Taiwan  8.52 
4. Hong Kong  8.22 
5. Malaysia  6.78 
6. Thailand  6.25 
7. S. Korea  5.35 
8. Indonesia  3.98 
9. Philippines  2.73 
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 Risk of Expropriation by the government of 9 Asian countries in LLSV’s (1998) Table 5  
 (Higher scores correspond to lower risk of expropriation by the government) 
 
1. Japan    9.67 
2. Singapore    9.30 
3. Taiwan    9.12 
4. S. Korea    8.31 
5. Hong Kong    8.29 
6. Malaysia    7.95 
7. Thailand    7.42 
8. Indonesia    7.16 
9. Philippines    5.22 
 
However, in another cross-country study on capital market governance over the period 
1969-1998 by Daouk, Lee and Ng (DLN, 2006), Hong Kong does not rank as high as other 
developed markets such as Japan, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan in the sub-sample 
of Asian countries that are examined (Indonesia and Philippines are not included in the 
original sample set). DLN compute a capital market governance (CMG) index based on 3 
components: insider trading laws enforcement, earning opacity, and relaxation of short-
selling restrictions.6  The capital market governance (CMG) index is the simple average of 
these 3 measures and ranges from 0 (worst governance) to 10 (best governance). Hong 
Kong ranks the last third in terms of transparency, only slightly better than Thailand but 
still relatively better than Malaysia. Such low ranking assigned to Hong Kong may be due 
to the undeveloped state of corporate governance prior to the Enron debacle (2001) and the 
subsequent corporate governance reform jointly carried out by accounting and regulatory 
institutions and the Hong Kong SAR Government: 
 
Capital Market Governance (CMG) Index of 7 Asian countries in DLN’s (2006) Table 1 
based on data 1969-1998 
(Higher scores indicate greater transparency) 
1. Singapore    7.96 
1. Taiwan    7.96 
3. Japan    6.40 
4. S. Korea    4.49 
                                                 
6 In Daouk, Lee and Ng’s self-constructed CMG index, insider trading laws enforcement follows a previous 
study by Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) that captures the level of enforcement of insider trading laws. The 
variable is assigned a value of 10 if there had been any enforcement and 0 otherwise. Earning opacity is 
defined as “the extent to which the distribution of reported earnings of firms in that country fails to provide 
information about the distribution of the true, but unobservable, economic earnings” (DLN, 2006, p. 565). 
This variable ranges from 0 (most opaque) to 10 (least opaque). As for short-selling constraint relaxation, 
any decreases in short-selling constraints are reflected as improvements in the capital market governance 
index. The variable also provides for the existence of put options on stocks (because equity put options offer 
an alternative to implement a short position) and is assigned 0 if short-selling was not allowed and put 
options do not exist in a given time period, and 10 if short-selling is allowed or put options exist. 
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5. Hong Kong    3.83 
6. Thailand    3.81 
7. Malaysia    1.92 
 
A country’s ranking of corporate governance very much depends on the factors that shape 
the standard of CG as well as the weighting each factor receives in a study. For example, in 
a survey conducted by Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia (CLSA, 2003) on 10 countries in 
East Asia including Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, South 
Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, and China, there are 7 key criteria for evaluating the concept of 
good corporate governance with respective weightings as follows:  
 
Key criteria for Corporate Governance:    Weightings 
1. Management discipline       15% 
2. Transparency in disclosure       15% 
3. Board independence       15% 
4. Accountability of the board of directors     15% 
5. Fairness to non-majority shareholders     15% 
6. Responsibility of the board of directors & management   15% 
7. Fairness to non-majority shareholders     10% 
         Total: 100% 
(Source: adapted from CLSA CG Watch – Corporate Governance in Asia, April 2003, 
Appendix 1: CLSA CG methodology)  
 
In CLSA (2003) survey, Hong Kong ranks 3rd among East Asian countries in the overall 
corporate governance scores: 
 
CLSA CG Watch April 2003 Appendix 3: Country average CG scores 
S. Korea   70.8 
Singapore   69.5 
Hong Kong   65.9 
Malaysia   65.0 
India    64.8 
Thailand   60.2 
Taiwan   58.7 
China    57.4 
Indonesia   43.0 
Philippines   39.8 
   
All in all, though there is no consensus among extant researchers about the Hong Kong’s 
CG ranking among Asian countries, the general evidence shows that Hong Kong stands 
relatively high in the overall CG framework. Under such a framework, individual firms in 
Hong Kong are given discretion to establish their internal CG mechanisms (which is the 
“balanced approach” – i.e., the comply or explain approach – as recommended in the final 
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report by the Standing Committee on Company Law Reform (SCCLR) in 2002 and was 
subsequently adopted by the Hong Kong Exchange in its listing rules in 2005).  The above 
studies show that there is room for improvement in Hong Kong’s CG practices for 
individual firms, particularly in the protection of minority shareholders and in enforcement 
of laws. 7
 
Hence, it can be concluded that at the time these studies were made, there were no 
mandatory requirement on listed firms in Hong Kong to install CG mechanisms.   
Directors of firms could weave between the rules and push business deals through that 
were clearly against minority shareholders’ interests.  There were no class action suits8 for 
minority shareholders to fight against injustice done to them by the firm’s managers. 
 
The Standing Committee on Company Law Reform (SCCLR, 2002) recommended a 
“balanced approach” regulatory framework in terms of CG disclosure, which was 
subsequently adopted by the HKEx in its Listing Rules 2005. This approach is similar to 
the “comply or explain” approach in the U.K. but differs from the prescriptive approach in 
the U.S.  Before the CG framework was formally implemented in 2005, the HKEx 
informed and consulted with its listed members on the expected implementation of CG 
mechanisms and practices. A set of codes of recommended best practices (the Code) was 
introduced to the member-listed firms in 2002 with the objective to enhance their 
transparency and improve their CG disclosure to outside investors.  Listed firms were 
allowed to opt for their own set up on CG mechanisms, and decide on the extent of their 
disclosure, for the period prior to the implementation date of the regulatory framework in 
2005.9  
 
This thesis investigates the effect of voluntary disclosure of CG mechanisms of Hong 
Kong listed firms on their valuation for the period 2003-2005, immediately before CG 
                                                 
7 In the SCCLR Consultation Paper on Proposals made in Phase I of the Review (July 2001), it was stated in 
the Terms of Reference of the Corporate Governance Review Directors Sub-Committee that “In the light of 
the predominance of controlling shareholder groups and the rights and interests of controlling shareholders; 
[and] the lack of shareholder activism as a natural force for improving corporate governance; …[its terms of 
reference is] to review the current statute law, administrative rules and regulations and codes of practice 
relevant to the directors and boards of all companies incorporated or registered in Hong Kong with the 
objective of enhancing genuine accountability, disclosure and transparency, and thereby further improving 
corporate governance standards”.  (Emphases added) 
8  As per comments on Hong Kong’s overall corporate governance in the CLSA CG Watch: Corporate 
governance in Asia, April 2003, p. 29. 
9 The HKEx recognised that the observance of good governance by the market as a whole was an important 
element in the perspective of local and overseas investors. It acknowledged the importance of raising the CG 
profile of Hong Kong amid the increasing competition from other marketplaces. It aims at promoting and 
enhancing the CG standards on a par with the evolving international standards (HKEx, Annual Report 2005). 
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disclosure became a mandatory disclosure requirement.   In the following section, the 
historical development of CG and implementation of the Code will be presented, and the 
salient items of mandatory disclosure and recommended practices specified by the HKEx 
Listing Rules 2005 will be summarized.  
 
5.4.2 Corporate governance development and implementation in Hong Kong  
Hong Kong began to follow the lead of Western countries such as the U.S. and the U.K. in 
the early 1990s in developing and adopting CG concepts and practices (Chau and Leung, 
2006). In 1993, the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong (SEHK)—later renamed as Hong Kong 
Exchanges and Clearing Limited (HKEx)—set up the first Working Group on Corporate 
Governance in conjunction with the Hong Kong Society of Accountants (HKSA). Its task 
was to analyse and advise on the relevancy of the U.K. Cadbury Report (1992) to Hong 
Kong. By the end of 1993, the SEHK introduced the Code of Best Practice, which aimed 
primarily at increasing the accountability of directors to their shareholders and improving 
the transparency of corporate management of the listed firms. The code was a set of 
voluntary codes and guidelines regarding mainly the composition, responsibility, and 
accountability of the board of directors. 
 
The SEHK set up the second and the third Working Group on Corporate Governance in 
1994, which were mainly concerned with issues relating to executive and non-executive 
directors. Some guidelines were suggested as to the qualifications, appointments and roles 
for the independent non-executive directors.  The SEHK required all listed member firms 
on the exchange to include a statement in their annual reports for periods ending December 
31, 1995 and after, to affirm compliance with the Code of Best Practice. Where the firms 
had chosen not to comply with the Code, they would be required to provide reasons for 
non-compliance. 
 
The fourth Working Group on Corporate Governance was formed in 1996. Its key tasks 
were to examine the role and legal liabilities of independent non-executive directors, audit 
committees, remuneration committees, and the education for directors. In view of the non-
prevalence of audit committees among the listed firms at that time, the Working Group 
suggested that the formation of audit committees should not be made mandatory under the 
SEHK Listing Rules. Rather, it should be included in the Code of Best Practice as a 
recommended practice.  
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From 1995 to 2005, this working group, later known as the Corporate Governance 
Committee (CGC), compiled 8 reports recommending certain changes and providing 
guidelines in the corporate governance in Hong Kong, namely: 
(i) First Report of the Working Group on Corporate Governance (HKSA, 1995); 
 
(ii) Second Report of the Corporate Governance Working Group (HKSA, 1997a); 
 
(iii) A Guide for the Formation of An Audit Committee (HKSA, 1997b); 
 
(iv) A Guide for Directors’ Business Review in the Annual Report (HKSA, 1998);  
 
(v) Directors’ Remuneration – Recommendations for Enhanced Transparency and 
Accountability (HKSA, 1999); 
 
(vi) Corporate Governance Disclosure in Annual Reports – A Guide to Current 
Requirements and Recommendations for Enhancement (HKSA, 2001);  
 
(vii) A Guide for Effective Audit Committees (HKSA, 2002); and 
 
(viii) Corporate Governance for Public Bodies: A Basic Framework (2004). 
 
Extensive consultation work with the listed firms, professional accounting bodies, 
regulatory bodies, and officials from overseas stock exchanges was carried out during the 
preparatory stages of these reports, resulting in substantive enrichment of the regulations. 
For instance, the First Report (1995) contained 19 recommendations for improved 
corporate governance standards and practices. The Second Report (1997), compiled based 
on a survey, revealed some contemporary disclosure shortcomings in the annual reports of 
listed firms with respect to the directors, shareholders rights, and audit committees. The 
CGC encountered some resistance from listed firms on how to meet with the requirements 
of forming an audit committee in 1997. As a result, it issued a Guide for the Formation of 
audit Committee (1997) and postponed the effective date for one year to allow sufficient 
time for the listed firms to form an audit committee. 
 
Consultative papers and proposals were issued to all members of the SEHK soliciting their 
opinions and feedback before the recommendations were accepted and codified into the 
listing rules. The consultation period varied from 3 months to a full year, depending upon 
the extent of controversy of the issue. For example, the SEHK revised the Code of Best 
Practice in May 1998 by consolidating the recommendations suggested in the First and the 
Second Report, formally endorsing the guidelines on the formation of an audit committee. 
The adoption of the Code was voluntary. However, the Listing Rules would require all 
listed issuers to report in both interim reports and annual reports on their compliance with 
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the setting up of audit committees or the reasons for any non-compliance for accounting 
periods ending December 31, 1999 or after. 
 
After the Enron, Worldcom, and Global Crossing debacles in early 2000s, the HKEx 
issued a circular Consultation paper on proposed amendments to the listing rules relating 
to corporate governance issue in 2002 to solicit opinions from the listed firms about the 
tightening of corporate governance practices. Subsequently, the HKEx published in 
January 2004 an exposure draft Exposure of draft code on corporate governance practices 
and corporate governance report to seek market views on the timing of the proposed 
implementation of the Code on Corporate Governance Practices (the Code), which aimed 
at formalising the disclosure of the listed firms’ corporate governance practices in their 
annual reports.  
 
In November 2004, the HKEx issued a 78-page report and announced that all listed firms 
on the HKEx would be required to comply with the Code for accounting periods 
commencing on or after January 1, 2005. All listed firms were required to release a 
separate Corporate Governance Report in accordance to the requirements as stipulated in 
the Listing Rules Appendix 14: Code on Corporate Governance Practices and Appendix 23: 
Corporate Governance Report.  
 
Appendix 14 sets out the principles of good corporate governance and two levels of 
recommendations: (a) the code provisions; and (b) the recommended best practices. The 
areas covered in the principles of good corporate governance are as follows: 
A. Directors:   
Principles are issued on:  1) the Board; 2) Chairman and Executive Officer;   
3) Board composition; 4) Appointments, re-election and removal;      
5) Responsibilities of directors; and 6) Supply of and access to information. 
 
B. Remuneration of Directors and Senior Management:   
Principles are issued on the level and make-up of remuneration and disclosure. 
 
C. Accountability and Audit:   
Principles are issued on: 1) Financial reporting; 2) Internal controls; and 3) Audit 
Committee. 
 
D. Delegation by the Board:   
Principles are issued on: 1) Management Functions; and 2) Board Committees. 
 
E. Communication with Shareholders:   
Principles are issued on: 1) Effective communication; and 2) Voting by poll. 
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 Appendix 23, on the other hand, prescribes the types of information to be disclosed in the 
Corporate Governance Report in terms of Mandatory Disclosure Requirements and 
Recommended Disclosures.  The Mandatory Disclosure Requirements cover the following: 
A. Corporate governance practices:    
The issuer is expected to give 1) a narrative statement of how the listed issuer has 
applied the principles in the Code, providing explanation which enables its 
shareholders to evaluate how the principles have been applied; 2) a statement as 
to whether the issuer meets the code provisions in the Code.  If the issuer has 
adopted its own code that exceeds the code provisions set out in the Code, the 
issuer may draw attention to such fact in its annual report; and 3) in the event of 
deviation form the code provisions set out in the Code, details of such deviation 
during the financial year with considered reasons for such deviation. 
 
B. Directors’ securities transactions:   
The issuer is to state whether a code of conduct regarding directors’ securities 
transactions as set out in Appendix 10 has been adopted or otherwise, and the 
details for the non-compliance. 
  
C. Board of Directors: 
The issuer has to provide details including composition of the board, number of 
meetings held, and individual attendance of each director.  The issuer has to give 
a statement of how the board operates, including the type of decisions made by 
the board and those delegated to management.  Details of non-compliance 
relating to the appointment of independent non-executive director and the 
remedial measures to address the non-compliance are expected.  Relationship 
including financial, business, family or other material/relevant relationship(s) 
among members of the board and in particular, between the chairman and the 
chief executive officer.  
 
D. Chairman and chief executive officer 
The issuer is to state the identity of the chairman and chief executive officer, and 
whether the roles of the chairman and chief executive officer are segregated. 
 
E. Non-executive directors 
The issuer is to state the term of appointment of non-executive directors. 
 
F. Remuneration of directors 
The directors’ remuneration policy have to be disclosed with respect to the role 
and function of the remuneration committee and its composition, the number of 
meeting held by the remuneration committee or the board of directors if there are 
no remuneration committee during the year.  A summary of the work performed 
by the remuneration committee relating to the policy in determining executive 
directors’ remuneration and the assessment of performance of executive directors 
have to be included.  
 
 
G. Nomination of directors 
The issuer is to spell out the role and function of the nomination committee, its 
composition, the nomination procedures and the process and criteria adopted by 
 143
the nomination committee.  A summary of the work done by the nomination 
committee during the year and the number of meetings held are to be disclosed. 
 
H. Auditors’ remunerations 
The issuer is to give an analysis of remuneration in respect of audit and non-audit 
services provided by the auditors to the issuer.  Information about the entity that 
is under common control, ownership or management with the audit firm or any 
entity that a reasonable and informed third party having knowledge of all relevant 
information would reasonably conclude as part of the audit firm nationally or 
internationally. 
 
I. Audit Committee  
The issuer to give information about the role, function and composition of the 
committee members, the number of audit committee meetings held during the 
year with attendance record of members, report of the work performed by the 
audit committee during the year in discharging its responsibilities in its review of 
the quarterly (if relevant), half-yearly and annual results and system of internal 
control, and its other duties set out in the Code.  Non-compliance of the audit 
committee and the steps to address such non-compliance has to be specified. 
 
Despite such a corporate governance disclosure rule having been proclaimed, the HKEx 
remained flexible in implementing such requirements, as stated in Appendix 14: 
 
“Issuers are expected to comply with, but may choose to deviate from, the code 
provisions. The recommended best practices are for guidance only. Issuers may also 
devise their own code on corporate governance practices on such terms as they may 
consider appropriate.”     
                                               (Listing Rules, HKEx 2005, Appendix 14, p. A14-1) 
 
Where an issuer discloses according to the provisions of the Code, the disclosure will 
include the following: 
1) An acknowledgement from the directors of their responsibility for preparing the 
accounts and a statement by the auditors about their reporting responsibilities. 
 
2) A report on material uncertainties, if any, relating to events or conditions that 
may cast significant doubt upon the listed issuer’s ability to continue as a going 
concern. 
 
3) A statement that the board has conducted a review of the effectiveness of the 
system of internal control of the issuer and its subsidiaries; and 
 
4) A statement from the audit committee explaining its recommendation and the 
reason(s) why the board has taken a different view from that of the audit 
committee regarding the selection, appointment, resignation or dismissal of the 
external auditors.   
 
Issuer must state whether they have complied with the code provisions set out in this Code  
(i.e., Appendix 14) for the relevant accounting period in their interim reports and annual 
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reports. However, issuers are permitted not to comply with the recommended best practices 
in full provided that they explain the reasons why: 
 “In the case of the recommended best practices, issuers are encouraged, but are not 
required, to state whether they have complied with them and give considered 
reasons for any deviation.”  (Listing Rules, HKEx 2005, p. A14-1) 
 
Appendix 23 also sets out a list of recommended disclosure for the issuers’ reference.  
They are not mandatory but intended to be areas, which the issuers may comment on in 
their Corporate Governance Report.  The areas include share interests of senior 
management, shareholders’ rights, investor relations, and internal controls and 
Management functions.   
 
Due to the listed issuers’ inexperience and inadequate time to implement the internal 
control system, the part of the disclosure requirements on internal controls did not take 
effect for 6 months until July 2005.  The requirements on Internal Control disclosure were 
then grouped under the Recommended Disclosures and not under the Mandatory 
Disclosure Requirements in Appendix 23.  Subsequently, some listed firms opted not to 
disclose their internal controls mechanisms in their annual reports with fiscal year ending 
2005.10  It is worth noting that only 27% of the issuers on the Main Board and 39% of the 
issuers on Growth Enterprise Market had complied with the code provisions for the whole 
accounting period (i.e., January to December 2005), as shown in the review made by HKEx in 
their report of March 200711.  During the first year of implementation of the Code, there 
were variations in both the scope and the depth in their corporate governance disclosure (to 
be further discussed in Chapter 9: Descriptive Statistics).  In effect, the disclosure by the 
listed firms in their fiscal year 2005 remained largely voluntary. 
 
5.5 The institutional framework of Hong Kong’s securities and futures 
markets 
The regulatory framework of Hong Kong’s securities and futures markets is mainly 
operated through three organisations: the Hong Kong Exchange (HKEx), the Securities and 
Futures Commission (SFC), and the Financial Reporting Council (FRC). From the legal 
perspective, the listed firms are subject to the Hong Kong Companies Ordinance (CO, Cap. 
                                                 
10 In its 2005 Annual Report, the HKEx disclosed that it had invited HKICPA to issue more guidance to help 
listed issuers to implement the CG Code requirements relating to internal control.  It was also revealed that 
HKEx had organised regular CG training seminars and programmes to raise the listed issuers’ awareness of 
the good CG and the reporting standards.  This reflects that some issuers were not complying with the 
mandatory disclosure requirements to the full within 2005, the first year in the Code’s implementation 
(HKEx, Corporate Governance Report, Annual Report, 2005). 
11 HKEx, Analysis of Corporate Governance Practices Disclosure in 2005 Annual Report, 2007, p. 2. 
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32) and the scrutiny of the listing rules of the Hong Kong Exchange on a continuous basis. 
The following is a brief discussion on these regulatory bodies and mechanisms. 
 
 
5.5.1 The Hong Kong Exchange (HKEx) 
 
The Hong Kong Exchange (HKEx) is the only stock exchange in Hong Kong which 
provides facilities for the buying and selling of securities of listed companies in Hong 
Kong. It operates three markets: the Main Board Market, the Growth Enterprise Market 
(GEM), and the Trading-only Market.  Each of them is discussed in turn below: 
 
1) Main Board Market 
In the Main Board Market, equity shares, warrants, debt securities, unit trusts and mutual 
funds, callable Bull/ Bear Contracts are traded.  The HKEx provides facilities to enable 
buyers and sellers to trade their securities using the Third Generation Automated Order 
Matching and Execution System (AMS/3). The maximum number of outstanding orders 
per price queue is 20,000 in all trading sessions, which start from 10:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m., 
Monday to Friday. The maximum size of an order in AMS/3 is 3,000 board lots, and that 
there is no restriction of outstanding orders per broker ID.  
 
In 2003, 2004, and 2005, the total number of listed companies on the Main Board of the 
HKEx was 852, 892, and 934 respectively.  By the end of 2007, there were 1,048 (975 in 
2006) listed firms on the Main Board. Among them were 104 companies with ‘H’ shares 
(i.e., firms that are domiciled in mainland China with or without their own ‘A’ shares 
issued and traded in either one of the two stock exchanges in mainland China), and nine 
companies were foreign companies that were incorporated overseas and had a majority of 
business outside Hong Kong and China. The domestic equity market capitalization was 
HK$ 20,698 billion (US$bn 2,654.4), an increase of 55% over 2006. According to the 
World Federation of Exchanges, Hong Kong was the 7th largest stock market in the world12 
and the 3rd largest in Asia following Tokyo Stock Exchange (US$bn 4,330.9) and Shanghai 
Stock Exchange (US$b 3,694.3). 
                                                 
12 World Federation of Exchanges website:  
http://www.world-exchanges.org/statistics/annual/2007/domestic-market-capitalization 
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2) Growth Enterprise Market (GEM) 
There were 193 listed companies on the GEM by the end of 2007 (198 in 2006). The total 
market capitalisation of GEM was HK$bn 161.1 (HK$bn 88.9 in 2006). The total turnover 
value on GEM in 2007 was HK$bn 159.3, a 265% increase from 2006.  
3) Trading-only market 
There were two ‘i’-Shares and seven NASDAQ stocks quoted on the trading-only market 
in 2007(same as 2006). Turnover was HK$m 16.13 in 2007 (HK$m 15.13 in 2006).  
 
In respect of information disclosure, the listed companies on the HKEx are required to 
comply with the listing rules to make announcement to the public. The information 
announced includes, inter alia, company performance on a yearly basis. For the period of 
study of this thesis (2003-2005), listed companies were required to publish the company 
performance in Hong Kong newspapers.   The HKEx ran a pilot scheme for six months 
from 25 June 2007 that, as long as a Main Board listed issuer published full announcement 
on its own website and the HKEx website with a notification of the announcement in the 
local newspapers, that issuer would not be obliged to make a paid announcement in the 
press. In addition, both Main Board and GEM listed issuers were required to submit their 
disclosures to HKEx electronically through the e-Submission System (ESS).  
 
The pilot scheme was found to be successful and well accepted by the listed firms. 
Effective 25 December 2007, Main Board issuers publishing announcements on their own 
websites were no longer required to publish notifications in newspapers (source: Fact Book 
2007, HKEx).  The shift from the newspaper to the website should save the listed 
companies from incurring hefty costs in buying advertising space for publishing their full 
announcements in the press.  On the other hand, publishing the announcements on 
company websites enables the public to acquire the information at any time.  In this way, 
HKEx has encouraged the listed companies to provide easy access to the public for the 
company’s information.  During the period of study of this thesis (i.e., 2003 to 2005), the 
public still had to look out for the announcements of listed companies from newspapers, 
although there might be individual companies placing their announcements on their 
company website out of their initiative. The main source of information about the listed 
firms, especially the detailed disclosure of non-financial information, remained with the 
company annual reports. 
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5.5.2 The Securities and Futures Commission (SFC) 
The Securities and Future Commission (SFC) is the principal regulator of Hong Kong’s 
securities and futures markets. It is an independent statutory body established in 1989 
under the Securities and Futures Commission Ordinance (SFCO, Cap. 24), which was 
subsequently consolidated with nine other securities and futures related ordinances into the 
Securities and Futures Ordinance (SFO, Cap. 571) that came into operation effective 1 
April 2003. 
 
The primary function of the SFC is to administer the laws governing the securities and 
futures markets in Hong Kong. It is also responsible for the facilitation and encouraging 
the development of these markets. The regulatory objectives of the SFO are: 
1) to maintain and promote the fairness, efficiency, competitiveness, 
transparency, and orderliness of the securities and futures industry; 
 
2) to promote understanding by the public of the operation and functioning of 
the securities and futures industry; 
 
3) to provide protection for members of the public investing in or holding 
financial products; 
 
4) to minimise crime and misconduct in the securities and futures industry; 
 
5) to reduce systemic risks in the securities and futures industry; and  
 
6) to assist the Financial Secretary in maintaining the financial stability of 
Hong Kong by taking appropriate steps in relation to the securities and 
futures industry. (Source: Regulatory Framework and Rule, Listing Rules 
2005, HKEx) 
5.5.3 Financial Reporting Council (FRC) 
The Financial Reporting Council (FRC) is an independent statutory body responsible for 
investigating complaints concerning irregularities of auditors and reporting accounts, and 
non-compliance in the financial reports, of listed companies. It is funded jointly by the 
HKEx, the SFC, the Hong Kong Institute of Certified Public Accountants (HKICPA), and 
the Registrar of Companies.  
 
The FRC has no authority to impose disciplinary action on, or prosecute, parties found to 
have breached any rules.  In November and December 2007, the FRC entered into a 
Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) with the SFC, the Hong Kong Monetary Authority 
(HKMA) and HKEx to facilitate information exchange and regulatory cooperation.  This 
development implies that any irregularities in the financial reporting of the listed firms 
identified by the FRC can be brought to the attention of the three parties of the MOU, with 
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a view of making amendments to the legislations and practices, or taking disciplinary 
actions by the SFC if necessary. 
 
The FRC was not operative for the period of study of this thesis from 2003 to 2005.  It was 
only set up on 16 July 2007.  The establishment of the FRC signals the intention of the 
regulatory bodies of Hong Kong to raise the corporate governance standards and improve 
the quality of disclosures in Hong Kong.   
 
The above-mentioned discussion has summarized the historical development of the Hong 
Kong CG and regulatory framework. The following section, Section 5.6, will present the 
characteristics of Hong Kong stock market and the characteristics of Hong Kong listed 
firms. 
 
5.6 Characteristics of Hong Kong stock market and Hong Kong listed 
firms 
In this section, the characteristics of the Hong Kong stock market and Hong Kong listed 
firms are presented.  These characteristics are either abstracted from the extant literature 
that has previously studied Hong Kong market and its listed firms, or sourced from the fact 
books of the HKEx and other regulatory organizations. 
5.6.1 Characteristics of the Hong Kong Stock Market 
Compared to other advanced economies such as the U.S., the U.K. and Australia, Hong 
Kong is “unique in its regulatory framework structure (relatively non-stringent financial 
reporting requirements) and corporate governance structure (most listed firms are family 
controlled)” (Ho, Lam & Sami, 2004, p. 384).  Hong Kong is a market-driven economy 
with very few restrictions on the movement of capital. With very limited exception, there 
are no minimum local shareholding requirements or restrictions on foreign ownership of 
shares or assets.13   For the 14th consecutive year in 2008, Hong Kong was ranked 1st out of 
30 countries in the Asia-Pacific region by the Heritage Foundation in 2008.as the freest 
economy in the world.14   
 
                                                 
13 The exceptions being restrictions on the exercise of voting control by non-residents in respect of some 
types of licences in the broadcasting industry under certain circumstances, according to a Merges and 
Acquisitions booklet from the law firm Deacons: 
http://www.deacons.com.hk/eng/knowledge/knowledge_106.htm#10 
  
14 2008 Index of Economic Freedom, as per the Heritage Foundation website: 
http://www.heritage.org/index/countries.cfm 
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The rates of income tax and corporate tax in Hong Kong are very competitive, and overall 
taxation is relatively small as a percentage of GDP. Hong Kong does not recognise the 
concept of taxing capital gains on the disposal of assets, which include property and shares. 
There is no withholding tax payable in respect of distributions of dividends to shareholders. 
To the shareholders, dividend incomes are not subject to tax. Business regulation is simple. 
There are virtually no restrictions on foreign capital15.  Not only does Hong Kong adopt an 
open-door policy on foreign capital movements, it is also one of the major players in the 
global financial markets.  Hong Kong’s stock market was the 6th largest in the world and 
the 2nd largest in Asia in terms of domestic market capitalisation in 2006.16  As at end 2007, 
Hong Kong had a domestic market capitalisation of US$bn 2,654, equivalent to 69% of 
that of the London Stock Exchange. In 2007, Hong Kong stock market ranked 7th in the 
world and was preceded by Shanghai stock market which experienced a phenomenal 
growth during the year. 
 
The total market capitalisation in 2007 was HK$bn 20,566.5 (US$bn 2,636.7), an increase 
of 55% over 2006 (HK$bn 13,248.8 or US$bn 1,698.6). The average daily number of trade 
deals was 602,906 (255,596 deals in 2006). Main Board equities recorded a total turnover 
of HK$bn 16,511.3 (US$bn 2,116.8), risen by 157% when compared with 2006 in about 
the same number of trading days (246 trading days in 2007 and 247 days in 2006)17. 
 
In sum, Hong Kong is an influential player in the global capital market. The HKSAR 
government, the HKEx, and the regulatory bodies recognise the importance of the stock 
market to the open economy of Hong Kong. They are determined to keep Hong Kong’s 
pre-eminent position as a leading financial nexus in Asia and develop it as a world-class 
asset management centre.  They accept that good corporate governance at market level and 
at company level is crucial to investors, and have taken continued efforts to foster CG 
culture, raise the CG standards, and improve the quality of disclosures in Hong Kong.18   
 
The above section has discussed the characteristics of the overall Hong Kong stock market. 
The following section, Section 5.6.2, will describe the characteristics of Hong Kong listed 
firms. 
                                                 
15 See p. 205, 2008 Index of Economic Freedom, The Heritage Foundation. 
16 World Federation of Exchanges:  
http://www.worldexchanges.org/WFE/home.asp?menu=406&document=4140 
 
17 HKEx Fact Book 2007. 
18 HKEx, Annual Report, 2005. 
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5.6.2 Characteristics of Hong Kong Listed Firms 
Survey results show that firms in Hong Kong are historically characterised with a high 
concentration of family ownership.  In a substantial number of firms in Hong Kong, 
individual shareholdings or family shareholdings far exceeded 10% (HKSA, 1997, p. 2-12).  
Concentrated ownership by families is not unique to Hong Kong firms. It is a common 
phenomenon in the East Asian region (Luo, 2007; Claessens, Djankov and Lang, 2000; 
Lim, 1981). Moreover, a substantial portion of board members of Hong Kong firms would 
belong to the management team or to the family that owned the firm (SEHK 1994, 1996). 
In fact, it is well documented in the accounting literature that family members tightly hold 
equity ownership in a typical Asian corporation (Claessens and Fang, 2002; Fan and Wong, 
2002; Ho and Wong, 2001; Mok, Lam and Cheung, 1992).  
 
What distinguishes Hong Kong family-owned firms from their counterparts in other Asian 
countries is that the business practices in Hong Kong have been heavily influenced by both 
the British value systems and the indigenous Chinese cultural values (Bond and King, 1985, 
p. 353-356).  Hong Kong has been heavily influenced by the British accounting practices 
(Phenix, 1994, p.164-165). Even after the 1997 reunion with mainland China, it is still 
running the Anglo-Saxon common law legal framework, which encourages arms-length 
transactions in business dealings. At the same time, the social relations between constituent 
firms of a business conglomerate are predominantly family relations (Mok, Lam and 
Cheung, 1992; Lam, Mok, Cheung and Yam, 1994).  Mok et al find that, out of the 77 
largest corporations in Hong Kong between 1985 and 1989, 72 companies are identified as 
family-controlled by 36 different families. Of these 36 families, 15 families controlled a 
total of 51 companies, the market value of which totalled US$43.34 billion, equivalent to 
55.88% of Hong Kong’s total market value, as of December 31, 1989 (ibid, 1992, p.282). 
 
In Hong Kong, the family owners of publicly listed firms do not act merely as figure-heads 
of the firms but actively participate in the management of their corporations.  In addition, 
the Chinese businessmen in Hong Kong extend their business control network by 
interlocking stock holdings (e.g., pyramiding) and interlocking directorships. Firms with 
ownership by a particular family are recognized as a group by the market.  Those groups of 
family-owned firms, particularly those owned by Chinese businessmen, tend to have 
family members appointed to the board of directors, or holding key executive positions in 
the firms.  Pennings (1980) suggests that a tight network of interlocking directorates can 
enhance a group’s survival.  Firms involved in interlocking directorates may help each 
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other in business dealings, thus creating resource interdependence in sharing business 
expertise and knowledge, adopting similar accounting policies, applying common 
corporate governance values and practices, and appointing alike financial reporting 
services (e.g., external auditors and tax consultants). In short, family-owned firms of the 
same group have the advantage over non-family owned firms competing in the same 
market economy in that the former ones can share the information set among the group.  
 
The concentration of family ownership has an impact on the stock price performance of 
listed firms in Hong Kong. Empirical studies have shown that prices of constituent stocks 
controlled by a family tend to move together more than prices of stocks controlled by 
different families (Mok, Lam and Cheung, 1992, 1989). The within-family-group 
correlation coefficients are much larger than the between-family-group correlation 
coefficients, indicating that firms in the family grouping are homogeneous. It seems to 
suggest that firms belonging to the same homogeneous group tend to co-vary more 
strongly within the family group than within industry groups.  
 
Mok et al (1992) also find that, whereas family association is significant in explaining 
returns covariation among the Chinese family groups of firm, the relationship is not 
significant for the non-Chinese family groups. Such a difference may be attributed to the 
characteristics of the non-Chinese family groups, which have more diversified business 
and there is only one family member sitting on the Board of Directors with the other 
directors being mostly professional management personnel. On the contrary, the Chinese 
family groups usually have family members as chairmen of the Board of Directors or 
holding significant executive positions. 
 
There is less incentive for transparency in respect of firms in the East Asian countries, 
including Hong Kong, as compared to the Anglo-American firms due to differences in 
cultural environments (Ball, Wu and Robin, 1999, p.3), as quoted in the study by Chen and 
Jaggi (2000). Chen and Jaggi find significant variations in financial disclosures across 87 
large Hong Kong firms. The comprehensiveness of disclosures increases with the increase 
in the proportion of independent non-executive directors (INEDs). However, for family-
controlled firms in Hong Kong, the impact of INED on financial disclosure is relatively 
weaker than non-family controlled firms (ibid, 2000).  Under this circumstance, it remains 
an empirical issue to test whether an enhanced level of requirements in corporate 
governance disclosure, in similar fashion to the enhanced requirements of financial 
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disclosure, would have an impact on a firm’s valuation.  Before any empirical tests are 
proposed, the setting of this study is explained in the following section.  
 
5.6.3 The setting for the current study 
Hong Kong has a common law regime. Being a former British colony, Hong Kong has its 
legal origin transplanted from the U.K. All business transactions, commercial contracts, 
and trading activities are under the jurisdiction of common law courts. Researchers have 
generally regarded the common law jurisdiction in Hong Kong as an important factor in 
providing high quality financial reporting (Ball, Robin, and Wu, 2003)19, high judicial 
efficiency (Johnson, Boone, Breach, and Friedman, 2000), and high level of investor 
protection (LLSV, 2002). The presence of many multi-national corporations, and the 
Anglo-American accounting practices hitherto developed and adopted in Hong Kong 
require more information disclosure and emphasize transparency on the firms’ owners and 
managers.  
 
Hong Kong has always been an open economy.  Hong Kong relies heavily on international 
trading. It is currently the world’s 12th largest trading entity. In 2007, its visible trade 
(including re-export, domestic exports and imports of goods) reached HK$ 5, 551 billion, 
equivalent to 343% of GDP, as compared to 223% (in 1997) and 190% (in 1987) in 
previous decades20 (Hong Kong Yearbook, 2007, p. 41). The openness of Hong Kong 
economy is further evidenced by the pegging of its currency with the U.S. dollars since 
1983; and the link has since not been waived even after Hong Kong’s political reunion 
with China in 1997.   According to Stulz and Williamson’s (2003) model, an open 
economy is negatively correlated to the shareholder’s rights but positively correlated to 
creditor’s rights. Stronger creditor protection demands more transparency, which is backed 
up by a common law court system.   Culturally, Hong Kong remains essentially a Chinese 
society which is less inclined to much voluntary disclosure.  The combination of these 
characteristics makes Hong Kong an ideal place for researchers to investigate which 
factor(s) of CG are important to the investors and to what extent each factor affects the 
overall protection of the minority outsiders from the expropriation by the insiders.  
                                                 
19 Ball et al address quality as “the extent to which accounting information reflects the underlying economic 
situation of the firm” and is related to the concept of transparency, which is defined as “the ability of users to 
‘see through’ the financial statements to comprehend the underlying accounting events and transactions in 
the firm” (ibid, 2003, p. 237).  
20 If the value of exports and imports of services is also taken into account, the proportion of GDP would be 
even greater: 404% (in 2007), 259% (in 1997) and 230% (in 1987). Sources: Hong Kong Yearbook 2007, the 
Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR). 
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 Hong Kong is characterised with a highly concentrated ownership in business by families.  
Researchers have found that firms in the same family group have advantages over other 
non-family firms in terms of information sharing.  However, family-owned firms tend to 
present entrenchment problems that will not be beneficial in attracting investments. 
Disclosure, on the other hand, helps eliminating the concerns from investors.  Hong Kong 
provides a unique environment to examine empirically firm characteristics that can affect 
corporate governance disclosure in a setting of highly family concentrated ownership. 
 
The establishment of the corporate governance framework by HKEx for its listed firms to 
take effect in the fiscal year of 2005 provides a good opportunity to investigate the effect 
of voluntary disclosure of corporate governance practices of listed firms in Hong Kong 
with respect to a firm’s value.  In studying the data for the three years from 2002-2005 
when disclosure of corporate governance information was not yet strictly enforced by 
HKEx, the relationship between voluntary disclosure of corporate governance practices of 
listed firms in Hong Kong with respect to a firm’s value can be revealed.        
 
In addition, the listed firms in Hong Kong had been years ahead aware of the imminent 
corporate governance disclosure requirements that were to take effect soon (i.e., since the 
SCCLR consultation paper 2001). The disclosure that some firms had voluntarily carried 
out prior to 2005 would be a valid indicator as to which firms were willing to comply with 
the disclosure requirements ahead of others. Moreover, the comprehensiveness of such 
voluntary disclosure would also differentiate some early compliance firms from the late 
conformers about their commitments to a better quality of corporate governance. Such 
voluntary corporate disclosure will therefore be used and seen as a signal to the market to 
differentiate the ‘good’ firms from the ‘bad’ firms in terms of corporate governance. If 
investors can interpret such signal correctly, the market is expected to respond which 
should give rise to variations in the firms’ market valuation, ceteris paribus.  
 
In this study, the comprehensiveness of the voluntary corporate governance disclosure of 
Hong Kong firms from 2003 to 2005 is measured by a composite score CGDscore, based 
on the requirements as suggested by the Appendix 23 of the HKEx Listing Rules. 
Empirical tests are then carried out to see if such level of voluntary disclosure has any 
impact on the firms’ valuation, controlling for the firm-specific characteristics. Also, this 
study will examine whether the outside investors would employ dividend payout as a 
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mitigating factor to determine the firm’s value, given the state of corporate governance 
disclosed in most family-owned firms in Hong Kong.  
 
5.7 Summary 
 
This chapter summarizes the historical development of corporate governance requirements 
of Hong Kong firms. It also presents the general legal and financial reporting framework 
and identifies the major institutional players within the regulatory framework of Hong 
Kong. Being an international financial centre in Asia, Hong Kong differs from other Asian 
Pacific economies in that it exhibits both the Anglo-Saxon type of open market 
characteristics and the conventional type of Chinese family-orientation in ownership plus 
control in corporations. The legacy of the British rule after 1997 is still prevalent in 
business, accounting, financial and legal regimes. The government officials of the Hong 
Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) have been vigilant in making the stock 
market more transparent and fairer to all investors21, local or overseas, in order to upkeep 
and further promote Hong Kong as a financial centre (being the 2nd largest in Asia outside 
Japan).  
 
On the other hand, the cultural environment in which Hong Kong firms operate (being 
dominated by Chinese people) does not encourage voluntary disclosure of corporate 
information (Chau and Gray, 2002; Chow, Chau and Gray, 1995). The influence of 
conservatism and tendency to secrecy of Chinese family-controlled firms, the growing 
demand for transparency, and the desire for internationalisation of the market jointly make 
Hong Kong the ideal setting for empirically examining how firms behave in corporate 
governance disclosure within an open economy and the impact, if any, of such voluntary 
disclosure on firm’s valuation.  The next chapter, Chapter 6, presents the hypotheses to be 
tested in this study, while Chapter 7 describes the variables to be used for testing those 
hypotheses.  Chapter 8 expounds the sample selection and research design.  
 
 
                                                 
21 Speech by the Secretary for Financial Services and the Treasury Branch (FSTB), HKSAR, September 2003. 
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 Chapter 6: Development of Hypotheses 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
The relationship between the disclosure of firms and their market valuation has been the 
subject of investigation by many corporate governance researchers since the late 1990s.  
Most of their works are cross-country studies, focusing on the differences in firms’ 
performances in different economies under various legal environments.  The selected 
sample firms in those studies are very often large in size but small in number for each 
country (e.g., LLSV, 1998; Mitton, 2002; Klapper and Love, 2004; Daouk, Lee, and Ng, 
2006).  The results of the governance-valuation relationship tested in these studies, though 
valid, are based on large-capitalized firms. They may not be applicable for relatively small 
firms.  
 
This study differs from other studies in that it aims at investigating corporate governance 
(CG) disclosure of large firms (LargeCap), medium firms (MidCap), and small firms 
(SmallCap) within one economy – Hong Kong – where minority shareholders’ rights are 
protected by a strong legal regime but a predominant share ownership (i.e., more than 50%) 
also prevails. High concentration of ownership implies that the classic agency problem 
stemming from the separation of ownership (shareholders) and control (managers) is less 
severe than entrenchment (Fan and Wong, 2002; Cheung, Connelly, Limpaphayom and 
Zhou, 2007).  One of the objectives of this study is to investigate whether the relationship 
between voluntary CG disclosure and firm valuation, if any, would vary for different 
market-capitalisation firms, when the classic agency problem arising from the separation of 
ownership and control (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) is rarely observed. 
 
This chapter presents the hypotheses tested in this thesis in light of the literature that has 
been reviewed in the previous chapters. It also discusses the rationale of the hypotheses in 
relation to other firm-specific variables. 
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6.2 Research questions 
 
Evidence from prior studies summarised previously in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 suggests 
that voluntary disclosure of a firm’s corporate governance (CG) is useful in reducing the 
information asymmetry between the insiders and the outsiders of a firm. More disclosure 
can increase investor awareness of the firm, hence reduce the cost of capital and increase 
equity valuation (Berglof and Pajuste, 2005). The information set available to outside 
investors can be drastically different for firms of different sizes and complexity, though. 
Many research studies have shown an inverse relation between information content and 
firm size (Atiase, 1985; Freeman, 1987, Bhushan, 1989a). These studies argue that larger 
firms are followed by more analysts, resulting in greater private information acquisition 
about those large firms. They posit that analysts have incentives to focus on large firms 
rather than small firms because the former are more widely held. Large firms stimulate the 
interest of a larger number of investors with more potential transactions business. 
Therefore, the larger is the firm size, the more opportunities that will lead to more 
transactions business for the analysts (Bhushan, 1989a).  
 
Other factors affecting the information set (hence the information asymmetry between 
insiders and outsiders) of large firms and small firms include listing age, firm reputation, 
and the costs of securing a controlling share ownership. Large firms usually grow from 
small firms. Compared with the small firms, they tend to have a longer listing history and 
may often enjoy a market reputation, a competitive power, and a degree of resourcefulness 
that are beyond the reach of the small firms.  
 
Ownership structure amongst large, medium, and small firms is often different.  In large 
firms, ownership tends to be more dispersed than smaller firms as it requires much more 
cash outlay to procure a controlling (i.e., more than 50%) portion of equity ownership of a 
large firm than for the same percentage of a small firm.1  For example, Faccio and Lang 
(2002) report a firm size effect on ownership.  In their empirical study of 5,232 firms in 13 
Western countries from 1996 to 1999, they find that large firms are more likely to be 
widely held than small firms.  In the U.K., Faccio and Lang observe that 90% of large 
                                                 
1 Bennedsen and Wolfenzon (2000) demonstrate in a model that, under a one-share-one-vote ownership 
structure, a winning coalition of shareholders is formed with more than 50% of the cash flow rights. However, 
in order to achieve absolute control of a firm, the optimal level of ownership for one investor is to buy more 
than two-thirds of the cash flow rights. The optimal investor would have to be very wealthy in the case of a 
large firm. 
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firms are widely held at the 20% voting rights threshold, but only 14% of small firms are 
widely held at the 10% voting rights threshold.  
 
On the other hand, most small listed firms tend to be younger in terms of listing age. They 
may have obtained their listing status relatively recently. The management style, business 
philosophy, and business model of small firms may not be all too familiar to potential 
investors. Financial analysts may not be interested in following these relatively un-
established, small, firms either, as it would not be economical for them to track, identify, 
and follow the business strategies and evaluate the potentials of those small firms which 
are often not transparent in their company disclosure.   
 
In terms of information set, more importantly is that corporate transparency has been 
directly linked to corporate governance (Gul and Leung, 2004). Investors want governance 
that is designed and administered to protect the interest of all shareholders (Berardino, 
2001). Without analyst following and in the absence of voluntary disclosure by the firm, 
the information gap between insiders and outsiders for small firms may be much greater 
than that for the large/ medium firms.  Outsiders may consider it risky to invest into small 
firms if there is insufficient information about the management, the sustainability, and the 
growth potential of small firms. Thus, investors (and potential investors) are expected to 
discount the share price when disclosure is inadequate (Leung and Horwitz, 2004). 
 
In view of such differences in information sets available to potential investors regarding 
large and small firms, it is therefore justifiable to analyse the voluntary CG disclosure 
behaviour of the firms separately according to their firm size grouping.  In this study, the 
sample firms are chosen according the Hang Seng Hong Kong Composite Index 
(HSHKCI), which is sub-classified by size into the Hang Seng HK LargeCap Index, Hang 
Seng HK MidCap Index, and Hang Seng HK SmallCap Index. A brief description about 
the classification criteria is summarized below (detailed descriptions of the firms will be 
presented in Chapter 8)2. 
 
The Hang Seng Hong Kong Composite Index (HSHKCI) is part of the Hang Seng 
Composite Index (HSCI) series. The HSCI aims to provide a comprehensive benchmark of 
the performance of stocks in the Hong Kong stock market and comprises the top 200 
companies listed on the Hong Kong Exchange (HKEx). The series covers about 90% of the 
                                                 
2 Source: Brochure: Hang Seng Composite Index Series, Hang Seng Freefloat Index Series, Hang Seng Index 
(http://www.hsi.com). 
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total market capitalisation of all stocks listed on the Main Board. The HSCI series is 
divided into Geographical Indices and Industry Indices. If the HSCI constituent companies 
with over 50% of their sales revenue (or profits, or assets if more appropriate) are derived 
from mainland China, they are included in the Hang Seng Mainland Composite Index 
(HSMLCI).  Companies not included in the HSMLCI, where sales revenue is derived from 
Hong Kong and outside the mainland China, are then included in the Hang Seng Hong 
Kong Composite Index (HSHKCI).   
 
The HSHKCI is further sub-divided into three indices based on the size of the constituents, 
namely, the Hang Seng HK LargeCap Index (HSHKLI), the Hang Seng MidCap Index 
(HSHKMI), and the Hang Seng HK SmallCap Index (HSHKSI).  The first index (HSHKLI) 
covers the largest 15 constituent stocks, whose market performance are reviewed regularly 
by Hang Seng Index Company, the company that prepares these index series.  Any stock 
with a market capitalisation ranking that falls below 18th position in the HSHKCI will be 
removed from the HSHKLI, while any stock ranking above 12th position will be included.  
The HSHKLI covers about 80% of the market capitalisation of the HSHKCI. 
 
The second index (HSHKMI) covers the Midcap firms. It comprises 35 constituent stocks 
and covers the next 15% of the market capitalisation of the HSHKCI, following the top 
80%. In regular reviews, any stock with a market capitalisation ranking that falls below the 
60th position in the HSHKCI will be removed from the HSHKMI, while any stock ranking 
above 40th position will be included.  Finally, the SmallCap index (HSHKSI) includes the 
remaining stocks of the HSHKCI which are not included in the HSHKLI or the HSHKMI. 
It covers the remaining 5% of the market capitalisation of the HSHKCI. 
 
It should be pointed out that a firm’s market capitalization is a continuous variable that 
may lie anywhere along a continuum of values. The classification methodology of 
LargeCap, MidCap, and SmallCap firms by the Hang Seng Index Company is arbitrary. 
There is no hard and fast rule that explains why large firms must be confined to the largest 
15 firms only. Nor is there any economic theory to justify that firms of medium size can 
only comprise those ranking between 16th and the 59th largest market capitalization.  Like 
any index classification methodology, the classification of firms by market capitalization is 
a matter of common practice if not a matter of convenience. This study follows the 
classification of Hang Seng Hong Kong Composite Index in grouping the Hong Kong 
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listed firms under study into large (LargeCap), medium (MidCap) and small (SmallCap) 
firms.   
 
There are four basic research questions in this study, which will be applied to LargeCap, 
MidCap, and SmallCap firms separately as individual groups first and then jointly as a 
pooled sample. They are discussed in turn below. 
 
Research question 1 
The first research question investigated in this study is whether voluntary disclosure of 
corporate governance (CG) affects a firm’s valuation.  The importance of this question lies 
in the fact that voluntary disclosure is an act of signalling from insiders to outsiders. As 
Verrecchia (1983) puts it, “The manager decides to either release or withhold this signal on 
the basis of the information’s effect on the asset’s market price” (ibid, 1983, p.179). Yet, 
strictly speaking, signalling on CG provides no additional information about the financial 
prospects or future cash flow of a firm. Will such signalling on CG be recognised as 
credible information about the firm? Will the market appreciate such non-financial 
disclosure by the firm and respond by according a higher market valuation to the firm? 
Research question 2 
When a predominant shareholder is present, it is questionable that firms will keep on 
voluntarily disclosing their CG. One could argue that the predominant shareholder is 
unrivalled in decision-making contests in the board of directors; there is no point in 
disclosing CG information to the minority outsiders. On the other hand, one could also 
argue that the minority outsiders are concerned about potential expropriation by the 
majority shareholder, derived from the majority shareholder’s dominant position in the 
equity holding. To alleviate some of these concerns, the majority shareholder may choose 
to voluntarily disclose more information on the CG practices, or voluntarily commit to a 
higher CG standard.  
 
Therefore, the second research question in this thesis is: Does concentrated ownership 
structure have any effect on the level of voluntary disclosure of CG?  What are the other 
CG variables that may also influence the level of voluntary disclosure?  The empirical 
findings for this research question can shed light on the effect of concentrated ownership 
structure on the level of voluntary disclosure of CG. 
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Research question 3 
Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2007) posit that the most important benefit that good 
governance brings to a firm is the access to capital markets on better terms. Compared with 
LargeCap firms, SmallCap firms can be expected to have more difficulty in obtaining their 
capital on better terms.  When SmallCap firms have bigger potential for business growth, 
their needs to tap the capital market will lead to stronger incentives to disclose voluntarily. 
In that case, will there be systematic differences in the voluntary CG disclosure between 
the LargeCap firms, MidCap firms, and SmallCap firms? If there are systematic 
differences in disclosure amongst the groups, will the different levels of disclosure affect 
their firm valuation, ceteris paribus? To what extent do LargeCap firms, MidCap firms, 
and SmallCap firms behave differently in terms of voluntary disclosure of CG?  These are 
the areas of inquiry for the third research question of this study.  
 
Research question 4 
For firms with a predominant shareholder, the minority outside investors would be legally 
powerless to remove incompetent management.  Moreover, both the market valuation and 
dividend payout tend to be lower (Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1988).  Morck et al posit 
that the quality of CG not only affects a firm’s access to and the amount of external 
financing but also the cost of capital and firm valuation.  Outsiders are less willing to 
provide financing to a firm with poor CG. As a result, they are more likely to demand a 
higher rate if the rate of return is seen as more risky, due to poor CG. Claessens (2006) 
argues that conflicts between small and large controlling shareholders are greater in weaker 
CG environments, which implies that smaller investors receive lower rates of return, in 
terms of either dividend payout or capital gains. Would voluntary CG disclosure and 
dividend payout of firms with prominent shareholder be any different from for firms 
without a dominant shareholder? If voluntary disclosure is a signalling device for sound 
management, can more voluntary disclosure of CG be a substitute for dividends to the 
small investors? These are the issues to be addressed in the fourth research question of this 
study. 
 
The following section, Section 6.3, will discuss the development of these research 
questions into testable hypotheses, using Hong Kong listed firms as samples. The rationale 
for using Hong Kong listed firms as samples is provided and further discussed in Section 
8.2 of Chapter 8.  
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6.3 Hypotheses development 
 
In this section, testable hypotheses will be developed with justifications provided. Much of 
the supporting arguments are derived from the literature review sections previously 
discussed in Chapters 3 and 4.  To facilitate the reasoning of these arguments for testable 
hypotheses in this study, the abstracts of main findings from prior key literature are re-
presented in the following subsections. They are presented to lend support to the building 
up of the hypotheses.   
 
Research Question 1, which is mainly on the value relevancy of voluntary CG disclosure, 
is addressed in Section 6.3.1 where the arguments for Hypothesis 1 (H1) are expounded.  
In Section 6.3.2, Research Question 2 is analysed and developed into 5 hypotheses (i.e., 
H2a - H2e) which aim at testing the factors that affect voluntary CG disclosure under 
concentrated ownership.  The arguments for selecting the control variables are also 
presented in that section.  Section 6.3.3 deals with Research Question 3, which queries the 
systematic differences among various firms’ capitalization. Five hypotheses (i.e., H3a – 
H3e) are developed.  Research Question 4, which explores the use of dividends as means 
of enhanced investor protection, is expounded in two sections.  Section 6.3.4 presents the 
hypothesis (H4), which tests the linkage between voluntary CG disclosure with dividend 
payout.  Section 6.3.5 explicates the hypothesis (H5) why dividend payout is also jointly 
affected by the level of insider ownership and the voluntary CG disclosure of a firm.  A 
summary of this chapter is presented in Section 6.4. 
 
 
6.3.1 Voluntary CG disclosure and valuation 
As argued by Jensen and Meckling (1976), agency problem may not be a major problem if 
the interests of managers are aligned with the owners of a firm.  This would be the case 
when the firm is tightly owned and controlled by a family and the CEO is also the 
controlling owner, as is the case in most of the firms in Hong Kong.  However, the 
entrenchment of managers may become a problem because minority shareholders are 
legally powerless to remove the controlling directors. There is a possibility for the problem 
to occur within a high investor protection regime such as Hong Kong (where the Anglo-
Saxon common law system is maintained and practised after the re-union with China in 
1997).  
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In cases of severe agency problem of entrenchment, outside investors can be expected to 
be reluctant to invest in a firm, which does not implement good corporate governance, 
especially if there is a track record of expropriation of minority shareholders, or there is 
any sign of potential expropriation, by the majority shareholder. Investors will therefore 
“discount stocks according to perceived corporate governance issues” (Claessens and Fan 
2002, p. 95). It can therefore be argued that investors will not pay as high a price for the 
stock of a firm suspicious of questionable corporate governance.  It follows that, a priori, 
firms that exhibit poor corporate governance should exhibit a lower market value, ceteris 
paribus, than other firms similar in size, scale, nature, or other firm characteristics under 
the same legal protection regime.  
 
On the other hand, firms with good corporate governance practices would have the 
incentive to differentiate themselves from firms with poor corporate governance because 
better corporate governance can benefit firms in many ways (Claessens, 2006). These 
include: 
1) Increased access to external financing which can lead to greater investment, higher 
growth, and more employment creation; 
 
2) Lower cost of capital and associated higher firm valuation, which makes more 
investments attractive to investors and leads to growth and employment; 
 
3) Better operational performance, through better allocation of resources and better 
management, which creates wealth; 
 
4) Reduced risk of financial crises, as financial crises (e.g., the 1997 Asian crisis) can 
impose large economic and social costs; 
 
5) Better relationships with all stakeholders, which helps improve social and labour 
relationships and areas such as environmental protection (ibid, 2006, p. 99). 
 
The argument that firms with better corporate governance tend to disclose more about their 
corporate governance structure and practices stems directly from the signalling theory of 
voluntary disclosure (Ross, 1979; Milgrom, 1982; Verrecchia, 1983; Dye, 1985; Lev and 
Penman, 1990). In Ross’s model and Milgrom’s theoretical information asymmetry model 
between the agent and principal, the agent always has a choice of an optimal act to signal 
to the principal. Implicit in such signalling models is that their analysis is driven by a 
monotonicity property: more good news about the state of affairs in a firm would lead to a 
favourable revision of a firm’s market valuation. In a rational expectations model, it is 
accepted that “the arrival of good news about a firm’s prospects would cause the price of 
its stock to rise” (Milgrom, 1982, p.381). One implication is that individual pieces of 
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information can be ordered by favourableness. For example, in a securities market model, 
more favourable news about a security’s future returns leads to a higher price for that 
security. The agent would therefore select the most favourable information to release first 
in order to achieve the best potential impact on a firm’s valuation.  
 
Voluntary disclosure literature follows the same argument which suggests that, given a 
choice to disclose, at equilibrium, the interested party will report the information that is 
most favourable to its case, while withholding less favourable information. It can be 
argued that voluntary disclosure is a special case of game theory. The central premise of 
such an argument is that an entity contemplating a voluntary disclosure “will disclose 
information that is favourable to the entity, and will not disclose information unfavourable 
to the entity” (Dye, 2001, p.184). The significance of the voluntary disclosure theory 
therefore lies in the intention and the expected reactions to such voluntary act of disclosure 
(Dye, 1985). Dye’s disclosure principle argues that those insiders (i.e., managers) with 
information to imply the firm is undervalued by the market will disclose it credibly such 
that their firm’s stock price will be revised upward. Similarly, those managers with 
information that implies values below market will withhold rather than disclose such 
information for as long as they can until it is legally necessary to disclose it. 
 
One implication of the voluntary disclosure theory is that: investors will perceive those 
non-disclosing firms (also known as “silent firms”) as firms with less than average 
valuation.  Accordingly, the prices of their shares will be re-valued downwards3. This 
potential downward price revision of non-disclosing firms will, in turn, motivate those 
firms with relatively good news to screen themselves out of the same group by disclosing 
their information. The disclosure process will therefore self-sustain until the positions of 
all firms in the valuation hierarchy are identified (Lev and Penman, 1990, p. 49).  
 
Since voluntary disclosure can benefit the investors and the firms in terms of liquidity and 
a lower cost of capital (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991; Baiman and Verrecchia, 1996, and 
others as reviewed in Section 4.3), firms with good corporate governance have strong 
incentives to differentiate themselves from the not-so-good corporate governance firms. 
Good CG firms would endeavour to communicate to the outside investors that they are 
                                                 
3 The classic “lemons” model by Akerlof (1970) points out that, taking used cars as an analogy, the good cars 
may be driven out of the market by the lemons if no proper, credible, signalling devise is available to the 
buyers and sellers. “For it is quite possible to have the bad driving out the not-so-bad driving out the medium 
driving out the not-so-good driving out the good in such a sequence of events that no market exists at all.” 
(Akerlof, 1970, p. 490) 
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practising a higher quality of corporate governance than others. There are arguably several 
ways to achieve this objective:  
(i) adopt more corporate governance structures and practices than is 
recommended by the regulatory bodies;  
 
(ii) disclose more in-depth the corporate governance (i.e., the quality of corporate 
governance) being implemented within the firm on a voluntary basis; or  
 
(iii) apply, implement, and disclose more corporate governance practices earlier 
than is statutorily required by the regulatory bodies. 
 
Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) posit that information asymmetries between the firm and its 
shareholders will create costs by introducing adverse selection into transactions between 
buyers and sellers of a firm’s shares. Adverse selection often leads to a lower liquidity of 
firm shares. To overcome the reluctance of potential investors to buy or hold such firms’ 
shares, firms have to issue capital at a discounted price. Discounted price results in fewer 
proceeds to the firms and hence higher costs of capital. Leuz and Verrecchia thus argue 
that a commitment to increased levels of disclosure will reduce the possibility of 
information asymmetries. This in turn should reduce the discount at which firms’ shares 
are sold, and hence lower the costs of issuing capital (ibid, 2000, p.92). 
 
It follows from this argument that firms that are better governed will disclose more about 
their corporate governance practices to differentiate them from others. Based on such 
voluntary disclosure, investors are willing to pay a premium for their shares. In view of the 
forgone discussion, Hypothesis 1 (stated in the alternative form), which is investigated in 
this study, postulates that4:  
Hypothesis 1(H1) 
H1: Firms that voluntarily disclose more information with regard to their corporate 
governance practices have higher market valuation than firms that disclose less, ceteris 
paribus. 
 
The variables to be employed in hypothesis H1 will be: 
• the market valuation (as proxied by Tobin’s q or the Market-to-book ratio); and 
• the corporate governance disclosure score. 
                                                 
4 For those firms with poorer governance, it may be argued that they may also employ a “me-too” strategy in 
disclosing their CG practices. They may “talk cheap” and yet decline to practise what they preach in their 
annual reports about the state of their CG. While there is no effective means to guard against such 
malpractices, there is, nevertheless, a reputation cost involved.   If the firms do not intend to improve their 
CG, then they stand to lose their credibility if what they voluntarily disclose do not match what they are 
practising. This is especially the case when they have no obligation at all to disclose their CG in the first 
place during the pre-regulation years. 
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 In this study, the firms’ market valuation is appraised by an approximation of Tobin’s q. 
The original Tobin’s q (Brainard and Tobin, 1968; Tobin and Brainard, 1977; Tobin, 1969, 
1978; Lindenberg and Ross, 1981) is a financial market-based measure of firm 
performance defined as the present value of future cash flows divided by the replacement 
cost of tangible assets. However, Chung and Pruitt (1994) have developed a simple 
approximation of Tobin’s q. This measure of market valuation has been widely used in 
recent CG and firm valuation studies such as: Black, Jang, and Kim (2006); Durnev and 
Kim (2005); Cremers and Nair (2005); Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003); Kaplan and 
Zingales (1997); Lang and Stulz (1994); McConnell and Servaes (1990); Morck, Shleifer, 
and Vishny (1988), Lindenberg and Ross (1981), among other extant researchers. Further 
discussion of the definition of the approximation of Tobin’s q is presented in Chapter 7. 
 
To capture the level of disclosure, a measurement needs to be devised. The corporate 
governance disclosure requirements are detailed in the HKEx Listing Rule Appendix 23. 
Based on this Appendix, a checklist containing the items required for disclosure is 
compiled. By comparing a firm’s disclosure as revealed in its annual reports from 2003 to 
2005 against the checklist, a Corporate Governance Disclosure score (CGDscore) is 
computed to indicate the level of disclosure of individual firms. More elaboration on the 
compilation of such a CGDscore and the choice of metric for market valuation will be 
presented in Chapter 8: Methodology. 
 
6.3.2 Factors affecting voluntary CG disclosure 
The second Research Question investigates if there are other firm characteristics affecting 
the voluntary CG disclosures of firms, which can be formulated into a testable hypothesis 
as follows: 
Hypothesis 2 (H2) 
H2: The level of voluntary CG disclosure is influenced by the CG practices within the firm 
and the level of insiders’ ownership, controlling for the firm’s performance and capital 
structure.  
 
This hypothesis is of particular interest as there is a prevalence of a predominant or 
controlling shareholder across all sizes of firms that it has included as samples, while most 
research studies investigate the disclosure-firm characteristics relationship based on U.S. 
and U.K companies where ownership is diverse (see Chapter 3).  Extant research studies 
have identified the following factors as related to the level of CG disclosure: 
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i) Ownership structure 
Previous CG disclosure research suggests that the voluntary disclosure level is associated 
with concentration of ownership of a firm (Berglof and Pajuste, 2005; Eng and Mak, 2003). 
Based on a sample of 370 non-financial firms listed on 10 Central and Eastern European 
stock exchanges, Berglof and Pajuste find that a more concentrated ownership is 
significantly and negatively associated with the disclosure level. They find empirical 
evidence that firms with more concentrated ownership structures disclose less. They argue 
that controlling shareholders disclose less in order to enjoy more benefits that are private. 
Their view supports Eng and Mak (2003) who find that lower managerial ownership are 
associated with increased disclosure, but total block-holder ownership is not related to 
disclosure for Singapore firms. Hence, a sub-hypothesis can be postulated as follows: 
Hypothesis 2a 
H2a: A firm’s voluntary CG disclosure is negatively related to the insiders’ ownership 
(proxied by the directors’ equity shareholding as a percentage of total outstanding 
shares). 
 
ii) Independent Non-Executive Directors 
Berglof and Pajuste (2005) endorse the view proposed by Ostberg (2004) that disclosure is 
essentially a form of minority protection that reduces the scope for extraction of private 
benefits by controlling shareholders. Fama and Jensen (1983b) have argued that the 
presence of Independent Non-Executive Directors (INEDs) is an important vehicle to 
reduce the expropriation risk and enhance minority investor protection. The presence of 
INEDs is an internal mechanism to safeguard investors from undue expropriation by an 
unchecked, predominant, shareholder. Weisbach (1988) finds boards of directors 
dominated by INEDs play a significant role in adding firm value through CEO changes. 
The numbers of INEDs sitting on the board and the INEDs as a percentage of the board are 
commonly regarded as indicators of how much a Chairman/CEO’s power is being 
monitored by the outside directors (Weisbach, 1988). Jensen (1993) proposes INEDs 
should dominate the board. He even goes to the extreme as to suggest that “the only inside 
board member should be the CEO” (Jensen, 1993, p. 865). 
 
Even if under certain circumstances that they are powerless to constrain the 
CEO/Chairman’s predominance on the board, INEDs are considered as useful in 
influencing the CEO/Chairman’s deliberations and decisions (Pearce and Zahra, 1992).  
Likewise, Mayers, Shivdasani and Smith (1997) show that INEDs perform an important 
monitoring function within the firm (see Chapter 2: Literature Review, Section 2.4.2). 
 167
Therefore, a positive relationship is expected to exist between the number of INEDs and 
the control and monitoring of the insiders’ responsibilities, which include the 
dissemination of information to the outsiders.  
 
Indeed, Patelli and Prencipe (2007) provide empirical evidence that there is a positive 
correlation between the proportion of INEDs on the board and the amount of voluntary 
information disclosed by the firms in their annual reports. Such correlation is found after 
controlling for ownership, size, leverage, profitability, and labour pressure. Their empirical 
evidence is consistent with the expectation that, with more outsiders sitting on the board, 
insiders are more willing to disclose information that allows for a better understanding of 
their current performance, rather than the information concerning the past or future 
expected results. Patelli and Prencipe’s empirical results reinforce the notion that voluntary 
disclosure is significantly influenced by the proportion of INEDs, the firm’s size, and 
ownership diffusion. Hence, it can be hypothesized that: 
Hypothesis 2b 
H2b: A firm’s voluntary CG disclosure is positively related to the number of INEDs and 
the percentage of INEDs sitting on the board, ceteris paribus. 
 
iii) Firm resourcefulness 
According to Berglof and Pajuste (2005), a higher disclosure level is associated with 
higher resource availability to a firm. Disclosure is a direct financial cost. In times of 
financial difficulties and limited resource availability, the efforts and money spent on 
voluntary CG disclosure may well be saved to reduce operating costs. Firms in financial 
‘dire straits’ may prefer not to engage too much in voluntary disclosure so as not to alarm 
the investors (ibid, 2005, p. 186).  On the other hand, a resourceful firm may attract 
attention from various stakeholders and thus face a higher demand for disclosure. To 
coordinate business activities and satisfy information needs of overseas financiers, the firm 
faces greater demand for information from customers, suppliers, analysts, and capital 
providers. It will be in the interests of the firm to improve voluntary disclosure to increase 
the marketability of its securities (Cooke, 1989a). Indeed, Cooke (1992) finds empirical 
evidence that larger firms, which control larger amount of resources than small firms do, 
differ significantly from smaller firms on the quantity of disclosure. His findings support 
Atiase’s (1985) hypothesis and concur with the empirical findings by Freeman (1987) that 
information production for the purpose of identifying mispriced stocks is an increasing 
function of firm size. 
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There may be a number of measures that can proxy for a firm’s resourcefulness, for 
example, a bigger amount of total assets (as expressed in, e.g., the natural logarithm 
(LnTA), a higher profitability (e.g., return on equity, ROE), a larger sales volume (e.g., as 
expressed in terms of natural logarithm, LnSales), or a lower leverage (e.g., Debt/Total 
Asset ratio, Debt/TA). Since none of these is arguably a perfect metric to measure a firm’s 
resourcefulness, LnTA is chosen to proxy for a firm’s resourcefulness because the amount 
of total assets under a firm’s direct control may better indicate a firm’s financial prowess in 
comparison with other proxies. However, ROE, LnSales, and Debt/TA are employed as 
control variables in the hypothesis postulated below: 
Hypothesis 2c 
H2c: A firm’s voluntary CG disclosure is positively related to the firm’s resourcefulness, 
controlling for profitability, sales, and leverage. 
 
 iv) Dual-listing 
Cooke’s (1992) empirical study also shows dual-listed firms disclose more. Dual- or 
multiple-listed firms are often motivated to disclose differently from single-market listed 
firms.  They have an interest in foreign capital markets because foreign operations are 
often financed by foreign capital (Choi and Mueller, 1984; Cooke, 1989b). To tap into 
such capital markets, firms will have to increase their disclosure levels to adapt to local 
customs, to meet the requirements of banks and other capital suppliers. By increasing the 
disclosure level, firms assist their capital suppliers to reduce the informational risk, thereby 
lowering the cost of capital (Spero, 1979). Lang, Raedy, and Yetman (2003) have tested 
cross-listed firms on the U.S. stock exchanges with non cross-listed firms. They find that 
cross-listed firms are systematically different.  Cross-listed firms typically enjoy higher 
valuation multiples, lower cost of capital, lower risk of expropriation, or higher expected 
growth. Because of such characteristics, cross listing (at least on the U.S. exchanges) is 
often regarded as a strong signal about the quality of a firm’s management. The firm is 
more transparent when there is a higher level of outside investors. Their findings are 
consistent with the empirical results by Lang, Lins and Miller (2003) who find ADR firms 
in the U.S. enjoy a lower cost of capital and improved corporate governance around the 
period of cross-listing. Moreover, Lang, Lins and Miller’s findings provide strong evidence 
that important changes in the information environment of firms occur around the time of 
cross listing. Such changes are rewarded with high valuations by the market. Hence, it is 
expected that a positive relationship is present between cross listing and the level of 
voluntary CG disclosure, as postulated in the hypothesis below: 
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Hypothesis 2d 
H2d: Firms that are cross-listed voluntarily disclose more information about their corporate 
governance. 
 
v) Duality of Chairman and Chief Executive Officer 
Prior to the 1990s, it was not uncommon for firms to have an individual to assume the dual 
roles of the Chairman and the Chief Executive Officer (CEO). For example, Pi and Timme 
(1993) study 112 U.S. banks from 1987-1990. They find that approximately 25% of the 
banks have separate persons carrying the titles of the Chairman and the CEO, while 75% 
have combined titles. They observe that, on average, banks with one individual performing 
the dual roles of Chairman/CEO under-perform those banks where the two roles are split 
between two persons. They conclude that firms with non-split roles of Chairman/CEO may 
be less inhibited from engaging in non-value maximizing behaviour. There are similar 
findings for industrial companies over the period 1986-1991 in the U.S. Baliga, Moyer, 
and Rao (1996) analyse 181 firms and observe that only 12 firms (i.e., 7%) had separate 
titles over the entire period while 111 firms (i.e., 61%) had combined titles of 
Chairman/CEO throughout the same time. The remaining 58 firms (i.e., 32%) changed 
leadership structures over the period under study. Baliga et al state that better long-term 
performance is found in firms where a switch to a split leadership structure had taken place.   
 
Agency theory may offer an explanation as to why the roles of Chairman and CEO held by 
separate persons may lead to better firm performance. Jensen (1993) argues that the 
combined roles of Chairman and CEO may give rise to an agency problem, as power and 
leadership of the firms are concentrated in the same person. Such concentration of power 
exacerbates potential conflicts of interest between the two roles and decreases the 
effectiveness of the board in monitoring the CEO.   A dual role of Chairman/CEO allows 
the CEO to exert more power over the decisions and practices of the board, making it more 
costly for the INEDs to disagree with the other directors on the management’s decisions. 
The duality also permits the CEO to control effectively the amount and type of information 
available to other board members, rendering the monitoring function of the board on the 
CEO less effective. To perform the fiduciary role of protecting investors’ interests, it is 
necessary for the board of directors to remain independent of the management in order to 
be effective in monitoring the executives.  
 
Recent empirical studies are not conclusive on the effect of splitting the dual roles of the 
Chairman and CEO on firm value. Brickley, Coles, and Jarrell (1997) examine 264 U.S. 
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firms in which the leadership structure has changed from dual to unitary or the reverse 
between 1984 and 1991. They find that 102 firms have split the CEO and Chairman titles 
and 162 firms have given one individual both titles. For those 102 firms that split the titles, 
Brickley et al find the two-day announcement period stock market abnormal returns (CAR) 
are not significantly different from zero.  The evidence seems to suggest that 
announcements of moves from unitary to dual leadership of Chairman/CEO do not 
systematically affect shareholder wealth. Similarly, for those 162 firms that announce 
combined title of Chairman/CEO, the average CAR is not significantly different from zero 
either.  Brickley et al conclude that there is no evidence that unitary leadership is 
associated with inferior accounting and market returns. They attribute the results to two 
causes. First, no major firm in the U.S. in the sample period had a truly independent 
outsider as chairman. In almost all cases, the chairman is either the former or the current 
CEO (i.e., ‘passing the baton’ as in a relay race), or a person with special ties to the firm.  
Second, when firms separate the titles, the chairmen are almost always people with 
detailed knowledge about the firm who have relatively high stock ownership. For that 
reason, the potential agency and information costs problems are not as severe as might 
have been expected.  
 
Brickley et al’s arguments are consistent with the findings by Booth, Cornett, and 
Tehranian (2002), who study 200 regulated firms (i.e., 100 largest banks and 100 largest 
utilities) and 100 largest industrial firms in U.S. in 1999. They find that the presence of 
Chairman/CEO duality in a firm does not affect the percentage of INEDs sitting on the 
board.  Furthermore, Booth et al find that in larger firms, there is a tendency for one person 
to serve as both the Chairman and the CEO. Among their sample groups of firms, they find 
the banks and utilities are more likely to have the dual roles of Chairman/CEO to be 
performed by the same person than industrial firms are.  Although the duality of 
Chairman/CEO in a firm implies less effective monitoring by the board of directors, the 
high degree of regulation in banks and utilities industries can substitute for the monitoring 
mechanism, thus making the separation of the CEO and Chairman less important in 
controlling agency conflicts. 
 
For those non-regulated firms, the effects of Chairman/CEO duality in a firm on the firm’s 
disclosure would vary, however. Cheng and Courtenay (2006) study the voluntary 
disclosure of 104 Singapore firms in 1998 and 2000. They examine the effects on the 
voluntary disclosure of firms by factors such as the role played by the board of directors, 
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board size, and duality of CEO/Chairman.  Their empirical findings show that, while the 
proportion of INEDs has a significant and positive association with the level of voluntary 
disclosure, the board size and Chairman/CEO duality are not associated with voluntary 
disclosure.  Hence, the impact of split roles of Chairman/CEO on the voluntary CG 
disclosure is unclear.  
 
Agency theory promulgates that an effective board of directors should be independent from 
management of a firm, implying that there should be separated roles for the CEO and the 
Chairman.  Although the evidence has not been conclusive about the effect of duality of 
Chairman/CEO on voluntary disclosure by firms, it can be argued that, judging from the 
perspective of agency theory and based on the findings of above research studies, a testable 
hypothesis, Hypothesis 2e, could be postulated as follows: 
Hypothesis 2e 
H2e: Firms that split the roles of CEO and Chairman have a higher voluntary CG 
disclosure. 
 
To sum up, previous literature shows that the level of voluntary CG disclosure is affected 
by a firm’s board characteristics. Nevertheless, past research studies also indicate that 
some non-board variables may also affect voluntary CG disclosure.  For instance, Haniffa 
and Cooke (2002) identify a great number of factors and summarize them into three non-
mutually exclusive categories of firm-specific characteristics that also impact on a firm’s 
extent of voluntary disclosure. Their work is based on a number of theoretical arguments 
including agency theory, signalling theory, capital market theory, and cost-benefit theory. 
These categories are generally referred to as: (i) structure-related variables (e.g., size, 
leverage, ownership structure, complexity); (ii) performance-related variables 
(profitability); and (iii) market–related variables (e.g., multiple listing).  This study follows 
Haniffa and Cooke’s (2002) approach in searching for control variables that are 
appropriate to test the hypotheses.   They are discussed in the following sub-section. 
 
Control Variables 
Previous literature has shown that researchers employ a variety of variables in exploring 
the relationship between voluntary disclosure by a firm and its valuation.  Some variables 
are used in common by researchers as control variables despite that the research questions 
are different (e.g., Singhvi and Desai, 1971; Choi, 1973; Myers, 1977; Firth, 1979; 
Schipper, 1981; Cooke, 1989a, 1992; Ahmed and Nicholls, 1994; Wallace, Naser and 
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Mora, 1994; Zarzeski, 1996; Chen and Jaggi, 2000; Berglof and Pajuste, 2005; Cheung, 
Connelly, Limpaphayom, and Zhou, 2007).  Four control variables are found to be 
commonly used in the firm valuation and disclosure studies. They are: (i) firm size; (ii) 
profitability; (iii) leverage; and (iv) sales growth. All these variables are used in this study 
as control variables in the analysis of the relation between CG disclosure and firm-specific 
characteristics. Each of them is discussed in turn as follows: 
 
a) Firm Size 
Previous research suggests that firm size may be important in explaining variability in the 
extent of disclosure. There may be a greater need for larger firms to raise capital to finance 
bigger projects at lower costs (Choi, 1973), hence a greater pressure from shareholders, 
their agents, and analysts for increased disclosures (Schipper, 1981).  It is also more likely 
for large firms to be more closely monitored by the regulatory authorities (Firth, 1979). 
Therefore, large firms are usually more willing to disclose information to customers, 
suppliers, and even the public in general (Cooke, 1989).  
 
Sales (expressed as the natural logarithm of net sales, LnSales) is used as the measure of 
firm size in this study as it is an ‘internally’ determined measure of a firm’s importance as 
opposed to ‘externally’ determined measure affected by the volatility of market price of the 
stock (Wallace and Naser, 1995). Sales has been adopted as a proxy for firm size in several 
prior studies (e.g., Cooke, 1989b, 1992; Ahmed and Nicholls, 1994; Wallace, Naser and 
Mora, 1994; Chen and Jaggi, 2000). 
 
b) Profitability 
Profitability has been found to be an important firm-specific variable that affects the extent 
of disclosure (Cerf, 1961). In an empirical study of 527 annual reports of U.S. firms, Cerf 
develops an index of disclosure and identifies profitability (measured by net profit divided 
by net worth) as one of the four key characteristics that are associated with the extent of 
disclosure.5 In another study of 155 randomly chosen largest U.S. firms between 1965 and 
1966, Singhvi and Desai (1971) also identify profitability (measured by the ratio of net 
profit to net worth) as a key variable that explains the variability of disclosure. Singhvi and 
Desai posit that, when the profitability is high, the management may disclose detailed 
information in order to support the continuance of its positions and compensations. When 
                                                 
5 The 4 key characteristics in Cerf’s (1961) study are: (i) company size; (ii) extent of ownership; (iii) 
profitability; and (iv) method of trading, viz. New York stock Exchange or other exchanges; or Over the 
Counter Market. 
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the profitability is low, the management may disclose less in order to cover up the reasons 
for losses or declining profits.  The return on equity (ROE) is the measure for profitability 
in this study. 
 
c) Leverage 
A firm’s leverage (or gearing) has been shown to be significantly related to disclosure (e.g., 
Wallace, Naser, and Mora, 1994; Cooke, 1996; Zarzeski, 1996). In capital market-based 
economies, companies with a higher proportion of their assets financed by bank 
borrowings need to disclose more information in their annual reports to meet the needs of 
their lenders.  Information may have to be disclosed to assure bond-holders that the 
insiders are less likely to bypass their covenant claims (Myers, 1977; Schipper, 1981). This 
view is consistent with agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) which suggests that 
firms with high gearing ratios will incur high monitoring costs. That agency problem, 
however, may be alleviated by more comprehensive levels of disclosure.  
 
The debt ratio (i.e., Debt/Total Assets expressed as a percentage, Debt/TA) is used as the 
variable for measuring a firm’s leverage in this study. 
. 
d) Sales growth 
High growth companies generally require more capital.  Their need for external funds is 
expected to be greater than those firms whose business growth is static. Moreover, sales is 
a clear indicator of a firm’s performance; and better performing firms tend to disclose more 
(Berglof and Pajuste, 2005).  The arguments above are in line of the hypothesis postulated 
by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (LLSV, 2000b), whose substitute 
model of dividends suggests that “firms with better growth prospects have a stronger 
incentive to establish a reputation for moderation in expropriating shareholders since they 
have a greater potential need for external finance”(LLSV, 2000b, p. 8).  
 
In this study, sales growth is measured by the percentage growth in sales over the firm’s 
sales in the previous year (SaleGrow), i.e., (Salest – Salest-1) x 100/ (Salest-1).   The higher 
the growth rate, the more the voluntary CG disclosure is expected.                                                       
 
These sub-hypotheses under the family Hypothesis 2 are summarized in Table 6.1 below. 
The expected signs for the company characteristics variables and control variables on the 
impact of the firm’s voluntary CG disclosure are presented in the last column. 
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 Table 6.1 Summary of expected impact of company characteristics variables and control 
variables on CG disclosure 
 
Hypothesis Variable Nature of 
variable 
Measurements  
level & scale 
Expected sign on CG 
disclosure 
Company characteristics variables 
H2a Directors ownership 
% 
numerical Continuous, 
Ratio. 
+ and – , due to non-
monotonous relationship   
H2b_1 No. of INEDs numerical Discrete,  
Interval 
+ 
H2b_2 % of INEDs on board numerical Continuous, 
Ratio. 
+ 
H2c Total assets numerical Continuous, 
Ratio. 
+ 
H2d Dual listing categorical Discrete, 
Nominal 
+ if dual listed  
H2e Split roles of 
CEO/Chairman 
categorical Discrete, 
Nominal 
+ if roles are split 
Control variables 
 Profitability (ROE) numerical Continuous, 
Ratio. 
+ 
 Sales (LnSales) numerical Continuous, 
Ratio. 
+ 
 Debt ratio (Debt/TA) numerical Continuous, 
Ratio. 
+ 
 Sales growth numerical Continuous, 
Ratio. 
+ 
 
It should be pointed out that the control variables listed in Table 6.1 are not exhaustive. 
Other factors that are non-specific to the firm will also affect voluntary CG disclosure. For 
example, Zarzeski (1996) presents an International Disclosure Model in which she 
suggests cultural forces as another set of independent variables that would affect investor-
oriented disclosure practices.6  Her study finds that the secretiveness of a culture underlies 
disclosure practices of the firms. Local enterprises disclose their information 
commensurate with the secretiveness of their local culture.  
 
The sample firms in this study are either domiciled in Hong Kong or their main sales 
revenue are derived from Hong Kong (which is the definition of the stocks included in the 
Hang Seng Hong Kong SmallCap, MidCap, and LargeCap Indices).  In Hong Kong, a 
majority of the listed firms are owned and managed by Chinese families (Mok, Lam, and 
Cheung, 1992; Lam, Mok, Cheung, and Yam, 1994; HKSA, 1997; Ho, Lam, and Sami, 
                                                 
6 The other set being the market forces which include the proportion of foreign sales to total sales, firm size, 
and the debt ratio. Since by default, the constituent stocks of HSHKI comprise only firms that derive their 
business mainly from Hong Kong, the proportion of foreign sales to total sales will not be covered in this 
study. The four cultural forces are based on Hofstede’s (1980) four cultural dimensions: uncertainty 
avoidance, individualism-collectivism, masculinity-femininity, and power distance. 
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2004). The cultural forces affecting the firms in this study are generally the same (thus 
controlled for); hence, market forces can be expected to constitute the major explanatory 
variables of a firm’s voluntary disclosure of the CG structure and practices, according to 
the categorization of variables by Zarzeski. Such market forces may include, among others, 
firm size, leverage, business growth potential, dual-listing status, and the proportion of 
Independent Non-Executive Directors (INEDs) on the board.  
 
Similarly, the legal origin, legal framework, capital market structure, and the 
presence/absence of various external CG mechanisms (as discussed in Chapter 2) would 
also affect the level of voluntary disclosure. All the sample firms in this study, being 
constituent firms of the Hang Seng HK Composite Index, are subject to the same 
regulatory environment and financial reporting standards. For instance, all listed firms on 
the HKEx are subject to the same set of Companies Ordinance, Securities and Futures 
Ordinance, and the listing rules of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. Prior to the 
implementation of Appendix 13 of the HKEx Listing Rules in January 2005, all the listed 
firms were encouraged to disclose their corporate governance practices since 2002 (after 
the SCCLR report 2001 as has been discussed in Chapter 5 of this thesis). However, there 
was no penalty for non-disclosure prior to 2005, the year Appendix 13 came to full 
enforcement. As such, some firms chose not to disclose their CG information as much as 
desired by the regulators, even though they were kept informed about the forthcoming CG 
disclosure requirements.  Variations in levels of disclosure were therefore expected.   Apart 
from those structure-related or performance-related variables as suggested by Haniffa and 
Cooke (2002), the variations in voluntary CG disclosure would most likely be caused by 
other managerial quality variables, depending on the management’s initiatives, intention, 
willingness, efforts, and commitment in reducing the information asymmetry between 
insiders and outsiders. These differences in disclosure contents are expected to be 
perceived, recognised, and valued differently by outside investors because investors would 
feel more comfortable to leave their investments in the hands of good quality managers, 
who will look after their interests with the vigilance they deserve. 
 
As the selected sample firms vary in their business nature (see Chapter 8: Data Collection) 
and market capitalization (see Chapter 9: Descriptive Statistics), their disclosure of 
corporate governance practices may vary. For example, some firms may have cross-listings 
on other stock exchanges in addition to the HKEx. They may have a motivation to 
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voluntarily disclose more than the mandatory requirements prescribed by HKEx. This 
leads to the development of a third hypothesis as presented in the following sub-section. 
 
6.3.3 Market capitalization and voluntary CG disclosure 
 
Prior research on disclosure of firms are mainly cross-countries studies with focus on large 
firms (e.g., Wallace and Naser, 1995; Chau and Gray, 2002; Cheung, Connelly, 
Limpaphayom, and Zhou, 2007). This study differs from prior studies in that the 
investigation on the voluntary disclosure practices will be made separately for sample 
firms of various size groups in terms of market capitalization, namely, the SmallCap, 
MidCap, and LargeCap firms in the Hang Seng HK Composite Index series.  These sample 
firms are operated under a highly acclaimed investor protection legal regime and a 
business environment that is predominantly dominated and controlled by family-members. 
There are benefits to carry out analyses on separate groups of firms, controlling for firm 
size. Firstly, the characteristics of LargeCap firms are different from SmallCap firms.  
LargeCap firms tend to be more complex in organization structure and more diverse in 
type of business they operate in than SmallCap firms are.  For this reason, the information 
asymmetry between insiders and outsiders for the LargeCap firms are likely to be wider. 
Bushman, Piotroski, and Smith (2004) argue that complex firms are more likely to face a 
demand for segment reporting than simple firms, before the time when segment reporting 
becomes a mandatory reporting requirement.  Hence, the voluntary disclosure behaviour of 
LargeCap and SmallCap firms is expected to differ.  
 
Secondly, the amount of private information of the firm disclosed through analysts 
following varies between LargeCap and SmallCap firms. LargeCap firms, by default with 
higher market value, tend to attract more analysts following who serve as information 
agents as well as providers between the outsiders and the insiders of the firms.  Analysts 
produce reports on firms and make recommendations to their clients on investment 
strategies as to buy, hold, or sell the stocks of these firms based on their understanding and 
analysis of those firms.  In this respect, analysts provide a service in supplementing the 
information quantity voluntarily disclosed by the firms. By providing more reports and 
recommendations on their selected firms (usually larger firms), these information agents 
add to the aggregate information set, thereby reducing the information gap between the 
insiders and the outsiders, for these firms. Consequently, LargeCap firms and SmallCap 
firms may have different information quantity available to prospective investors, even if 
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both types of firms have disclosed voluntarily the same amount of information to the 
market.  It is therefore desirable, if not necessary, to distinguish the LargeCap firms from 
SmallCap firms in analyzing the relationship between voluntary disclosure and firm 
valuation in order to control for this factor.  
 
Thirdly, LargeCap firms (many of them are ‘blue chips) have a longer listing history than 
SmallCap firms do in general. Many of the LargeCap firms are well established with good 
market reputation. Over the years, outside investors may have already acquired certain 
knowledge about the management style, recruitment principles, and business policies of 
the LargeCap firms.  They may have established some level of understanding and trust in 
these firms.  In contrast, outside investors may not know much about the SmallCap firms 
whose listing history may be relatively short.  SmallCap firms are generally well known 
for adopting a more aggressive approach in their investment strategies and policies, which 
often leads to a need for closer monitoring in their usage of funds and more scrutiny on 
their business strategies.  Investors’ expectations on the corporate governance of LargeCap 
firms and SmallCap firms may therefore be drastically different (measurements of 
voluntary disclosure and other variables will be discussed in detail in Chapter 7: Research 
Design). 
 
Finally, the tendency to seek cross-listing is higher for large firms than small firms. In 
countries with weak investor protections and disclosure standards, firms may choose to 
cross-list in another country with strong investor protections and disclosure requirements 
(e.g., the U.S. or the U.K.) in order to to increase the level of investor protection for their 
minority shareholders (Reese and Weisbach, 2002).  Cross listing is voluntary, and incurs 
additional costs to firms.  It is more likely for LargeCap firms than SmallCap firms to incur 
hefty costs to tap into foreign capital markets.  By cross listing, firms indicate their 
willingness to comply with an additional set of accounting and disclosure requirements of 
a foreign country. The requirements are not applicable to those firms that are not cross-
listed. Therefore, ceteris paribus, the following hypothesis (stated in alternative form) can 
be tested: 
Hypothesis 3(H3) 
H3: There are systematic differences in the voluntary CG disclosure between large-cap 
firms and small-cap firms in both the level of disclosure and the value relevance of 
disclosure. 
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While there may be marked differences between the LargeCap firms and SmallCap firms 
in terms of firm characteristics, the differences may not be so distinct between the 
LargeCap and MidCap firms. Due to the fluctuations in market capitalization value, there 
is a possibility for a MidCap firm to drop out of the MidCap Firm category and be demoted 
to the SmallCap Firm category when other upcoming SmallCap firms surpass its market 
value.   It is an empirical issue to find out if the characteristics of MidCap firms in terms of 
CG disclosure are similar to LargeCap firms or to SmallCap firms.  In order to test if there 
are systematic differences amongst the LargeCap, MidCap, and SmallCap firms in terms of 
their voluntary CG disclosure, firm valuation as proxied by Tobin’s q, and the value 
relevance of CG disclosure (i.e., the strength of relationship between CG disclosure and q), 
Hypothesis 3 is decomposed into three supplementary hypotheses, which are stated as 
follows: 
Hypothesis 3a: 
H3a: There are systematic differences in the voluntary CG disclosure of LargeCap, 
MidCap, and SmallCap firms. 
 
Hypothesis 3b: 
H3b: There are systematic differences in the market valuation amongst LargeCap, MidCap, 
and SmallCap firms. 
 
Hypothesis 3c, 3d and 3e: 
H3c: There are systematic differences in the strength of relationship between voluntary CG 
disclosure and firm valuation among LargeCap, MidCap, and SmallCap firms.  
 
As three types of firms are involved, a pair-wise comparison is needed to accept or reject 
any one of these sub-hypotheses.  In order to reject the null hypothesis that there is no 
difference amongst LargeCap, MidCap, and SmallCap firms in terms of, say, CG 
disclosure, a higher threshold is usually required, that is to say, all three pair-comparisons 
must be shown to have no statistically significant difference (i.e., CGDscore of LargeCap 
firms = CGDscore of MidCap firms = CGDscore of SmallCap firms). 
 
The disclosure of CG information of a firm by the insiders is a means to give assurance to 
the outside investors that their investments are safe and not subject to insiders’ 
expropriation. Outside investors could also seek such assurance through the demand of 
regular returns from their investments in the form of dividend payments. In the following 
sub-section, Section 6.3.4, the role of dividend payout in a firm’s CG will be discussed, 
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and the rationale for dividend payout to be construed as a substitute for investor protection 
will be presented. 
 
6.3.4 Dividend payout and CG disclosure 
In a world of perfect capital markets, dividends payout are generally considered as not 
having any impact on firm value (Miller and Modigliani, 1961). However, in an imperfect 
capital market, a mature firm with stable cash flows but paying too small a dividend may 
run the risk of investing the retained profits in projects with insufficient net present value 
to justify its cost of capital. On the other hand, for some prospering high-growth firms, 
paying too high a dividend to the investors will decrease the level of retained profits within 
the firm, thus reducing the firm’s financial flexibility and stripping the firm of valuable 
investment opportunities (Baker and Powell, 2000). Hence, managers of a firm tend to 
deliberate on the decisions made with regard to dividends because any dividend decisions 
will convey certain meanings to the outsiders. Dividends are often considered as signals to 
the investors, as will be discussed in more details in the following sub-section. 
i) Dividends serve as signals 
Lintner (1956) argues that a major change in earnings shift from existing dividend rate is 
the most important determinant of a company’s dividend decisions. The change in 
dividend rate therefore may carry a strong signal to the market. He suggests a behavioural 
model of dividend policy that states two implications.  First, shareholders always prefer a 
steady stream of dividends, thus the managers have an incentive to smooth dividends in the 
short run to avoid frequent changes. Second, an increase in dividend rate is a signal about a 
permanent shift in earnings rather than a signal about future earnings growth; and 
consequently about future firm value. In his own words, Lintner states: 
“It was equally clear that these elements of inertia and conservatism … were strong 
enough that most managements sought to avoid making changes in their dividend 
rates that might have to be reversed within a year or so. This conservatism and 
effort to avoid erratic changes in rates very generally resulted in the development of 
reasonably consistent patterns of behaviour in dividend decisions.” (ibid, 1956, p. 
99-100) 
 
Lintner (1956) argues that a policy to stabilize dividend distributions would give a 
consistency in the pattern of dividend action and would help to minimize adverse 
stockholder reactions.  It follows that: 
 “…any reason which would lead management to decide to change an existing 
rate … had to seem prudent and convincing to officers and directors themselves 
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and had to be of a character which provided strong motivations to management.” 
(ibid, 1956, p. 100) 
 
He also comments that, when a dividend rate is to be reduced,  
“Managements felt that it was both fair and prudent for dividends to the 
shareholders to reflect some part of any substantial or continued decline in earnings, 
and that under these circumstances stockholders would understand and accept the 
cut.” (ibid, 1956, p. 100-101) 
  
His views are supported by other empirical researchers such as Watts (1973) who agrees 
that information on future earnings dividends may be contained in dividends.  However, 
the information content of dividends is trivial.  It is modified by how quickly the firm 
adjusts actual dividends to the desired level of dividends and also by the firm’s target 
dividend payout rate.   
ii) Market reacts to signals conveyed by dividends 
There are different findings as to whether dividend carries any signal to the market. 
Gonedes (1978) find no evidence to support the view that dividends are signals that reflect 
information beyond what has been reflected in contemporaneous income signal.  On the 
other hand, Brickley (1983) finds significant differences in market reactions to firms’ 
announcing regular (unlabelled) dividends increases to firms declaring specially designated 
dividends (SDDs) such as ‘extra’, ‘special’ or ‘extraordinary’ dividends.  Regular dividend 
increases and SDDs are both dividend decisions which represent cash disbursements to 
shareholders with identical tax consequences.  Any difference in the market reaction to the 
labelling of a dividend increase is attributable to a difference in the signal or ‘message’ 
conveyed by management through the label. A comparison is made of the three groups of 
firms, namely, those announcing SDDs, those announcing regular dividend increases, and 
those announcing no change in the dividend payout.  Brickley finds empirical support for 
the argument that a regular dividend increase conveys more positive information than an 
SDD as reflected by the dividend payouts in the year following the dividend increases. He 
interprets the result as consistent with the signalling notion of dividends, which implies 
that for the firms giving regular dividend increase, there is statistically larger earnings 
changes in the fiscal year after the dividend announcement. 
 
Aharony and Dotan (1994) test if quarterly cash dividends announcements would convey 
useful information about a firm’s future profitability. They use changes in the quarterly 
dividends and unexpected accounting earnings in subsequent quarters of 838 NYSE firms 
from 1967 to 1990.  They classify any increase in quarterly dividends as “good news” and 
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any decrease as “bad news” to construct a naïve expectations model in which no change in 
dividends is expected. In their empirical findings, there is a strong association between 
dividend changes and subsequent unexpected earnings (e.g., earnings continue to increase 
for at least 4 quarters after the quarterly dividend change), which does not disappear when 
current unexpected earnings are introduced as an explanatory variable. Aharony and Dotan 
conclude that their findings provide strong support to the hypothesis that quarterly 
dividend changes are predictive of future earnings. Dividend changes do convey 
information and can be interpreted as useful signals as to future earnings.  
 
Benartzi, Michaely and Thaler (1997) challenge the above view, however.  Contrary to 
Brickley (1983) and Aharony and Dotan (1994), they do not find any empirical evidence to 
support the view that dividend changes incorporate information content about future 
earnings changes in their 4,996 samples (firm-years) from the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE) and the American Stock Exchange (AMEX) from 1979 to 1991. Benartzi et al’s 
findings are consistent with those of Watts’ (1973) in that dividends contain only trivial 
information on the firm’s future earnings. A strong past and concurrent link between 
earnings and dividend changes is, however, observed. The predictive value of changes in 
dividends seems to be minimal.  Nevertheless, Benartzi et al also find some evidence that 
dividend-increasing firms are less likely to have subsequent earnings decreases when 
compared to firms that do not change their dividend despite similar earnings growth. In 
this sense, a change in dividends does signal a message about the present that the current 
increase in earnings is permanent.  
iii) Managers’ dividend decisions are shaped by investors’ expectation 
The level of dividend can be taken as a signal to the outsiders on how the insiders perceive 
the prospects of the firm.  However, managers tend to maintain the same level of dividend 
payout over the years unless a permanent change in the business outlook is looming. In the 
face of any adverse development in sales revenue that is considered as temporary, the 
board of directors may still approve the same level of dividend payout as in the previous 
year. By the same argument, any increases in revenue that is regarded by management as 
short-lived and not permanent over the long run will not spur the board to increase the 
dividend payout. As a result, dividend payout will be maintained at the same level as in the 
previous year despite the profit for the current year has much improved. From a signalling 
perspective about future firm value, firms seem to prefer a stable dividend payout policy 
over the years unless there are substantial changes in their business operation.  
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While the level of dividend payout (and any changes in the level of dividend payout) may 
be endogenously determined and controlled by the board of directors of a firm, outside 
investors can make a demand for regular payout of dividends, though subject to the 
constraints imposed by company laws in most countries. A survey of ordinary investors 
shows that, when there is no tax difference between dividends and capital gains, small 
individual investors have a strong preference to receive dividends (Dong, Robinson, and 
Veld, 2005). Individual investors prefer cash dividends to stock dividends, and prefer stock 
dividends to no dividends at all. The findings support the signalling theories of 
Bhattacharya (1979) and Miller and Rock (1985).  
 
If the investors’ demand for regular dividends is not met satisfactorily, investors may 
express their views in the annual general meetings of the firm.  There are legitimate means 
or actions that the investors may take in their fight for dividends. For instance, they may 
strive to appoint a director to speak for their interest, instigate a proxy fight, demand an 
overhaul of management, initiate acquisition or hostile takeover, etc. Failing all that, their 
last resort is to sell off their shares of the firms (or refuse to subscribe for new shares), the 
result of which would be a prolonged lower-than-expected market valuation of the firm 
and creating a higher cost of finance to the firm. To avoid such undesirable scenarios, the 
board of directors can be expected to not only address the concerns of the insiders (i.e., the 
needs of management), but also consider expectations from the outside investors – 
including those of block-holders. Short, Zhang and Keasey (2002) find evidence in the U.K. 
in support of the hypothesis that a negative association is present between managerial 
ownership and dividend payout, but there is a positive association between block-holder 
ownership and dividends. 
iv) Predominant shareholders dominating dividend policies 
In the presence of a predominant shareholder in a firm such as the case of most Hong Kong 
firms with family ownership exceeding 50% of a firm’s equity, outside minority 
shareholders have fewer means to air their grievances or disappointment of dividend 
payouts than their counterparts in the U.S. or U.K.  A predominant shareholder can veto 
any unfavourable motions in the annual general meetings by calling a poll. Any prospect of 
hostile takeover may be squashed whenever a predominant shareholder is present. The 
only weapon the outsiders have is to threaten to sell off their shares in the market at a deep 
discounted price. According to the Listing Rule of HKEx, listed firms have to allow at 
least 25% of their issued share capital to be held by the public at all times (HKEx Listing 
Rule, 2005, Sect. 8.08).  Any consensus effort to sell off all their shares by these 25% 
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equity holders may cause the share price to drop, rendering a blow to the firm’s market 
valuation as well as the firm’s reputation.  Provided the majority shareholder cares about 
the firm valuation, the threat to ‘vote with their feet’ of the disgruntled minority 
shareholders can still be an effective measure to channel through their request for a decent 
return on their investment in the form of dividend payout.  
 
In sum, managers place high importance on maintaining the continuity of dividends. They 
believe that there is an impact of dividend policy on stock prices, and are concerned about 
the signals that dividend change may provide to investors (Baker and Powell, 2000, p. 31). 
In this sense, dividend payout can serve as a tool in monitoring the insiders (Gugler, 2003), 
keeping the managers vigilant (Easterbrook, 1984; Jensen, 1986), and hence having a 
corporate governance role to play in an environment where there are insufficient monitors 
(Borokhovich, Brunarski, Harman, and Kehr, 2005). One of the examples of insufficient 
monitoring of insiders is the presence of a predominant shareholder, who by capturing 50% 
or more share ownership enjoys almost unchecked power inside the board of directors. The 
following sub-section discusses the corporate governance role of dividends. 
v) Dividend payout as a mechanism for corporate governance 
Dividend payout has always been regarded as a monitoring device for agency costs.  
Rozeff (1982) and Easterbrook (1984) argue that, to make cash dividends payout, a firm is 
forced to go to the capital market more frequently, thereby subjecting the firm to increased 
scrutiny from the capital market, and hence reducing its agency costs. Jensen (1986) 
emphasizes the importance of disgorgement of free cash flow to shareholders: it reduces 
the resources under the control of the managers, thereby reducing managers’ power and 
preventing firms from wasting resources on low-return projects. These researchers, 
however, have not stated clearly whether the dividend payout policy is an endogenous 
management decision or is indeed a response from the pressure of shareholders.  
 
There are recent studies that directly examine the dividend payout of a firm in light of its 
corporate governance mechanism. Faccio, Lang, and Young (2001) find evidence that 
support Jensen’s notion.  The payment of dividends to shareholders can reduce the 
resources available to managers to invest in wealth-reducing projects or to waste on 
excessive perquisites. Distributing dividends, by removing corporate wealth from insider 
control, has a basic role to play in limiting insider expropriation.   Faccio et al’s empirical 
findings suggest that investors anticipate strongly the expropriation within corporations 
where there is a low ratio of ownership rights to control rights (e.g., firms that are tightly 
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affiliated to a group). As a result, those firms pay higher dividends to allay these concerns 
of the insiders, especially when the firms have to compete for capital. Faccio et al argue 
that dividend payouts are significantly impacted by how vulnerable the minority 
shareholders are to the firm’s controlling shareholders’ expropriation. Hence, dividends 
can be interpreted as a means for limiting expropriation.  
 
It must be pointed out that Faccio et al’s study is a comparative study of European firms 
and Asian firms. From their empirical findings, they observe that group-affiliated firms in 
Western Europe pay significantly higher dividend rates than firms in East Asia. Moreover, 
in Europe, the presence of other large shareholders appears to help contain the controlling 
shareholder’s expropriation of minority shareholders. In East Asia, in contrast, they appear 
to collude in that expropriation.   
 
 Mitton (2004) observes that firms with higher corporate governance ratings have higher 
dividend payouts7  in a cross-country study of 365 firms from 19 emerging markets 
(including Hong Kong) using the firm-specific corporate governance ratings developed by 
Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia (CLSA). His empirical result is consistent with the 
outcome agency model of dividends postulated by La Porta, Lopes-de-Silanes, Shleifer, 
and Vishny (LLSV, 2000b)8, which states that investors afforded with stronger rights will 
use those rights to extract dividends from the firm. However, such a positive relationship is 
limited primarily to countries with strong investor protection. Similar relationship may not 
exist in countries with weak legal investor protection.  
 
Both LLSV (2000) and Mitton (2004) find empirical evidence that, in countries with strong 
investor protection, there is a stronger negative relationship between growth opportunities 
and dividend payouts. Their findings imply that, when shareholders within a strong 
protection regime perceive that their rights are well protected, they are “more willing to let 
firms with good growth opportunities retain cash, being confident that they will share in 
the payoff from good projects later on” (Mitton, 2004, p. 411).  
 
In contrast, when shareholders perceive that their rights are poorly protected, they “may be 
more haphazard in their desire for dividends, trying to extract whatever value they can, 
                                                 
7 Mitton does not take into account  the insider ownership of the firms, however. In emerging markets, there 
is more often than not a prevalence of a predominant shareholder whose presence renders the minority 
shareholders powerless to seek legitimate protection even though the firm is operating under a strong legal 
investor protection regime.  
8 See sub-section f) below. 
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regardless of the firm’s growth opportunities, before being expropriated” (ibid, 2004, 
p.411). Gugler (2003) comments that dividend payouts are “the result of effective pressure 
by minority shareholders to force corporate insiders to disgorge cash” (ibid, 2003, p.1299); 
and find evidence in his sample of Austrian firms to support LLSV’s (2000) outcome 
model of dividends that “corporate outsiders force corporate insiders to disgorge cash if 
their legal rights allow them to do so” (ibid, 2003, p. 1318). 
 
Finally, Borokhovich, Brunarski, Harman and Kehr (2005) provide empirical evidence that 
support the view that distributing dividends reduces agency costs. Using three common 
measures (i.e., the independence of the board of directors, the percentage of votes held by 
outside block-holders, and the presence of poison pills in the firm’s charter) to proxy 
agency costs, they study 776 firms that announced quarterly dividend increase from 1992 
to 1999.  The notion is that, if dividends are capable of benefiting shareholders by reducing 
agency costs, the stock price reaction to positive dividend changes will differ from firm to 
firm, depending upon the firm’s level of agency costs. It means that, given a dividend 
surprise, firms with lower agency costs should benefit less. Their empirical findings 
indicate a significant negative relation between the stock-price reaction to dividend 
increases and the presence of an independent board of directors. Borokhovich et al 
conclude that dividend payouts serve as a corporate governance mechanism to reduce 
agency costs. 
 
The above findings lend theoretical support to the postulation of the fourth main 
hypothesis of this study, which is derived from La Porta, Lopes-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and 
Vishny’s (LLSV, 2000b) dividend outcome model to be discussed below. 
vi) Dividend outcome model by LLSV (2000b) 
Given that a large majority of listed firms in markets such as Hong Kong are under tight 
control by members of the same family who share the insider information much more 
conveniently, can the outsiders (i.e., the investors) seek any protection from potential 
expropriation by the insiders other than resorting to legal redress?  Are there any 
alternatives to merely pricing the firm at a lesser value?  
 
La Porta, Lopes-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (LLSV, 2000b) propose a model in which 
the investors can use dividends as a substitute for legal protection. They argue that a firm 
has the need to establish a reputation for moderation in expropriating shareholders’ wealth 
if it desires external capital on attractive terms.  Paying dividends is one of the ways to 
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establish such a reputation. LLSV regard that a good reputation for treating fairly all 
shareholders – majority and minority alike – is highly valuable for firms operating in 
countries with weak legal protection as the minority shareholders have nothing else to rely 
on. To start a legal contest otherwise with majority shareholders would likely incur more 
costs than benefits to the minority shareholders, who may as well sell off their stakes under 
such a scenario. LLSV conjecture that the need for paying dividends to establish a 
reputation is greater for firms in poorer investor protection countries. This is the supply 
side argument of the outcome agency model of dividends. 
 
LLSV (2000b) also propose another reasoning for their hypothesis. They posit that 
investors (i.e., external funds providers) would demand the firm to pay out as much in 
dividends as financially feasible instead of leaving any undistributed earnings inside the 
firm. This is because the temptation is greater for managers (or insiders) to expropriate the 
surplus cash for their own benefits when the minority shareholders have no effective way 
to monitor the agents (i.e., the managers), or when the outsiders have no legal way to 
access the same information that the insiders may possess.  LLSV argue that, other things 
being equal, dividend payout ratios should be higher in countries with weaker legal 
protection than those with stronger protection of minority shareholders. This is referred to 
as the demand side argument of the outcome agency model. 
 
Both the supply side and the demand side argument of the dividend outcome model can be 
applied to firms operating even in a strong legal investor protection regime. Firms with 
greater corporate governance disclosure can be expected to stand out from the crowd to 
signal to investors their willingness to treat all shareholders fairly, whenever the firms are 
perceived as exhibiting comparable levels of agency or entrenchment problems. They 
plausibly feel the same need to establish a reputation to be fair, and such need is arguably 
stronger for those firms that are in greater need of external funds for future development.  
 
SmallCap firms are a good case in point. SmallCap firms do not often attract international 
investors’ attention or analysts following (Bhushan, 1989a). Unlike LargeCap firms, 
SmallCap firms may not generate sufficient interest to the analysts to follow or make a 
recommendation on their stocks. Yet, SmallCap firms may still need external capital for 
business development. By voluntarily disclosing more corporate governance practices, and 
by paying dividends at a higher payout ratio, these firms can signal to the external 
investors that they would be handling all outsiders’ funds fairly. 
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 Likewise, given the same growth opportunities among firms, the outside investors need 
information to decide which firm is more trust-worthy in terms of protecting their 
investments. In the absence of detailed knowledge of how the firm is being run on a day-
to-day basis, the outside investors may be expected to rely on the extent of voluntary 
corporate governance disclosure and the dividend payout to cast their vote of confidence. 
Comparing like with like, a firm with higher corporate governance voluntary disclosure 
ranking may signal to the investors that the management of the firm is more willing to treat 
all investors fairly.  If the investors are not so assured, the investors will most likely press 
for a higher dividend payout. Unless the outside investors feel satisfied and secure that 
their investments are safe, they are not expected to be contented with any low level of 
dividend payout and would sell out all their holdings of the firm’s stock. Therefore, ceteris 
paribus, it can be hypothesized that: 
Hypothesis 4(H4) 
H4: Under a strong legal protection regime, high corporate governance ranking firms have 
lower dividend payout ratios, ceteris paribus, than those of low corporate governance 
ranking firms. 
 
In the above-mentioned hypothesis, high corporate governance ranking firms are proxied 
by the extent of voluntary disclosure of corporate governance structure and practices. The 
more the voluntary disclosure is, the higher is the corporate governance ranking of the firm. 
 
6.3.5 Dividend payout, corporate governance, and ownership structure 
To the minority shareholders of small firms, their risk of expropriation comes from two 
sources: controlling shareholders and entrenched management (Ang, Cole and Lin, 2000; 
Bebchuk and Cohen, 2005). The higher the insider ownership of a firm’s equity, the more 
likely the entrenchment problem to exist and that the insiders are more inclined to retain 
profits within the firm. In an empirical study of 211 U.K. firms between 1988 and 1992, 
Short, Zhang and Keasey (2002) find strong evidence in support of the hypothesis that a 
negative association exists between dividend payout and managerial ownership. However, 
as they use a dummy variable 1 to proxy management ownership being greater than or 
equal to 5% (and 0 for otherwise), their empirical analysis cannot differentiate the impact 
on dividend payout along the continuum of levels of managerial ownership.  
 
Short et al’s results are in line with the empirical findings by Schooley and Barney (1994), 
who find a non-monotonic relationship between the percentage of stock owned by the CEO 
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and the dividend yield in 235 large, U.S. industrial firms around 1980. Their study shows 
that CEO ownership is negatively related to dividend yield9 over low levels of ownership, 
while the relation becomes positive when CEO ownership is large. Schooley and Barney 
conclude that, beyond a certain level of insider ownership, entrenchment may occur10 and 
dividends may then become a more effective tool for reducing agency costs. 
 
Farinha (2003) tests the hypothesis that insider ownership affects dividend policies in 
another context, using U.K. data from 600 firms for two separate periods of time (1987-
1991 and 1992-1996). He detects a U-shape relationship between the two variables. 
Moreover, he finds that the entrenchment levels for both small firms and large firms in 
1991 are approximately the same (around 31% insider ownership); but the levels are 
different in 1996 (i.e., around 16% for small firms and 32% for large firms). It should be 
pointed out, however, that both Schooley and Barney’s and Farinha’s sample firms operate 
under strong legal regimes (i.e., the U.S. and U.K. respectively) and the ownership of firms 
tend to be highly diverse. Whether the presence of a predominant shareholder affects the 
non-linear relationship between ownership and dividends remains to be tested. This study 
intends to fill this gap. 
 
Going along the same logic of the dividend agency outcome model as proposed by LLSV 
(2000b) – i.e., outside investors will not be contented to accept a low level of dividend 
payout ratio unless they feel their interests are adequately protected – outsiders can be 
expected to press for a high dividend payout. They may be willing to accept a lower level 
of dividend payouts when they are fully informed that their own interests are in alignment 
with those of the insider’s (i.e., the management’s) interests. Such scenario would be the 
case when the insiders are either having nil or negligible shareholding (thus likely high 
agency cost) or they are firmly entrenched (i.e., a predominant owner).  Morck, Shleifer, 
and Vishny (1988) have shown that a firm’s Tobin’s q goes up as insider ownership 
increases from the low end up to 5% ownership, and falls as entrenchment creeps in when 
insider ownership increases to 25% and beyond. 
 
It follows that, within similar grouping of corporate governance disclosure by rank, firms 
that are prone to the agency problem (as proxied by a low level of insider ownership) and 
                                                 
9 Schooley and Barney (1994) also test the relation using the dividend payout ratio as the dependent variable 
for robustness test. The estimated coefficients are found to have the same sign and approximately the same 
level of statistical significance. Only the coefficient of determination is lower. 
10 The point of entrenchment is estimated by differentiating dividend yield with respect to CEO ownership to 
find the minimum, which is roughly 14.9% CEO ownership in Schooley and Barney’s sample. 
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firms that may suffer entrenchment problems (as proxied by a high level of insider 
ownership) are most vulnerable to non-alignment of interests between insiders and 
outsiders. Such firms would therefore be expected to respond to outsiders’ demand by 
distributing dividend at higher payout ratios than firms which have moderate insiders’ 
ownership (as proxied by a middle-range insider ownership).  
 
While the critical entrenchment level may vary from country to country, in a situation 
where a predominant shareholder prevails, entrenchment is certain to happen when insiders 
capture 50% (or even less in the case of LargeCap firms, depending on how diffused the 
ownership of the firm is) of equity ownership.  The ownership threshold for entrenchment 
tends to be lower for LargeCap firms than SmallCap firms, as the required capital outlay to 
evict a substantial shareholder is much larger. As the Listing Rules of HKEx require all 
listed firms to have a float of at least 25% of shares to the public, a predominant 
shareholder cannot hold more than 75% of the share capital if the firm is to remain a listed 
company. A majority shareholder may therefore afford to allow a float of 25% to 50% 
ownership without jeopardizing its predominance over the firm. All in all, across the 
ownership continuum, it can be broadly hypothesized that firms that are prone to the 
agency problem (as proxied by 0-25% insider ownership) and firms that suffer from 
entrenchment problem (as proxied by over 50% insider ownership) would have a higher 
dividend payout ratio than firms which are free from these problems (as proxied by 25%-
50% insider ownership). Specifically, a testable hypothesis H5 is suggested as follows: 
Hypothesis 5(H5) 
H5: Firms that have insider ownership of 25%-50% exhibit the lowest dividend payout 
ratio, comparing with firms that have insider ownership of 0-25% or over 50%, ceteris 
paribus. 11
 
Therefore, both variables – the firm size (as proxied by the market capitalization) and 
directors’ ownership – are controlled in this study. The next chapter, Chapter 7, will 
specify the methodology to test these hypotheses. 
 
                                                 
11 It must be pointed out that the distinction of 0, 25%, and over 50% insider ownership in this study is only 
a crude way of classifying insider ownership along a continuum. Previous research such as Schooley and 
Barney (1994), Ang, Cole and Lin (2000), Farinha (2003), and Bebchuk and Cohen (2005), among others, 
have shown that entrenchment may start to emerge from as low as 15% insider ownership. The market 
capitalisation of the firm – whether it is a large-cap or small-cap corporation – is clearly one of the factors 
that determine how easily a single shareholder of sizeable insider ownership can be entrenched or evicted 
from the management of the firm. 
 
 190
6.4 Summary  
 
The rationale behind the hypotheses developed in this study follows from the signalling 
theory of voluntary disclosure (Ross, 1979; Milgrom, 1981; Verrecchia, 1983; Dye, 1985; 
Lev and Penman, 1990), which states that voluntary disclosure would benefit the firm. 
Applying this principle to a firm’s corporate governance disclosure in Hong Kong where 
there is a strong investor protection, the marginal benefits to the firm thus incurred could 
lead to either a higher market valuation of the firm by the outside investors, or a lower 
dividend payout ratio (as conjectured by LLSV, 2000b). However, recent research also 
suggests that ownership structure of a firm has a mitigating impact on the dividend payout 
(Farinha, 2003) by showing a U-shaped relationship between dividend payouts and insider 
ownership in the U.K. This study intends to test empirically in a business environment 
where predominant ownership structure prevails, whether voluntary disclosure has a role to 
play in affecting a firm’s valuation and dividend payout.  
 
Four research questions are raised: (i) Would voluntary disclosure of corporate governance 
(CG) affect a firm’s valuation? (ii) Does concentrated ownership structure have any effect 
on the level of a firm’s voluntarily disclose of CG? (iii) Would firms of different market 
capitalisations behave differently in their voluntary CG disclosure? (iv) Would voluntary 
disclosure of CG be a substitute for dividend payouts, given the presence of a predominant 
insider shareholder? 
 
The hypotheses in this chapter are derived from these four research questions, which are to 
be tested using multiple regression techniques. In the following two chapters, Chapter 7 
and Chapter 8, the variables to be used in this study, the research design, and the 
methodology will be presented.  The explanation on the selection of variables and their 
constructions will be discussed in Chapter 7 while the methodology is to be discussed in 
Chapter 8.   
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Chapter 7: Definitions and Computations of Variables 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter of this study, 13 hypotheses have been put forward based on the 
four major research questions as discussed in earlier chapters.  The selection of sample 
firms and the construction of the sample frame for this study will be explained in the next 
chapter (i.e., Chapter 8), where empirical models are also developed and presented. In the 
current chapter, Chapter 7, an introduction of the variables that are used in the models is 
provided.  It states the definitions of the variables, specifies the source of information, and 
explains the mechanisms of computation of variables that are used in this study.   Section 
7.2 focuses on the definitions of the dependent variables in this study. Two dependent 
variables of interest in this study are identified: (i) the market valuation of the firm as 
proxied by Tobin’s q; and (ii) the dividend payout ratio of the firms. Section 7.3 presents 
the independent variables of the various models.  These independent variables (also known 
as explanatory variables) include the corporate governance disclosure score (CGDscore), 
board size, director ownership, and the splitting of the dual roles of Chairman and CEO of 
the sample firms.  Section 7.4 introduces the control variables of the models. These control 
variables are selected from the previous literature on corporate governance research studies, 
such as proxy for firm size, return on equity, profitability, earnings, leverage, sales growth, 
and dual listing, which are shown to have impact on the dependent variables (i.e., market 
value and dividend payouts) of this study.  The definitions and computations of all these 
variables will be explained.  Section 7.5 concludes the chapter with a summary. 
 
7.2 Estimation of Dependent Variables 
 
This thesis is a study of the effect of voluntary disclosure of corporate governance (CG) 
practices by a firm on its market valuation.  The impact of the voluntary CG disclosure on 
the dividend payout of a firm is also another area of research in this study.  The empirical 
models are constructed with a view to estimating the effects of a firm’s voluntary CG 
disclosure on its market valuation and its dividend payouts. Accordingly, two dependent 
variables are going to be estimated in this study, namely: 
1) the market valuation of the firm as proxied by Tobin’s q; 
2) the dividend payout ratio of the firms. 
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These two dependent variables are discussed in sub-section 7.2.1 and sub-section 7.2.2 
respectively. 
 
7.2.1 Estimation of market valuation 
 
According to the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH), the market value of a firm is 
reflected in the market price of the shares of the firm if the capital market is efficient at the 
strong or semi-strong form.  This study assumes that the stock market of Hong Kong is at 
least a semi-strong form efficient market, which implies that all publicly available 
information that are related to a firm will be incorporated and reflected in the share prices 
of the firm immediately, when the news reach the market. 
 
Market value of a firm is defined in this study as the number of ordinary shares issued by 
the firm multiplied by the share price.  As the share price fluctuates from day to day, the 
market value of a firm will vary similarly, depending on the amount of information 
arriving at the market.  While the financial information about a firm may be made available 
to the market as financial news, the non-financial information about the firm’s CG 
practices is mainly disclosed to the public via the firm’s annual report, which is released in 
full version approximately three months after the end of the firm’s fiscal year.  Hence, for 
the purpose of this study, the market value of the firm is computed with reference to the 
closing share price of the firm as at the date of release of the full version of the annual 
report. 
 
The closing share price as at the release date of the full version of the annual report sent to 
the shareholders is usually different from that as at the release date of the summarized 
operating results for the firm.  Like similar practice of many firms in other stock markets, 
listed firms in Hong Kong usually announce their operating results, mainly about their 
financial performance in a summary format to the market (i.e., when the firms 
communicate to the Hong Kong Stock Exchange) at least two business working days 
before they release the full set of annual report to their shareholders and the public (to 
allow adequate time for mailing).  Should there be any price change due to the un-
anticipated information about the financial performance of the firm, a semi-strong 
efficiency market such as Hong Kong is expected to impound the news and adjust the 
share price of the firm’s stock immediately.  Hence, at the date of release of the full annual 
report, any unanticipated price information due to financial disclosure will already be 
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reflected.  On that date of release of the full annual report, the changes of the firm’s market 
value, if any, are presumed to be attributable to the disclosure of non-financial information 
(such as the firm’s CG practices) because the firm discloses such information publicly only 
in the full version rather than the summarized version.  The general public can only come 
to know about a firm’s CG practices and assess the firm’s CG conditions as at that date, 
not as at the date of the end of the fiscal year.  Since the focus of this study is on the firm’s 
disclosure of CG practices, which is essentially non-financial rather than financial 
information, any spurious effects due to the financial performance of the firm is expected 
to have been fully reflected in the share price by the time the full set of annual report is 
made available to the public at large.1  
 
Market value of a firm needs to be scaled by a number of factors in order to facilitate 
proper comparisons on equal bases across firms of different sizes, industry sectors, and 
business natures.  Instead of the market value per se, researchers generally use Tobin’s q to 
proxy for a firm’s market valuation.  This study follows similar approach.  Specifically, the 
definition of Tobin’s q in this study follows previous studies by Demsetz and Lehn (1985), 
Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988), McConnell and Servaes (1990), Kaplan and Zingales 
(1997), Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003), Cremers and Nair (2005), and Durnev and 
Kim (2005). Their definition of Tobin’s q is as follows: 
 
q  = (Total assets + market value of equity – book value of equity – deferred tax)
                                                       Total assets 
 
The source of information for the computation of q is Datastream. Except for the market 
value of equity, which is stated as at the annual report release date, all other accounting 
measures such as total assets, book value of equity, and deferred tax are stated as at the end 
of the firm’s fiscal year end. 
 
In Datastream, the market value is defined as follows: 
 
“Market value on Datastream is the share price multiplied by the number of ordinary 
shares in issue. The amount in issue is updated whenever new tranches of stock are 
issued or after a capital change.  
                                                 
1 It may be argued that, from time to time, a firm may have released non-financial information (such as 
information about its CG practices) to the market through channels other than its annual report.  Though this 
may be true, there is no commonly accepted evidence that all these channels may reach all investors at the 
same time.  Therefore, it is likely that some outside investors may know about a firm’s CG practices later 
than other investors.  It is assumed that such timing difference in investor cognition about a firm’s CG will be 
eliminated once the firm’s annual report is made available to the public.  This assumption is one of the 
limitations of this study. 
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• For companies with more than one class of equity capital, the market value is 
expressed according to the individual issue. 
• Market value is displayed in millions of units of local currency.” 
 
The annual report release date is based on the report date as recorded on the website of the 
Hong Kong Exchange.  A summary of the annual report release dates of the sample firms 
in this study is included in Appendix 1 to this thesis.    
 
In addition to the components of Tobin’s q, other accounting performance information is 
also sourced from Datastream.  Some variables are directly obtained from Datastream, but 
other variables need to be computed from raw data. For example, a firm’s leverage is 
defined as the percentage of a firm’s total debt to its book value of total equity.  Leverage 
by itself is not available from Datastream but the two components, total debt and book 
value of equity, are.   Similarly, dividend payout is defined as the dividend per share (DPS) 
expressed as a percentage of a firm’s earnings per share (EPS), both of which are available 
from Datastream.  In the event where the firm’s annual report is expressed in denomination 
of U.S. dollars, the account values are converted into equivalent Hong Kong dollars by the 
official exchange rate US$1 = HK$7.78.2   Table 7.1 below summarizes the names of the 
variables to be used in this study and their corresponding Datatype Mnemonics from 
Datastream: 
 
Table 7.1 Variable names and the source of information 
Item Datastream Code/ Datatype Mnemonic 
Total assets 392 (WC02999) 
Market Value of Equity MV (as at Annual Report disclosed date) 
Book Value of Equity  WC03501 
Deferred Tax 311 (WC03263) 
Total Debt 1301 
Return on Equity 1506 (WC08301) 
Pre-tax Profit Margin% 716 (WC08321) 
Research & Development3 119 (WC01201) 
Total Sales 104 (WC01001) 
Dividend Per Share DPSF 
Earnings Per Share EPS 
 
                                                 
2 The Hong Kong dollar has been officially pegged to U.S. dollar at the rate US$1 = HK$7.78 since 1983. 
3 Some researchers incorporate the expenditure on Research & Development (R&D) by a firm in the 
computation of a firm’s Tobin’s q but most researchers will ignore it if it is small and insignificant compared 
to a firm’s total assets.  In Hong Kong listed firms, R& D expenditure is low and is seldom reported.  
Therefore, R & D expenditure is not included in the computation of Tobin’s q for this study.  
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7.2.2 Dividend payout ratio 
 
In the U.S. and most other developed economies, dividends are taxed at a higher rate than 
capital gains (LLSV, 2000b; Grullon and Michaely, 2002). For instance, in the U.S., 
Grullon and Michaely state that, by the end of 2001, there was a gap between the top 
marginal rate of tax on ordinary income and the marginal rate on capital gains.  The top 
marginal rate on ordinary income was 39.6% but the top marginal rate on long-term capital 
gains was only 20%.  Therefore, dividends are less valuable than capital gains to the 
common investors because capital gains are taxed at more favourable rates than ordinary 
income (ibid, 2002, p. 1650). Yet, there are always debates as to why firms pay dividends. 
 
There are a number of theories dealing with the identification of the common determinants 
of corporate dividend policy such as the tax preference theory, signalling theory, 
behavioural theory, and agency theory, etc (Baker and Powell, 2000). These studies have 
identified that profitability, firm size, growth opportunities, and leverage would affect the 
likelihood of paying dividends (e.g., Fama and French, 2001; Benito and Young, 2001; von 
Eije and Megginson, 2008).  In a survey of 603 NYSE-listed firms that had paid cash 
dividends at least once during the period 1994-1995, Baker and Powell (2000) find that the 
five major considerations for setting the level of dividends are: (i) the level of current and 
expected future earnings; (ii) the pattern or continuity of past dividends; (iii) the 
motivation to maintain or increase the stock price of a firm; (iv) the concern for 
disseminating a false signal to investors in case of a change in dividends; and (v) the 
stability of cash flows.  
 
Denis and Osobov (2008) summarize the previous studies by various finance scholars on 
the determinants of dividend policy into four main theories which are (i) the signalling 
theory (Lintner, 1956; Miller and Rock, 1985); (ii) clientele theory (Bajaj and Vijh, 1990; 
Allen and Michaely, 2003); (iii) catering theory (Baker and Wurgler, 2004); and (iv) the 
life-cycle theory (Fama and French, 2001; Grullon, Michaely and Swaminathan, 2002; 
DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 2006).    
 
The Signalling theory proposes that any changes in the level of dividend payout serve as a 
signal to the outsiders by the insiders about the future prospects of a firm. Lintner (1956) 
puts forth a behavioural partial adjustment model which states that managers would prefer 
a stable dividend policy, and would smooth dividends in the short run to avoid frequent 
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changes with the aim to minimize adverse stockholder reactions. Empirical work by Fama 
and Babiak (1968), and Fama (1974), support Lintner’s view that managers prefer 
consistency in dividend payout, and that managers are reluctant to increase dividends to a 
level that cannot be sustainable.  
 
Clientele theorists of dividends assume that investors can satisfy their demand for 
dividends while still achieving suitable levels of diversification. Investors are 
heterogeneous and they have different demands for dividends. Some investors may, for 
institutional or tax reasons, prefer dividends to capital gains (Black and Scholes, 1974).  
Firms would therefore satisfy demands of these clienteles until, at the margin, no firm 
could increase its value by changing its dividend payout. Pettit (1977) explains that 
investors have a tendency to concentrate their portfolios on certain types of dividend-
paying securities in an effort to reduce transaction costs and differential tax rates. Though 
important this clientele effect is, its influence on the investor’s portfolio decision is “at the 
margin” (Pettit, 1977, p. 420; Bajaj and Vijh, 1990, p. 194). 
 
The Catering theory of dividends suggests that the propensity to pay dividends can be 
explained by changes in investor sentiment toward dividend-paying stocks. Baker and 
Wurgler (2004) hypothesize that investors have a time-varying demand for dividend-
paying stocks for either psychological or institutional reasons. Managers rationally cater to 
investors’ demand for dividends by paying dividends when investors place a valuation 
premium on dividend-paying firms.  Managers do not pay dividends where such valuation 
premium on dividend payers ceases to exist. Baker and Wurgler (2004) conclude that 
dividends are highly relevant to share price, but in different directions at different times. 
They state that managers cater to time-varying investor demand in an effort to maximize 
current share prices.  
 
The Life-cycle theory predicts that firms optimally alter dividends through time (i.e., 
through the firm’s life-cycle stages) in response to the evolution of their opportunity set 
(DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 2006).  Firms pay few dividends in their early years because 
their investment opportunities exceed their internally generated capital.  In later years, 
internal funds exceed investment opportunities so firms optimally pay out the excess funds 
to mitigate the free cashflows problem as suggested by Fama and French (2001).  
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While this study does not attempt to investigate the rationale for firms to pay dividends, it 
contributes to the dividend policy literature by testing whether a firm’s voluntary 
disclosure of CG practices would mitigate the level of dividend payouts.  The arguments 
for this empirical testing are based on the agency models of dividends hypothesis proposed 
by LLSV (2000b) as will be discussed in Chapter 8.   The manager of a firm would like to 
establish a reputation for treating all capital suppliers fairly, so that when investment 
opportunities arise the manager can have access to the capital market to raise funds at 
competitive rates.  LLSV (2000b) argue that, in a weak legal protection regime for 
minority shareholders, paying dividends is one way to establish such a reputation.  This 
thesis tests whether the level of a firm’s voluntary disclosure of its CG practices would be 
an alternative way to establish a similar reputation, under the business environment where 
a prevalence of predominant share-ownership undermines the legal protection of investor 
protection, while controlling for profitability, growth opportunities, and leverage.     
 
Hong Kong provides an ideal place for the test because, in Hong Kong, there is no tax 
levied on either dividends or capital gains.  Except for the minor differences in transaction 
cost, there is effectively no taxation difference to receive a return on investment in terms of 
capital gains or dividend income to the investors.  
 
In this study, the dividend payout ratio is computed as follows: 
 
Dividend payout ratio (%)  =   Dividend per share  x 100
                                                                           Earnings per share 
 
Both the dividend per share and earnings per share are obtained from Datastream as at the 
end of the firm’s fiscal year. The Datastream codes for these 2 items are DPS and EPS 
respectively (as reported earlier in Section 7.2.1). In Datastream, the definition of DPS is: 
“The dividend per share as published in the last company accounts, and fully 
adjusted for capital changes. It is given in prime units of local currency, except for 
the UK where the figure is in pence per share.” 
 
As for EPS, the definition is: 
“This is the earnings per share figure derived from the last published company 
accounts (or preliminary figures when these are the latest), and adjusted for 
subsequent capital changes. It is shown in prime units of local currency, except for 
the UK where it is shown in pence.” 
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In this study, the dividend payout ratio is defined as dividend per share (DPS) divided by 
earnings per share (EPS), and is expressed as a percentage. By default, it requires the 
denominator, EPS, to be positive. However, in the event that some firms decided to pay 
dividends while suffering a loss (i.e., a negative EPS), the dividend payout ratio would 
become negative, which does not make analytical sense in the empirical models of this 
study.  Under such circumstances, the dividend payout ratio will be set to 100% so as to 
differentiate these special firms from those that did not pay any dividends at all due to a 
loss (i.e., dividend payout = 0).  From the information perspective, firms that insist on 
paying dividends (albeit a token sum) during negative earnings periods are no different 
from the firms that pay out all its earnings as dividends to the shareholders because, in both 
cases, the firms would not keep any retained earnings for that year. In that sense, the 
managers are also giving a signal to the market that they are confident that such a negative 
EPS might be a temporary phenomenon. Out of total 258 firm-years, there are 17 cases of 
negative-EPS-dividend-paying incidents (i.e., 6.6%). 
 
7.3 Estimation of Independent variables 
 
As mentioned in Section 6.2.1, the relationships between firm value and voluntary 
disclosure of corporate governance are tested in this study. While two dependent variables 
are to be tested, namely, the firm value (as proxied by Tobin’s q) and the dividend payout, 
several independent (or explanatory) variables are employed.  These independent variables 
are selected based on economic reasoning and similar disclosure studies outlined 
previously in Chapter 2 Literature Review.  
 
In order to determine the impact of corporate governance on a firm’s value, outside 
investors may find it relevant to find a measure that can capture the extent of the voluntary 
corporate governance disclosure by a firm. A CG disclosure index (or CGD score) is often 
computed to proxy for the overall state of a firm’s corporate governance disclosure (e.g., 
Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, 2003; Beiner, Drobetz, Schmid, and Zimmerman, 2006; 
Black, Jang, and Kim, 2006). Other discrete measurements about a firm’s governance 
practices include:  board size, directors’ ownership, duality of the roles of the chairman and 
the chief executive officer (CEO).  They will serve as the independent variables to test the 
hypotheses in this study while controlling for some factors about individual firm’s 
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characteristics (i.e., control variables).  Each of them will be discussed in the following 
subsections.  
 
7.3.1 CGDscore 
 
In order to analyze the relationship between the voluntary CG disclosure of a firm and its 
valuation in this study, the CG disclosure needs to be measured. A disclosure index, 
CGDscore, is computed for this purpose. This subsection will present the computation 
process of the CGDscore, which has three sections.  Section A introduces the construction 
of the disclosure score (CGDscore).  Section B discusses the weighting mechanism of each 
aspect of CG that enters into the computation of the CGDscore. Section C explains why the 
disclosure by listed firms in year 2005 is still considered as voluntary disclosure and why it 
should be retained in this study. 
 
i) Construction of the disclosure score  
 
The corporate governance (CG) score is compiled based on the voluntary disclosure in the 
firm’s annual reports in 2003, 2004, and 2005. According to the Listing Rules of Hong 
Kong Exchange (HKEx), firms were required to include a mandatory Corporate 
Governance Report in their annual reports with fiscal year starting January 2005. The 
Corporate Governance Report must be issued in accordance with Appendix 23: Corporate 
Governance Report, which includes two main sections: (i) Mandatory Disclosure 
Requirement; and (ii) Recommended Disclosures. The report should indicate the overall 
compliance with the provisions of the Code on Corporate Governance Practices (the Code) 
contained in Appendix 14: Code on Corporate Governance Practice.  If there are some 
areas where firms deviate from these codes, the Listing Rules require the firms to highlight 
the deviations and provide explanations for such deviations (copies of the Listing Rules 
Appendix 14 (24 pages) and Appendix 23 (8 pages) can be found at the website of HKEx at 
http://www.hkex.com.hk/rule/listrules/appendix_14.pdf, and at 
http://www.hkex.com.hk/rule/listrules/MB App 23(E).pdf, respectively). 
 
According to Appendix 23, a listed firm (i.e., the listed issuer on the HKEx) has to disclose 
its corporate governance practices related to nine areas as stipulated in the Mandatory 
Disclosure Requirement section, each area with sub-requirements of disclosure as stated 
below: 
(a) corporate governance practices:- 
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a1:  a narrative statement of how the listed issuer has applied the principles in the 
code;  
a2:  a statement as to whether the listed issuer meets the code provisions in the 
code; 
a3:  if there is any deviation, then details of such deviation. 
 
(b) directors’ securities transactions: 
b1: whether the listed issuer has adopted a model code of conduct (set out in 
Appendix 10: Model Code for Securities Transactions by Directors of Listed 
issuers) regarding directors’ securities transactions on terms no less exacting 
than the required standard; 
b2: whether the directors have complied with the Model Code; 
b3: if there is any non-compliance, then details of such non-compliance and 
explanation. 
 
(c) board of directors: 
c1: composition of the board by categories, and number in each category; 
c2: number of board meeting held in the financial year; 
c3: individual attendance of each director; 
c4: a statement of how the board operates; 
c5: details of non-compliance, if any, and explanation of the remedial step; 
c6: where an independent director fails to meet one or more of the guidelines as set 
out in Listing Rule 3.13, reasons why the listed issuer considers him/her to be 
independent; 
c7: relationship, if any, among members of the board and in particular, between the 
chairman and the chief executive officer.   
 
(d) chairman and chief executive officer: 
d1:  the identity of the chairman and chief executive officer; 
d2:  whether the roles of the chairman and chief executive officer are segregated 
and are not exercised by the same individual. 
(e) non-executive directors: 
e1:  the term of appointment of non-executive directors. 
(f) remuneration of directors: 
f1: the role and function of the remuneration committee or the reason(s) for not 
having a remuneration committee; 
f2: the composition of the remuneration committee; 
f3: the number of meetings held by the remuneration committee; and the record of 
individual attendance of members on a named basis 
f4: a summary of the work performed by the remuneration committee. 
 
(g) nomination of directors: 
g1: the role and function of the nomination committee; 
g2: the composition of the nomination committee; and the identity of the committee 
chairman; 
g3: the nomination procedures and the process and criteria adopted to select and 
recommend candidates for directorship; 
g4: a summary of work by the nomination committee; 
g5: the number of meetings held by the nomination committee. 
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 (h) auditors’ remuneration: 
h1: an analysis of remuneration in audit and non-audit services and the fees paid. 
(i) audit committee: 
i1: its role, function, and composition; and the identity of the chairman; 
i2: the number of meetings held; and the attendance record of individual members; 
i3: a report of the work performed; 
i4: details of non-compliance, if any. 
 
Other than these mandatory disclosures, there are four other specified disclosures that are 
required to be disclosed in the Corporate Governance Report that are not grouped under 
any heading: 
(a) An acknowledgement from the directors of their responsibility to prepare the 
accounts; and a statement by the auditors about their reporting responsibilities; 
(b) A report on material uncertainties, if any, in relation to the firm’s ability to continue 
as a going concern; 
(c) A statement of review of the effectiveness of the internal control system by the 
board; and 
(d) A statement by the audit committee why the board has taken a different view from 
that of the audit committee regarding the selection, appointment, resignation, or 
dismissal of external auditors. 
 
Other than these mandatory disclosures, a firm is strongly encouraged to include 
information on the following five areas of Recommended Disclosures: 
(a) share interests of senior management: 
a1: the number of shares held by senior management. 
(b) shareholders’ rights: 
b1: the way in which shareholders can convene an extraordinary general meeting; 
b2: the procedures by which enquires may be put to the board; 
b3: the procedures for putting forward proposals at shareholders’ meetings with 
sufficient contact details. 
(c) investor relations: 
c1: any significant changes in the firm’s articles of association; 
c2: details of shareholders by type and aggregate shareholding; 
c3: details of last shareholders’ meeting;  
c4: indication of important shareholders’ dates in the coming financial year; and 
c5: public float capitalisation as at the end of the financial year.  
 
(d) internal controls: 
 d1: an explanation of how the internal control system is defined; 
 d2: the procedures and internal controls for handling price sensitive information; 
 d3: whether the firm has internal audit function; 
 d4: how often internal controls are reviewed; 
 d5: a statement that the directors have reviewed the effectiveness of the internal 
control system; 
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 d6: criteria to assess the effectiveness of the internal control system; 
 d7: the period which internal control review covers; 
 d8: details of any significant areas of concern which may affect shareholders; 
 d9: significant views or proposals put forward by the audit committee; and 
d10: where the firm has not conducted an internal control review, an explanation 
why the firm has not done so; 
d11: a narrative statement on how the firm has complied with the code provisions 
as specified in the Code on internal control; and 
d12: the outcome of the internal control review on an annual basis if the firm does 
not have an internal audit function. 
 
(e) management functions: 
e1: the division of responsibility between the board and management. 
 
It can be seen that, based on these categories and each sub-requirement, a single-barrel 
question can be raised with a possible answer ‘Yes’, ‘No’, or ‘Not Applicable’. When there 
are joint requirements stated by a conjuncture “and”, the requirements are broken up into 
separate questions. Thus a total of 66 single-barrel questions are derived therein to form a 
CG disclosure checklist (a copy of the checklist is included in the Appendix 2 of this 
thesis).  
 
This disclosure checklist is used to match the information disclosed in all non-financial 
sections of the annual reports.  Specifically, these sections include the Contents, Highlights 
of Company Performance, Corporate Information, Chairman’s Report, Operation Review, 
Business Review, Bibliography of Directors and Senior Executives, Directors’ Report, 
Corporate Governance Report, Auditors’ Report, and Investor Relations.  Should the 
information provided in those sections be inadequate to answer fully the questions on the 
disclosure checklist, the Notes to the Accounts and Social Responsibility Report sections 
are also reviewed to look for any missing information.  
 
A score of ‘1’ is assigned to each question if the answer is ‘Yes’, and ‘0’ to the answer of 
‘No’ or ‘Not Applicable’. Then the total of the ‘Yes’ answer is summed up, to be scaled by 
the total of applicable questions (i.e., 66 net of the total of ‘Not Applicable’ answers). The 
ratio is then expressed in percentage to arrive at the composite disclosure index CGDscore. 
After filling the checklists and computing the CGDscores, 10% of the checked results were 
randomly selected and verified by a third person to see if any errors of coding or mis-
interpretation of the disclosed information were present. A consistency check was carried 
out when the raw data were input into an EXCEL spreadsheet so that any irregularities/ 
unsupported extreme values were rectified.  
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 It should be pointed out that the composite index CGDscore is only capable of capturing 
the disclosure of the CG practices, not the quality of the individual CG practice. For 
example, if Firm A disclosed that it had three independent non-executive directors (INEDs) 
sitting on the board of directors, it would have the same disclosure score (i.e., 1) as Firm B 
that disclosed it had six INEDs.  However, if Firm A, in addition to the number of INEDs, 
had also disclosed the number of board meetings that these directors attended whilst Firm 
B had not disclosed the same, then Firm A would have a higher CGDscore than Firm B 
because Firm A had disclosed more aspects of its CG practice.  In practice, Firm A and 
Firm B could have in fact maintained similar quality in their CG, because presumably the 
board meetings had been convened with all the directors present. If not, the quorum would 
ensure the minimum number of directors to be present so as to permit an effective board 
meeting to take place.  Nevertheless, the CGDscore, which is a composite index intended 
to record objectively the CG practices that a firm voluntarily discloses, does not purport to 
reflect the quality or the state of the CG of the firm4.  This is one of the limitations of this 
study. 
 
ii) Weighting 
Because every answer carries a score of “1” only, the CGDscore so compiled is an 
unweighted metric, with a possible range of values 0~100. The higher the CGDscore is, the 
more disclosure a firm has voluntarily provided in its annual reports. 
 
Equal weighting is assigned to each answer to the single-barrel question.  This has two 
advantages: (i) it is transparent and easily reproducible; and (ii) no assumption is made 
about the efficacy or wealth effects of any corporate governance provisions (Gompers, 
Ishii and Metrick, 2003).  Other reasons for equal weighting are that:  
(1) there is so far a lack of a theoretical basis to assign weights which would vary from 
user to user (Black, Jang, and Kim, 2006);  
 
(2) users of disclosed information may have their own preferences, hence may attach 
different weightings to the various items of disclosure which may not be common 
to all others even for similar items (Chang, Most and Brain, 1983; Meek, Roberts, 
and Gray, 1995);  
 
(3) unweighted scores have been used in other empirical studies (Cooke, 1989; Ahmed 
and Nicholls, 1994; Meek, Roberts, and Gray, 1995; Chau and Gray, 2002); and   
                                                 
4 To evaluate the quality of a firm’s CG, the researcher would have had to participate in all the decision-
making processes of the firm that are related to all investors, observe how the decisions are being made, and 
to assess whether a ‘good’ governance practise has been applied.  This is almost infeasible in all practical 
sense. 
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(4) empirical evidence has suggested that a compound (i.e., weighted) disclosure index 
may yield a lower collective explanatory power in R2 than a simple (unweighted) 
disclosure index (Robbins and Austin, 1986); and there is also empirical evidence 
that shows  a simple unweighted disclosure index has equivalent explanatory power 
to a weighted one (Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987). 
 
In short, an equal weighted index is simple, intuitive, and less prone to measurement error. 
It is not affected by the problem of subjectivity in assigning weights to a multitude of 
governance provisions in constructing a governance index. 
 
iii) Rationale for including disclosure in fiscal year 2005 as voluntary disclosure 
While the CG disclosures in the annual reports for fiscal years 2003 and 2004 made by the 
listed firms are completely voluntary, there are also arguments to support that the 
disclosures made in fiscal year 2005 should also be classified as voluntary despite the 
promulgation of the new Listing Rules.  During the first year of implementation of the 
Rules, the listed firms (or the issuers) were allowed great flexibility in compliance, as 
stated in Appendix 14 of the Listing Rules: 
“Issuers are expected to comply with, but may choose to deviate from, the code 
provisions. The recommended best practices are for guidance only. Issuers may also 
devise their own code on corporate governance practices on such terms as they may 
consider appropriate.”     
  
“Issuer must state whether they have complied with the code provisions set out in this 
Code (i.e., Appendix 14) for the relevant accounting period in their interim reports and 
annual reports. However, issuers are permitted not to comply with the recommended 
best practices in full provided that they explain the reasons.”  
 
Similarly, Appendix 23 also sets out a list of recommended disclosure for the issuers’ 
reference.  They are not mandatory but intended to be areas that the issuers may comment 
on in their Corporate Governance Report.  These areas include share interests of senior 
management, shareholders’ rights, investor relations, and internal controls and 
management functions.   
 
The HKEx has therefore given much leeway and autonomy to the issuers in deciding on 
the corporate governance structure of the firms.  What is absolutely mandatory for 
disclosure is that “issuer must state whether they have complied with the code provisions 
set out in Appendix 14 for the relevant accounting period in their interim reports and 
annual reports”.  Listed firms are de facto given the option to decide if the CG structures 
and practices stipulated in the revised Listing Rules will be adopted or otherwise.  In the 
 205
process of examining the annual reports for 2005, it is found that there is a significant 
portion of firms which did not comply with the code provision that the roles of the 
Chairman and the CEO should be split.  The management of these firms argued that 
splitting the roles would not be in the interest of the firm’s long-term development.  
Another area of non-compliance is found in the disclosure of the Internal Control System. 
Many issuers did not disclose how the Internal Control System had been set up or 
implemented during their fiscal year 2005, despite the concession that the HKEx had 
agreed earlier on to postpone the effective date on disclosure of the Internal Control 
System until July 2005. A third area of major deviation from the Listing Rules 
requirements is the setting up of the Nomination Committee or the Remuneration 
Committee. Many issuers only set up the committee in early 2006, i.e., after the 2005 fiscal 
year end but before the annual report release date. They stated in their annual reports for 
2005 that such committees had been set up, but no meetings had been held for that fiscal 
year. In effect, the firms did not implement the CG practices in 2005. 
 
As the firms could have opted not to implement the CG mechanisms by stating the reason 
for non-compliance, this study will consider those firms that adopt the CG mechanisms and 
practices in 2005 as to have done it on a voluntary basis.  The fiscal year of 2005 is 
therefore included for study, with the focus of attention on whether the firms have 
implemented any CG mechanisms and actually practised them.  Consequently, the data 
collected for this study are for three consecutive fiscal years from 2003 to 2005.   
 
7.3.2 Board size 
 
Board size is one of the independent variables to be employed in the empirical analyses of 
the models in this study (model specifications will be discussed in Chapter 8).  It refers to 
the total number of directors sitting on the board. Previous literature has shown two board-
size effects for large public firms: (i) increased problems of communication and 
coordination as group size increases, and (ii) decreased ability of large boards to control 
management (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Jensen, 1993). Yermack (1996) find empirical 
evidence from U.S. large firms that board size and firm market value (as represented by 
Tobin’s q) are inversely related. However, board size remains quite stable over time with 
little sensitivity to performance, whereas the rate of director turnover increases following 
poor performance.  
 
 206
On the other hand, Eisenberg, Sundgren, and Wells (1998) find empirical evidence from 
900 small boards and small firms in the U.S. to support a negative correlation between 
board size and profitability. Their findings suggest that board-size effects may have 
different roots in small, closely held firms than in large firms.  
 
Nevertheless, board size is often accepted as endogenously determined because the board 
of director is an institution that has “arisen endogenously in response to the agency 
problem inherent in governing any organization” (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003). Such a 
monitoring hypothesis argument is not supported by a panel study of all U.S. industrial 
firms by Boone, Field, Karpoff, and Raheja (BFKR, 2007) on board size development over 
a 10-year span since the firms’ initial public offerings. The empirical results of BFKR’s 
study affirm that board size (and composition) is shaped by a broad combination of firm-
specific and managerial characteristics. Most boards are tailored-made to suit their unique 
competitive environment. BFKR’s findings support the scope of operations hypothesis as 
proposed by Fama and Jensen (1983b), Lehn, Patro, and Zhao (2005), and Coles, Daniel, 
and Naveen (2008), who claim that board structure is driven by the scope and complexity 
of the firm’s operation. 
 
If board size is not endogenously determined, then it qualifies very well as an independent 
variable in explaining the relationship between corporate governance disclosure and a 
firm’s value.  
 
7.3.3 Directors’ ownership 
 
Directors’ ownership refers to the percentage of equity collectively owned by members of 
the board of directors, including their family members, as disclosed in the annual reports. 
The non-linear relationship between firm value and managerial ownership (or directors’ 
ownership in this study) has been well documented (Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1988; 
McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991).  In prior literature, firm 
value has been found to increase with managerial holdings for very low levels of 
managerial ownership, which lends support to the alignment of interest argument by 
Jensen and Meckling (1976). However, when managerial holdings reach a higher level, a 
fall in firm value is observed with further increases in holding by management due to the 
agency problem (Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1988; Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991). This 
is often explained by the entrenchment argument, which suggests that entrenched managers 
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may pursue their own self-interests rather than the interests of the shareholders as a whole.  
At the same time, the entrenched managers cannot be easily evicted from the firm due to a 
lack of consensus efforts by the outside investors. A high agency cost is therefore likely to 
occur. At this stage, outside investors need information to assure themselves that their 
interests will be treated equally and protected by the insiders (i.e., the management). Any 
voluntary disclosure of corporate governance by the insiders can be expected to be useful 
to reinstall outsiders’ confidence. Hence, insiders’ ownership is a factor that is likely to 
affect firm valuation.   
 
Though some researchers argue that the level of managerial ownership is determined 
endogenously in equilibrium (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Cho, 1998; Himmelberg, Hubbard 
and Palia, 1999), recent researchers using advanced econometric models find empirical 
evidence that managerial ownership in the U.K. has a significant impact on firm value 
(Short and Keasey, 1999; Davis, Hillier and McColgan, 2005), and that there are more 
turning points in the non-linear relationship between the level of ownership and firm value. 
Nevertheless, there is little theoretical basis on which the individual turning points can be 
precisely determined. 
 
The director ownership percentage data in this study are hand collected from the annual 
reports for each of the 3-year period from 2003 to 2005. Since the ownership percentage is 
a ratio measurement, it can vary continuously between 0 and 100% and can provide a high 
level of flexibility in forming sub-categories of different groups of ownership level (e.g., 
low, medium, and predominant) for further analyses.  
 
7.3.4 Split roles of Chairman and CEO 
 
Shareholder activists generally consider whether or not the roles of a Chairman and the 
Chief Executive Officer (CEO) are split as a key function of checks and balances imposed 
on the autonomy of the managers of the firm (Wahal, 1996).    Cadbury (1992, p. 21, para. 
4.9) recommends that the two roles of the Chairman of the board and the CEO be separated 
in the quoted companies in the U.K.   Jensen (1993) articulates the potential benefits of 
separation of the two roles as “the function of the Chairman is to run board meetings and 
oversee the process of hiring, firing, evaluating, and compensating the CEO. Clearly the 
CEO cannot perform this function apart from his or her personal interest.”  It follows that 
for the board to be effective, “it is important to separate the CEO and Chairman positions” 
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(ibid, 1993, p.36). From the corporate governance point of view, the roles of the two titles 
should be split, otherwise the Chairman/CEO’s duality will allow the CEO to exert 
dominant power over the decisions and practices of the board (Booth, Cornett, and 
Tehranian, 2002).  
 
However, Brickley, Coles, and Jarrell (1997) challenge this view. Based on a sample of 
737 firms from the 1989 Forbes survey, they find that the separation of the titles of the 
Chairman and CEO may not be what it seems: that almost no major firm in the U.S. as 
reported in that survey had an independent outsider as chairman. The Chairmen are almost 
always the people with detailed knowledge of the firm and relatively high equity 
ownership. Furthermore, they find evidence to suggest that firms employ the title of 
chairman as a reward for CEOs who perform well during a probationary period – a 
‘passing-of-the-baton’ succession process rather than a monitoring function. Most critically, 
they find no empirical evidence that combining the two roles into one person is associated 
with inferior accounting performance or market returns. 
 
The fact that the chairperson is a knowledgeable insider, rather than an independent 
outsider, is a common phenomenon to firms in Asian countries.  In Asia, especially in 
Hong Kong where family businesses abound, insiders typically dominate boards of 
directors; and the controlling shareholders are often founders of the firms (Claessens, 
Djankov, and Lang, 2000; Claessens and Fan, 2002; Chen, 2005). Nevertheless, investors 
may not necessarily be worse off because they would discount the stocks according to the 
perceived corporate governance issue (Claessens and Fan, 2002), and are willing to pay a 
premium for firms that protect shareholder rights and engage in open disclosure (Klein, 
Shapiro, and Young, 2005). Since the disclosure of the duality of Chairman/CEO is 
stipulated by the Listing Rules in Hong Kong, such information can be expected to be 
useful to the investors to shape or modify their perception about the firm value. The 
disclosure of the split roles of the Chairman/CEO is therefore an independent variable in 
the analysis of the relationship between the voluntary corporate governance disclosure and 
firm value. 
 
To operationalise this criterion, a dummy variable SplitRole is employed to denote whether 
a split role for the chairperson and the CEO is performed by separate persons. If the 
segregate roles are borne by separate individuals, the dummy variable takes on a value ‘1’, 
otherwise ‘0’. This is in line with the computation of the corporate governance disclosure 
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score (CGDscore) when the split of Chairman’s and CEO’s roles is advocated by the 
Listing Rules.  However, it should be noted that, in some firms, although the titles of 
Chairman and CEO are separate, the office bearer’s name appears the same.  That is, they 
are listed as separate titles in the annual report but are performed by the same individual.  
In that case, both the CGDscore and the SplitRole will take on a value ‘0’ to denote the de 
facto state of this CG provision, i.e., there was no splitting between the roles of Chairman 
and CEO even though their titles appear to be split. The reason of using two measures to 
capture the same CG provision is that the CGDscore reports the fact that this CG provision 
is being disclosed; whilst the SplitRole reports the CG provision is being practised.5
 
7.4 Control variables 
 
Control variables are the explanatory variables in an analytical model that are specially 
chosen (i.e., they are not allowed to vary freely) in order to study how the dependent 
variable behaves under set conditions (Francis, 1990). These variables are chosen because 
they have been previously established (or known) to have an impact on the dependent 
variable, but their estimated relationship with the dependent variable is not the primary 
focus of the study in that model.  Omission of controlled variables from a model may give 
rise to a biased relationship, and may often lead to an unduly low coefficient of 
determination R2 for the regression model.  
 
Previous empirical studies on disclosure and valuation of firms have suggested the use of 
control variables.  For instance, Khanna, Palepu and Srinivasan (2004) suggest that firm 
size, firm performance, analyst following, and country legal origin can have impact on the 
market valuation of a firm. Other studies suggest that market dominance, owners’ equity, 
leverage, sales growth, and dual listing should also be considered (e.g., Mitton, 2002; Eng 
and Mak, 2003; Hutchison and Gul, 2004).  Following their recommendations, this study 
employs firm size (as proxied by the sales income of a firm), ROE (return on equity), sales 
growth, the size of owners’ equity, and the debt ratio as the control variables.  They are 
discussed in turn in the following subsections. 
 
                                                 
5 The direct link between the CGDscore and SplitRole may be one of the factors that lead to high correlation 
between these two variables. See the descriptive statistics in Chapter 9. 
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7.4.1 Firm size  
 
In the corporate disclosure literature, firm size is one of the main corporate characteristics 
that have been found to affect a firm’s extent of disclosure (Cerf, 1961; Singhvi and Desai, 
1971; Choi, 1973; Foster, 1986; Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987; Cooke, 1989a, 1992; Meek, 
Roberts, and Gray, 1995; Eng and Mak, 2003).  Generally, large firms disclose more 
information than small ones because of their characteristics such as lower information 
production costs, higher complexity in business operation, wider ownership base, greater 
liability to agency costs, and more susceptibility to political costs (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976; Watts and Zimmerman, 1986) as previously discussed in the Chapter 4 of this thesis. 
 
The information economics literature also suggests that firm size has an impact on the 
information set available to outsiders. Large firms tend to be more diversified, more 
complex, and have larger information set than do small firms in terms of their market 
development, sales sustainability, and business risks (Meek, Roberts, and Gray, 1995). 
Firm size is computed as the logarithm of net sales in this study.  It is often regarded as a 
proxy for the amount of information available to outside investors (Cheng and Shiu, 2007), 
or a proxy for informational asymmetries between insiders and the capital markets (Rajan 
and Zingales, 1995). Finance literature has often suggested that firms of different sizes will 
opt for different disclosure strategies to reduce such information asymmetries.  Based on 
this information, investors adjust their assessment of the firm’s future profitability.   
 
Firm size often helps in explaining disclosure behaviour.  As larger firms are likely to face 
higher public demands for information (Zarzeski, 1996), it seems likely that investors’ 
valuation of the firm will change accordingly, hence there should be different strengths in 
the disclosure-firm valuation relationship.  
 
Firm size is usually proxied by 3 metrics, namely, market value, total assets, and total sales.  
In this study, firm size is computed as the logarithm of net sales in HK dollars, which is 
captured from Datastream file (Datastream code: 104 Total Sales).  The reason for using 
‘Sales Revenue’ instead of ‘Total Assets’ as a proxy for firm size is that one of the 
dependent variables in this study, Tobin’s q, has ‘total assets’ as a component in its 
computation. If Tobin’s q (the left-hand side variable) is regressed on some independent 
variables with ‘total assets’ appearing on the right-hand side of the regression, an 
unjustifiably high score of R2 will incur. Another benefit of choosing sales revenue to 
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proxy for firm size is that it is less affected by variations in GAAP than are other common 
measures of size, such as total assets (Meek, Roberts, and Gray 1995). 
 
The definition of ‘Total Sales’ of industrial companies (i.e. firms that are not Banks, 
Insurance or other financial companies) in Datastream is: 
 
“Net sales or revenues (01001) represent gross sales and other operating revenue 
less discounts, returns and allowances.”  
 
It includes, but is not restricted to, franchise sales, consulting fees, service income, royalty 
income, contracts-in-progress income, licensing and franchise fees, income derived from 
equipment lease or rental, commissions earned, income from leased departments. It 
excludes non-operating income, interest income, rental income, dividend income, foreign 
exchange adjustment, sale of plant, equipment, or investment, etc.  
 
7.4.2 Return on Equity (ROE) 
 
The rate of return measures the overall performance of a firm and is usually considered as 
an indicator of good management (Singhvi & Desai, 1971). It is generally defined as a 
ratio of net profit to net worth.  If the rate of return is high, the managers may disclose 
detailed financial information in order to support the continuance of their positions and 
compensations. If, however, the rate of return is low, the managers may disclose less 
information in order to cover up the reasons for losses or declining profits (Singhvi & 
Desai, 1971; Bradury, 1992; Eng and Mak, 2003).  
 
One of the measures of a firm’s rate of return is the return on equity (ROE), defined in 
Datastream as follows and will be adopted in this study:  
 
(Net Income before Preferred Dividends – Preferred Dividend Requirement) x 100
             Last Year’s Common Equity 
 
The ROE is also one of the factors that may have an impact of a firm’s disclosure quality 
(Singhvi & Desai, 1971). Less profitable firms (as measured either by a lower ROE or a 
lower earnings margin) tend to disclose less information. Conversely, more profitable 
firms (high ROE) have been found to disclose more about their voluntary disclosures in 
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their annual reports (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002), as has been posited by the signalling 
hypothesis (Ross, 1979). 
 
As the ROE is defined as a ratio with the firm’s equity as the denominator, any negative 
equity (due to restructuring, for example) recorded by a firm will lead to a negative ROE, 
which has not the same meaning as making a loss as a negative ROE may seem to suggest.  
Therefore, any entry in the Datastream data set that carries a negative ROE will be cross-
checked with the firm’s equity to see if a negative equity is present.  If there is a negative 
equity, the case will be deleted from the sample.  
 
7.4.3 Leverage (Debt /Total Assets ratio) 
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976), Chow and Wong-Boren (1987), Meek, Roberts and Gray 
(1995) observe that agency costs are higher for firms with proportionally more debt in their 
capital structures, suggesting a positive relationship between the extent of voluntary 
disclosure and leverage. With increased leverage, there are increased potential for wealth 
transfers from bondholders to shareholders, thus calling for more voluntary disclosures on 
the part of the managers (Smith and Warner, 1979).  
 
On the other hand, Zarzeski (1996) argues that, if firms have higher debt ratios, it is likely 
that they share more private information with their creditors. Highly leveraged firms are 
therefore likely to have developed banking relationships and interlocking corporate 
ownerships as alternate capital sources to public ownership. Conversely, firms with lower 
debt have a higher percentage of stock ownership, which could encourage investor demand 
for more voluntary disclosure. Zarzeski finds empirically a negative relationship between 
the debt ratio and investor-oriented disclosure in her cross-country sample (256 firms) as 
well as in her sub-sample of Hong Kong firms (29 firms). 
 
In this study, leverage of a firm is defined as the Total Debt (Datastream Code 1301) 
divided by the sum of the firm’s Book Value of Equity (Datastream Code WC03501) and 
Total Debt (Datastream Code 1301).  The definition of Total Debt is: 
 
“Total debt represents all interest bearing and capitalized lease obligations. It is the 
sum of long and short term debt.” 
 
The Book Value of Equity (Common Equity 03501) is defined as: 
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“Common equity represents common shareholders’ investment in a company.” 
 
It includes common stock value, retained earnings, capital surplus, capital stock premium. 
It excludes common treasury stocks, preferred stock, and any accumulated unpaid 
preferred dividends. For consistency and the purpose of further ratio analyses that may 
require equity as a denominator, any firms that have a negative book value of equity (e.g., 
a leverage buy-out) will be deleted from the sample. 
 
7.4.4 Sales growth  
 
Growth firms have greater information asymmetry and agency costs (Smith and Watts, 
1992; Gaver and Gaver, 1993). For growth firms, information asymmetry arises between 
managers and shareholders because managers have private information about the future 
value of investments not readily accessible to outsiders (Hutchison and Gul, 2004). On the 
other hand, the preference for equity over debt financing in growth firms may help 
alleviate some of the potential conflicts between managers and shareholders, because 
equity financing is less restrictive on managers than covenant-based debt (Skinner, 1993). 
It follows that managers in growth firms may behave differently in voluntary disclosures in 
their corporate governance practices from those in non-growth firms. Nevertheless, Eng 
and Mak (2003) find a negative though not significant relationship between a firm’s 
growth and the voluntary disclosure on its corporate governance information in their study. 
 
In this study, growth is proxied by the increase in Total Sales in percentage over the 
previous fiscal year. The definition is as follows: 
 
Growth =   [Total Sales in fiscal year n -  Total Sales in fiscal year (n-1) ] x 100  
                                                   Total Sales in fiscal year (n-1) 
 
Total Sales is obtained from Datastream (code WC01001) with definition as previously 
stated in Section 7.4.1. 
 
7.4.5 Dual or Multiple listing 
Multiple listed firms are often motivated to disclose differently from single-market listed 
firms. They have an interest in foreign capital markets since foreign operations are often 
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financed by foreign capital (Choi and Mueller, 1984; Cooke, 1989a). LLSV (1998) and 
Johnson, Boone, Breach, and Friedman (2000) argue that accounting standards and 
regulations play an important part in corporate governance.  Mitton (2002) suggests that 
firms with a listed ADR (American Depositary Receipt) have higher disclosure quality. 
Reese and Weisbach (2002) suggest that non-US firms choose to cross-list in the U.S. in 
order to demonstrate to investors that they are providing protection to minority 
shareholders. It follows that when a firm chooses to be cross-listed, it subjects itself to 
additional set of disclosure requirements, which non-cross listed firms do not. Therefore, 
the status of being cross-listed on other country’s stock exchanges may affect a firm’s 
voluntary disclosure. 
 
In the sample set of this study, most cross-listed firms obtain an ADR status while only a 
handful of firms are cross-listed fully either in London or Tokyo Stock Exchanges. Given 
that an ADR status may often require a firm to comply with an additional set of accounting 
standards (which may lead to reconciliation of accounts and further scrutiny on the 
interpretation of, say, accruals), all ADR firms and full cross-listing firms are treated as the 
same and will be assigned with a dummy variable “1”, otherwise “0”, in the empirical 
models.   
 
7.5 Summary  
 
This chapter has described the variables that are going to be used in the testing of the 
empirical models, to be presented in the following chapter.  Two dependent variables 
(Tobin’s q and the Dividend Payout ratio) are discussed, with the construction and the 
explanations for the use of four independent variables (i.e., CGDscore, Board Size, 
Directors’ Ownership, and Split Roles of Chairman and CEO) and five control variables 
(i.e., Firm Size, ROE, Leverage, Sales Growth, and Dual Listing) identified. The 
definitions of these variables are presented and the sources of information for the 
compilation of these variables are documented. The next chapter, Chapter 8, will focus on 
the research design, sample selection, and methodology of this study.  It will present the 
sample space of firms and provide a description of the constituent stocks of the SmallCap, 
MidCap, and LargeCap indices of the Hang Seng Hong Kong Composite Index series, 
from which the sample firms are drawn. Finally, the empirical models will be specified.  
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Chapter 8: Sample Selection, Data Collection, 
Methodology, and Research Design 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
The aims of this study are to investigate the relationships between a firm’s voluntary 
corporate governance (CG) disclosure, its market valuation, and its dividend payouts. 
The relationships are to be examined in the context of a strong legal protection 
regime and with the presence of a predominant shareholder.  These relationships are 
explored by conducting empirical analyses on different groups of Hong Kong listed 
firms and in terms of market capitalisation.   The constituent firms of the Hang Seng 
Hong Kong Composite Index (HSHKCI), namely, LargeCap, MidCap, and SmallCap 
firms, are used for this study. 
 
The research questions, hypotheses, and variables have been discussed in chapters 6 
and 7.  In this chapter, the discussion will focus on the sample selection, data 
collection, research design and methodology.  Specifically, Section 8.2 lays down the 
justifications for sample selection and expounds on the merits for choosing listed 
firms in Hong Kong as the sample for this study.  Section 8.3 discusses the sample 
construction in terms of their groupings of market capitalisation. Section 8.4 
describes the period of study over which accounting data and market performance 
data of the sample firms are collected.  A breakdown of the total observations for the 
sample is also provided. 
 
Section 8.5 presents a descriptive account of the cross-listing status of the sampled 
firms.  Cross listing is a factor likely to enhance a firm’s CG practices, but the 
disclosure of such status is not mandatory in the Corporate Governance Report of the 
annual report of the firm.  Section 8.6 describes the data collection of CG 
information about the firms from their annual reports. It describes the construction of 
the CG checklist, based on Appendix 23 of the HKEx Listing Rules (2005).  The CG 
checklist is the tool for compiling the CG disclosure score (CGDscore) of the sample 
firms, which is also elaborated in that section.  Section 8.7 explains the research 
design. The LargeCap (L) firms, MidCap (M) firms, and SmallCap (S) firms from 
the HSHKCI are grouped into three samples consisting of (i) L+M+S; (ii) L+M; and 
(iii) S firms. These three samples will provide the sample frame for testing the 
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empirical models, which are to be specified in the section that follows.  Section 8.8 
features and explains the models, which are derived from the hypotheses that are 
stated previously in Chapter 6, with the variables defined in Chapter 7.  Section 8.9 
provides a summary on the chapter. 
 
8.2 Justifications for sample selection 
 
The rationale for selecting Hong Kong firms as the sample for this study has been 
briefly discussed in Section 1.2 of Chapter 1 of this thesis.  The characteristics of 
Hong Kong firms in terms of their propensity towards predominant ownership have 
also been described in Section 5.6 of Chapter 5.  The current section expatiates on 
these arguments and enriches them with findings from previous studies to provide 
support for selecting Hong Kong firms for this study. 
 
There are three major reasons for selecting Hong Kong listed firms as the sample for 
this study. Firstly, Hong Kong is an international financial centre. Although over 
90% of the population in Hong Kong is Chinese, English is one of the official 
languages in the HKSAR government and is widely used in the business sector. 
Located on the Pacific Rim in East Asia, Hong Kong has, for many years, been the 
second largest stock market in Asia by market capitalisation after Tokyo Stock 
Exchange1.  It is ranked by international rating agencies as one of the most advanced 
markets in the region, probably due to the legacy of an Anglo-Saxon common law 
system (Cheung, Connelly, Limpaphayom, and Zhou, 2007). It also has a reputable 
and well-developed finance market infrastructure. The accounting standards of Hong 
Kong listed firms are being harmonized with international standards. There is no 
restriction on the flows of capital, individuals, or information inside or outside of 
Hong Kong.  Neither dividends nor capital gains are taxable. Compared with other 
Asian economies, cross listing of firms from outside Hong Kong is made relatively 
easy.  All these characteristics of Hong Kong market provide a suitable setting for 
testing the hypotheses relating to the effect of voluntary disclosure of CG practices 
on firm valuation. 
 
                                                 
1 As at the end of 2005, Hong Kong ranked the 8th by market capitalization among members of the 
World Federation of Exchanges (HKEx, Fact Book 2005). 
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Secondly, the classification of listed firms in Hong Kong in terms of market 
capitalisation by the HSHKCI index provides a comprehensive framework for 
sample collection.  The Hong Kong stock market is currently floated with firms 
either domiciled in Hong Kong or Mainland China.  Since 1964, the Hang Sang 
Index Company Ltd (HSICO) has been continually providing market index services 
to the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKEx), with the Hang Seng Index (HSI) being 
the main market index.  HSICO has been compiling, publishing, and up-keeping the 
HSI for many decades.  It has accumulated a wealth of experience and credibility in 
the provision of an unbiased index to measure market sentiments accurately.  With 
more and more China-based corporations floating on the HKEx (i.e., the state-owned 
enterprises and financial institutions with main business operations in China), it 
became necessary for HSICO to provide separate geographic indices to reflect the 
performances of the Hong Kong stock market net of the effect of these China-based 
companies, which are often characterized with very large capitalisation.   
 
On 3 October 2001, the geographical index series of the Hang Seng Composite Index 
(HSCI) was launched.  It offered investors a more relevant benchmark to gauge the 
different risk-and-return profiles of listed companies based on the principal markets 
of business rather than the market for listing of the firms.  The stock universe of the 
HSCI is composed of firms with primary listing on the Main Board of the HKEx.  
Firms with more than 50% of their sales revenue (or profits, or assets, if more 
appropriate) derived from mainland China are included in the Hang Seng Mainland 
Composite Index (HSMCI). Firms with sales revenue derived from Hong Kong and 
outside Mainland China are included in the Hang Seng Hong Kong Composite Index 
(HSHKCI).  The HSHKCI index excludes all the Chinese state-owned firms whose 
main business is derived from Mainland China. It is devoid of the undue influence 
from the China-based stocks and, as such, is a more accurate index of the 
performance of the Hong Kong domestic market.  The HSHKCI is further divided 
into 3 sub-indices: 
(i) The Hang Seng HK LargeCap Index (HSHKLCI); 
(ii) The Hang Seng HK MidCap Index (HSHKMCI); and 
(iii) The Hang Seng HK SmallCap Index (HSHKSCI).   
 
During September 2005 when the data collection of this study began, the 
classification criteria for the HSHKLCI (i.e., LargeCap) were based on the top 15 
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stocks by market capitalisation in the HSHKCI. The HSHKMCI (i.e., MidCap) was 
based on the market value of firms that ranked from the 16th to 50th in the HSHKCI, 
while the HSHKSCI (i.e., SmallCap) was based on those that ranked 51st and below 
till the 90% threshold of the market capitalisation of stocks had been reached.  As at 
September 2005, these three sub-indices comprised 106 firms (or 11%) of a total 934 
listed members on the main board of the HKEx, but accounted for 90% of the market 
capitalisation of all Hong Kong-domiciled firms in 2005 (HKEx Factbook 2005).  
 
The constituent companies of these sub-indices hence represent a reliable cross-
sectional sample of Hong Kong enterprises.  They conduct their business activities 
under a common law regime that provides a strong, legal, protection for investors 
(LLSV, 2000).  By referring to the three indices of the HSHKCI and their constituent 
firms, this study is unique in being able to analyse three groups of firms of different 
market capitalisations both individually and collectively.  This differs from most of 
the previous CG research studies using Hong Kong firms as samples, which used a 
few top LargeCap firms as representative for all Hong Kong businesses, or did not 
distinguish the LargeCap corporations from the SmallCap companies (e.g., Chen and 
Jaggi, 2000; Cheung, Connelly, Limpaphayom and Zhou, 2007). 
 
Thirdly, unlike those state-owned firms domiciled in Mainland China but floated on 
the HKEx, the constituent firms of the HSHKLCI, HSHKMCI, and HSHKSCI are 
characterized by the usual presence of a predominant (and often, family) shareholder 
(Lam, Mok, Cheung, and Yam, 1994; Claessens, Djankov, and Lang, 2000; Chen 
and Jaggi, 2000; Lins, 2003; Ho, Lam, and Sami, 2004). Such a predominant 
shareholder very often holds more than 50% equity ownership, thus commanding a 
decision-making power almost unrivalled on the board of directors. Moreover, the 
presence of a highly concentrated ownership often leads to the majority shareholders 
appointing themselves as directors.  As a result, the ownership, control, and 
management of a firm are often vested in the same person or family (Chen and Jaggi, 
2000; Ho, Lam, and Sami, 2004).  The predominant shareholder is often in charge of 
the board as well as the day-to-day management activities of the firm. As Ho and 
Wong (2001) put it, family ownership in Hong Kong firms is often high enough to 
secure a controlling position that may lead to entrenchment problems.  The 
controlling position is so common that “corporate boards in Hong Kong are 
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sometimes viewed by international investors simply as a means to approve the 
wishes of the family shareholders”(ibid, 2001, p. 145).  
 
Corporate governance issues in these Hong Kong-based firms, therefore, are likely to 
be distinct from those of the state-owned firms, but similar to those firms in other 
markets wherever a concentrated ownership prevails.  A CG report compiled by the 
credit-rating agency Standard & Poor has already pointed out in 2002 that the main 
weaknesses in the Hong Kong governance environment are less at the legal and 
regulatory levels than at the individual firm level.  Rather, the family domination of 
firm’s ownership structure in Hong Kong and the limited – though growing – 
shareholder activism culture present particular challenges (Standard & Poor’s, 2002).  
The report points out that having a predominant shareholder of 50% or more equity 
ownership would often render the market-disciplining mechanisms (such as proxy 
fights, market for corporate control, and takeovers etc.) ineffective in Hong Kong.2
 
In sum, Hong Kong provides a unique setting to study the voluntary disclosure of 
CG practices and the valuation of firms. It combines characteristics of both 
developed and developing economies (Cheung, Connelly, Limpaphayom, and Zhou, 
2007). It has concentrated ownership (Claessens, Djankov and Lang, 2000), a 
predominance of family-owned and -managed firms  (Chen and Jaggi, 2000), an 
Anglo-Saxon common law legal system that provides strong legal protection of 
minority shareholders (LLSV, 2002), a corporate governance system closely 
following those adopted in the U.S. and the U.K.(Cheung, Stouraitis and Wong, 
2005), a single unitary stock exchange exercising strong regulatory control over the 
listed firms, and a weak market for corporate control (Cheung, Connelly, 
Limpaphayom, and Zhou, 2007). It provides an ideal testing ground to investigate 
how voluntary disclosure and firm valuation are related in a market where family 
ownership and concentrated shareholdings predominate. Compared with state-owned 
enterprises, the voluntary CG disclosure behaviour of these predominantly insider-
owned firms can be expected to be quite different from those firms whose directors 
are mainly government ex-officials with nil ownership (or very little stakes in the 
firms) characterised with uncertain board directorship tenure. A CG disclosure study 
using Hong Kong firms as samples provides the researcher with the benefit to be able 
                                                 
2 Cheung and Shum (1993) report that there was only one successful hostile takeover in Hong Kong 
during the period 1986 to 1991. They conclude that it was, to a large extent, due to the concentrated 
ownership structure of Hong Kong listed firms.  
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to test if a strong legal investor protection is effective to curb the excessive power of 
a predominant shareholder. A CG study that examines LargeCap, MidCap, and 
SmallCap firms as separate categories within the same market and legal regime 
provides added benefits in isolating the effects of CG disclosure on market valuation 
of a firm, which might be caused by the differences in the firm’s market 
capitalisation, or by other differences in information asymmetry related to insider 
ownership. 
 
8.3 Sample construction  
 
Sample firms in this study are identified from the constituent stocks of the three sub-
indices of the Hang Seng HK Composite Index (HSHKCI), namely, the HSHKLI for 
the large capitalisation (LargeCap) firms, the HSHKMI for the medium capitalisation 
(MidCap) firms, and the HSHKSI for the small capitalisation (SmallCap) firms as at 
5th September 2005 when the data collection process of this study began. As at that 
date, there were 106 stocks in the Hang Sang HK Composite Index with the 
composition as follows: 
• 16 stocks3 in the Hang Seng HK LargeCap Index, covering 80% of the 
market capitalisation of the HSHKCI. 
 
• 35 stocks in the Hang Seng HK MidCap Index; covering the next 15% of the 
market capitalisation of the HSHKCI. 
 
• 55 stocks in the Hang Seng HK SmallCap Index; covering the remaining 5% 
of the market capitalisation of the HSHKCI. 
 
A full list of the names of the 106 HSHKCI constituent stocks as at 5 September 
2005 is provided in Appendix 1.  
 
For the purpose of this study, the following firms in the HSHKCI are excluded: 
(i) Banking corporations, insurance corporations, financial institutions (e.g., 
deposit-taking companies); whose accounting definitions on assets, equities, 
and liabilities are different from non-financial firms.  The market 
performance measure, q, and the market-to-book ratio, for these financial 
firms may not be similarly defined as for non-financial firms, hence making 
                                                 
3 Swire Pacific ‘A’ shares (HKEx code: 19) and ‘B’ shares (HKEx code: 87) are both listed on the 
HKEx and are constituent stocks of the HSHKLCI. Hence, effectively, there were only 15 companies 
but 16 stocks in the LargeCap category. 
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them incomparable with the non-financial firms (Wallace and Naser, 1995).  
Moreover, financial firms are subject to the monitoring regulations set by the 
Hong Kong Monetary Authority.  The disclosure environments are vastly 
different from those of non-financial firms. For these reasons, 14 financial 
firms of the HSHKCI are excluded from this study. 
(ii) In addition, two non-financial firms are excluded from this study: (1) China 
Resources Peoples Telephone Co. (HKEx Code 331), which was not yet 
listed in 2003 but was privatised on 28 March 2006, shortly before its results 
for fiscal year 2005 (year end at December) became available; and (2) Pacific 
Century Premium Developments Ltd (HKEx Code 432) which changed its 
fiscal year in 2004, resulting in incompatible comparison of its data with 
other sample firms. 
 
A total of 90 constituent stocks of the HSHKCI (i.e., Panel A in Appendix 1) are 
identified, representing 89 firms eligible for this study.4  The distribution of these 
sample firms, subdivided into three market capitalisation categories according to the 
HSHKCI sub-indices, is stated in Table 8. 1 below: 
 
Table 8.1 Number of firms in the sample by market capitalisation 
Market 
Capitalisation 
No. of non-financial firms in 
the sample 
LargeCap  12 
MidCap  29 
SmallCap  48 
Total 89 
 
The stock composition of the LargeCap, MidCap, and SmallCap indices changes 
from time to time, though not frequently.  As already explained in Section 8.2 of this 
chapter5, the set of indexed firms changes according to the market capitalisation of 
the constituent stocks from time to time. The index preparing company, HSI Co Ltd 
(HSICO), conducts regular reviews of the performance of these stocks, usually on a 
half-yearly basis but not on a fixed, pre-announced, date.  It replaces the constituent 
                                                 
4 As per same reason stated in Footnote 3 above. 
5 In regular review by HSICO, any stock with a market capitalisation ranking that falls below the 18th 
position in the HSHKCI will be removed from the HSHKLI, while any stock with ranking above the 
12th position will be included.  Similarly, during the regular review,  any stock with market 
capitalisation that ranks below the 60th position in the HSHKCI will be removed from the HSHKMI, 
while an stock with ranking above the 40th position will be included (Hang Seng Index Co Ltd, 2005). 
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stocks with new candidates as the occasion arises.  Successful SmallCap firms can be 
promoted to MidCap firms. Likewise, prosperous MidCap firms can swap places 
with LargeCap firms, though not so frequently as SmallCap firms would.  For the 
purpose of this study, the classification of a listed firm in the HSHKCI as at 5 
September 2005 is ‘frozen’ retrospectively for the entire 3-year period of study.  For 
example, a firm listed in the MidCap category at 5 September 2005 is treated as a 
MidCap firm throughout the entire period of study from 2003 to 2005, although it 
might have been promoted from the SmallCap category or demoted from the 
LargeCap category shortly before that date.6   
 
8.4 Period of study and annual report release dates 
 
The sample period of this study covers the years 2003-2005. During this 3-year 
period, the CG disclosure data, market performance variables, accounting variables, 
and firm-related variables of each sample firm are collected. The rationale for 
selecting the period of study has been discussed in Section 5.4.2 of Chapter 5 and 
Section 7.3.1 of Chapter 7. 
 
The total number of observations (firm-years) for the three categories of firms in the 
sample space is 258, and the breakdown is shown in Table 8.2.  It can be seen from 
Column 6 of Table 8.2 that the sample size for SmallCap firms constitutes 54% of 
the whole sample; while for LargeCap firms, it represents only 14% (actual number 
of firm-years = 36).  The proportion of SmallCap firms would very likely have a 
dominant effect on the entire sample space, while the LargeCap firms would seem to 
be under-represented. 
 
                                                 
6  As the historical changes in the composition of the HSHKCI stocks are not available to the public 
before September 2005 when data collection began (archived information of HSICO not accessible), 
this may post a limitation on this study. 
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Table 8.2: Sample observations (firm-years)  
 2003 2004 2005 Total % 
LargeCap 12 12 12 36 14 
MidCap 26 27 29 82 32 
SmallCap 44 48   48 * 140 54 
Total 82 87 89 258 100 
 
* Notes: 
1. In the SmallCap category, there were originally 50 non-financial firms as at 2005.  China 
Resources Peoples Telephone was not yet listed in 2003. It cancelled its trading on 
28/03/2006 thus no annual report for fiscal year 2005 was released. Pacific Century Premium 
Development changed its fiscal year in 2004 due to re-organisation and a major change of 
business nature. It produced an annual report in 2005 that covered a fiscal shorter than the 
normal 12 months, making the data non-comparable with other companies. For these reasons, 
both companies are deleted from the SmallCap sample of this study. 
 
2. Four SmallCap firms, namely, Lifestyle International Holdings, Luen Thai Holdings, Pacific 
Basin Holdings, and Solomon Systech International, became listed companies only in 2005 
and hence their back data for 2003 are not available. Their back data for 2004, however, are 
featured in their 2005 annual reports for comparative purposes. Hence, the number of valid 
observations in 2004 remains on par with 2005, and the total number of firm-years for the 
SmallCap category from 2003 to 2005 is maintained at 140.)  
 
The CG disclosure data of the sample firms are collected from their annual reports. A 
total of 258 annual reports are examined. Other accounting data and market 
performance of the firms are obtained from Datastream (description on the definition 
of the variables has been presented in Chapter 7). 
 
Sample firms in this study have various fiscal year-ends. Most of them have their 
fiscal year ended at December 31, some at March 31, and a few on other dates. For 
this study, the accounting data of these companies such as the book value of total 
assets, total equity, total debt, and leverage, etc. are extracted from Datastream as at 
the end of the fiscal year. The market value of equity and the share price are obtained 
from Datastream as at the date of release of the firm’s annual report to HKEx (the 
annual report release date, or the ARR date). The ARR date is approximately three 
months after the fiscal year-end and is obtained from the website of HKEx 
(www.hkex.com.hk). 
 
During the period of study 2003-2005, the CG information of a listed firm publicly 
available to the investors was mainly reported in its annual reports.7  Therefore, the 
                                                 
7  It was not common for Hong Kong listed firms to set up their own company websites in 2005.  At 
that time, only some of the LargeCap firms,  few of the MidCap firms, and even fewer of the 
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source of information about the CG of the firms under study is the annual reports of 
the firms.  It is likely that outside investors can only have a full knowledge of the 
firm’s operation when the annual report becomes publicly available.  The date that 
the annual report is first released to the public (i.e., the ARR date) is the earliest time 
that the outsiders can obtain the most recent information about the CG of a listed 
firm. For this study, the ARR date is used as the reference date for arriving at the 
market value of a listed firm as at that date.  The CG information contained in the 
annual report of a listed firm is taken to be valid for the fiscal year prior to the ARR 
date unless it is specified otherwise.  The ARR dates in respect of the sample firms 
for 2003 to 2005 are shown in Appendix 1.  As the period of study is from fiscal 
year 2003 to 2005, the ARR dates span across three calendar years from 2004 to 
2006.  Based on these ARR dates, the market data on the sample firms are collected 
from Datastream.  
 
8.5 Cross listing of sample firms  
 
Previous studies as discussed in Section 6.3.2 of Chapter 6 have suggested that cross 
listing (or dual listing) can serve as a CG mechanism (Cooke, 1992; Lang, Raedy, 
and Yetman, 2003; Lang, Lins, and Miller, 2003). The information about a firm’s 
cross listing status is not a mandatory disclosure requirement in the Corporate 
Governance Report.  Yet, it is always disclosed in the annual reports of the firm 
(mainly under the “Corporate Information” section).  In this study, some of the 
sample firms are dual-listed on other stock exchanges.  Most of the dual-listed firms 
have an American Depositary Receipt status.  Appendix 1 presents the dual-listing 
status of the LargeCap, MidCap, and SmallCap sample firms respectively in this 
study as at September 2005.  
 
Among the 3 market capitalisation groups of firms, it can be seen from Appendix 1 
that LargeCap firms have the highest percentage of cross listing. Out of the 12 
LargeCap firms in the sample, 67% (i.e., 8 firms) had either an American Depositary 
                                                                                                                                          
SmallCap firms had the IT resources to build, maintain, and update their company websites.  Even if a 
firm had constructed its own website by 2005, the construction of the website was rather rudimentary; 
and was more oriented to promoting sales of its products or services than to providing CG information 
to the general public. The information related to a firm’s internal operation, including the information 
about its CG practices, that had been uploaded onto its official website was almost identical to the 
information that was disclosed in its annual reports – the entire annual reports were scanned and 
archived, with no supplementary information provided. 
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Receipt (ADR) listing status in the U.S., or the status of dual listing on other stock 
exchanges besides HKEx. Two of these eight LargeCap firms, Henderson Land 
Development and Hutchison Whampoa, had been qualified to trade their stocks on 
three exchanges in 2005.  In the MidCap firms category, 28% (i.e., 8 firms) of 29 
sample firms had an ADR status, or were dually listed on some other stock 
exchanges besides HKEx at that time (Appendix 1).  In contrast, only 19% (or 9 
firms) of the 48 SmallCap sample firms had cross-listing status (Appendix 1). The 
percentage of dual-listing firms increases with the firm’s market capitalisation, which 
is consistent with the view that larger firms need more foreign capital; thus they are 
more willing to seek overseas listing (Reese and Weisbach, 2002).  It also supports 
the view that dual-listed firms tend to disclose more information (Cooke, 1992) than 
non-dual listed firms.  As a result, they are likely to operate in an information 
environment different from that of the non-dual listed firms. 
 
It should also be noted that the status of cross listing of the sample firms was not 
static. The cross listing status of the sample firms was recorded as at 2005 (and 
retrospectively verified for 2003 and 2004 from the firms’ annual reports). It would 
be expected that more firms from the same sample would become dually listed in the 
years after 2005.  
 
The fact that a firm’s stock is qualified to trade on another stock exchange outside 
Hong Kong indicates that the management of the firm is willing to subject itself to 
the scrutiny of an additional set of accounting standards and reporting regulations.  
As discussed in Section 4.2.4 of Chapter 4, the cross listing status can be a signal to 
the outside investors, which is provided voluntarily by the management, about the 
state of the corporate governance of the firm.  As the present study aims to examine 
the relationship between voluntary disclosure of CG practices and a firm’s valuation, 
the cross listing status of a firm is a relevant factor, and is treated as a dummy 
variable in the empirical models (i.e., takes on a value ‘1’ if cross listed, ‘0’ 
otherwise), which will be specified in Section 8.7 of this Chapter.  The following 
section, Section 8.6, will discuss the data collection on CG practices from the annual 
reports of the sample firms.  
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8.6 Corporate governance data collection 
 
In November 2004, the HKEx announced that all listed firms on the Hong Kong 
Stock Exchange would be required to comply with the Code of Best Practice for 
accounting periods commencing on, or after, 1 January 2005.  All issuers of 
securities on the stock exchange were asked to issue a separate Corporate 
Governance Report in accordance with the requirements as stipulated in Appendix 14: 
Code on Corporate Governance Practices and Appendix 23: Corporate governance 
Report of the Listing Rules.  Appendix 14 sets out the principles of good corporate 
governance and two levels of recommendations, namely, the code provisions and the 
recommended best practices. Appendix 23 sets out a list of recommended disclosure 
for the issuers’ reference.  They are not mandatory but intended to be areas on which 
the issuers may comment in their Corporate Governance Report. In sum, Appendix 
14 states the principles of good corporate governance for the firms to apply, whereas 
Appendix 23 provides the format of a report for the firms to follow. 
 
As explained in Chapter 5, HKEx had been engaging in dialogues with its listed 
member firms on the improvement of their corporate governance since early 2000s. 
Consultation papers had been drafted and issued to its members to solicit their 
opinions on the significance of good corporate governance practices to investors. 
Reports were written following the consultation works to consolidate the members’ 
comments regarding the implementation of the desirable CG practices. The listed 
member firms had been strongly encouraged to adopt the Code of Best Practices 
since its first publication in 2002.  The final HKEx report on the mandatory 
implementation of the Code of Best Practices in November 2004 was the result of a 
series of consultation works between the HKEx, the listed members, and the 
professional accounting organizations. In effect, Appendix 14 and Appendix 23 
represent the final outcome of the negotiations over many years on the required 
disclosure of a firm’s CG practices that are mutually acceptable to the regulators and 
the listed firms.  As the format of the CG Report is specified in Appendix 23, it can 
be converted into a checklist to measure a listed firm’s disclosure of its CG practices.  
It can also be used retrospectively to measure the firm’s similar disclosure of its CG 
practices for the previous years, which was voluntary before and up to 2005.8
                                                 
8 The rationale for treating the disclosure of a firm’s CG practices for 2005 as voluntary has been 
discussed in Section 7.3.1 in Chapter 7. 
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 Data on the CG of the listed firms under study are collected from the annual reports 
of the firms for the fiscal years from 2003 to 2005.  To collect the CG information, 
the following nine sections of the companies’ annual reports are examined: 
(i) Director Report; 
(ii) Corporate Governance Report (if any); 
(iii) Audit Committee Report (if any); 
(iv) Remuneration or Compensation Committee report (if any); 
(v) Nomination Committee Report (if any); 
(vi) Profile (or Biography) of Directors and Senior Management; 
(vii) Corporate Information; 
(viii) Investors Relations (if any); 
(ix) Important Dates (or Company Calendar). 
 
To facilitate the collection of CG information from past annual reports of the sample 
firms, a checklist for recording the CG disclosure is needed.  The following sub-
section, Section 8.6.1, explains the construction of the CG disclosure checklist.  
8.6.1 Construction of the CG Disclosure Checklist 
A CG disclosure checklist is developed with reference to the Code Provisions and 
Recommended Best Practices as stipulated in Appendix 23 of the Listing Rules.  The 
checklist consists of 66 single-barrel questions on CG disclosure, two thirds of which 
are on the items from the Code Provisions section and the remaining one third from 
the Recommended Best Practices section.  Similar to Appendix 23, these 66 
questions are grouped under nine categories of mandatory disclosure and five 
categories of recommended disclosures as follows: 
 
A) Mandatory disclosure 
1. Corporate governance practices; 
2. Directors’ securities transactions; 
3. Board of directors; 
4. Chairman and Chief Executive Officer; 
5. Non-executive Directors; 
6. Remuneration of directors; 
7. Nomination of directors; 
8. Auditors’ remuneration; and 
9. Audit Committee. 
 
B) Recommended disclosure 
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1. Share interests of senior management; 
2. Shareholders’ rights; 
3. Investor relations; 
4. Internal controls; and 
5. Management functions. 
 
For each single-barrel question on the checklist, there are three possible answers: 
• ‘Yes’ if there is disclosure of relevant contents in the annual reports; 
• ‘No’ if no disclosure of relevant contents is found; 
• ‘Not Applicable’ if the question does not apply to the sample firm. 
 
For example, a provision for setting up a Nomination Committee is broken down into 
several questions that can be answered with any one of the three suggested answers. 
The first question asks whether a Nomination Committee has been established, to 
which an answer can be either ‘Yes’ or ‘No’.  The second question enquires whether 
the composition of the Nomination Committee is disclosed.  If a firm has not set up a 
Nomination Committee in the first place, then the most proper answer to the second 
question should be ‘Not Applicable’.  A ’No’ answer to the second question in that 
case would be construed as indicating the firm’s non-disclosure of the composition 
when it has already established the Nomination Committee.   A copy of the CG 
checklist is presented in Appendix 2 of this study.  
 
When applied retrospectively for the year 2003 and 2004, the same checklist can be 
used to ascertain if firms had been prepared to disclose their CG practices on a 
voluntary basis. As explained in Chapter 5, HKEx had informed, and the Hong Kong 
Society of Accountants (HKSA) had advised, the listed firms to disclose their CG 
practices several years in advance before the Code on Corporate Governance 
Practices became mandatory in 2005. However, listed firms were at liberty to choose 
as to when to disclose their compliance with the Code, how much to disclose, or 
whether to disclose their CG practices at all at that time.  Using the CG disclosure 
checklist based on the mandatory requirements in 2005 to assess retrospectively the 
extent of voluntary disclosure in 2003 and 2004, will provide a common denominator 
for comparing the voluntary disclosure of all listed firms. 
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 8.6.2 Construction of the CG disclosure index 
Based on the answers to the questions in the checklist, a CG disclosure index, 
CGDscore, is compiled. One point is given for a ‘Yes’ answer and zero for a ‘No’ 
answer.  The total score of CG disclosure, the CGDscore, is the sum of all points for 
the ‘Yes’ answers divided by the net number of relevant questions (i.e., 66 minus the 
number of ‘Not Applicable’ answers), multiplied by 100. Hence, the possible range 
for CGDscore is 0~100. This dichotomous scoring method has been used in prior 
studies (e.g., Cooke, 1989a; Wallace, Naser, and Mora 1994; Chau and Gray, 2002; 
Gul and Leung, 2004) and the approach in coding ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ net of the ‘Not 
Applicable’ answers has been commonly practiced. 
 
All answers to the questions carry equal weighting in the compilation of the index. 
There are merits in this approach over an index compiled with unequal weighted 
scoring system for different aspects of CG practices. First, there is no economic 
theory in support of any particular aspect of CG practice being more important or 
valuable than others. Any importance assigned to an aspect of disclosure may bring 
about a certain degree of subjectivity, depending upon the users of the index. It may 
also reflect the extent to which the importance of such information meant to that 
specific group of users (Firth, 1979), which may vary with other groups. Using an 
equal- weight (or un-weighted) scoring system permits an analysis to be independent 
of the perceptions of a particular user group (Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987).  
 
Second, using an equal-weight measuring approach implies that each item of 
disclosure is considered to be equally important.  It allows different facets of the 
index to be additive so that a direct link is established between the index and the 
number of aspects of CG practices that are disclosed.  In contrast, when different 
users assign different weights to various provisions of the CG Disclosure Code, the 
subjective weights assigned to the provisions may average each other out in the final 
score so that no differentiation can be made between the importance and the quantity 
of provisions disclosed.   Clearly, it is possible for one group of users (e.g., creditors) 
to attach a level of importance to an item of disclosure that is different from another 
group of users (e.g., analysts).  A specifically weighted measurement therefore only 
represents the perceived importance of the disclosure items by some specific group 
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of users.  It does not necessarily represent a stable perception across all users over 
time (Dhaliwal, 1980, p. 387).  
 
Third, the un-weighted scoring approach has been employed and supported in many 
prior studies (e.g., Ahmed and Nicholls, 1994; Cooke, 1991; Meek, Roberts, and 
Gray, 1995; Wallace and Naser, 1995; Chau and Gray, 2002) and the results of prior 
studies have suggested that weighted and un-weighted disclosure indices are 
interchangeable because their effects are equivalent (Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987, 
p. 536-538).   Moreover, the focus of this study is not to cater to the needs of one 
particular user group but to the general users of the disclosure index.   An approach 
that tries to encapsulate the subjective weights assigned by a multitude of user groups 
would be unwieldy and probably futile (Cooke, 1989a).  For these reasons, this study 
will adopt an unweighted approach in the construction of the CGDscore. 
 
8.7 Research design and methodology 
 
This section discusses two aspects of research in this study. Section 8.7.1 describes 
the research design and explains the formation of three different sampling groups. 
Section 8.7.2 accounts for the choice of methodology. 
8.7.1 Research design 
Table 8.2 in Section 8.4 of this chapter shows the sampling frame of 258 
observations, which consist of 36 firm-years for LargeCap, 82 for MidCap, and 140 
for SmallCap firms.  If the entire sampling frame is treated as one homogenous group 
(similar to the treatment by previous researchers like Chen and Jaggi, 2000; Cheung, 
Connelly, Limpaphayom, and Zhou, 2007), there is a potential risk that the test 
results thus obtained would be unduly influenced by SmallCap firms, which 
represent 54% of the total observations.  On the other hand, if the sampling frame is 
split up into 3 separate groups of LargeCap (L), MidCap (M), and SmallCap (S) 
firms individually, the small size in the L sample (i.e., 36 firm-years) may not 
support a reliable statistical analysis due to its low degree of freedom (i.e., 12 firms’ 
data over 3 years, but there are 15 explanatory variables at maximum in some 
models). 
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Therefore, the research design of this study is re-shaped as follows. The entire 
sampling frame is composed of observations from LargeCap, MidCap, and SmallCap 
firms.  They can be grouped into three sub-samples:  
(i) LargeCap, MidCap, and SmallCap firms (L+M+S) sample;  
(ii) LargeCap and MidCap firms (L+M) sample; and 
(iii) SmallCap firms (S) sample. 
 
Under such grouping, the (L+M+S) sample provides a sample size with 258 
observations, the (L+M) sample with 118 observations, and the (S) sample with 140 
observations.  Provided that LargeCap firms are not entirely irreconcilable with 
MidCap firms on every attribute, this grouping shall yield a bigger sample size for 
testing the models with a higher statistical power.   
 
In addition to the practical need for an increased sample size for the LargeCap firms, 
there are also justifications for grouping them with MidCap firms to form a 
combined L+M sample, while leaving the SmallCap firms as a stand-alone sample.  
Firstly, prior studies on Hong Kong firms rarely single out the small firms as focus of 
study.  In contrast, the present study offers an alternative to compare and contrast the 
voluntary disclosure behaviour of small firms with that of larger firms. Secondly, 
LargeCap firms and MidCap firms have more analysts following (as suggested by 
their higher propensity for cross listing) than SmallCap firms (Cooke, 1989a; Lang, 
Raedy, and Yetman, 2003).  It is suggested that the information asymmetry between 
the insiders (i.e., managers) and the outsiders (i.e., investors) tends to be bigger for 
the small firms (Cheung, Stouraitis, and Wong, 2005).  Compared to small firms, the 
total information set on large and medium firms available to outside investors is 
likely to be larger (Berglof and Pajuste, 2005). Hence, combining LargeCap and 
MidCap firms to form an (L+M) sample is less likely to distort their overall 
characteristics in terms of information environments. 
   
The descriptive statistics of LargeCap, MidCap, and SmallCap firms in terms of their 
financial performance, market performance, accounting ratios, and CG 
characteristics are presented in Chapter 9, where further justifications for grouping 
LargeCap firms with MidCap firms will be provided.  
 232
 8.7.2 Methodology 
A multiple ordinary least square regression (OLS) is applied to test the hypotheses 
between voluntary CG disclosure (i.e., dependent variable) and other firm 
characteristics and control variables (i.e., independent variables). Lang and 
Lundholm (1993) point out that multiple regressions offer a methodology to examine 
the incremental explanatory power of the variables.  However, when the theoretically 
correct form of the relationship between the dependent variable and the explanatory 
variables is not known, rank regressions may be useful in analysing the data.   For 
example, if the relationship between the dependent variable (e.g., Tobin’s q) and the 
explanatory variables (e.g., the CG characteristics) is monotonic, implying that the 
dependent variable changes in just one direction – either up or down as the 
explanatory variables increase, a higher-ranked explanatory variable will correspond 
to a higher-ranked dependent variable, regardless of the precise relationship between 
the two variables when they are unranked (Lang and Lundholm, 1993, p. 262-264; 
Wallace, Naser, and Mora, 1994, p. 47). This study will primarily use the OLS 
methodology in testing the models, and use ranked data in the regression models if 
necessary.  In the following sections, the hypotheses as stated in Chapter 6 will be 
specified into models, with reference to the studies by extant researchers as 
previously discussed in Chapters 2 - 4.  
 
8.8 Model specification 
 
This section features the specification of the models.  These models are constructed 
with the variables defined in Chapter 7 and are empirically tested in the next chapters.  
The models are developed with reference to the hypotheses stated in Chapter 6.  
Under usual circumstances, one specific model is constructed to test one hypothesis. 
In some cases, however, several sub-hypotheses can be simultaneously tested by a 
single model.   
 
8.8.1 Hypothesis 1 (H1) 
As explained in Section 6.3.1 of Chapter 6, the following hypothesis (H1) 
hypothesizes a relationship between voluntary CG disclosure and firm valuation: 
 
 233
Hypothesis 1 
H1: Firms that voluntarily disclose more information with regard to their corporate 
governance practices have higher market valuation than firms that disclose less, 
ceteris paribus. 
 
Following Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988); McConnell and Servaes (1990); 
Kaplan and Zingales (1997); Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003); Cremers and Nair 
(2005); and Durnev and Kim (2005), firm valuation is proxied by the approximation 
of Tobin’s q, calculated as follows: 
 
q = (Total assets + market value of equity – book value of equity – deferred tax)  
                                           Total assets 
 
where q is the approximation for Tobin’s q. 
 
Total assets, book value of equity, and deferred tax for sampled firms are measured 
as at the end of fiscal year t. Market value of equity for each firm is measured as at 
the Annual Report Release Date, which is about 3 months after the end of fiscal year 
t and is recorded in the HKEx website.  The data for all variables needed for the 
computation of a firm’s q are obtained from Datastream. The information of CG 
practices voluntarily disclosed by a firm is proxied by the CG disclosure score 
(CGDscore). Detailed discussion of the definitions of each variable and the 
computation of each construct has been presented in Chapter 7. 
 
To empirically test Hypothesis 1, a firm’s q is estimated as a function of CGDscore, 
and the model is specified as follows: 
 
Model 1.0 
qi,t  =  β0 + β1 CGDscorei,t  + εi,t     (Model 1.0) 
where qi,t is an approximation of Tobin’s q as previously defined; CGDscorei,t is the 
corporate governance disclosure score for firm i in period t; β0,  β1  are parameter 
estimates;  εi,t is the error term, and subscript i denotes the firm i where i = 1,2,…n,  
and subscript t denotes fiscal year where t=1, 2, 3.   
 
Model 1.0 is extended to incorporate other aspects of a firm’s CG disclosure, known 
collectively as the CGprac variables in this study, which include the following five 
variables: 
• board size (BoDsize);  
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• the number of independent non-executive directors (INEDs) appointed to the 
board (NumINED); 
• the proportion of the INEDs of the board members (INED%); 
• the splitting of the dual roles of the Chairman from the Chief Executive 
Officer (SplitRole); and 
• Dual listing (DualList) status. 
 
A control variable (Dir%Own), which denotes Directors’ Ownership expressed as the 
percentage of common shares owned by all directors, is also added into the extended 
model.  The extended model, Model 1.1, is therefore specified as follows: 
 
Model 1.1 
qi,t = β0 + β1 CGDscorei,t  + β∑
=
k
j 1
jCGpraci,t +  β2Dir%Owni,t + εi,t  
(Model 1.1) 
where qi,t, CGDscorei,t are as defined in Model 1.0; β0 ,  β1 , and β2 are parameter 
estimates,  βj is a vector for the parameters of the CGpraci,t; where CGpraci,t is a 
family of variables that comprises five (k =5) variables on CG practices: 
• BoDSizei,t = total number of all director on the board of directors; 
• NumINEDi,t = the number of INEDs sitting on the board of directors; 
• INED%i,t = the percentage of INEDs of the total number of directors; 
• SplitRolei,t = a dummy variable ‘1’ for split role of CEO and Chairman,  
                                       ‘0 ‘otherwise;  
• DualListi,t = a dummy variable ‘1’ for cross listing on any other   
                                        exchange, 0 otherwise; and  
 
Dir%Owni,t is the percentage of common shares owned by the directors;  εi,t is the 
error term; subscript i denotes the firm i where i = 1,2, 3…, n;  subscript t denotes 
fiscal year where t=1, 2, 3; and subscript k = 1,2,…5. 
 
In addition to a firm’s CG practices, prior accounting research suggests that a 
number of financial performance factors may also influence the firm’s valuation (e.g., 
Mitton, 2002; Eng and Mak, 2003; Hutchison and Gul, 2004). These factors are more 
closely related to the financial conditions of the firm than to the industry or market in 
which the firm operates.  Model 1.1 is therefore extended further to take these 
financial performance factors into consideration as control variables.  In this study, 
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these financial performance factors are collectively represented by Company 
Characteristics (ComChar) variables, which include the following:  
• the firm’s profitability as proxied by return on equity (ROE);  
• the firm’s sustainable income as proxied by the natural log of sales (LnSales); 
• the firm’s growth prospect as proxied by the year-on-year sales growth 
(SalGrow); 
• the firm’s resources as proxied by the natural log of equity (LnEqty); and  
• the firm’s leverage as proxied by the debt ratio (Debt/Total Assets). 
 
Model 1.2 
qi,t = β0 + β1 CGDscorei,t  +  β∑
=
k
j 1
jCGpraci,t + β∑
=
p
m 1
mComChari,t  
             + β2Dir%Owni,t +  εi,t         (Model 1.2) 
 
where qi,t, CGDscorei,t, CGpraci,t , and Dir%Owni,t are as previously defined;  β0, β1, 
and β2 are parameter estimates; βj, βm are vectors, εi,t is the error term; subscript i 
denotes the firm i where i = 1,2, 3…, n;  subscript t denotes fiscal year where t=1,2,3;  
subscript k = 1,2,…5; subscript p = 1,2,…5;  and ComChari,t is a family of company 
characteristics variables which represent a firm’s financial performance and consist 
of the following five control variables: 
 
• ROEi,t  = return on equity; 
• LnSalesi,t   = natural log of a firm’s sales; 
• SalGrowi,t   = sales growth over previous year; 
• LnEqtyi,t    = natural log of a firm’s equity9; and 
• Debt/TAi,t  = debt ratio (i.e., Debt/TA) expressed in percentage; 
  
 
The above-mentioned models, namely, Models 1.0, 1.1 and 1.2, are applied to the 
three samples mentioned in Section 8.7.1, namely, the pooled LargeCap, MidCap, 
and SmallCap (L+M+S) sample, the combined LargeCap and MidCap (L+M) sample, 
and the SmallCap (S) sample. 
 
                                                 
9 The Total Assets (TA) of a firm is not used here as a proxy for a firm’s resources because q, the 
dependent variable on the left hand side of a regression model, consists of a component - the book 
value of total assets. Putting TA on the right hand side of the model to test for q will likely cause an 
upward biased coefficient of determination r2 in the regression.   
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These models are specified with OLS methodology, which can test the strength of 
the linear relationship between the dependent variable q (the market valuation of a 
firm) and the explanatory variables (such as CGDscore, amongst others).   
 
Previous research indicates that a firm’s valuation proxied by q is associated with 
insiders’ shareholding, and the relationship may be non-linear (Morck, Shleifer, and 
Vishny, 1988; McConnell and Servaes, 1990).  In addition, Claessens and Fan (2002) 
posit that shareholders will discount the stocks according to the perceived CG issues.  
It seems plausible that a firm’s share prices (and thus its market valuation) can be 
jointly affected by both the insiders’ ownership and the CG practices of a firm – the 
former being proxied by the directors’ ownership (Dir%Own) and the latter by the 
voluntary CG disclosure (CGDscore) of the sample firms in this study. Yet, few 
studies have tested the potential joint effect of insiders’ shareholding and voluntary 
CG disclosure on a firm’s valuation.  This study aims at exploring such relationship 
using a specific research design, as explained in the following sub-section. 
 
8.8.2 Level of Directors’ Ownership, CG rank, and q 
As documented in the literature review in Section 3.2.8 of Chapter 3 and the 
hypotheses development sections in Chapter 6, firms that are tightly held or owned 
by insiders often have their owners as managers, and resulting in entrenchment 
problems rather than classical agency problems. When the CG of a tightly insider-
owned firm is poor, outsiders are expected not to pay a high price for its stock 
(Claessens and Fan, 2002). A firm’s CG practice, therefore, is likely to have a 
discernable impact on a firm’s market valuation.  However, outsiders may not be 
able to assess the state of a firm’s CG unless the insiders (i.e., the management) 
voluntarily disclose it.  Suppose there are two firms, Firm A and Firm B, which have 
comparable level of insiders’ ownership.  If Firm A is voluntarily disclosing more 
information on its CG practices than Firm B, it is likely that outside investors will 
regard Firm A (i.e., with higher CG disclosure) as having implemented more CG 
mechanisms than Firm B.  More mechanisms installed within a firm imply a higher 
commitment to investor protection by the management.  Subsequently, outside 
investors may infer that Firm A provides more investor protection, hence a better CG, 
than Firm B, when the levels of insiders’ ownership of both firms are comparable.  
The share price of Firm A will be rated higher.  Hence, ceteris paribus, it can be 
hypothesized:  
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 8.8.3 Hypothesis H1a 
 
H1a: Low CG rank firms have lower q, controlling for the level of insiders’ 
ownership. 
 
Before a model is specified to test H1.a, it is necessary to define clearly the meaning 
of ‘High’ and ‘Low’ in the CG ranking of a firm.  In this study, a firm’s CGDscore is 
ranked as ‘High’ if it is above the median CGDscore of the group of firms to which 
the firm is placed, and ‘Low’ if it is below.  The median CGDscore is a better 
threshold than the mean CGDscore in this case because, at the median, 50% of the 
sample firms have a higher CGDscore and 50% of the sample firms have a lower 
CGDscore.   
 
The insiders’ ownership of a firm may have impact on the firm’s voluntary CG 
disclosure. For different levels of insider ownership, there may be different attitudes 
towards voluntary CG disclosure.  An insider who owns a predominant shareholding 
of a firm may not feel obliged to disclose voluntarily the CG practices more than is 
necessary to the outside investors, because the minority shareholders do not have 
sufficient voting power to demand more disclosure.   On the other hand, an insider 
with low level of ownership may feel compelled to disclose more (as discussed in the 
literature review in Chapter 2 and Section 6.3.2 in Chapter 6).  While the absolute 
difference between the CGDscores of two firms may not result in a corresponding 
difference of equivalent magnitude in the valuation of the firms, the difference in the 
ranking of the CGDscores may indicate a categorical difference in the managers’ 
attitudes towards their CG practices.  Generally, it is expected that outside investors 
would prefer a relatively high CG-ranking firm to a relatively low CG-ranking firm. 
Therefore, in order to specify a model for testing H1a, both the CG ranking and the 
insiders’ ownership level of the firm should be considered. 
 
In considering the method of measuring the insider ownership levels of a firm, 
reference is made to the practices adopted in prior studies.  In a study to account for 
the possibility that variations in ownership levels affect corporate value, 
Wiwattanakantang (2001) categorizes the sample of Thai firms into four groups 
according to the shares held by the largest shareholder group. The levels of 
ownership are 0-25%, 25-50%, 50-75%, and 75-100%.  Chau and Gray (2002), in 
 238
their empirical study of Hong Kong firms, use the same method to divide their 
ownership variable into quartiles: 1-25%, 25-50%, 50-75%, and 75-100%, to test the 
relationship between higher ownership and the extent of voluntary disclosure.  Leung 
and Horwitz (2004) use 25% director ownership as the threshold to classify Hong 
Kong firms into their high (above 25%) or low (below 25%) ownership samples.  It 
seems that the categorization of insider ownership into quartiles is a commonly 
adopted practice in measuring the level of ownership in a firm. 
 
The sample of Hong Kong listed firms in this study is thus categorized into groups 
according to the level of directors’ (or insider) ownership. It is desirable to follow 
similar practice in adopting the quartile method used in prior studies to facilitate 
comparison of test results, if necessary.  Hence, directors’ ownership of the sample 
firms in this study will be categorised into ownership levels of 0-25%, 25-50%, and 
50-75% and 75%-100%.   However, it is noted that in the Listing Rules of HKEx, the 
public float of shares of a listed firm, i.e., issued share capital to be held by 
“unconnected persons” (those with no family relationship with the members of a 
firm’s board of directors) and the general public, is set at 25% or more of the issued 
share capital (HKEx, 2005).  The maximum level of issued share capital of the listed 
firm that an insider can own is thus capped at 75%.  Although the quartile method is 
used in categorizing the level of ownership in this study, in effect the feasible range 
of directors’ ownership will spread to three quartiles only, i.e., 0-25%, 25-50%, and 
50-75%.  As explained in Section 6.3.5 in Chapter 6, an insider enjoys predominance 
once he owns more than 50% equity of the firm. There is no difference in practice 
between a 50% ownership and a 75% ownership, as both levels of ownership yields 
predominance in ownership. Therefore, in this study, the level of insider ownership 
of a firm is classified as follows:  
(i) 0 - 25% (Low ownership);  
(ii) 25-50% (Medium ownership), and  
(iii) 50% or more (Predominant ownership).  
 
They are referred to as Low, Medium, and Predominant director’s ownership 
(Dir%Own) groups respectively. The Predominant group signifies those directors- 
cum-owners who have predominant ownership of more than 50%.   
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As discussed earlier, firms can be ranked into two levels in terms of CG ranking 
(CG_rank) with reference to the median of CGDscore pertaining to each sample:  
(i) High level of CG disclosure (H); and  
(ii) Low level of CG disclosure (L).  
 
Those firms with CGDscore higher than the median will be ranked as ‘H’, and those 
with CGDscore lower than the median will be ranked as ‘L’.  It should be noted that 
the classification of ‘H’ or ‘L’ is a relative measure (i.e., ‘H’ and ‘L’ are relative to 
each other); whereas in the ownership classification, a Predominant director 
ownership group has always had a majority of shareholding.    
 
The measurement of a firm’s CG ranking (CG_rank) and its level of director’s 
ownership (Dir%Own) is now presented in a 2x3 matrix, as shown in Table 8.3 
below.  There are six different combinations of CG_rank and Dir%Own Groups, 
namely, HL, HM, HP, LL, LM, and LP, which represent the respective level of CG 
ranking and director’s ownership of a firm in a sample.  
 
Table 8.3 A 2x3 matrix on CG ranking and Director’s Ownership of a firm  
 1 2           3                 4 
1  Dir%Own 
(Director’s Ownership) 
2 CG_rank 
(vs. median) 
Low  
(0-25%)
Medium 
(25-50%)
Predominant 
(50%+) 
3 High HL HM HP 
4 Low LL LM LP 
 
Using the high CG_rank and low DirOwnGrp (HL) as the base group (highlighted in 
row 3, column 2 of Table 8.3), five dummy variables are set up to denote the other 
five different combinations of CG-ranking and director’s ownership, stated in Table 
8.4 as follows: 
 
Table 8.4 Dummy variables of the joint CG_rank and Dir%Own Group 
DV_HM High CG_rank and Medium Dir%Own Group 
DV_HP High CG_rank and Predominant Dir%Own Group  
DV_LL Low CG_rank and Low Dir%Own Group  
DV_LM Low CG_rank and Medium Dir%Own Group  
DV_LP Low CG_rank and Predominant Dir%Own Group  
 
These 5 dummy variables, together with other control variables, will be used in the 
model for testing hypothesis H1a.  Model 1.3 is thus specified as follows: 
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Model 1.3 
qi,t = β0 + β1BoDsizei,t+ β2 NumINEDi,t + β3INED%i,t + β4SplitRolei,t  
            + β5DualListi,t + β6ROEi,t + β7 LnSalesi,t + β8 SalGrow%i,t + β9 LnEqtyi,t 
            + β10Debt/TAi,t + β11DV_HMi,t +  β12DV_HPi,t  
            + β13DV_LLi,t + β14DV_LPi,t + β15DV_LMi,t
+ εi,t         (Model 1.3) 
where all the variables are as previously defined; β0, β1, β2,… β15 are parameter 
estimates; εi,t is the error term; subscript i denotes the firm i where i = 1,2, 3…, n; 
and subscript t denotes fiscal year where t=1, 2, 3. 
 
The sample space for Model 1.3 is presented in Table 8.5 below, where Panel A 
denotes the 3-year pooled sample (L+M+S), Panel B denotes the 3-year LargeCap 
and MidCap combined sample (L+M), and Panel C denotes the 3-year SmallCap 
sample (S). The median of CGDscore for each sample, based on which a firm’s CG 
disclosure is compared and categorized as being High or Low in CG_rank, is stated 
in each panel.  
 
Table 8.5 Sampling frames for Model 1.3 
 Dir% Own Group  
CG_rank Low 
(0-25%) 
Medium
(25-50%)
Predominant
(50%+) 
Total 
Panel A: Pooled sample (L+M+S) Median of CGDscore = 34.43) 
High 31 40 58 129 
Low 18 44 67 129 
Total 49 84 125 258 
Panel B: Combined sample(L+M) Median of CGDscore = 42.15) 
High 7 24 28 59 
Low 0 23 36 59 
Total 7 47 64 118 
Panel C: SmallCap sample (S) Median of CGDscore = 31.68) 
High 24 14 32 70 
Low 18 23 29 70 
Total 42 37 61 140 
 
It should be noted that in Panel B (i.e., the L+M sample), no entry is recorded for the 
combination LL (i.e., Low CG_rank and Low Dir%Own Group) as there was no firm 
in that Panel that had a Low CG_rank and an insider ownership of less than 25%. 
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8.8.4 Hypothesis 2 (H2) 
Hypothesis 2 (H2) postulates that the level of voluntary CG disclosure by a firm is 
influenced by factors including: insiders’ ownership; the number of independent 
executive directors (INED) on the board; a firm’s resource availability; the status of 
cross listing of the firm; and the split roles of Chairman and CEO, as suggested by 
extant researchers and presented in Chapter 2 and Chapter 6 of this study.  Previous 
research studies by Eng and Mak (2003) and Berglof and Pajuste (2005) find that a 
more concentrated ownership tends to lower a firm’s disclosure level. Pearce and 
Zahra (1992) and Mayer, Shivdasani, and Smith (1997) hypothesize that the number 
of INEDs should have a positive impact on the level of a firm’s voluntary disclosure. 
Berglof and Pajuste (2005) find that the voluntary disclosure of information is 
positively associated with resource availability of a firm in Central and Eastern 
Europe.  In particular, larger firms and firms with less leverage tend to disclose more 
information (ibid, 2005, p. 179).  They suggest that more resources available to a 
firm (as indicated by a firm’s sales) would attract more attention from various 
investors. The firm would then face a higher demand for information, and hence 
should be associated with a higher level of voluntary disclosure. Cooke (1989a) and 
Lang, Raedy, and Yetman (2003) expect the cross-listed firms to be more transparent 
because, by raising the level of voluntary disclosure, the firms imply a lower risk for 
expropriation to the outside investors. These researchers’ theories and conjectures are 
incorporated into five hypotheses under Hypothesis 2 as stated in Chapter 6 of this 
study but are re-stated here with the specified variables as follows: 
 
Hypothesis H2a 
A firm’s voluntary CG disclosure is negatively related to the insiders’ ownership 
(proxied by the directors’ equity shareholding as a percentage of total 
outstanding shares (Dir%Own)).                        
 
Hypotheses H2b(1) and H2b(2)  
A firm’s voluntary CG disclosure is positively related to the number of INEDs 
(NumINED) and the percentage of INEDs sitting on the board (INED%), 
controlling for the size of the board (BoDsize).       
  
Hypothesis H2c  
A firm’s voluntary CG disclosure is positively related to the firm’s resource 
availability as proxied by sales (LnSales), controlling for profitability (ROE), 
size (LnTA), and leverage (Debt/TA).                                         
 
Hypothesis H2d 
Firms that are cross-listed (DualList) voluntarily disclose more information about 
their corporate governance.                           
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Hypothesis H2e 
Firms that split the roles of CEO and Chairman (SplitRole) have a higher voluntary 
CG disclosure.                                          
 
 
A multiple regression model for these five sub-hypotheses can be specified as 
follows: 
 
Model 2.0 
CGDscorei,t = β0 + β1BoDsizei,t  + β2NumINEDi,t + β3INED%i,t + β4SplitRolei,t  
                           + β5DualListi,t + β6Dir%Owni,t + β7ROEi,t +  β8LnSalesi,t  
                           +  β9SalGrowi,t + β10LnTA i,t + β11Debt/TA i,t   
                           + εi,t                                                                          (Model 2.0) 
where CGDscorei,t, ROEi,t, LnSalesi,t, SalGrowi,t, and Debt/TAi,t are as defined 
previously in Model 1.2;  β0 ,  β1 … β11 are parameter estimates;  εi,t is the error term,  
and 
 
BoDsizei,t = the board size (total number of directors on the board); 
NumINEDi,t = the number of INEDs sitting on the board of directors; 
INED%i,t = the percentage of INEDs of the total number of directors; 
SplitRolei,t = a dummy variable 1 for split role of CEO and Chairman,  
                           0 otherwise; 
DualListi,t = a dummy variable 1 for dual listing of the firm i, 
                            0 otherwise;  
Dir%Owni,t = the percentage of common shares owned by the directors; 
LnTAi,t = the natural log of total assets; 
 
and subscript i denotes the firm i where i = 1,2, 3…, n; and subscript t denotes fiscal 
year where t=1, 2, 3. 
 
8.8.5 Hypothesis 3 (H3) 
As discussed in Section 6.3.3 in Chapter 6, Hypothesis 3 (H3) hypothesizes that large 
firms would have systematically different disclosure behaviour than small firms. 
Large firms tend to be more complex, and are more likely to face a demand from 
outside investors for more detailed reporting (e.g., segment reporting). In order to 
close the information gap between the outsiders and the insiders, large firms would 
be expected to disclose more information voluntarily than small firms, as they would 
have more resources (Bushman, Piotroski, and Smith, 2004).  On the other hand, 
small firms are usually characterized with a high level of insider ownership, and 
greater information asymmetry between owners-managers and outside investors, 
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because they are followed by fewer analysts compared to large firms (Cheung, 
Stouraitis, and Wong, 2005, p. 522-525).  From the information asymmetry point of 
view, small firms with entrenched managers are expected to be less likely to enhance 
voluntary disclosure to the outsiders. Therefore, it is hypothesized that a systematic 
difference exists between LargeCap and SmallCap firms in terms of their voluntary 
disclosure behaviour. To put this hypothesis into testing, the original H3 is re-stated 
below and split up into 4 sub-hypotheses, i.e., H3a to H3d, as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 3   
H3: There are systematic differences in the voluntary CG disclosure between 
LargeCap firms and SmallCap firms in both the level of disclosure and the 
value relevance of disclosure.  
 
There are three aspects to test the differences in Hypothesis 3: (i) the level of 
disclosure; (ii) the market valuation as proxied by Tobin’s q; and (iii) the value 
relevance of disclosure. In the following sub-sections, Hypotheses H3a and H3b test 
for the level of disclosure and Tobin’s q respectively, while Hypotheses H3c to H3e 
test for the value relevance of disclosure.  Different tests will be carried out on these 
three aspects. 
 
(i) Level of disclosure 
To facilitate quick reference, sub-hypothesis H3a postulated on the systematic 
differences on the level of voluntary disclosure amongst the three types of sample 
firms, as originally discussed in Section 6.3.3, is re-stated as follows: 
 
Hypothesis H3a 
H3a: There are systematic differences in the voluntary CG disclosure of LargeCap 
firms and MidCap firms. 
 
To test H3a, a one-way ANOVA (analysis of variance) test is run amongst the three 
groups of firms (i.e., LargeCap, MidCap, and SmallCap) on their CGD Scores.  
Let : 
      CGL = the mean of LargeCap firms’ CGDscore; 
      CGM = the mean of MidCap firms’ CGDscore; 
      CGS = the mean of SmallCap firms’ CGDscore      
 
An ANOVA test is to be used to test the null hypothesis given by: 
 
Model 3.0 
      
 H0: CGL  = CGM  = CGS     
 H1: At least one of them is different    (Model 3.0) 
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An F test using F statistics is used to test whether the above-mentioned null 
hypothesis can be rejected, subject to the (k -1) degrees of freedom in the numerator 
and (N1 + N2 + N3 – k) degrees of freedom in the denominator, where: 
 
k = number of groups; 
N1 = sample size of group 1 (LargeCap firms); 
N2 = sample size of group 2 (MidCap firms); and 
N3 = sample size of group 3 (SmallCap firms). 
 
The decision rule is: if the calculated F statistic is sufficiently larger than a critical 
value Fcrit (e.g., α = 0.05), then the means across all groups are not all equal.  
 
If the null hypothesis is rejected, further tests (i.e., a post hoc test using the Tukey 
method) will be carried out to test the significance of differences between the means 
of paired groups. According to the National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST) Handbook, the Tukey method (or the Tukey-Kramer method) is a single-step 
multiple comparison procedure and statistical test generally used in conjunction with 
an ANOVA to find out which means are significantly different from one another.  It 
compares all possible pairs of means (µi, µj) and is based on a studentized range 
distribution q (this distribution is similar to the distribution of t from the t-test). The 
test compares the means of every treatment to the means of every other treatment.  It 
applies simultaneously to the set of all pairwise comparisons (µi - µj) and identifies 
the cases where the difference between two means is greater than the standard error 
would be expected to allow.  When all sample sizes are equal, the confidence 
coefficient for the set is exactly 1−α . For unequal sample sizes, however, the 
confidence coefficient is greater than 1 −α . In a sense, the Tukey method is 
conservative when there are unequal sample sizes. The Tukey tests will be conducted 
on a year-on-year basis from 2003 to 2005 for LargeCap, MidCap, and SmallCap 
firms as they are of unequal sample sizes10. 
 
(ii) Market valuation of firms as proxied by Tobin’s q 
Similar ANOVA test can also be applied to test whether different groups of firms 
have systematically different market valuations (as proxied by Tobin’s q) amongst 
LargeCap firms, MidCap firms, and SmallCap firms.  The sub-hypothesis from 
section 6.3.3 of Chapter 6  is re-stated as follows: 
 
                                                 
10 Hair, Anderson, Tatham, and Black (1998) comment that if the number of groups is small, the post 
hoc methods may identify the group differences (ibid, 1998, p. 356). 
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Hypothesis H3b 
H3b: There are systematic differences in the market valuation amongst LargeCap, 
MidCap, and SmallCap firms. 
 
To supplement the test on the value relevance of disclosure (to be postulated in H3c 
and H3e in the subsection that follows), a two-tailed t-test of the difference between 
the two population means of Tobin’s q (with population standard deviation σ’s 
unknown) is conducted as follows: 
Let : 
      QL = the mean of LargeCap firms’ approximation of Tobin’s q; 
      QM = the mean of MidCap firms’ approximation of Tobin’s q; 
      QS = the mean of SmallCap firms’ approximation of Tobin’s q.      
 
ANOVA test is to use to test the null hypothesis, which is stated together with the 
alternative hypothesis for a two-tailed test, subject to the degree of freedom offered 
by the sample size of LargeCap, MidCap, and SmallCap firms, as follows: 
 
Model 3.1a 
H0: QL  -  QM = 0 
H1: QL  -  QM ≠  0     (Model 3.1a) 
 
Model 3.1b 
H0: QL  -  Qs = 0 
H1: QL  -  Qs ≠  0     (Model 3.1b) 
 
Model 3.1c 
H0: QM  -  QS = 0 
H1: QM  -  QS ≠  0     (Model 3.1c) 
 
Since the sample size changes in the years of study, the above-mentioned ANOVA 
test is applied across different groupings of firms on a year-by-year basis to see if 
there are any significant differences between the LargeCap, MidCap, and SmallCap 
firms.  
 
(iii) Value relevance of disclosure 
The third aspect of Hypothesis 3 is related to the strength of the relationship between 
CG disclosure and firm valuation for various firms.  It is hypothesized that the 
strength of relationship would differ across LargeCap, MidCap, and SmallCap firms; 
and calls for tests whether the strength differs systematically amongst them. As 
discussed in Section 6.3.3 in Chapter 6, the following three sub-hypotheses are 
postulated: 
 
 246
Hypothesis H3c 
H3c: There are systematic differences in the strength of relationship between 
voluntary CG disclosure and firm valuation of LargeCap firms and MidCap 
firms. 
 
Hypothesis H3d 
H3d: There are systematic differences in the strength of relationship between 
voluntary CG disclosure and firm valuation of MidCap firms and SmallCap 
firms. 
 
Hypothesis H3e 
H3e: There are systematic differences in the strength of relationship between 
voluntary CG disclosure and firm valuation of LargeCap firms and SmallCap 
firms. 
 
To test sub-hypotheses H3c, H3d, and H3e, a different approach is adopted.  Firstly, 
three dummy variables, DV_L, DV_M, and DV_S, are assigned to each firm of the 
LargeCap-, MidCap-, and SmallCap group respectively. A value ‘1’ is assigned to 
the dummy variable if the firm belongs to its respective group, and ‘0’ otherwise. 
Then the CGDscore of each sample firm is multiplied by the value of its respective 
dummy variable to form three types of interaction variables: CG*DV_L, CG*DV_M, 
and CG*DV_S for LargeCap, MidCap, and SmallCap firms respectively. These three 
sets of interaction variables should be able to demonstrate the joint effect of market 
capitalization membership and CGDscore for each sample firm.  Table 8.6 below 
illustrates the construction of these three types of interaction variables: 
 
Table 8.6 Construction of interaction variables for LargeCap, MidCap, and SmallCap 
firms 
 
Market Capitalization Dummy 
Variable 
Interaction variable 
LargeCap            MidCap           SmallCap  
LargeCap CGDscore DV_L CG*DV_L 0 0 
MidCap CGDscore DV_M 0 CG*DV_M 0 
SmallCap CGDscore DV_S 0 0 CG*DV_S 
 
Secondly, to test whether there are any systematic differences in the strengths of 
value relevance of voluntary disclosure of the firms due to their variations in market 
capitalization, a regression model is specified similar to Model 1.2 using q as the 
dependent variable, and choosing one of the three market capitalization groups as a 
base group.  As the sample of LargeCap firms has the smallest sample size, it is 
selected as the base group. In addition to the same set of explanatory variables as in 
Model 1.2, two dummy variables (namely, DV_M and DV_S) and two interaction 
 247
variables (namely, CG*DV_M and CG*DV_S) will enter the new regression model 
as explanatory variables. The coefficients of DV_M and DV_S estimated from the 
regression model should be able to indicate the differences from the Intercept (i.e., 
the coefficient on Beta 0, which represents that of the DV_L) and the significance of 
their difference. The coefficients of the interaction variables (i.e., CG*DV_M and 
CG*DV_S) thus estimated should indicate the difference in slope from that of the 
LargeCap firms for the MidCap and SmallCap firms respectively. A t-test on these 
coefficients should then be able to indicate whether there are systematic differences 
across the different market capitalization groups in terms of the value relevance of 
their voluntary disclosure (i.e., to test the three sub-hypotheses H3c, H3d, and H3e).  
The new regression model is specified as follows: 
 
Model 3.2a 
 qi,t = β0 + β1CGDscorei,t  +  β∑
=
k
j 1
jCGpraci,t + β∑
=
p
m 1
mComChari,t  
                   +   β2DV_Mi,t +  β3DV_S i,t + β4CG*DV_M i,t + β5CG*DV_Si,t  
 
             +  εi,t               (Model 3.2a) 
 
where: 
qi,t, CGDscorei,t, CGpraci,t, ComChari,t, DV_Mi,t, DV_Si,t, CG*DV_Mi,t, and 
CG*DV_Si,t are as previously defined;  β0 ,  β1 … β5 are parameter estimates;  βj, βm 
are vectors; εi,t is the error term; subscript i denotes the firm i where i = 1,2, 3…, n; 
subscript t denotes fiscal year where t=1, 2, 3; subscript k = 1,2,…5; and subscript p 
= 1,2,…5. 
 
As suggested by previous studies (e.g., Cheung, Stouraitis, and Wong, 2005), small 
firms are likely to have larger information asymmetry, compared to larger firms. The 
impact of voluntary disclosure by small firms is therefore likely to be different from 
that of larger firms. To test the above preposition, another model is set up 
specifically for the SmallCap firms (S) to compare with other firms, that is, the 
sample of LargeCap and MidCap combined (L+M).  The SmallCap firm model, 
Model 3.2b, specified as follows, differs from Model 3.2a in that only the dummy 
variable DV_S and the interaction variable CG*DV_S that are related to SmallCap 
firms enter the model, controlling for other variables: 
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Model 3.2b 
 qi,t = β0 + β1CGDscorei,t  +  β∑
=
k
j 1
jCGpraci,t + β∑
=
p
m 1
mComChari,t  
            +   β2DV_Si,t + β3CG*DV_Si,t  + εi,t             (Model 3.2b) 
 
where: 
qi,t, CGDscorei,t, CGpraci,t, ComChari,t, DV_Si,t , and CG*DV_S i,t are as previously 
defined;  β0 ,  β1 … β3 are parameter estimates; βj, βk are vectors, εi,t is the error term; 
and subscript i denotes the firm i where i = 1,2, 3…, n; subscript t denotes fiscal year 
where t=1, 2, 3; subscript k = 1,2,…5; and subscript p = 1,2,…5. 
 
8.8.6 Hypothesis 4 (H4) 
Hypothesis 4 (H4) is set on the relationship between the dividend payout (DivPay) 
and the CG disclosure of a firm. The dependent variable is dividend payout, while 
the independent variables are the CGDscores, company characteristics variables, and 
the control variables.  For easy reference, H4 is repeated as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 4  
H4: Under a strong legal protection regime, high corporate governance ranking firms 
have lower dividend payout ratios, ceteris paribus, than low corporate 
governance ranking firms. 
 
Before H4 is tested, it is necessary to test if dividend payout can be affected by the 
CG disclosure, CG practices, and the performance characteristics specific to the 
sample firms.  In similar fashion to Model 1.1, a preparatory model is constructed 
and applied to the L+M+S sample, the L+M sample, and the S sample as follows: 
 
Model 4.0 
DivPayi,t = β0 + β1 CGDscorei,t  + β∑
=
k
j 1
jCGpraci,t +  β2Dir%Owni,t + εi,t  
(Model 4.0) 
where DivPay is the Dividend Payout ratio expressed in percentage; CGDscore and 
Dir%Own as previously defined in Model 1.0; β0 ,  β1 , and β2 are parameter 
estimates,  βj is a vector for the parameters of the CGpraci,t which is a family of 
variables that comprises five (k =5) variables on CG practices: 
• BoDSizei,t = total number of all director on the board of directors; 
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• NumINEDi,t = the number of INEDs sitting on the board of directors; 
• INED%i,t = the percentage of INEDs of the total number of directors; 
• SplitRolei,t = a dummy variable ‘1’ for split role of CEO and Chairman,  
                                       ‘0 ‘otherwise;  
• DualListi,t = a dummy variable ‘1’ for cross listing on any other   
                                        exchange, 0 otherwise; and  
 
 εt is the error term; subscript i denotes the firm i where i = 1,2, 3…, n;  subscript t 
denotes fiscal year where t=1, 2, 3; and subscript k = 1,2,…5. 
 
The objective of Model 4.0 is to identify the significant factors, if any, that may 
affect the level of Dividend Payout amongst the firms with various market 
capitalizations. Testing Model 4.0 with three samples of firms will also shed light on 
the differences, if any, among LargeCap, MidCap, and SmallCap firms in terms of 
their dividend payout levels. Hence, there will be three versions of Model 4.0, 
namely, Model 4.0_LMS on the L+M+S sample, Model 4.0_LM on the L+M sample, 
and Model 4.0_S on the S sample, using the same variables but with different sample 
firms. 
 
Model 4.1 
In order to test H4, which postulates that the ranking of the firm’s CG disclosure 
may have an impact on its dividend payout, the 2x3 matrix similar to what is stated 
previously in Table 8.3 is adopted.  The regression model for testing H4 is specified 
as follows: 
 
DivPayi,t = β0 + β1CGDscorei,t  +  β∑
=
k
j 1
jCGpraci,t + β∑
=
p
m 1
mComChari,t  
                      + β2DV_HMi,t + β3DV_HPi,t + β4DV_LLi,t + β5DV_LMi,t  
                      + β6DV_LPi,t  + εi,t                (Model 4.1)  
where: 
DivPayi,t is the dividend payout ratio by firm i in year t; CGDscorei,t, CGpraci,t, are as 
previously defined; DV_HMi,t ,  DV_HPi,t , DV_LLi,t , DV_LMi,t , and DV_LPi,t  are 
dummy variables as defined in Model 1.3; ComChari,t denotes a set of company 
characteristic variables consisting of: 
ROEi,t    = return on equity; 
LnSalesi,t  = natural log of a firm’s sales; 
SalGrowi,t  = Sales growth over previous year; 
 250
LnEqtyi,t   = natural log of a firm’s equity; 
Debt/TAi,t = debt ratio (i.e., Debt/Total Assets) expressed in percentage; 
 
β0 ,  β1…  β6 are parameter estimates;   βj, βm are vectors;  εi,t is the error term; 
subscript i denotes the firm i where i = 1,2, 3…,n; subscript t denotes fiscal year 
where t=1, 2, 3; subscript k = 1,2,…,5; and subscript p = 1,2,…,5. 
 
Model 4.1 will be applied to the three samples as shown previously in Table 8.5.  
Subject to the test results of the models on Hypothesis 3 (i.e., if it is empirically 
tested that no systematic differences exist between LargeCap and MidCap firms in 
both aspects of CG disclosure level and value relevance), the LargeCap firms can be 
pooled with the MidCap firms to form a bigger (L+M) sample for the purpose of 
testing H4.  This is justifiable because previous research has suggested that larger 
firms (including medium-sized firms) tend to have more stable dividends-profits-
and-retained-earnings relationship (Lintner, 1956, p. 113).  Large and established 
firms tend to have a target payout ratio (Miller and Modigliani, 1961). These well-
established firms tend to adjust dividends only marginally, primarily upward in 
response to their earnings increases (Fama and Babiak, 1968). Furthermore, larger 
and more profitable firms are more likely to pay dividends (Denis and Osobov, 2008).  
In sum, larger and more visible firms are likely to have a dividend policy different 
from that of small firms (Mitton, 2004). To control for any firm size effects within 
the same group of sample firms, the variable LnEqtyi,,t (as included under the 
ComChari,t variable specified on the right hand side of Model 4.0), is retained in the 
model. 
 
The established theories suggest that firms would try to avoid drastic fluctuations in 
dividend payout over years (i.e., ‘dividend smoothing’ as suggested by Renneboog 
and Trojanowski, 2007).  Hence it appears that there is no loss of robustness if the 3 
years’ data are pooled into one sample frame for the purpose of testing hypotheses on 
the firm’s dividend payouts.  Similar to the treatment in Model 1.3, the sample frame 
of Model 4.0 for testing the dividend payout can be regrouped into three panels of 
firms: (i) pooled sample (L+M+S), (ii) combined sample of LargeCap and MidCap 
firms (L+M), and (iii) SmallCap sample (S).  Model 4.0 is applied to each of these 
three panels. To specify the model for each panel, Model 4.0 is split into three sub-
models as follows: 
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Model 4.1_LMS 
DivPayi,t = β0 + β1BoDsizei,t + β2NumINEDi,t + β3INED%i,t + β4SplitRolei,t  
                       + β5DualListi,t + β6ROEi,t  + β7LnSalesi,t + β8SalGrowi,t  
                       + β9LnEqtyi,t + β10 Debt/TAi,t  + β11DV_HMi,t  + β12DV_HPi,t   
   + β13DV_LLi,t + β14DV_LMi,t  + β15DV_LPi,t  + ε i,t    (Model 4.1_LMS)  
 
where DivPayi,t , BoDsizei,t , NumINEDi,t , INED%i,t , SplitRolei,t , DualListi,t , ROEi,t, 
LnSalesi,t , SalGrowi,t, LnEqtyi,t , and Debt/TAi,t are as previously defined; DV_HMi,t, 
DV_HPi,t , DV_LLi,t , DV_LM i,t , DV_LP i,t  are dummy variables as defined in 
Model 1A;  β0,  β1…  β15  are parameter estimates; εi,t is the error term; subscript i 
denotes the firm i where i = 1,2, 3…, n; and subscript t denotes fiscal year where t=1, 
2, 3. 
 
Model 4.1_LMS is to be applied onto the pooled sample of LargeCap, MidCap, and 
SmallCap firms (L+M+S).  
 
Model 4.1_LM 
DivPayi,t = β0 + β1BoDsizei,t + β2NumINEDi,t + β3INED%i,t + β4SplitRolei,t  
                       + β5DualListi,t + β6ROEi,t  + β7LnSalesi,t + β8SalGrowi,t  
                       + β9LnEqtyi,t + β10 Debt/TAi,t  + β11DV_HMi,t  + β12DV_HPi,t   
   + β13DV_LLi,t  +  β14DV_LMi,t  + β15DV_LPi,t  + εi,t    (Model 4.1_LM)  
 
where all variables, dummy variables, parameter estimates, error term, and subscripts 
are same as defined in Model 4.1_LMS.  Model 4.1_LM is to be applied onto the 
combined sample of LargeCap and MidCap firms (L+M).  
 
Model 4.1_S 
DivPayi,t = β0 + β1BoDsizei,t + β2NumINEDi,t + β3INED%i,t + β4SplitRolei,t  
                       + β5DualListi,t + β6ROEi,t  + β7LnSalesi,t + β8SalGrowi,t  
                       + β9LnEqtyi,t + β10 Debt/TAi,t  + β11DV_HM + β12DV_HP  
   + β13DV_LL + β14DV_LM + β15DV_LP + εi,t               (Model 4.1_S)  
 
where all variables, dummy variables, parameter estimates, error term, and subscripts 
are same as defined in Model 4.1_LMS.  Model 4.1_S is to be applied onto the 3-
year pooled sample of SmallCap firms (S).  
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8.8.7 Hypothesis 5 (H5) 
Hypothesis 5 (H5) postulates that firms with insider ownership of 25% to 50% 
exhibit the lowest dividend payout ratio; because the probability of agency problem 
and the entrenchment problem occurring is likely to be the lowest at this range of 
insider ownership, ceteris paribus (as explained in Section 6.3.5 in Chapter 6).   For 
quick reference, H5 is re-stated as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 5  
H5: Firms that have insider ownership of 25%-50% exhibit the lowest dividend 
payout ratio, compared to firms that have insider ownership of 0-25% or over 
50%, ceteris paribus. 
 
To put H5 into context, the 2x3 matrix table as stated in Table 8.3 is adopted.  The 
empirical results derived from the tests conducted in Section 8.8.6 under Model 
4.1_LMS, Model 4.1_LM, and Model 4.1_S will indicate whether H5 can be 
accepted or rejected. Specifically, the models constructed to test H5 can be 
prescribed as follows: 
 
Model 5.1 
The coefficient of the dummy variable DV_HM is less than that of DV_HL and 
DV_HP for Model 4.1_LMS, Model 4.2_LM, and Model 4.3_S applying 
respectively onto the L+M+S, L+M, and S samples.   (Model 5.1) 
 
Model 5.2 
The coefficient of the dummy variable DV_LM is less than that of DV_LL and 
DV_LP for Model 4.1_LMS, Model 4.2_LM, and Model 4.3_S applying 
respectively onto the L+M+S, L+M, and S samples.   (Model 5.2) 
 
8.9 Summary 
 
Following Chapter 7 that covers the definitions of the explanatory and the dependent 
variables, this chapter explains the sample selection, data collection, methodology, 
and research design of this study. The first half of this chapter discusses the CG data 
collection process, the collection period, and the construction of the CG Disclosure 
Checklist, which is compiled with reference to Appendix 23 of the Listing Rules of 
HKEx.  It explains the computation of the CG disclosure index (the CGDscore), 
which is one of the key variables for the empirical models to be specified in this 
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study. The CGDscore is computed by assigning equal weights to each aspect of CG 
practices that are disclosed in the annual reports from 2003 to 2005, and scaled by 
the number of applicable questions on the checklist. A total of 258 annual reports are 
examined to obtain the CGDscores of these sample firms, which spread over the 
LargeCap, MidCap, and SmallCap constituent stocks of the HSHKCI Index.  In order 
to obtain an overall picture about the pervasiveness of dual listing of the sample 
firms, data on their dual listing status are also collected from their annual reports.  
 
The second half of this chapter is devoted to the research design, the elaboration on 
methodology, as well as the specification of models for the purpose of testing the 
hypotheses as stated in Chapter 6 previously. The models are to be tested with 
empirical results reported in Chapter 10.  In the next chapter, Chapter 9, the 
descriptive statistics and the univariate analytical results of these variables are 
reported. 
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Chapter 9: Descriptive Statistics and Univariate 
Analyses of Sample Firms 
9.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter presents the descriptive statistics about the sample firms in terms of the 
variables, which have been identified and defined in Chapter 7.  The summary statistics of 
these variables are grouped according to the market capitalization of sample firms, namely, 
LargeCap firms, MidCap firms, and SmallCap firms; across the period of study (i.e., 2003-
2005).  As the purpose of this study is to investigate the relationship between the voluntary 
CG disclosures, market valuation, and dividend payout of the sample firms with respect to 
insider ownership, the key variables of interest in this study are: 
(1) corporate governance disclosure scores (CGDscore); 
(2) market valuation measure as proxied by Tobin’s q; 
(3) dividend payout ratio (DivPay); and 
(4) directors’ ownership percentage (Dir%Own). 
 
The summary statistics of above-mentioned key variables will be discussed in detail for 
each group of sampled firms.  The descriptive statistics of other control variables used in 
the study are also discussed.  
 
The structure of this chapter is as follows:  Section 9.2 focuses on the descriptive statistics 
of LargeCap firms; Section 9.3 features those of MidCap firms; while Section 9.4 
describes the same for SmallCap firms.  Section 9.5 compares the differences amongst 
LargeCap, MidCap, and SmallCap firms in respect of the four key variables as mentioned 
above.  The results of the univariate analyses of these sample firms are also presented in 
the same section.  Section 9.6 concludes with a summary that highlights the significance of 
the statistics for each market capitalization category of sample firms. 
 
9.2 Descriptive statistics of LargeCap firms 
 
The summary statistics of LargeCap firms for each year of the study period 2003-2005 are 
presented in Table 9.1.  Unlike MidCap and SmallCap firms, the sample size (N) of 
LargeCap firms for the period remains unchanged at 12. In Panel A, the means for 2003 – 
2005 are shown under columns 2 - 4; the medians for 2003 - 2005 are shown under 
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columns 5 - 7; and the standard deviations for 2003 - 2005 under columns 8 - 10 
respectively.   In Panel B, the minimum and maximum value of each variable are reported 
under columns 2-3 for 2003, under columns 4-5 for 2004, and under columns 6-7 for 2005.   
Table 9.2 shows the statistics for the pooled period. 
 
Table 9.1 Descriptive statistics of variables for LargeCap firms in 2003-2005 
Panel A: Means, medians, and standard deviations of the variables for LargeCap firms  
               (N=12 for each year of 2003-2005) 
 1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 2003 2004 2005 2003 2004 2005 2003 2004 2005
 
LargeCap 
Mean Median Standard Deviation 
2 q 1.38 1.39 1.42 1.12 1.10 1.17 0.76 0.81 0.79
3 CGDscore 26.72 41.68 53.41 20.47 42.24 54.12 12.57 17.74 11.59
4 NumINED 4.25 4.83 4.83 4.00 4.50 4.00 1.82 1.64 1.53
5 BoDsize 14.92 15.17 15.83 15.50 15.50 15.00 3.09 3.30 3.88
6 INED% 29.06 32.80 31.73 28.34 31.37 30.38 14.49 11.69 11.01
7 Dir%Own 45.27 45.15 46.21 47.55 47.55 49.01 17.98 17.64 17.45
8 SplitRole* 0.67 0.83 0.75 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.49 0.39 0.45
9 DualList** 0.75 0.75 0.75 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.45 0.45 0.45
10 DivPay 61.06 52.05 42.80 56.11 51.99 46.12 17.15 20.12 13.42
11 ROE 8.71 10.43 16.26 6.07 7.94 14.82 6.01 5.43 8.71
12 LnSales 23.53 23.61 23.65 23.37 23.43 23.46 0.80 0.84 0.99
13 SalGrow 27.20 9.72 7.05 7.03 7.60 7.51 70.42 17.31 22.29
14 Ln(TA) 25.27 25.34 25.44 25.14 25.27 25.38 0.81 0.80 0.74
15 LnEqty 24.79 24.89 24.94 24.69 24.86 24.91 0.76 0.77 0.77
16 Debt/TA 25.62 24.11 26.66 23.84 22.29 25.46 13.58 13.00 13.32
 
Panel B: Minimum and maximum values of the variables for LargeCap firms  
               (N=12 for each year of 2003-2005) 
 1  2    3  4       5  6       7 
1 2003 2004 2005 
 
LargeCap 
Minimum Maximum Minimum Maximum Minimum Maximum
2 q 0.90 3.68 0.93 3.85 0.92 3.86 
3 CGDscore 15.18 51.06 17.70 72.30 29.33 74.85 
4 NumINED 0.00 7.00 3.00 8.00 3.00 8.00 
5 BoDsize 10.00 19.00 9.00 21.00 10.00 23.00 
6 INED% 0.00 60.00 18.75 54.55 17.39 50.00 
7 Dir%Own 0.07 71.88 0.06 71.88 0.07 71.75 
8 SplitRole* 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 
9 DualList** 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 
10 DivPay 41.34 93.40 28.67 97.06 14.10 59.60 
11 ROE 3.20 19.96 5.32 20.40 5.80 34.05 
12 LnSales 22.71 25.38 22.63 25.63 22.49 25.93 
13 SalGrow -10.61 246.30 -12.48 43.49 -49.21 35.65 
14 Ln(TA) 23.80 27.15 23.88 27.18 24.11 27.09 
15 LnEqty 23.53 26.23 23.58 26.29 23.52 26.22 
16 Debt/TA 9.31 51.92 10.20 51.58 7.65 52.40 
Notes: 
*   Dummy variable with value 1= split roles of Chairman and CEO, 0 = otherwise. 
** Dummy variable with value 1 = dual listed, 0 = otherwise. 
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Table 9.2 Descriptive statistics of variables for LargeCap firms in 2003- 2005 
                 (N= 36) 
2003-2005 
LargeCap Mean Median Std Dev Minimum Maximum
q 1.40 1.13 0.77 0.90 3.86
CGDscore 40.60 44.03 17.70 15.18 74.85
Num INED 4.64 4.00 1.64 0.00 8.00
BoDsize 15.31 15.00 3.36 9.00 23.00
INED% 31.19 29.41 12.23 0.00 60.00
Dir%Own 45.54 49.01 17.19 0.06 71.88
SplitRole*  0.75 1.00 0.44 0.00 1.00
DualList** 0.75 1.00 0.44 0.00 1.00
DivPay 51.97 49.89 18.26 14.10 97.06
ROE 11.80 8.12 7.43 3.20 34.05
LnSales 23.60 23.42 0.86 22.49 25.93
SalGrow 14.66 7.15 43.49 -49.21 246.30
Ln(TA) 25.35 25.27 0.76 23.80 27.18
LnEqty 24.87 24.80 0.75 23.52 26.29
Debt/TA 25.46 23.28 12.96 7.65 52.40
Notes: 
*   Dummy variable with value 1= split roles of Chairman and CEO, 0=otherwise. 
** Dummy variable with value 1 = dual listed, 0=otherwise. 
 
Some comments on the variables of LargeCap firms with respect to their statistics in Table 
9.1 and 9.2 are provided as follows: 
 
(i) Market valuation as proxied by Tobin’s q 
Market valuation of firm is proxied by the approximation of Tobin’s q (as discussed in 
Section 7.2.1 of Chapter 7).   From row 2, columns 2 to 4, of Table 9.1, it can be seen that 
the mean of q for all LargeCap firms in the study had increased slightly over the period of 
study, at 1.38, 1.39 and 1.42 for the years 2003, 2004, and 2005 respectively. There is not 
much change in the medians, observed as 1.12, 1.10, and 1.17 for the three years (as shown 
in row 2, columns 5-7 of Table 9.1), which cluster around 1.10.  The standard deviation 
also remains closely to each other at 0.76, 0.81, and 0.79 over the three years (row 2, 
columns 8-10 of Table 9.1).  Thus, it could be interpreted that the market valuation (q) of 
LargeCap firms did not seem to change a lot during the study period.    
 
(ii)  CG Disclosure Score (CGDscore) 
 
Unlike q, CGDscore of LargeCap firms spreads over a wide range, indicating that there is a 
big difference in the levels of disclosure on CG practises.  Table 9.1 (Panel B, row 3) 
shows that the minimum CGDscores for years 2003, 2004, and 2005 are respectively 15.18 
(row 3, column 2), 17.7 (row 3, column 4), and 29.33 (row 3, column 6).  It suggests that 
LargeCap firms that were scarcely disclosing their CG practices in the early years turned to 
do so in 2005.  However, comparing with a possible score of 100, the minimum score of 
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29.33 (row 3, column 6) is still far from satisfactory.  The maximum score is 51.06 in 2003, 
72.3 in 2004, and 74.85 in 2005 (Table 9.1, Panel B, row 3).  It shows that some LargeCap 
firms started to increase their CG disclosure in 2004, and kept on increasing its disclosure 
further in 2005.   
 
The improvement in CG disclosure is particularly noticeable in 2004.  The median of the 
CGDscores indicates that 50% of LargeCap firms had a CGDscore of 20.47 in 2003, 42.24 
in 2004, and 54.12 in 2005 (Table 9.1, Panel A, row 3, columns 5-7). It suggests that one 
half of LargeCap firms had a CGDscore above 20.47 in 2003, but this threshold had risen 
to 54.12 by 2005.  It seems that a big progress on CG disclosures was made in 2004. On 
average, LargeCap firms disclosed more and more over the years: the mean of CGDscore 
(Table 9.1, row 3, columns 2-4) is 26.72 in 2003, 41.68 in 2004 (or 56.0% year-on-year 
increase), and 53.41 in 2005 (or 28.1% increase).    For the 3-year pooled period of study, 
the average mean CGDscore is 40.60 (Table 9.2, row 3, column 2).       
 
Assessing the CG disclosure scores in association with the firm valuation proxied by q for 
LargeCap firms, it is noticeable that the sharp increase in CGDscore is accompanied by 
only a mild increase in q. In theory, sales growth could be causing an increase in firm 
valuation.  In practice, a declining trend of average sales growth across the years is actually 
observed for the study period – the mean sales growth rates of LargeCap firms are 27.2%, 
9.72%, and 7.05% respectively for 2003, 2004 and 2005 (Table 9.1, Panel A, row 13, 
columns 2 - 4).  In order to find out the association between CGDscore and other variables 
of LargeCap firms, a Pearson correlation analysis is carried out, with results discussed in 
sub-section (viii) below.  
 
 (iii)  Director Ownership (Dir%Own) 
It is observed from Table 9.1, Panel B, row 7, columns 2-7, that Director Ownership 
(Dir%Own) ranges from 0.07% to 71.88% in the three years of study.  With such a wide 
range of values, it would be more meaningful to examine the median rather than the mean 
of these director ownership levels.  As shown in Table 9.1, Panel A, row 7, columns 5-7, 
the median Dir%Own is 47.55 in 2003 and 2004, but rises to 49.01 in 2005.  These 
statistics show that half of the LargeCap firms in the period of study had a director 
ownership above 47.55%, and half of them had an ownership below 47.55%.  The median 
had risen slightly to 49.01 in 2005.  In terms of total firm-years during the pooled period, 
the median Dir%Own is at 49.01% (Table 9.2, row 7, column 3 refers).  In sum, there is 
hardly any great change in director ownership (Dir%Own) over the three years. For firms 
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with large market capitalization, an insider ownership of 49% is quite high compared to 
similar diffusely owned firms in the U.S. and U.K., but such high insider ownership is 
common in Asia. This finding is consistent with the empirical results reported by Chau and 
Gray (2002) whose sample shows a mean insider ownership of 44% for Hong Kong firms; 
and 43% for Singapore firms. 
 
(iv) Dividend Payout (DivPay) 
Dividend payout ratio (DivPay) is defined as the dividend per share divided by earnings 
per share and expressed in percentage. As discussed in Section 7.2.2 in Chapter 7, there are 
many theories for paying dividends; and correspondingly many rationales for the dividend 
payout ratios.  For Hong Kong listed firms, their dividend payout ratios vary greatly. In the 
sample period, some firms did not pay at all; some firms paid historically the same level of 
dividend payout rate; and some firms paid a token dividend even when they reported a loss 
in profits.  For LargeCap firms, DivPay fluctuates from 41.43% - 93.40% in 2003, 28.67% 
- 97.06% in 2004, to 14.10% - 59.60% in 2005 (Table 9.1, Panel B, row 10).  The median 
DivPay is 56.11%, 51.99%, and 46.12% respectively for 2003, 2004 and 2005, which 
indicates that half of LargeCap firms paid out approximately half of their profits as 
dividends in years 2003 and 2004 (Table 9.1, Panel A, row 10, columns 5-7) but they cut 
their payout ratio severely below 50% for year 2005, probably due to the downturn in the 
Hong Kong economy then.  In the 3-year pooled period, the average DivPay ratio is 
51.97% (Table 9.2, row 10, column 2), which is similar to that of MidCap firms (51.37%, 
see Section 9.3 below) but is considerably higher than SmallCap firms (42.47%, see 
Section 9.4 below).  The overall dividend payout ratio is therefore not excessively low or 
high, judging from the fact that most LargeCap firms in the sample are long-established 
companies that might have passed the rapid growth stage in their business life cycles.   
 
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (LLSV, 2000b) posit that in a weak legal 
protection environment where expropriation of shareholders’ wealth can easily be achieved 
by insiders, firms will be eager to establish a good reputation for moderation in 
expropriating shareholders’ wealth, so as to make it easier to raise external funds from 
investors at a later stage.  Paying high dividends is one way to establish such a reputation. 
In Hong Kong, there is prima facie evidence that LargeCap firms do not pay an excessively 
high dividend rate, probably because the outside shareholders have not exercised their 
legal rights to demand a high payout (as in LLSV’s outcome model); or the inside 
shareholders do not consider it necessary to use high dividends to protect their reputation 
against the alleged expropriation of minority shareholders.  
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 (v)  Dual Listing (DualList) 
Reese and Weisback (2002) argue that managers of firms that decide to cross-list signal to 
the market a reduction of their private benefit.   Hence, cross listing can be construed, and 
perceived, as an indicator of an enhanced level of corporate governance for a firm. As 
discussed in Chapter 4 (Section 4.2.4), in terms of investor protection, the choice of listing 
location of a firm has a signalling effect. Klapper and Love (2004) state that reporting 
standards and investor protection in the U.S. are much higher than in most other countries.   
Therefore, firms would be required to improve their corporate governance provisions in 
order to list on the U.S. stock exchanges.  In the current sample of LargeCap firms (N=12 
firms), eight firms (67%) have cross-listing status, mostly with the second market being 
American Depository Receipt (ADR) in the U.S.  Two of them cross-listed in a third 
market at London Exchange or Tokyo Exchange (Appendix 1).  The corporate governance 
standards of those LargeCap firms having cross-listed standings (67%) are therefore likely 
to meet the expectations of investors and be acceptable to the regulators in that foreign 
exchange.  
 
(vi)  Split Role of Chairman and Chief Executive Director (SplitRole) 
The state of corporate governance in a firm can be visibly observed in two variables, 
namely, the roles of Chairman and the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) if split (i.e., 
SplitRole) and the percentage of independent directors on the board (INED%).  In this 
study, the duality of Chairman and CEO of the sample firms is measured with a dummy 
variable (SplitRole) with value equals ‘1’ to denote their roles are split and ‘0’ otherwise.  
For the sample of LargeCap firms, the mean of SplitRole is 0.67 for year 2003, 0.83 for 
year 2004, and 0.75 for year 2005 (Table 9.1, Panel A, row 8, columns 2-4). These dummy 
variable values show that in a majority of the LargeCap firms, the roles of Chairman and 
CEO are carried out by two different persons.  The practice of splitting the Chairman and 
CEO had become more popular, as indicated by the increased values of the mean of the 
dummy variable from two-thirds in 2003 to three quarters in 2005.  For the 3-year study 
period, the mean is 0.75.  It can be interpreted, therefore, that most LargeCap firms had 
split their roles in Chairman/CEO for most of the time in the study period. 
 
(vii)  Percentage of Independent Executive Directors on the Board of Directors (INED%) 
The presence of independent non-executive directors (INEDs) is a necessary condition for 
exerting effective monitoring of a firm tightly owned by insiders, particularly by family 
owners (as discussed in Section 3.3.4 of Chapter 3). To outside investors, the composition 
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of the board in a family-owned firm may indicate the willingness of the family members to 
share their power with non-family members in decision-making.  The proportions of 
INEDs among all directors on the board can proxy for the emphasis that an insider-owned 
firm would place on addressing its corporate governance issues. In this study, the number 
of the INEDs as a percentage of the board of directors (INED%) is a quantitative CG 
measurable that can be observed objectively.  Generally speaking, the higher the INED%, 
the more likely the insiders are to be effectively monitored by the INEDs.  Nevertheless, it 
should be pointed out that this study only considers the quantitative aspect of corporate 
governance.  In the event that independent directors are compromised by insiders, leading 
to a failure to perform their fiduciary duties to investors to the fullest extent, there is no 
iron-clad correlation that a high INED% may correspond with a high quality of CG 
practice within the firm.  In that case, there is still likelihood for the outside investors’ 
wealth to be expropriated.     
 
In the sample of LargeCap firms, the INED%, though steadily rising, does not increase 
much over the years.  As shown in Table 9.1, Panel A, row 6, columns 5-7, the median 
INED% is 28.34% in 2003, rises to 31.37% in 2004, and slightly declines to 30.38% in 
2005.  However, in 2003, there had been cases where no INED was serving on the board of 
directors for some LargeCap firms (Table 9.1, Panel B, row 6, column 2). The scarcity of 
INEDs started to improve in 2004, and had reached 18.75% in 2004 (Table 9.1, Panel B, 
row 5, column 4) from 0 in year 2003 (Table 9.1, Panel B, row 5, column 2) before it 
diminished slightly to 17.39% in 2005 (Table 9.1, Panel B, row 6, column 6).  On the other 
hand, the maximum INED% showed a decrease from 60% in 2003 to 50.00% in 2005 
(Table 9.1, Panel B, row 6).  In terms of the pooled firm-years over the 3-year study period, 
the mean INED% is 31.19%, which is lower than the recommended level stipulated in 
Appendix 14 of the Listing Rules (i.e., at least one-third of the board).  If outsiders used the 
statistics to judge whether there are sufficient INEDs on the board to carry out the 
monitoring function, the statistics are not particularly satisfactory because the overall 
percentage of INEDs had not reached the desirable level as proposed in the principle of 
board composition stated in Appendix 14 of the Listing Rules.  
     
(viii)  Correlations between the key variables  
A Pearson correlation analysis is conducted for the variables of corporate governance to 
test whether there is any significant association between one variable and the other for the 
LargeCap sample. The results are presented in Table 9.3, with the Pearson coefficients 
shown in each cell of the table with the p-value provided underneath.  From Table 9.3, 
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column 2, it can be seen that the coefficient of correlation between q and CGDscore is 
negative (-0.109) but not significant (p-value = 0.528). Hence, it can be argued that 
CGDscore does not seem to be strongly correlated with q for LargeCap firms (at 0.05 alpha 
level). However, CGDscore is correlated (p-value < 0.10) with the following corporate 
governance variables (Table 9.3, column 3):  
(i) NumINED – the number of Independent Non-Executive Directors (positively); 
(ii) INED% – the percentage of INED on the board of directors (positively);  
(iii) SplitRole – the roles of CEO and Chairman are split (positively);  
(iv) DualList – the dual-listing status of the firm (positively); 
and is strongly correlated (p-value < 0.05) with the following control variables (Table 9.3, 
column 3): 
(v) ROE – return on equity (positively); 
(vi) LnSales – the natural log of sales (positively); and 
(vii) Debt/TA – Debt/Total Assets (positively). 
 
The results suggest that, the larger the profitability and sales turnover, and the greater the 
leverage, the higher will be the voluntary disclosure of the LargeCap firms as expressed in 
terms of CGDscore. This is consistent with Capital Markets Transactions Hypothesis 
(Section 4.3.1 of Chapter 4) that a reputable, large-scale, firm tends to be more transparent 
in order to satisfy the information needs of its stakeholders including its creditors, suppliers, 
and customers.   
 
As regards the Dividend Payout ratio (DivPay), the downward trend of DivPay for 
LargeCap firms during the study period 2003-2005 (as shown in Table 9.1, row 10, 
columns 2-4) does not seem to have a strong correlation with the decline in the firms’ sales 
growth (SalGrow), as the Pearson Correlation between DivPay and SalGrow in Table 9.3 
(row 12, column 10) shows that the p-value is larger than 0.05.  However, Dividend Payout 
is correlated with the following CG practices variables (Table 9.3, row 9): 
(i) NumINED – Number of INEDs (negatively); 
(ii) INED% – Percentage of INEDs on the board (negatively); 
(iii) DualList – Dual listing status (positively);  
and strongly correlated  with the following control variables (Table 9.3, column 10): 
(iv) LnTA – Size of total assets (negatively);  
(v) LnEqty – Size of the firm’s equity (negatively).  
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The correlation coefficients of DivPay with these variables suggest that the Independent 
Non-Executive Directors do not seem to endorse LargeCap firms in disgorging more 
dividend payments. On the other hand, the dual listing status of the firm is positively 
associated with the level of Dividend Payout, suggesting a cross listed LargeCap firm is 
often associated with distributing a higher proportion of earnings as dividends to investors, 
both domestic and overseas.  
 
It should be pointed out that a correlation test does not consider the joint effect of all the 
variables on q, or on Dividend Payout. A regression analysis will be a better method to 
identify the determinants of q and Dividend Payout, controlling for other firm-related 
variables. This will be covered in Chapter 10: Regression analysis.  The frequency 
distribution charts of q, CGDscores, Director Ownership of equity, and Dividend Payout 
ratios for the pooled period of 2003-2005 are shown in Figures A.1- A.4 respectively in 
Appendix 3 of this thesis. 
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Table 9.3 2003-2005 LargeCap Firms Variables Correlations 
 
 q 
 
CGDscore NumINED   BoDsize  INED%  Dir%Own   SplitRole  DualList   DivPay
 
ROE LnSales SalGrow  LnTA LnEqty Debt/TA
CGDscore                -0.109
(0.528) 
NumINED   -0.362* 
(0.030)     
 0.301 
(0.074) 
             
BoDsize     0.470**
(0.004)     
-0.001 
(0.996)     
 0.279 
(0.099)     
            
INED%      
 
-0.093 
(0.590)     
 0.302 
(0.074)     
0.784** 
(0.000)      
-0.339* 
(0.043)    
           
Dir%Own    -0.157 
(0.362)     
-0.191 
(0.264)     
-0.274 
(0.106)      
 0.419* 
(0.011)     
-0.559**
(0.000)     
          
SplitRole     0.225  
(0.188)     
 0.315 
(0.061)     
 0.149 
(0.387)      
-0.276 
(0.104)     
 0.226 
(0.185)    
-0.272 
(0.108)        
         
DualList   -0.396* 
(0.017)     
 0.328 
(0.051)     
-0.367* 
(0.028)      
 0.111  
(0.518)     
-0.342* 
(0.041)    
 0.114  
(0.508)      
-0.185 
(0.280)      
        
DivPay    
 
 0.161 
(0.348)     
-0.221 
(0.195)     
-0.406* 
(0.014)      
-0.068  
(0.693)     
-0.290  
(0.086)    
 0.017  
(0.923)      
-0.079 
(0.647)      
 0.317 
(0.059)     
       
ROE          
 
 0.605**
(0.000)     
 0.348*  
(0.037)     
-0.138 
(0.421)      
-0.242 
(0.155)     
 0.009 
(0.958)    
-0.121 
(0.482)      
 0.249 
(0.142)      
-0.178 
(0.299)     
-0.174 
(0.310)   
      
LnSales   -0.222 
(0.193)     
0.337*  
(0.045)     
-0.236 
(0.166)      
-0.044 
(0.800)     
-0.277 
(0.102)    
 0.371* 
(0.026)      
 0.164  
(0.339)      
 0.431**  
(0.009)     
-0.028 
(0.873)   
-0.175 
(0.308) 
     
SalGrow   -0.089 
(0.608) 
-0.155 
(0.367)   
 0.054 
(0.752)  
 0.081 
(0.640)     
-0.032 
(0.854)    
-0.031 
(0.855)      
 0.165 
(0.337)  
-0.227 
(0.183)    
-0.154 
(0.370)   
-0.122 
(0.477)     
 0.094 
(0.584)
    
LnTA      
 
-0.634** 
(0.000)     
 0.137 
(0.427)     
 0.201  
(0.239)      
 0.252 
(0.138)     
-0.007 
(0.970)    
 0.023 
(0.896)      
-0.058  
(0.735)      
 0.206  
(0.228)     
-0.372*
(0.025)   
-0.493**
(0.002)   
0.548**
(0.001)    
 0.227 
(0.182) 
   
LnEqty      -0.625**
(0.000)    
 0.045  
(0.795)      
 0.294  
(0.082)     
 0.306 
(0.069)     
 0.045  
(0.793)    
-0.047 
(0.787)      
-0.151 
(0.379)      
 0.088  
(0.610)     
-0.410*
(0.013)   
-0.520**
(0.001)     
 0.359*
(0.031)    
 0.249 
(0.143)     
0.957**
(0.000) 
  
Debt/TA    -0.086  
(0.617)    
 0.333* 
(0.048)      
-0.235 
(0.168)     
-0.220 
(0.198)     
-0.092 
(0.592)    
 0.076  
(0.661)      
 0.393* 
(0.018)      
 0.352*  
(0.035)     
 0.116 
(0.502)   
-0.005 
(0.977) 
0.690**
(0.000)    
-0.014 
(0.934)     
 0.288 
(0.088)     
 0.008 
(0.963) 
 
PTBV 0.982**
(0.000) 
-0.029 
(0.868) 
-0.353* 
(0.035) 
-0.454**
(0.005) 
-0.092 
(0.593) 
-0.140 
(0.414) 
0.260 
(0.126) 
-0.361* 
(0.031) 
0.137 
(0.427)
0.678**
(0.000) 
-0.186 
(0.277)
-0.085 
(0.622) 
-0.635**
(0.000) 
-0.653**
(0.000) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
(Notes: p-values are shown in brackets. Coefficients are bold if p-value < 0.10; * if p-value < 0.05; ** if p-value < 0.01. PTBV denotes the Price-to-Book Value of Equity of 
firms)  
 
      
 
9.3 Descriptive statistics of MidCap firms 
 
9.3.1 Introduction 
There are 29 MidCap sample firms in this study as at 2005.  Two firms in the sample of 2005, 
namely, Foxconn International and Hutchison Telecom, were only listed in 2005.  There is 
no publicly available data for these two firms in 2003.  The accounting data for Hutchison 
Telecom became available starting 2004, but the data for Foxconn International were still 
missing.  As a result, the number of MidCap firms in the study is reduced to 27 in 2003, 28 in 
2004, and 29 in 2005.  Total number of firm-years for the MidCap firms in the study period 
is therefore 84.   
 
Some treatment to the data collected has been performed prior to compiling the summary 
statistics.  They are presented below:   
 
(i) Some MidCap firms are found to have negative equity in the sample in 2003 and 2004.  
The firm concerned, PCCW, underwent a leverage buyout in 2000.  As a negative equity 
means no equity for the firm, the entire case of the firm is deleted from the sample.  The 
number of firms in the study is reduced to 26 firms in 2003, and 27 in 2004. 
 
(ii)  There are firms that distributed dividend per share (DPS) in excess of earnings per share 
(EPS) in the study period.  There are two circumstances.  Firstly, there are firms that 
distribute more dividend per share than they earned per share during that fiscal year.  In 
that case, the firms were paying the dividends from their retained earnings accumulated 
from previous years.  Secondly, there are firms that suffered a loss in earnings in some 
fiscal years but still paid a dividend.  In both cases, one can view from a dividend 
signalling perspective that these firms are indicating that the reduced earnings (or loss) is 
a temporary phenomenon.  Either that the management is confident that the performance 
of the firm will turn around very soon, or that the reserve in the firm is more than 
sufficient to cover the expenses for the dividend paid.  In such cases, there are no current 
earnings for the firms to transfer to the reserve.  The position is equivalent to the position 
of a firm where all its current year’s earnings have been distributed as dividends, i.e. 
Dividend Payout at 100%.  To avoid inadvertent distortions to the overall summary 
statistics and the follow-on regression analyses, Dividend Payout ratio for firms 
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distributing DPS in excess of EPS is taken to be 100%; and those dividend-paying firms 
that had actually incurred a loss (or a negative EPS) but paid dividend are also treated as 
paying 100% dividend payout ration.  Similar treatment is applied to other SmallCap 
firms in this study if same circumstances arise.  As no LargeCap firms had shown zero or 
negative dividend payout, there is no need to cap or adjust the DivPay for them. 
 
The summary statistics of MidCap firms after adjustment of capping is used for analysis in 
this chapter.   
 
 
9.3.2 Summary Statistics of MidCap firms 
Summary statistics of the means, medians, and standard deviations of the variables for 
MidCap firms in 2003, 2004 and 2005 are presented in Table 9.4 (Panel A), while the 
minimum and maximum values of the variables are presented in Table 9.4 (Panel B).  The 
statistics of the variables for the 3-year pooled sample are shown in Table 9.5.  The 
frequency distributions of the four CG variables, namely, q, CGDscores, Dividend Payouts 
(DivPay), and Director’s Ownership (Dir%Own) for MidCap firms for the years 2003, 2004 
and 2005 are shown at Figures 9.5- 9.8 in Appendix 5.      
 
Table 9.4 Descriptive statistics of variables for MidCap firms in 2003-2005 
Panel A:  Means, Medians and Standard Deviations of the variables of MidCap firms.  
N varies with year. 
 1    2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 2003 2004 2005 2003 2004 2005 2003 2004 2005
 
LargeCap 
Mean Median Standard Deviation 
2 q 1.86 1.86 2.12 1.21 1.23 1.51 1.52 1.45 1.67
3 CGDscore 30.50 42.89 62.32 26.15 37.50 68.33 14.90 22.94 23.04
4 NumINED 3.15 3.81 3.93 3.00 3.00 3.00 1.26 1.75 1.62
5 BoDsize 11.23 11.30 11.52 11.00 12.00 12.00 3.20 3.11 3.03
6 INED% 30.09 35.38 34.33 27.92 33.33 33.33 13.03 15.16 14.58
7 Dir%Own 52.47 52.37 51.41 55.38 54.69 54.34 17.10 17.34 18.11
8 SplitRole* 0.73 0.81 0.72 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.45 0.40 0.45
9 DualList** 0.23 0.26 0.28 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.43 0.45 0.45
10 DivPay 63.07 51.35 40.91 66.60 46.51 38.00 29.52 26.68 31.33
11 ROE 12.23 15.65 21.90 9.81 10.97 18.22 11.95 13.62 14.77
12 LnSales 22.38 22.67 22.86 22.16 22.60 22.73 1.09 1.10 1.17
13 SalGrow 184.10 41.33 13.93 11.88 21.83 9.42 883.36 80.77 27.05
14 Ln(TA) 23.74 23.87 24.00 23.79 23.93 23.96 0.84 0.82 0.80
15 LnEqty 23.11 23.26 23.26 23.32 23.42 23.51 0.85 0.85 1.00
16 Debt/TA 27.16 24.32 24.57 27.81 25.51 21.28 17.08 18.24 22.81
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Table 9.4 Descriptive statistics of variables for MidCap firms in 2003-2005 
Panel B: Minimum and Maximum values of the variables of MidCap firms. N varies with year. 
  1 2  3   4  5           6  7 
1 2003 2004 2005 
 
LargeCap 
Minimum Maximum Minimum Maximum Minimum Maximum
2 q 0.69 5.63 0.69 6.02 0.76 6.85
3 CGDscore 15.15 62.30 15.38 94.64 20.31 98.18
4 NumINED 0.00 6.00 2.00 11.00 3.00 11.00
5 BoDsize 5.00 19.00 6.00 19.00 6.00 17.00
6 INED% 0.00 55.56 16.67 84.62 3.28 84.62
7 Dir%Own 0.15 84.82 0.46 84.82 0.80 84.82
8 SplitRole* 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00
9 DualList** 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00
10 DivPay 14.39 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00
11 ROE -9.64 33.41 -1.94 48.99 -5.12 68.33
12 Ln(Sales) 20.50 24.48 20.30 24.58 20.33 24.74
13 SalGrow% -29.43 4513.90 -27.89 410.53 -37.31 92.07
14 Ln(TA) 21.63 25.48 21.73 25.44 21.84 25.53
15 LnEqty 21.37 24.55 21.50 24.72 20.23 24.84
16 Debt/TA% 0.00 65.05 0.00 67.35 0.00 97.97
 
Notes:   
Number of firms (N): = 26 firms in 2003; 27 firms in 2004; 29 firms in 2005 
* Dummy variable with value 1= split roles of Chairman and CEO, 0=otherwise. 
** Dummy variable with value 1 = dual listed, 0=otherwise. 
 
 
Table 9.5 Descriptive statistics of variables for MidCap firms in 2003- 2005 
                  (N= 82)  
        1  2       3  4        5    6 
1 2003-2005 
MidCap Mean Median Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
2 q 1.95 1.25 1.54 0.69 6.85 
3 CGDscore 45.83 40.63 24.43 15.15 98.18 
4 NumINED 3.65 3.00 1.58 0.00 11.00 
5 BoDsize 11.35 11.00 3.08 5.00 19.00 
6 INED% 33.33 33.33 14.31 0.00 84.62 
7 Dir%Own 52.06 54.60 17.33 0.15 84.82 
8 SplitRole* 0.76 1.00 0.43 0.00 1.00 
9 DualList** 0.26 0.00 0.44 0.00 1.00 
10 DivPay 51.37 42.72 29.03 0.00 100.00 
11 ROE 16.77 13.43 13.99 -9.64 68.33 
12 LnSales 22.64 22.60 1.13 20.30 24.74 
13 SalGrow 76.91 13.53 498.72 -37.31 4513.90 
14 Ln(TA) 23.87 23.95 0.82 21.63 25.53 
15 LnEqty 23.21 23.42 0.90 20.23 24.84 
16 Debt/TA 25.31 25.31 19.45 0.00 97.97 
 
Notes: 
* Dummy variable with value 1= split roles of Chairman and CEO, 0=otherwise. 
** Dummy variable with value 1 = dual listed, 0=otherwise. 
 
Observations and commentary are made in the following sub-sections. 
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(i) Firm valuation as proxied by q 
 
The mean of Tobin’s q for all MidCap firms remains stable in 2003 and 2004 (q = 1.86) and 
increases by 13% (2.12) in 2005 (Table 9.4, Panel A, row 2, columns 2-4).  For the 3-year 
study period, the mean q for MidCap firms is 1.95 (Table 9.5, row 2, column 2), which is 
higher than LargeCap firms (3-year mean q = 1.40 as per Table 9.2, row 2, column 2).  
Hence, the Tobin’s q for MidCap firms is generally larger than that of LargeCap firms, 
despite that MidCap firms are classified as having a lower market value in terms of market 
capitalization (as defined by the HSHKCI index series). The market valuation of firms (as 
proxied by Tobin’s q), therefore, may not correspond to the market capitalization of firms.  
This relationship will be tested in Chapter 10. 
 
 (ii) CGDscore 
As shown in row 3, Panel B of Table 9.4, the minimum of CGDscore of MidCap firms does 
not change much in the first two years (15.15 in 2003, 15.38 in 2004) but improves greatly to 
20.31 in 2005.  It indicates that some MidCap firms did not pay much attention to disclosing 
their CG practices, or they were reluctant to do so.  However, at the maximum end of the 
CGDscore spectrum, significant improvement is observed for firms that had already 
implemented CG practices – the maximum CGDscore rises from 62.3 in 2003, to 94.64 in 
2004, and 98.18 in 2005 (Table 9.4, Panel B, row 3, columns 3, 5, and 7 refer).  The median 
of CGDscore also rises from 26.15 in 2003, 37.5 in 2004, to 68.33 in 2005.  The 
improvement is significant in the year 2005, with an increase of 82% (Table 9.4, Panel A, 
row 3, columns 5-7).  It suggests that more and more MidCap firms became aware of the 
need to disclose their CG practices in that year.   
 
The mean of CGDscore per MidCap firm increases with time too – from 30.5 in 2003 to 
42.89 in 2004 (up 40%), and 62.32 in 2005 (up 45 %), as shown in Panel A of Table 9.4 (row 
3, columns 2-4).  It seems that there was a significant improvement in the adoption of  
corporate governance mechanisms and practices in 2005.  As at 2005, the mean of CGDscore 
for MidCap firms is 62.32 (Table 9.4, Panel A, row 3, column 4), which is even higher than 
that of LargeCap firms (53.41, as shown in Table 9.1, Panel a, row 3, column 4).  The mean 
of CGDscore over the pooled 3-year period is 45.83 (Table 9.5, row 3), which is also higher 
than the LargeCap firms (40.6, as shown in Table 9.2, row 3).   In short, more Midcap firms 
had disclosed their CG practices than LargeCap firms (probably due to a larger sample size).  
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Also, on average, the MidCap firms were disclosing more about their CG practices than their 
LargeCap counterparts over the period 2003-2005.  
 
(iii) Director Ownership (Dir%Own) 
For the sample period in this study, the median Director Ownership (Dir%Own) for MidCap 
firms varies narrowly around 55% (Table 9.4, Panel A, row 7, columns 5-7). The mean 
Director Ownership for each year also clusters around 52%, although the span of equity 
ownership is rather wide – it ranges from a minimum of 0.15% in 2003 (Panel B, row 7, 
column 2), to a maximum of 84.82% in 2004 and 2005 (Panel B, row 7, columns 5 & 7).  As 
shown in row 7, column 2 of Table 9.5, the 3-year mean Dir%Own for MidCap firms is 
52.06%, which is larger than that of LargeCap firms (45.54%, as shown in Table 9.2, column 
2). When compared to LargeCap firms, MidCap firms are characterised by a higher insider 
ownership, which is consistent with the findings in prior literature (e.g., Leung and Horwitz, 
2004). The preponderance of a majority insider ownership (> 50%) for the MidCap firms is 
probably due to the fact that, generally, it takes lesser financial resources to acquire a higher 
share of equity for medium firms than for large firms. 
 
(iv) Dividend Payout ratio (DivPay)  
The Dividend payout ratios for MidCap companies vary from firm to firm.  The statistics 
show that there are firms that do not pay any dividend at all (minimum= 0), and there are 
firms that pay dividend per share equal to or in excess of earnings per share, or pay dividend 
while EPS is negative (in which cases, it will be capped at 100% at maximum as explained in 
Section 9.3.1).  Half of MidCap firms have a Dividend Payout ratio (DivPay) at or over 
66.60% in 2003, but the median DivPay steadily declines to 46.51% in 2004 and 38% in 
2005 (Table 9.4, Panel A, row 10).  The mean Dividend Payout ratio has decreased quite 
rapidly during the study period, suggesting an absence of a stable Dividend Payout policy 
within MidCap firms.  (It should also be noted that the declining trend happens for LargeCap 
firms too, whose median DivPay falls from steadily from 56% in 2003, 52% at 2004, to 46% 
at 2005, as per Table 9.1, Panel A, row 10).  Compared to LargeCap firms, the 3-year 
average DivPay for MidCap firms firm-years is 51.37%, which is similar to LargeCap firms 
(51.97%).  According to La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (LLSV, 2000b), 
paying higher dividends is one method for the insider owners to establish a reputation for 
moderation in expropriating shareholders’ wealth.  This argument may hold true for MidCap 
firms whose average insider ownership (52.06%) is higher than that of LargeCap firms 
 269
(45.54%, as per previous subsection).  Further evidence is needed before any conclusions are 
made on the pattern of Dividend Payout ratios of the sample firms.   
 
(v) Dual Listing (DualList) 
Cross listing is yet another indicator of an enhanced level of corporate governance for a firm, 
as discussed in a similar section under LargeCap firms in this Chapter.  It is found in Table 
9.4, Panel A, row 9 that there is a much lower percentage of MidCap firms that are cross-
listed in another exchange (the means are 0.23, 0.26, and 0.28 for 2003, 2004, and 2005 
respectively, as per Table 9.4, Panel A, row 9), as compared to LargeCap firms (mean 
remains unchanged at 0.67 for 2003-2005). In 2005, eight MidCap firms cross-listed on other 
stock exchanges, one at London Stock Exchange and seven at ADR or NYSE in the U.S.   
For those eight firms that are subject to the accounting standards and regulations of U.K. and 
U.S., there is likelihood for more corporate governance practices being implemented in the 
firms.  However, cross listing on another exchange often involves high costs.  Firms would 
not seek cross listing unless they are certain that cross listing will bring about overseas 
capital to help develop their business further.   In fact, not all MidCap firms can successfully 
raise foreign capital by cross-listing; and conversely, many MidCap firms can successfully 
raise capital without cross-listing. Hence, cross listing alone is not the only factor that 
determines the state of CG for MidCap firms.  Other variables, such as splitting the roles of 
the Chairman from the CEO’s, may need to be taken into consideration.   
 
(vi)  Split Role of Chairman and CEO (SplitRole) 
For the sample of MidCap firms, the mean value for SplitRole is 0.73, 0.81, and 0.72 for 
2003-2005 respectively (Table 9.4, Panel A, row 8, columns 2-4). It shows that, on average, 
the role of Chairman and the role of CEO for a MidCap firm are split; and that the proportion 
of MidCap firms with SplitRole changes only slightly over the 3 years.  This proportion is 
comparable to the state of LargeCap firms, where the mean is recorded as 0.67 in 2003, 0.83 
in 2004 and 0.75 in 2005 (Table 9.1, Panel A, row 8). Over the 3-year study period, the mean 
for SplitRole is 0.76 for MidCap firms (Table 9.5, row 8, column 2), similar to 0.75 for 
LargeCap firms (Table 9.2, row 8, column 2).  The split role of Chairman and CEO is 
promulgated by HKEx under the code provision, which is a mandatory requirement of the 
Listing Rules.  Yet, by end of 2005, there were still about one fourth of the firms on average 
with the functions of Chairman and CEO performed by the same person.       
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(vii) Percentage of Independent Executive Directors on a Board of Directors (INED%) 
 
In the sample of MidCap firms, the medians for INED% are 27.92, 33.33, and 33.33 for 2003, 
2004 and 2005 respectively (Table 9.4, Panel A, row 6, columns 5-7), which is comparable to 
those for LargeCap firms (28.34, 31.37, and 30.38 for 2003-2005 respectively as shown in 
Table 9.1, Panel A, row 6, columns 5-7).  Yet, in 2003, there were MidCap firms with no 
INED appointed (as shown in Table 9.4, Panel B, row 6, column 2).  The minimum INED% 
increased to 16.67% in 2005 but dropped again to 3.28% in 2005 (Table 9.4, Panel B row 6, 
column 4 and column 6).  On the other hand, the maximum INED% had increased from 
55.56 in 2003, to 84.62 in both 2004 and 2005 (Table 9.4, Panel B, row 6, columns 3, 5, and 
7).  The statistics indicate that, for those firms without INEDs appointed previously, the 
management was struggling with the concept of installing INEDs in the firm, or was having 
difficulty in identifying suitable candidates as INEDs.  For those firms at the other end of the 
spectrum, a higher percentage of INED% installed in year 2004 and 2005 reflects an 
assumption that a continual emphasis had been placed on the role of INEDs in corporate 
governance by the management of MidCap firms. In short, some MidCap firms appointed 
more and more INEDs over the 3-year period, while other MidCap firms did not. There is a 
diversity of importance attached to the role of INEDs amongst the MidCap firms.  Over the 
3-year study period, the mean INED% is 33.33, just enough to meet the Listing Rule’s 
requirements.    
  
 (viii) Correlations between the key variables  
As discussed earlier in this section, the mean of Tobin’s q of all MidCap firms remained 
stable in 2003 and 2004 (q = 1.86) but increased by 13% (q = 2.12) in 2005.   Yet, the year-
on-year increase of the mean CGDscore is 40% (i.e., 42.89/30.5) in 2004 and 45% (i.e., 
62.32/42.89) in 2005.  Table 9.6 presents a correlation test of the pooled variables for the 
MidCap firms from 2003 to 2005. From Table 9.6 (row 2, column 2), it can be seen that no 
significant correlation is found between CGDscore and q (p-value > 0.10). However, it is 
found that CGDscore is strongly and significantly (p-value < 0.05) correlated with the 
following corporate governance variables (Table 9.6, column 3): 
(i) NumINED – number of INEDs (positively); 
(ii) INED% – percentage of INEDs on the board (positively);  
(iii) Dir%Own – percentage of Director Ownership (negatively).  
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In terms of control variables, the MidCap firms’ CG disclosure score is positively correlated 
with profitability (ROE). This is similar to LargeCap firms. However, MidCap firms’ 
CGDscore is not correlated with LnSales or Debt Ratio (Debt/Total Assets). 
 
As regards Midcap firms’ Dividend Payout (DivPay), it is highly and significantly correlated 
(p-value <0.01) with market valuation q (Table 9.6, row 9, column 2).  DivPay is also 
strongly correlated (p-value < 0.05) with the following corporate governance variables (Table 
9.6, row 9): 
(i) NumINED – number of INEDs (positively); 
(ii) INED% – percentage of INEDs on the board (positively); 
(iii) SplitRole – the role of CEO and Chairman is split (positively); and 
(iv) Dir%Own – percentage of Director Ownership (negatively). 
 
Such correlation is similarly found in the variables for the LargeCap firms. However, the 
signs are different for the number of INEDs and the percentage of INEDs on the board. It 
seems that the presence of INEDs on the board of directors has a different impact on 
LargeCap firms than the MidCap firms. 
 
To sum up, there is a significant year-on-year change of CGDscores for MidCap firms’ from 
2003 to 2005, similar to the case of LargeCap firms.  The q’s, however, do not show any 
significant changes. As regards Dividend Payouts, the MidCap firms show a gradual but not 
significant change from 2003 to 2004, but the significant decrease in the Dividend Payout 
from 2003 to 2005 is notable.  Similar to the case of LargeCap firms, Director Ownership in 
respect of MidCap firms does not show any significant differences over the 3 years, which is 
also consistent with prior literature (e.g., Leung and Horwitz, 2004). 
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Table 9.6 2003-2005 MidCap Firms Variables Correlations 
 
 q 
 
CGDscore NumINED   BoDsize  INED%  Dir%Own   SplitRole  DualList   DivPay 
 
ROE LnSales SalGrow  LnTA LnEqty Debt/TA
CGDscore                0.043
(0.702) 
NumINED   0.088 
(0.433) 
0.354** 
(0.001) 
             
BoDsize     -0.157 
(0.160) 
0.050 
(0.655) 
0.176 
(0.114) 
            
INED%      
 
0.186 
(0.094) 
0.267* 
(0.015) 
0.769** 
(0.000) 
-0.419**
(0.000) 
           
Dir%Own    -0.161 
(0.149) 
-0.232* 
(0.036) 
-0.332** 
(0.002) 
-0.116 
(0.299) 
-0.234*
(0.034)
          
SplitRole    0.184 
(0.099) 
0.146 
(0.192) 
0.179 
(0.107) 
0.344**
(0.002) 
-0.052 
(0.646)
-0.153 
(0.170) 
         
DualList   0.168 
(0.132) 
-0.050 
(0.657) 
-0.063 
(0.571) 
-0.086 
(0.442) 
-0.016 
(0.888)
-0.212 
(0.055) 
-0.057 
(0.610) 
        
DivPay    
 
0.288**
(0.009) 
0.009 
(0.934) 
0.233* 
(0.035) 
0.098 
(0.380) 
0.193 
(0.083)
-0.407** 
(0.000) 
0.290** 
(0.008) 
-0.151 
(0.175) 
       
ROE          
 
0.650**
(0.000) 
0.207 
(0.062) 
0.137 
(0.218) 
-0.078 
(0.484) 
0.161 
(0.148)
-0.168 
(0.133) 
0.017 
(0.881) 
0.108 
(0.336) 
0.058 
(0.602) 
      
LnSales   0.245* 
(0.027) 
0.151 
(0.176) 
0.001 
(0.996) 
-0.156 
(0.161) 
0.083 
(0.457)
0.108 
(0.335) 
-0.127 
(0.254) 
-0.110 
(0.324) 
-0.045 
(0.687) 
0.337**
(0.002) 
     
SalGrow   -0.053 
(0.637) 
-0.078 
(0.485) 
-0.048 
(0.666) 
-0.040 
(0.723) 
-0.033 
(0.765)
0.061 
(0.586) 
0.068 
(0.544) 
-0.071 
(0.527) 
-0.150 
(0.179) 
0.027 
(0.810) 
0.006 
(0.955)
    
LnTA      
 
-0.776**
(0.000) 
0.102 
(0.363) 
0.051 
(0.651) 
0.055 
(0.626) 
-0.024 
(0.831)
0.144 
(0.198) 
-0.195 
(0.079) 
-0.122 
(0.275) 
-0.276* 
(0.012) 
-0.506**
(0.000) 
0.087 
(0.437)
0.030 
(0.787) 
   
LnEqty      -0.671**
(0.000) 
-0.103 
(0.357) 
-0.138 
(0.217) 
-0.049 
(0.061) 
-0.114 
(0.309)
0.384** 
(0.000) 
-0.167 
(0.134) 
-0.172 
(0.123) 
-0.334**
(0.002) 
-0.689**
(0.000) 
-0.144 
(0.198)
-0.035 
(0.757) 
0.792**
(0.000)
  
Debt/TA    -0.440**
(0.000) 
0.028 
(0.806) 
-0.144 
(0.196) 
0.013 
(0.910) 
-0.137 
(0.219)
0.092 
(0.413) 
-0.258* 
(0.020) 
0.096 
(0.389) 
-0.162 
(0.145) 
-0.067 
(0.549) 
0.356**
(0.001)
0.170 
(0.128) 
0.434**
(0.000)
0.005 
(0.961) 
 
PTBV 0.355**
(0.001) 
0.222* 
(0.045) 
0.253* 
(0.022) 
0.151 
(0.176) 
0.122 
(0.274)
-0.277* 
(0.012) 
0.109 
(0.330) 
0.229* 
(0.038) 
0.204 
(0.066) 
0.652**
(0.000) 
0.242* 
(0.028)
-0.036 
(0.751) 
-0.174 
(0.117)
-0.637**
(0.000) 
0.241* 
(0.029) 
(p-values are shown in brackets. Coefficients are bold if p-value < 0.10; * if p-value < 0.05; ** if p-value < 0.01. PTBV denotes Price-to-Book Value of Equity of firms)  
 
 
 
9.4 Descriptive statistics of SmallCap firms 
 
9.4.1 Introduction 
There are 50 SmallCap firms in the Hang Seng Hong Kong Composite SmallCap Index 
(HSHKCSI) as at 5 September 2005, the cut-off date for selection of sample firms.  Two 
firms on the HSHKCSI were subsequently removed from the sample, for reason that (i) no 
annual reports are available for extracting raw data in 2003 and 2005 for China Resources 
Peoples Telephone1; and (ii) the reporting period is less than a 12-month period for one year 
for Pacific Century Premium Development2; rendering it inappropriate to include the data in 
the study.  Hence there are 48 SmallCap firms for study in 2005. 
 
Four firms3 were only listed in 2005 and there is no publicly available data for the two firms 
in 2003.  As a result, the number of SmallCap firms under study in 2003 is reduced to 44.  
With 48 firms in 2004, and 48 firms in 2005, the total number of firm-years in the SmallCap 
sample study is 140.  
 
Some treatment to the data collected has been performed prior to compiling the summary 
statistics.  Three firms4, CNAC, Far East Consortium, and Wheelock Property, distributed 
dividends despite making a loss in 2003.   There was a negative value for the Dividend 
Payouts (i.e., DPS divided by EPS and expressed in terms of %).  Following the treatment 
made previously for similar cases for MidCap firms (Section 9.3.1), the Dividend Payout is 
taken to be 100% for those loss making but dividend paying firms.  Another firm5, SCMP 
Group, distributed dividend per share in excess of earnings per share. In line with the 
treatment for similar cases of MidCap firms, its Dividend Payout is capped at 100%. 
                                                 
1 China Resources Peoples Telephone was listed on 2004 and delisted on 28/3/2006.  No annual report was 
issued for 2003 and 2005.   
2 Pacific Century Premium Development changed its fiscal year in 2004 due to re-organisation and major 
change of business nature. The annual report for 2004 was shorter than the normal 12 months period.   
3 The four companies are Lifestyle International Holdings, Luen Thai Holdings, Pacific Basin Holdings, and 
Solomon Systech International. 
4 CNAC: EPS = HK$(0.00566) loss in 2003; DPS = HK$0.009. The other two firms are: 
Far East Consortium: EPS = HK$(0.13) loss in 2003; DPS = HK$0.02; and Wheelock Property: EPS = 
HK$(0.378) loss in 2003; DPS = HK$0.07. 
5 SCMP Group, recorded a very small profit in 2003 (EPS = HK$0.0011) and paid a DPS at HK$0.06 per share, 
making the dividend payout ratio exceeding high at 5455%. 
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9.4.2 Summary statistics of SmallCap firms 
Summary statistics for SmallCap firms for the individual years of 2003, 2004 and 2005 are 
presented in Table 9.7 Panel A and Panel B, while the statistics in terms of the pooled 3-year 
period for the study are shown in Table 9.8 below.  The frequency distributions of the four 
variables of corporate governance, namely, q, CGDscores, Director’s Ownership, and 
Dividend Payouts, for SmallCap Firms for the years 2003, 2004 and 2005 are respectively 
shown as Figures A1.3, A2.3, A3.3, and A.4.3 in Appendix 3 of this study.       
 
Table 9.7 Descriptive statistics of variables for SmallCap firms in 2003 -2005 
Panel A:  Means, Medians and Standard Deviations of the variables of MidCap firms.  
N varies with year (see notes). 
2003 2004 2005 2003 2004 2005 2003 2004 2005 SmallCap 
Mean Median Standard Deviation 
q 1.21 1.59 1.45 1.04 1.18 1.18 0.80 1.15 0.86 
CGDscore 25.61 35.42 57.91 23.76 30.51 62.71 8.05 16.56 19.28 
NumINED 2.66 3.21 3.35 3.00 3.00 3.00 1.08 0.92 0.70 
BoDsize 9.18 9.77 9.83 9.50 10.00 10.00 2.63 2.61 2.48 
INED% 30.80 34.07 36.13 28.57 34.52 34.85 13.27 11.32 11.04 
Dir%Own 52.59 50.97 49.06 57.04 55.60 51.98 17.11 18.04 19.87 
SplitRole* 0.41 0.46 0.60 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.50 0.50 0.49 
DualList** 0.20 0.19 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.41 0.39 0.39 
DivPay 46.68 43.15 37.94 44.82 44.86 33.33 32.50 25.67 27.39 
ROE 10.21 18.35 19.96 9.23 12.76 17.05 11.33 22.15 17.08 
LnSales 21.27 21.44 21.55 21.42 21.43 21.55 1.03 0.96 0.92 
SalGrow 33.32 33.52 30.84 7.34 14.25 10.91 93.08 68.23 120.30 
Ln(TA) 22.13 22.23 22.41 21.94 22.13 22.28 0.84 0.79 0.85 
LnEqty 21.91 21.99 22.16 21.90 21.87 22.07 0.75 0.71 0.79 
Debt/TA 17.34 18.76 18.85 11.79 14.00 18.28 16.22 17.05 16.46 
Panel B: Minimum and Maximum values of the variables of SmallCap firms 
N varies with year (see Notes). 
2003 2004 2005 SmallCap  
Minimum Maximum Minimum Maximum Minimum Maximum
q 0.34 4.04 0.40 6.37 0.53 4.49
CGDscore 15.38 52.46 12.12 78.69 20.00 89.83
NumINED 0.00 6.00 0.00 5.00 2.00 5.00
BoDsize 4.00 15.00 4.00 15.00 6.00 18.00
INED% 0.00 60.00 0.00 60.00 16.67 66.67
Dir%Own 0.97 74.74 1.07 74.81 1.71 78.73
SplitRole* 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00
DualList** 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00
DivPay 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00
ROE -11.77 42.83 -5.85 130.52 -12.60 91.49
LnSales 18.50 23.55 18.73 24.09 18.91 24.39
SalGrow -39.97 504.14 -43.69 332.46 -83.28 799.35
Ln(TA) 20.33 24.16 20.90 24.36 21.00 24.60
LnEqty 20.33 23.52 20.79 23.79 20.83 24.21
Debt/TA 0.00 56.30 0.00 63.56 0.00 72.11
Notes:  Total number of firms is 44 in 2003; 48 in 2004; and 48 in 2005.  
* Dummy variable with value 1= split roles of Chairman and CEO, 0=otherwise. 
** Dummy variable with value 1 = dual listed, 0=otherwise. 
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Table 9.8 Adjusted summary statistics of SmallCap firms in 2003-2005. 
2003-2005 
SmallCap Mean Median Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
q 1.42 1.13 0.96 0.34 6.37 
CGDscore 40.05 31.68 20.54 12.12 89.83 
NumINED 3.09 3.00 0.95 0.00 6.00 
BoDsize 9.61 10.00 2.57 4.00 18.00 
INED% 33.75 33.33 11.99 0.00 66.67 
Dir%Own 50.82 55.59 18.33 0.97 78.73 
SplitRole* 0.49 0.00 0.50 0.00 1.00 
DualList** 0.19 0.00 0.40 0.00 1.00 
DivPay 42.47 40.88 28.57 0.00 100.00 
ROE 16.34 12.58 17.95 -12.60 130.52 
LnSales 21.42 21.48 0.97 18.50 24.39 
SalGrow 32.54 11.70 95.65 -83.28 799.35 
Ln(TA) 22.26 22.13 0.83 20.33 24.60 
LnEqty 22.03 21.92 0.75 20.33 24.21 
Debt/TA 18.34 14.35 16.48 0.00 72.11 
 
Notes: Number of counts for each of the variables: 140 
* Dummy variable with value 1= split roles of Chairman and CEO, 0=otherwise. 
** Dummy variable with value 1 = dual listed, 0=otherwise. 
 
(i) Firm valuation as proxied by q 
The mean of Tobin’s q for all SmallCap firms fluctuates during the study period, from 1.21 
in 2003, it rises to 1.59 in 2004 but falls to 1.45 in 2005 (Table 9.7, Panel A, row 2).   
Amongst the three categories of sampled firms, SmallCap firms exhibit the most volatile 
pattern of market valuation as proxied by q.  The spread of q for SmallCap firms also differs 
from year to year:  it ranges between 0.34 - 4.04 in 2003; 0.40 - 6.37 in 2004; and 0.53 - 4.49 
in 2005 (Table 9.7, Panel B, row 2).  
 
(ii) CGDscore 
For the sample of SmallCap firms, there is a wide range between the minimum and the 
maximum CGDscore for the three-year study.  The lowest score is 12.12 in 2004, and the 
highest score is 89.83 in 2005.  The minimum value of the score has not improved much over 
time (15.38 in 2003, 12.12 in 2004, and 20.00 in 2005, as shown in Table 9.7, Panel B, row 3, 
columns 2, 4, and 6), showing that CG mechanisms and practices installed in those firms are 
quite limited.  However, at the maximum end of the disclosure continuum, substantial 
increase in disclosure is detected for firms that had already practised corporate governance, 
with the rise of the maximum CGDscore from 52.46 in 2003, 78.69 in 2004, to 89.93 in 2005 
(Table 9.7, Panel B, row 3, columns 3,5, and 7).  The median of the CGDscores for all firms 
rises from 23.76 in 2003, 30.51 in 2004, to 62.71 in 2005 (Table 9.7, Panel A, row 3, column 
5-7).  The rising medians indicate that, generally, the 50th percentile of SmallCap firms are 
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disclosing more CG practices with years, with substantial increase in disclosure in 2005 (the 
median CGDscore in 2005 rises by 105% over that in 2004).  
 
The mean of CGDscore also rises with time, from 25.61 in 2003 to 35.42 in 2004 (up 38%), 
and to 57.91 in 2005 (up 62 %), as shown in Table 9.7, Panel A, row 3, column 2-4).   Like 
MidCap firms discussed previously in this chapter, a significant improvement in adopting 
corporate governance mechanisms and practices has been made in 2005.  As at 2005, the 
mean of CGDscore for SmallCap firms is at 57.91, compared to 62.32 of MidCap firms and 
53.41 of LargeCap firms.  In terms of the pooled 3-year study period, the mean of CGDscore 
is 40.05 for SmallCap firms (Table 9.8, row 3, column 2). SmallCap firms’ 3-year average 
disclosure is the lowest, compared to LargeCap firms (40.60) and MidCap firms (45.83).  
Overall speaking, the average CGDscore of SmallCap firms is more similar to LargeCap than 
to MidCap firms. 
 
(iii) Director Ownership (Dir%Own) 
The percentage of Director Ownership of SmallCap firms remains high (i.e. 3-year median = 
55.59%, as shown in Table 9.8, row 7, column 3), indicating that more than half of SmallCap 
firms have always been owned by insiders who have collectively a predominant ownership.  
However, the ownership has decreased steadily over the years, with median Dir%Own at 
57.04%, 55.60%, and 51.98% for 2003 - 2005 respectively (Table 9.7, Panel A, row 7, 
columns 5-7). The mean ownership by insiders has also fallen year on year, from 52.59%, 
50.97%, to 49.06 in 2003-2005 (Table 9.7, Panel A, row 7, columns 2-4).  The range of 
Director’s Ownership fluctuates from as low as 0.97 in 2003 to a high of 78.73 in 2005 
(Table 9.7, Panel B, row 7).  Over the 3-year study period, the mean of Director’s Ownership 
for SmallCap firms is 50.82% (Table 9.8, row 7, column 2), which is lower than that of 
MidCap firms (52.06% as in Table 9.5) but higher than that of LargeCap (45.54%, as in 
Table 9.2).  This is in line with the findings by previous researchers (e.g., Leung and Horwitz, 
2004) and consistent with the notion that it would be easier to obtain a predominant 
shareholding for smaller firms than for larger firms, as such a predominant ownership 
requires lesser financial costs.  
 
(iv) Dividend Payout ratio (DivPay)  
In the sample of SmallCap firms, the Dividend Payout ratios vary with firms.  The summary 
statistics (Table 9.7, Panel B, row 10) show that there are firms that do not pay any dividend 
at all (minimum is 0); there are firms that pay dividend per share in excess of earnings per 
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share (capped at 100% in this study); and there are firms that pay dividend while making a 
loss (Dividend Payout ratio is taken to be 100% in this study).  Half of SmallCap firms have 
a Dividend Payout ratio (DivPay) at or over 44.82%, 44.86%, and 33.33% respectively in 
2003 - 2005 (Table 9.7, Panel A, row 10, columns 5-7).  The mean of DivPayout drops 
steadily over the same period, from 46.68%, 43.15%, to 37.94% in 2003-2005 (Table 9.7, 
Panel A, row 10, columns 2-4).  The average Dividend Payout ratio has been decreasing 
during the study period, although at a slower pace than MidCap firms (63.07%, 51.35%, and 
40.91% in 2003- 2005; as shown in Table 9.4, Panel A, row 10).  The 3-year average DivPay 
for SmallCap firms is 42.47% (Table 9.8, row 10, column 2).  Compared with the other two 
groups of firms in this study, SmallCap firms record the lowest DivPay.  
 
As mentioned earlier, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (LLSV, 2000b) posit 
that paying higher dividends is one way for the insider owners to establish a reputation for 
moderation in expropriating shareholders’ wealth.  This argument does not seem to fit the 
case of SmallCap firms, as they make a relatively low DivPay to their shareholders compared 
to MidCap or LargeCap firms. Yet, at the same time, SmallCap firms had a higher insider 
(director) ownership.  Taking both DivPay and Dir%Own into consideration, one may argue 
that the outside minority shareholders are powerless to demand for a higher dividend payout 
where a predominant shareholder is present.  Therefore, it would be an empirical issue to 
investigate how these firms that are predominantly owned would fare in terms of market 
valuation q, controlling for other company characteristics such as profitability, sales growth, 
and leverage.  Such relational analysis will be the focus of Chapter 10.  
 
 
(v) Dual Listing (DualList) 
Cross listing is an indicator of an enhanced level of corporate governance for a firm, as 
discussed earlier in Section 9.2 of this Chapter.  There are nine SmallCap firms out of 48 
firms in 2005 that are cross-listed, all at ADR in the U.S.  As cross listed firms are subject to 
an additional, and usually more stringent, set of regulations and accounting standards in the 
U.S., it is expected that their corporate governance structure is better than their counterparts 
that are not cross-listed.  The lowest percentage of cross listing is found in SmallCap firms 
(0.19), as shown in row 9 of Table 9.8, when compared to MidCap firms (0.26) and 
LargeCap firms (0.67).  As discussed earlier in a similar sub-section for MidCap firms, the 
high cost incurred in cross listing and the required resources to meet additional scrutiny by 
another stock exchange/ regulatory institution may be too prohibitive for SmallCap firms.  
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Therefore, it may be argued that the status of cross listing, ex post, may not be appropriate to 
infer the ex ante state of corporate governance for SmallCap firms due to the endogenous 
costs involved.  Other variables may have to be considered for determining the state of 
corporate governance of SmallCap firms.   
 
(vi)  Split Role of Chairman and CEO (SplitRole) 
As discussed in similar sub-sections for LargeCap firms and MidCap firms, the state of 
corporate governance in a firm can be reflected in two variables, namely, the split of 
Chairman and CEO (SplitRole) and the percentage of Independent Directors on the board 
(INED%).  A board led by a Chairman who is separate from the CEO is generally regarded 
as able to exert effective control over the management.  Therefore, the role of the Chairman 
and CEO should be split and performed by two separate persons.   
 
For the sample of SmallCap firms, the mean of the SplitRole dummy variable is less than 
half in 2003 (= 0.41) and 2004 (=0.46) but increases sharply in 2005 (= 0.60) (Table 9.7, 
Panel A, row 8).  It seems to suggest that SmallCap firms were only willing to comply with 
the imminent regulation to split the roles towards the later part of the period.  As such, the 
overall 3-year average value for SplitRole dummy variable is 0.49 (Table 9.8, row 8), which 
is less than the expected average level (0.5) and the 3-year average for MidCap firms (0.76) 
and LargeCap firms (0.75).   It shows that less than half of the firms have the roles of 
Chairman and CEO carried out by two different persons.  This suggests that the split roles of 
Chairman and CEO in SmallCap firms are relatively uncommon.  In view that the split role 
of Chairman and CEO was going to be mandatory requirement in the Listing Rules, a great 
number of SmallCap firms still had to adjust to the new structure as required.    
 
 
(vii) Percentage of Independent Executive Directors on a Board of Directors (INED%) 
As explained in similar sections under LargeCap and MidCap firms, the presence of 
Independent Non-Executive Directors (INEDs) is expected to be able to exert effective 
monitoring of a family firm (Chapter 3, Section 3.3.4). In this study, the percentage of INEDs 
on the board of directors (INED%) is used as a proxy for the corporate governance in a firm.  
The higher the INED%, the more importance is given to corporate governance by the board 
of a firm and a more effective monitoring of insiders is inferred.  
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In the sample of SmallCap firms, the medians for INED% are 28.57%,  34.52% , and 34.85% 
for 2003-2005 (Table 9.7, Panel A, row 6, columns 5-7), which is comparable to the medians 
for MidCap firms (27.92%, 33.33%, and 33.33% for 2003- 2005) and LargeCap firms (28%, 
31%, and 30% for 2003- 2005).  In 2003 and 2004, some SmallCap firms had appointed no 
INED at all (Table 9.7, Panel B, row 6, columns 2 and 4).  The minimum for INED% jumps 
to 16.67% in 2005 (Table 9.7, Panel B, row 6, column 6).  As splitting the roles of Chairman 
and CEO is a code to be mandated by the Listing Rules to take effect in 2005, this pattern 
shows that some SmallCap firms would delay implementing this code provision as long as 
possible.  When the predominant insider ownership is put into the context, the reluctance of 
these SmallCap firms to comply with the requirement of INED appointment is clear.   
 
Furthermore, the maximum percentages of INED for the SmallCap firms over the period of 
study are 60.00%, 60.00% and 66.67% for 2003-2005 (Table 9.7, Panel B, row 6, columns 
3,5, and 7), which do not show any substantial increase in the first two years.  It therefore 
lends support to the notion that there is reluctance in SmallCap firms to appoint more 
outsiders to the board of directors of the firm.  As compared to the drastic increase of the 
maximum of INED% for MidCap firms for the same period (increased from 55.56% in 2003, 
to 84.62% in 2004 and 2005), the SmallCap firms are more conservative about the 
appointment of INED to the board of directors.  Overall, the mean INED% for SmallCap 
firms over the 3-year period is 33.75% (Table 9.8, row 6, column 1), which is slightly higher 
than what is expected or required by the HKEx.       
 
 
(viii) Correlations between the key variables  
There is a noticeable year-on-year change in the average CGDscore for SmallCap firms from 
2003 to 2005 (mean CGDscore is 25.61, 35.42, and 57.91 in 2003- 2005 as shown in Table 
9.7, Panel A, row 3).  However, an increase in q is only registered from 2003 to 2004; and 
there is a slight decrease in q in 2005 (mean q is 1.21, 1.59, and 1.45 for 2003-2005 as shown 
in Table 9.7, Panel A, row 2).  As indicated in previous sections, the market valuation of firm 
as proxied by q does not necessarily equal the market capitalization of firms.  To explore the 
potential relationship between q and other variables, a regression model should be used.  
Before testing the relationship, a correlation test between the variables is necessary.  Table 
9.9 presents the Pearson correlation results of the variables of SmallCap firms.  As shown in 
row 2 of Table 9.9, CGDscore is found to be positively correlated with q and the correlation 
is fairly significant (p-value =0.067). It seems to suggest that, for SmallCap firms, voluntary 
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disclosure of their corporate governance is positively associated with their firm valuation. 
Such positive association is not found in LargeCap or MidCap firms. SmallCap firms, 
therefore, may be quite different from LargeCap and MidCap firms in terms of the value 
relevance of CG disclosure. Other corporate governance variables with which the CGDscore 
of SmallCap firms is significantly correlated are: 
(i) NumINED – number of INEDs (positively); 
(ii) BoDsize – the size of the board of directors (positively); 
(iii) SplitRole – the role of CEO and Chairman is split (positively); and 
(iv) Dir%Own – the percentage of equity owned by directors (negatively) 
 
As regards the control variables, the SmallCap firms’ CGDscore is highly and significantly 
correlated with profitability (i.e., ROE). The p-value is 0.005 (Table 9.9, row 10, column 3). 
This is very similar to the case of LargeCap firms (p-value = 0.037, as per Table 9.3) and 
MidCap firms (p-value = 0.062, as per Table 9.6). It suggests that a profitable firm is 
associated with a firm that tends to be transparent with its CG disclosure.  
 
A correlation test between the two market valuation measurements, q and Price-to-Book ratio, 
is also conducted to check whether these proxies are substitutes or compliments in the 
regression analyses. If they are highly correlated, then using either q or Price-to-Book ratio as 
the dependent variable in the structural model will yield similar findings and interpretations. 
From the correlation Tables 9.3, 9.6 and 9.9, it can be seen that q and Price-to-Book Value of 
equity ratios (PTBV) are significantly and positively correlated for all the LargeCap, MidCap 
and SmallCap firms. Therefore, both measures are robust in measuring the firms’ market 
valuation. Following previous research (e.g., Black, Jang and Kim, 2006; Brown and Caylor, 
2006; Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell, 2008), this study uses q instead of Price-to-Book Value 
of Equity ratio as proxy for the market valuation of sample firms. 
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Table 9.9 2003-2005 SmallCap Firms Variables Correlations 
 
 q 
 
CGDscore NumINED   BoDsize  INED%  Dir%Own   SplitRole  DualList   DivPay 
 
ROE LnSales SalGrow  LnTA LnEqty Debt/TA
CGDscore 0.155 
(0.067) 
              
NumINED   -0.012 
(0.888) 
0.285** 
(0.001) 
             
BoDsize     -0.097 
(0.252) 
0.180* 
(0.034) 
0.244** 
(0.004) 
            
INED%      
 
0.065 
(0.446) 
0.106            
(0.213) 
0.652** 
(0.000) 
-0.500**
(0.000) 
Dir%Own    -0.114 
(0.180) 
-0.204* 
(0.016) 
0.010 
(0.909) 
0.026 
(0.759) 
-0.041 
(0.631)
          
SplitRole    0.036 
(0.672) 
0.337** 
(0.000) 
0.168* 
(0.048) 
0.229**
(0.006) 
-0.068 
(0.425)
0.010 
(0.905) 
         
DualList   0.006 
(0.941) 
0.112 
(0.187) 
0.166* 
(0.049) 
0.188* 
(0.026) 
0.024 
(0.776)
0.033 
(0.696) 
0.242** 
(0.004) 
        
DivPay    
 
0.155 
(0.068) 
-0.014 
(0.869) 
-0.019 
(0.827) 
0.102 
(0.231) 
-0.066 
(0.442)
-0.011 
(0.901) 
-0.035 
(0.681) 
-0.018 
(0.832) 
       
ROE          
 
0.241**
(0.004) 
0.237** 
(0.005) 
0.178* 
(0.035) 
-0.006 
(0.942) 
0.130 
(0.127)
-0.092 
(0.279) 
-0.003 
(0.972) 
0.035 
(0.680) 
-0.218* 
(0.010) 
      
LnSales   -0.006 
(0.947) 
0.110 
(0.195) 
-0.073 
(0.392) 
0.029 
(0.730) 
-0.079 
(0.357)
-0.197* 
(0.020) 
0.039 
(0.649) 
0.203* 
(0.016) 
-0.025 
(0.771) 
0.159 
(0.061)
     
SalGrow   0.050 
(0.560) 
0.091 
(0.284) 
0.030 
(0.722) 
-0.112 
(0.186) 
0.098 
(0.250)
-0.029 
(0.732) 
0.003 
(0.971) 
-0.158 
(0.062) 
-0.200* 
(0.018) 
0.108 
(0.204)
-0.086 
(0.311)
    
LnTA      
 
-0.505**
(0.000) 
0.065 
(0.448) 
-0.027 
(0.751) 
0.243**
(0.004) 
-0.203*
(0.016)
0.077 
(0.364) 
-0.031 
(0.713) 
0.037 
(0.663) 
-0.396**
(0.000) 
-0.015 
(0.856)
0.171* 
(0.043)
0.002 
(0.980) 
   
LnEqty      -0.462**
(0.000) 
0.051 
(0.550) 
-0.030 
(0.728) 
0.241**
(0.004) 
-0.192*
(0.023)
0.074 
(0.387) 
-0.028 
(0.738) 
0.071 
(0.405) 
-0.309**
(0.000) 
-0.086 
(0.313)
0.225**
(0.007)
-0.048 
(0.570) 
0.950**
(0.000) 
  
Debt/TA    -0.313**
(0.000) 
0.044 
(0.608) 
0.003 
(0.974) 
0.131 
(0.122) 
-0.138 
(0.103)
0.050 
(0.558) 
-0.015 
(0.865) 
-0.090 
(0.288) 
-0.390**
(0.000) 
0.179* 
(0.034)
-0.078 
(0.361)
0.077 
(0.363) 
0.526**
(0.000) 
0.249**
(0.003) 
 
PTBV 0.785**
(0.000) 
0.318** 
(0.000) 
0.001 
(0.993) 
-0.069 
(0.415) 
0.062 
(0.467)
-0.206 
(0.014) 
0.003 
(0.975) 
0.052 
(0.546) 
0.051 
(0.552) 
0.367**
(0.000)
0.230**
(0.006)
0.040 
(0.638) 
-0.425**
(0.000) 
-0.415**
(0.000) 
-0.227** 
(0.007) 
(p-values are shown in brackets. Coefficients are bold if p-value < 0.10; * if p-value < 0.05; ** if p-value < 0.01. PTBV denotes Price-to-Book Value of Equity of firms)  
 
 
9.5 Differences amongst LargeCap, MidCap, and SmallCap firms 
 
The Pearson correlation test on the variables in Section 9.4 has identified that CGDscore is 
significantly correlated to market valuation q for SmallCap firms (Table 9.9 refers), but not 
necessary so for LargeCap or MidCap firms (as shown in Tables 9.3 and 9.6 respectively).  
CGDscore, however, is generally associated with some other corporate governance practices 
(CGpractices) variables such as board size, insiders’ ownership, the percentage of INEDs on 
the board, and split roles of the Chairman and CEO.  Analytical tests, using multiple 
regression models as stated in Chapter 8, will be able to assess the impact of each 
explanatory variable (e.g., those CGpractices variables) on the dependent variable (e.g., 
market valuation q).  Before such a relational test is carried out, it would be necessary to 
evaluate if the key variables would change substantially over the years of study for LargeCap, 
MidCap, and SmallCap firms.    
 
9.5.1 Differences in the key corporate governance variables for 2003 – 2005 
 
Four key variables related to a firm’s corporate governance are identified and tested to 
determine if there are any significant changes over time of the study period.  They are: CG 
disclosure score (CGDscore), q, Dividend Payout, and Director Ownership, which are the 
core variables of interest in this study as discussed in Section 9.2 of this Chapter.  
Understanding the changes in these variables, if there are any, may shed light on the 
interpretation of the results of the subsequent regression analyses.  To test for the differences 
of variables over the years, a t-test of the difference between two population means is 
conducted for years 2004 over 2003, 2005 over 2004, and 2005 over 2003 for each category 
of LargeCap firms, MidCap firms, and SmallCap firms.   
 
The results of the t-test are presented in Table 9.10 with comments as follows: 
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Table 9.10 t-statistics of CG scores, q, Dividend Payout, and Directors’Ownership in 2003-2005 
for all firms: comparison by year 
 
  t-statistics  
(p-value) 
Variables Market 
Capitalization  
2004/2003 2005/2004 2005/2003 
LargeCap  2.38* 
(0.014) 
 1.92* 
(0.035) 
 5.41** 
(0.000) 
MidCap  2.34* 
(0.012) 
 3.16** 
(0.001) 
 6.14** 
(0.000) 
 
CGDscore 
SmallCap  3.66** 
(0.0001) 
 6.13** 
(0.0001) 
10.64** 
(0.0001) 
LargeCap  0.03 
(0.487) 
 0.07 
(0.471) 
 0.11 
(0.457) 
MidCap -0.02 
(0.494) 
 0.63 
(0.267) 
 0.59 
(0.278) 
 
 
q 
SmallCap  1.84* 
(0.034) 
-0.67 
(0.252) 
 1.39 
(0.085) 
LargeCap -1.18 
(0.126) 
-1.33  
(0.100) 
-2.91**  
(0.004) 
MidCap -1.51 
(0.068) 
-1.44 
(0.078) 
-2.87** 
(0.003) 
 
 
DivPay 
SmallCap -0.57 
(0.284) 
-0.96 
(0.169) 
-1.39 
(0.084) 
LargeCap -0.02 
(0.494) 
 0.15 
(0.442) 
 0.13 
(0.449) 
MidCap -0.02 
(0.492) 
-0.20 
(0.420) 
-0.22 
(0.412) 
 
 
Dir%Own 
SmallCap -0.44 
(0.330) 
-0.49 
(0.312) 
-0.91 
(0.181) 
(Notes:  
p-values are shown in brackets.  P-values are bold if < 0.1; * if < 0.05; and ** if < 0.01) 
 
The results indicate the following findings: 
(i) CGDscores are significantly different (at 0.05 level) for each pair-comparison for all 
three years for LargeCap firms, MidCap firms and SmallCap firms.  As discussed 
earlier in the respective sections in this Chapter, firms have paid increasing attention 
to corporate governance, with more disclosure on their corporate governance year on 
year (as shown in the positive values of the t-statistics in Table 9.10, rows 3-5, 
columns 3-5). All three classes of market capitalization of the sample firms have 
shown an increase in their CG disclosure, and this increase is statistically significant 
(p-value <0.05). Therefore, it may be postulated that some rationale may be 
underlying these significant changes in the yearly CG disclosure scores for all 
categories of firms in 2003, 2004, and 2005.     
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(ii) The market valuation proxy, q, is significantly different in 2004 from 2003 for 
SmallCap firms (Table 9.10, row 8, column 3).  It is also different, only marginally, 
in 2005 when compared to 2003 (Table 9.10, row 8, column 5).  From Table 9.7 in 
the previous section, it is already noted that q rises from 1.21 to 1.59 in 2003/2004 
for SmallCap firms.  This change in q can be affirmed by the t-statistics in Table 9.10 
to be statistically significant, with p-value equals 0.034 (Table 9.10, row 8, column 
3).   
 
Correspondingly, there is a highly significant change (p-value <0.0001) observed in 
the CGDscores for SmallCap firms (Table 9.10, row 5, column 3).  Likewise, the 
changes in CGDscore for both LargeCap firms and MidCap firms from 2003 to 2004 
are statistically significant, with p-values smaller than 0.05 (Table 9.10, rows 3 and 4), 
but they are not accompanied by any corresponding changes in q.  If CG disclosure 
has value relevance to a firm, then it seems that it is only manifested in SmallCap 
firms and not in the other two categories of sampled firms. In fact, no statistically 
significant changes in q are observed for either LargeCap or MidCap firms for other 
periods.  Hence, the value relevance of CG disclosure seems to be more pronounced 
in SmallCap firms than in LargeCap or MidCap firms. Previous literature has not 
found any prima facie evidence to support the assertion that changes of sample firms’ 
CGDscores are universally related to the changes of q for all types of sample firms. 
The results of Table 9.10 (row 5 and row 8) suggest that SmallCap firms may be a bit 
different from the others. 
 
(iii) In terms of Dividend Payout, the decrease in payout ratio for LargeCap firms in 
2004/2003 (Table 9.10, row 9, column 3) is statistically non-significant (p-value = 
0.126) whereas the decrease in 2005/2004 is fairly significant (p-value = 0.100, 
Table 9.10, row 9, column 4).   DivPay for LargeCap firms in 2005 is significantly 
less than that in 2003 (p-value = 0.004), as shown in Table 9.10, row 9, column 5. 
 
Similarly, the dividend payout ratio for MidCap firms in 2005 is less than that in 2003, 
which is highly significant (p-value = 0.003, as shown in table 9.10, row 10, column 
5).  Compared with 2003, MidCap firms pay less in 2004, which is statistically fairly 
significant (p-value = 0.068, as shown in Table 9.10, row 10, column 3). The decline 
in DivPay for Midcap firms for 2005/2004 is also fairly significant (p-value = 0.078, 
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as shown in table 9.10, row 10, column 4). Among three categories of firms, MidCap 
firms’ decreases in DivPay over the years were statistically significant, suggesting 
that there is no historical pattern in their dividend policies. 
 
SmallCap firms also display a declining trend in Dividend Payout, but the differences 
in dividend payout ratios across all three years do not show any changes that are 
statistically significant. It may be true that SmallCap firms are paying less dividend 
ratios year on year, but the differences are not statistically significant from one year 
to another.  Among the three categories of firms, SmallCap firms seem to be the only 
one that exhibits a steady pattern of dividend policy. 
 
(iv) There are some differences in respect of Director Ownership for LargeCap, MidCap, 
and SmallCap firms across the years (Table 9.10, rows 12-14). However, such 
differences are not statistically significant. It suggests that for the sample firms, 
insider ownership tends to be similar over the years, regardless a firm’s capitalization.  
 
In conclusion, both LargeCap and MidCap firms show significant decreases in their 
Dividend Payout for in 2005 compared to 2003, but no significant changes for SmallCap 
firms are noted.  In addition, the market valuation proxy, q, of LargeCap and MidCap firms 
show no significant changes over the three years of study, but the q of SmallCap firms in 
2004/2003 is significantly different and that the q in 2005/2003 is also fairly different. All in 
all, the statistics suggest that there are more similarities between LargeCap and MidCap 
firms than between MidCap and SmallCap firms in terms of the pattern of changes in the 
four variables: CGDscore, q, Dividend Payout, and Director Ownership.  
 
The t-statistics and the p-values in Table 9.10 above also show that changes in the four key 
variables (i.e., CG Score, q, Dividend Payout, and Dir%Own) for LargeCap firms are quite 
similar to the changes for MidCap firms over the entire period of study 2003-2005.  Due to 
their resemblances in respect of these four key variables, a possibility is opened up to pool 
LargeCap firms (L) with MidCap firms sample (M) into a larger sample (L+M), ready for 
further regression analyses.  A larger sample size yields more reliable statistics to be 
estimated on the same regression model, without causing any alterations to the fundamental 
nature of those four variables of corporate governance.  In the next section, analysis will be 
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made to test if there are systematic differences across the three samples of firms (L, M, and S) 
in respect of the four key variables in this study, on a per-year basis.     
  
9.5.2 Hypotheses for testing the differences in key corporate governance 
variables amongst categories of firms by year 
 
In section 9.5.1, t-tests are conducted based on the ex ante classification criterion – the 
market capitalisation of the firms – as prescribed by the Hang Seng Hong Kong Composite 
Index.  In this section, a t-test is conducted to find out if there are any differences amongst 
the different categories of firms in terms of the four key variables of corporate governance, 
on a year-by-year basis.  To recap, the four variables are:  (i) corporate governance disclosure 
(CGDscore); (ii) market valuation as proxied by q, (iii) dividend payout ratio (DivPay); and 
(iv) directors’ ownership (Dir%Own).   
 
A family of null hypothesis is to be tested as follows: 
Ho: Xi,L = Xi,M = Xi,S  for year t 
where: 
Xi = mean of variable i (i = 1,2,3,4);  
X1 = mean of CGDscore; 
X2 = mean of q; 
X3 = mean of Dividend Payout; 
X4 = mean of Dir%Own. 
L = LargeCap firms; 
M = MidCap firms; 
S = SmallCap firms; 
t = 2003, 2004, and 2005. 
 
Specifically, four null hypotheses can be stated as follows: 
1) There is no statistically significant difference in the CG disclosure among LargeCap, 
MidCap, and SmallCap firms for each year in 2003-2005.  In functional form, this 
hypothesis is expressed as: 
H1: CGDscoreL = CGDscoreM = CGDscoreS
2) There is no statistically significant difference in market valuation q among LargeCap, 
MidCap, and SmallCap firms for each year in 2003-2005, expressed as: 
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H2: qL = qM = qS
3) There is no statistically significant difference in dividend payout ratio among LargeCap, 
MidCap, and SmallCap firms for each year in 2003-2005, expressed as: 
H3: DivPayL = DivPayM = DivPayS
 
4) There is no statistically significant difference in insider (director) ownership among 
LargeCap, MidCap, and SmallCap firms for each year in 2003-2005, expressed as: 
H4: Dir%OwnL = Dir%OwnM = Dir%OwnS
 
The results of the t-tests for 2003, 2004, and 2005 can test whether the above-mentioned four 
hypotheses can be accepted or rejected.  The test results are presented in the next section.  
 
9.5.3. Differences between pairs of categories of firms by year  
 
The objectives of the t-tests conducted between LargeCap and MidCap firms, MidCap and 
SmallCap firms, and LargeCap and SmallCap firms on a yearly basis are to investigate 
whether these firms, with ex-ante different market capitalizations, would differ from each 
other year by year in terms of the four key variables as mentioned in Section 9.5.2.   If no 
yearly difference is observed, then it can be interpreted that these key variables remain 
relatively unchanged over the years for all types of firms.  The t-statistics and their p-values 
(stated in brackets) of the 4 major variables for each year from 2003 to 2005 are shown in 
Table 9.11.   
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Table 9.11 t-statistics of CGD scores, q, Dividend Payout, and Director’s Ownership in 2003-
2005 for all firms: comparison by firms’ capitalisation  
  t-statistics  
(p-value) 
 
Variables 
 
Year 
LargeCap vs. 
MidCap 
MidCap vs. 
SmallCap 
LargeCap vs. 
SmallCap 
2003 -0.81  
(0.212) 
1.55  
(0.066) 
0.29  
(0.388) 
2004 -0.190  
(0.4298) 
1.49 
(0.072) 
1.11 
(0.142) 
 
CGDscore 
2005 -1.64 
(0.055) 
0.86 
(0.196) 
-1.03 
(0.155) 
2003 -1.299 
(0.101) 
2.03* 
(0.025) 
0.68 
(0.251) 
2004 -1.27 
(0.105) 
0.82 
(0.207) 
-0.68 
(0.250) 
 
 
q 
2005 -1.82* 
(0.039) 
2.00* 
(0.027) 
-0.13 
(0.450) 
2003 -0.26 
(0.397) 
2.16* 
(0.018) 
2.06* 
(0.023) 
2004 0.09 
(0.464) 
1.29 
(0.101) 
1.29 
(0.105) 
 
 
DivPay 
2005 0.29 
(0.385) 
0.46 
(0.324) 
0.87 
(0.193) 
2003 -1.17 
(0.128) 
-0.03 
(0.489) 
-1.26 
(0.112) 
2004 -1.19 
(0.126) 
0.33 
(0.371) 
-1.02 
(0.162) 
 
 
Dir%Own 
2005 -0.86 
(0.200) 
0.53 
(0.298) 
-0.49 
(0.314) 
(Notes: p-values are shown in brackets.  P-values are bold if < 0.1; * if < 0.05; and ** if < 0.01) 
 
 
The following observations are made on a yearly basis with reference to Table 9.11: 
 
(i) Year 2003 
When MidCap firms are compared to SmallCap firms (column 4, rows 3, 6, and 9), MidCap 
firms show a statistically significant difference from SmallCap firms in three out of four key 
variables: CGDscore (fairly significant, p-value = 0.066), q (significant, p-value = 0.025), 
and DivPay (significant, p-value = 0.018).  Comparing LargeCap firms with SmallCap firms 
in the same year, only in one variable, DivPay, is a significant difference detected (p-value = 
0.023, as shown in row 9, column 5).  No significant differences are found in terms of 
Director Ownership for all three pair-comparisons of firms.  Therefore, the test results for 
2003 (Table 9.11, rows 3, 6, 9, and 12) show that the null hypotheses: 
 
H1: CGDscoreL = CGDscoreM = CGDscoreS is rejected. 
H2: qL = qM = qS is rejected. 
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H3: DivPayL = DivPayM = DivPayS is rejected. 
H4: Dir%OwnL = Dir%OwnM = Dir%OwnS cannot be rejected. 
 
(ii) Year 2004 
 Except for CGDscore where MidCap firms are significantly different from SmallCap firms 
statistically, all pair comparisons of firms exhibit very similar patterns to each other (Table 
9.11, rows 4, 7, 10, and 13).   The test results for 2004 show that the null hypotheses: 
H1: CGDscoreL = CGDscoreM = CGDscoreS is rejected. 
H2: qL = qM = qS cannot be rejected. 
H3: DivPayL = DivPayM = DivPayS cannot be rejected 
H4: Dir%OwnL = Dir%OwnM = Dir%OwnS cannot be rejected. 
 
(iii) Year 2005 
 LargeCap firms tend to differ statistically and significantly from MidCap firms in terms of 
CGDscore and q.  In terms of q, there is statistically significant difference between MidCap 
firms and SmallCap firms too. LargeCap firms are not significantly different from SmallCap 
firms for all four variables (Table 9.11, rows 5, 8, 11, and 14). The test results in 2005 show 
that the null hypotheses: 
H1: CGDscoreL = CGDscoreM = CGDscoreS is rejected. 
H2: qL = qM = qS is rejected. 
H3: DivPayL = DivPayM = DivPayS cannot be rejected 
H4: Dir%OwnL = Dir%OwnM = Dir%OwnS cannot be rejected. 
 
The t-test results in 2005 also show that in terms of CGDscore, LargeCap tend to disclose 
statistically less than MidCap firms, which is statistically fairly significant (p-value = 0.055, 
as shown in row 5, column 3).  In contrast, MidCap and SmallCap firms are quite similar, 
and so are LargeCap firms and SmallCap firms.  It indicates that, in 2005 which is the year 
for complying with the new regulations, MidCap firms disclosed their CG practices the most, 
followed by SmallCap firms, and lastly by LargeCap firms.  
 
To sum up, the t-test results by year indicate that, in 2003, all three categories of firms have 
no differences that are statistically significant in terms of Director’s Ownership, but they 
differ in terms of CGDscore, q and Dividend Payout.  In 2004, these firms became similar in 
terms of q, Dividend Payout, and Director Ownership. They remained different in terms of 
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CGDscore.  In 2005, the firms are moderately different in respect of CGDscore, but show a 
highly significant difference in terms of q.  They were similar to each other in terms of 
Dividend Payout and Director Ownership.  It is noted that throughout the study period, the 
Director Ownership of three categories of firms did not differ significantly, which is 
consistent with previous literature that shows firms in Hong Kong are characterized with 
predominant ownership that seldom changes over years.  Predominant ownership by insiders 
seems to be pervasive and persistent amongst Hong Kong firms. 
 
9.5.4. Differences in key corporate governance variables by market 
capitalization 
 
The results in Table 9.11 (column 4) can also indicate if firms of various market 
capitalizations would differ in terms of the four key variables.  For instance, from column 4, 
it can be shown that MidCap firms are different from SmallCap firms in three aspects: i.e., 
CG Disclosure Score (moderately different in 2003 & 2004); q (significantly different in 
2003 and 2005); and Dividend Payout (significantly different in 2003).  In contrast, Table 
9.11 (column 5) shows that LargeCap firms differ significantly from SmallCap firms on 
Dividend Payout in 2003 only (column 5, row 9).  These incidents of differences imply that 
MidCap firms are closer to LargeCap firms than to SmallCap firms. Apart from the 
differences mentioned above, their CG characteristics have been quite similar to one another, 
particularly, in respect of Director Ownership for the period of study. 
 
One of the objectives of this study is to find out the effect of voluntary disclosure of CG 
practices on the market valuation of a firm, for firms of different categories of market 
capitalization.  This study differs from previous studies, which often pooled various firms of 
various market capitalizations together as samples.  It is for this reason that firms of the Hang 
Seng Hong Kong Composite Index (HSHKCI) that categorizes firms by market capitalization 
are used in this study.  To carry out further empirical tests to meet the objective stated above, 
regression analyses are to be conducted.  However, it has been known that sample size is a 
factor that affects the reliability of the outcome of the regression analysis.  If sample size is 
too small, the result of the regression analysis is unlikely to be reliable.  In this study, the 
number of firm-years is 36 for LargeCap firms, 84 for MidCap firms, and 140 for SmallCap 
firms.  The small sample size of LargeCap firms may be a concern for getting reliable results 
from the regression analysis.   
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 A possible way to overcome the sample size problem is to merge LargeCap firms with 
MidCap firms into one sample (i.e., L+M sample), as they are close to each other in terms of 
market capitalization, Dividend Payout, and Director Ownership.  The t-test results reported 
in Table 9.11 above show that MidCap and LargeCap firms are more similar to each other 
than is the case of combining MidCap with SmallCap firms. The enlarged L+M sample 
should be a viable research design strategy to overcome the small sample size problem for 
LargeCap firms, because it will enhance the explanatory power of the regression models.   
 
On the other hand, one may argue that, as the t-test results also show that LargeCap firms are 
similar to SmallCap firms (in that LargeCap firms and SmallCap firms only differ 
significantly in terms of Dividend Payout in 2003), it should also be viable to merge 
LargeCap firms with SmallCap firms (i.e., L+S sample).  However, there is a big difference 
between LargeCap firms and SmallCap firms in terms of market capitalization and 
proportion of dual listing, as explained in the previous Chapters.  When a regression model is 
applied onto a combined L+S sample composed of LargeCap firms and SmallCap firms,  the 
model may average out their differences and yield an analytical result not much different 
from the pooled samples, i.e., a mixture of firms of different market capitalisations, as had 
been used in prior studies.  As the L+S sample cannot serve the purpose of this study and is 
likely to be repetitive of previous researchers’ work, it is not adopted in this study.  
 
9.6 Summary 
 
This chapter presents the descriptive statistics and the results of the univariate analyses of the 
variables for the sample firms in relation to four key aspects, namely, market valuation as 
proxied by Tobin’s q; CG disclosure scores (CGDscore); directors’ ownership of the firm 
(Dir%Own); and dividend payout ratio (DivPay) in respect of the constituent stocks of the 
HSHKCI index for LargeCap, MidCap, and SmallCap firms.   
 
In terms of the market valuation q, it is found that the pattern of changes during the study 
period is different for different categories of firms.  The change in q for LargeCap firms is 
minimal, while the change in q for SmallCap firms is volatile.  Evidence also suggests that 
the market valuation of a firm does not correspond directly to its market capitalization, as the 
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average q for MidCap firms (q = 1.95, as per Table 9.5) is found to be higher than that of 
LargeCap firms (q =1.4, as per Table 9.2).   
 
There is a general increase in the CG disclosure for all categories of firms during the period 
of study, which may be an outcome of the efforts by the Hong Kong Stock Exchange in 
introducing the Recommended Best Practice and code provision on CG for the listed firms.   
A substantial increase in CG disclosure is noticed in 2005 for MidCap firms and SmallCap 
firms.   
 
In contrast, the directors’ ownership of a firm’s equity is found to be high across all 
categories of firms, but it does not change drastically over the three years.  Half of the 
MidCap firms, as well as half of the SmallCap firms, in the sample of this study have 54% or 
more directors’ ownership of equity (i.e., a predominant insiders’ ownership, as per Table 9.5 
and Table 9.8, respectively). As for the LargeCap firms, the median Dir%Own is 49% (Table 
9.2), which is considered as high when compared to other diffusely owned firms in the U.S. 
and U.K., as reported in previous research.  A high level of insiders’ ownership implies that 
decisions by managers can be promptly approved by insider owners who are more informed 
than outside investors.  Hence, it is likely that firms with high insiders’ ownership may 
exhibit a different pattern of voluntary CG disclosure than firms with a diffuse ownership.  
Subsequently, the impact of voluntary CG disclosure on a firm’s valuation may differ. 
 
In terms of dividend payout, the descriptive statistics of this study indicate that SmallCap 
firms offer the lowest DivPay (42.47%, Table 9.8), as compared to LargeCap firms and 
MidCap firms (about 51%, Table 9.2 and Table 9.5).  The evidence shows that, in a strong 
legal investor protection environment such as Hong Kong, minority shareholders of 
SmallCap firms are receiving dividends not as much as other shareholders of LargeCap or 
MidCap firms.  A possible interpretation of this evidence is that the outside investors of a 
SmallCap firm have not opted to exercise their legal rights to demand a high payout (as 
suggested in LLSV’s (2000b) dividends outcome model); or that they have been unable to do 
so due to the predominant ownership by insiders (i.e., manager-owners of the firms).  If the 
latter interpretation is the case, it is expected that outside investors may not be willing to pay 
a premium price for the shares of the SmallCap firm.  As such, the market valuation of the 
firm will be expected to be adversely affected.  
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Regarding the univariate analyses, the results of the Pearson correlations show that CG 
disclosure is positively and significantly related to the number, and the percentage, of the 
INEDs on the board (at 0.1 alpha level).   The finding is consistent with the view that the 
INEDs could help alleviating the information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders of a 
firm.   On the other hand, CG disclosure is negatively correlated with directors’ equity 
ownership of a firm.  This is consistent with the notion that, among tightly-owned firms, 
information about a firm’s CG is less likely to be shared with or disclosed to outsiders.   
 
Results of the correlation test between q and various CG practices variables suggest that the 
association of q with individual CG practices may differ with firms.   For LargeCap firms, a 
significant and positive relationship is found between q and Board Size; but a negative 
relationship is present between q, the number of INEDs, and the dual listing status of the firm.  
For MidCap firms, a significant and positive relationship is found between q and the 
percentage of INEDs, and the split role of Chairman and CEO.  For SmallCap firms, q is 
significantly and positively correlated with CGDscore (at 0.10 alpha level) and DivPay.  On 
the other hand, significant relationships between q and some control variables (such as 
Return on Equity and Total Assets) are found to exist for LargeCap firms and MidCap firm, 
but not for SmallCap firms.   
 
Similarly, the impact on DivPay by the CG practices variables vary with the market 
capitalization of the firms.  For LargeCap firms, their DivPay is significantly correlated with 
the dual listing status (positively) and the number of INEDs (negatively).  For MidCap firms, 
the DivPay is significantly associated with the number of INEDs (positively) and the Split 
Role of Chairman and CEO (positively).   The evidence suggests that a higher level of 
dividend payout can be associated with better corporate governance practices for the MidCap 
firms.  However, no similar association between DivPay and CG variables is found for 
SmallCap firms, which further adds to the argument that the presence of a predominant 
insider ownership may be a factor that the minority outside investors are not receiving as 
much dividends as those investors who have stakes in MidCap or LargeCap firms.  
 
Finally, the results of correlation tests for Director Ownership (Dir%Own) for the three 
categories of firms are found to be mixed.  For MidCap firms, Director Ownership is 
negatively (at 0.05 alpha level) correlated with CG practices variables such as the number of 
INEDs, the percentage of INEDs on the board, and dual listing status, all negatively.  This 
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implies that more corporate governance practices are installed where insider ownership is 
low. However, such relationship is not found for LargeCap and SmallCap firms.   
 
In conclusion, the correlation results shown above show that the relationships between each 
of the four key variables in this study (CGDscore, q, Dir%Own, and DivPay) and other 
explanatory variables defined in this study have not been consistent for all three categories of 
firms.  The differences in correlations may be induced by the characteristics specific to each 
category of firms inherent in their market capitalization (as pre-determined by the HSHKCI 
index), or attributed to firm-specific characteristics that are not related to market 
capitalization.  In view of the different characteristics of the firms, the sample firms will be 
partitioned into three different groupings and tested with multiple regression analyses: (i) the 
pooled sample comprising all firms in the LargeCap, MidCap and SmallCap firms (as 
commonly used by prior studies); (ii) the combined sample of LargeCap and MidCap firms; 
and (iii) the sample of SmallCap firms only. 
 
Multivariate analyses are conducted to explore the impact of CG practices variables, 
company characteristics variables, and directors’ ownership on the key areas of market 
valuation of a firm (q), CG disclosure, and dividend payout, with respect to the research 
questions of this study as set out in Chapter 6.  The test results of the multivariate analyses on 
the models for these three partitioned samples will be presented in the next chapter, Chapter 
10. 
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Chapter 10: Empirical Test Results 
10.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter presents the empirical test results of the models as discussed in Chapter 8, 
which are constructed to test five key hypotheses and their subsidiary hypotheses 
previously set out in Chapter 6.  Each key hypothesis is to be tested by a key model, and 
the subsidiary hypotheses are tested by the extended models.   As discussed in Chapter 8, 
these models are used to test the relationship between three key dependent variables, 
namely, q (representing the market value of a firm); CGDscore (representing the state of 
CG disclosure of a firm); and DivPay (representing the level of dividend payout made by a 
firm to its shareholders); and the explanatory variables relating to the corporate governance 
practices of a firm whilst controlling for a firm’s performance, capital structure, and 
ownership.     
 
The structure of this chapter is as follows.  Section 10.2 presents the results for Model 1.0, 
which tests the effect of CGDscore on a firm’s market valuation q. Section 10.3 reports the 
results for the extended model (Model 1.1), which tests the same relational effect of 
CGDscore on q as in Model 1.0, but with five additional CG practices variables included 
as explanatory variables. Section 10.4 provides the results of a further extended model 
(Model 1.2), which incorporates some variables related to the company’s characteristics in 
the relational test.  Section 10.5 discusses the results of Model 1.3, which extends Model 
1.2 by including the joint variable of CG-Rank-Director-Ownership as explanatory 
variable in the model.   
 
Section 10.6 presents the empirical test results for Model 2.0, which tests the relationship 
between voluntary CG disclosure and the CG practices and company characteristics for 
sample firms. Section 10.7 reports the test results for Model 3.0, testing whether a 
systematic difference in the level of CG disclosure among firms is present in the three 
categories of sampled firms.   
 
Section 10.8 reports the results for Models 4.0 and 4.1, which test the relationship between 
Dividend Payout and other explanatory variables such as the CGDscore, CG practices 
variables, and company characteristics, as stated in Hypothesis 4.   
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In section 10.9, Model 4.0 is extended to Model 4.1 to test the extent to which a firm’s 
dividend payout is affected by the joint variable of CG Rank-Director Ownership. The 
results of these extended models shall provide answers to Hypothesis 5, which postulates 
that firms with a medium level of insider ownership tends to exhibit the lowest dividend 
payout ratio. 
 
Section 10.10 provides some robustness tests on some key models, while Section 10.11 
concludes the chapter with a summary. 
 
As discussed in Chapter 9, the SmallCap firms tend to be different from LargeCap and 
MidCap firms in terms of some key variables such as CGDscore, q, and Dividend Payout.  
Therefore, it seems justifiable to partition the sample firms into three sub-samples, and test 
the models on them accordingly. These sub-samples are, namely, the pooled sample of 
LargeCap, MidCap, and SmallCap firms (the L+M+S sample), the combined sample of 
LargeCap and MidCap firms (the L+M sample), and the sample of SmallCap firms (the S 
sample).  
 
The empirical test results for the various models are presented in this chapter.  For ease of 
comparison, the regression results for the models applied onto all three sub-samples are 
displayed side by side in the same table.   
 
10.2 Testing the effect of CGDscore on firm valuation  
This section reports the findings of Model 1.0, which is constructed to test Hypothesis H1 
as stated earlier in Chapter 6.  Before the findings are presented, some discussion on the 
treatment of the dependent variable, q, is provided.   
10.2.1 Winsorization of the dependent variable q 
Before Model 1.0 is applied to the partitioned samples, a review of the descriptive statistics 
in Chapter 9 shows that q, which proxies for market valuation of a firm, has a wide spread 
from 0.34 (in 2003 for SmallCap firms) to 6.85 (in 2005 for MidCap firms), as shown in 
Table 9.7 (Panel B) and Table 9.5 (Panel B) respectively.  These extreme values in q, 
which are more than three standard deviations away from their mean, are likely to bias the 
estimates of the coefficients in the regression models.  To reduce the impact of extreme 
values on the regression results, the q’s are winsorized at 5% and 95%, i.e., setting the 
lower 5% and uppermost 5% percentiles equal to values at the 5th and 95th percentiles 
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respectively.1  The frequency distribution of winsorized q (Wq) for the pooled sample is 
shown in Figure 10.1. After winsorization, Wq tends to fall mostly between 1.0 and 1.5 
(Figure 10.1).  All q’s in the three partitioned samples have been individually winsorized at 
5% and 95%.  Henceforth, Wq will replace q for testing the models in this study, unless 
specified otherwise. 
 
Figure 10.1 Frequency distribution of Wq. Sample size = 258. 
 
 
10.2.2 Testing the impact of various firms’ CGDscore on valuation  
The first main hypothesis in this study, Hypothesis 1 (H1), postulates that firms with more 
voluntary disclosure tend to have higher market valuation.  From Chapter 8, it is re-stated 
as follows:  
H1: Firms that voluntarily disclose more information with regards to their corporate 
governance practices have higher market valuation than firms that disclose less, ceteris 
paribus.  
 
As discussed in Chapter 8, this key hypothesis can be expressed in terms of three sub-
hypotheses H1a, H1b, and H1c; which are to be tested separately by different extended 
models.  Sub-hypothesis H1a is re-stated from Chapter 8 as follows: 
 
H1a: A firm’s market valuation as proxied by Wq is a function of its CG disclosure. 
 
                                                 
1 Winsorizing the extreme values of a variable before conducting a regression model is commonly practised 
in accounting research studies (e.g. Fan and Wong, 2005; Lang, Lins and Miller, 2004). 
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Model 1.0 explores the relationship between a firm’s valuation represented by Wq and the 
CG disclosure score (CGDscore) of the firm given by a simple regression: 
 Wqi,t = β0 + β1 CGDscore i,t + εi,t………………………………………………….(Model 1.0) 
 
where Wq is the winsorized q,  β0  the intercept,  β1  the coefficient for CGDscore, and ε is 
the error term with i = 1, 2, 3 …, nth firm and t runs for year 2003, 2004, and 2005. 
CGDscore is the score of a firm’s CG disclosure as defined in Chapter 7.   
 
The simple regression model is firstly applied to separate market capitalization of firms 
individually.   LargeCap (L) firms are tested in Model 1.0_L, MidCap (M) firms are tested 
in Model 1.0_M, and SmallCap (S) firms are tested in Model 1.0_S.  Then the firms are 
partitioned into two groups to form a bigger sample size for testing the simple regression 
model. The findings based on the windsorised q (Wq) are presented in Table 10.1 below. 
 
Table 10.1 Results of market valuation regressed on CGDscore. Dependent variable = Wq. 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 Model 
 
1.0_L 1.0_M 1.0_S 1.0_LMS 1.0_LM 
2 Sample 
 
L M S L+M+S L+M 
3 Observations 
 
36 82 140 258 118 
4 Intercept 1.587** 
(0.0001) 
1.808**
(0.0001)
1.181**
(0.0001)
1.376** 
(0.0001) 
1.675** 
(0.0001) 
5 CGDscore -0.005 
(0.528) 
0.003 
(0.699) 
0.007 
(0.072) 
0.005 
(0.108) 
0.002 
(0.666) 
6 Adj. R2 
 
-0.017 -0.011 0.016 0.010 0.002 
7 Significance F 
 
0.528 0.699 0.072 0.108 0.666 
 
(Notes: P-values are shown in brackets.  Coefficients are bold if p-values < 0.10; * if p-values < 0.05; and ** 
if p-values < 0.01)  
 
For the individual samples, the coefficient on CGDscore is not statistically significant for 
LargeCap firms (Table 10.1, row 5, column 2) and MidCap firms (row 5, column 3) at any 
significance level, but it is statistically significant at 0.10 level for SmallCap firms (row 5, 
column 4).  The disclosure of CG information is found to have a positive and significant 
impact on SmallCap firms. 
  
For the pooled sample of LargeCap, MidCap, and SmallCap firms (henceforth referred to 
as the L+M+S sample, as shown in Table 10.1, row 2, column 5), Model 1.0_LMS (Table 
10.1, column 5) indicates that both the coefficient for the CGDscore and the adjusted R2 
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are very small (0.005 and less than 0.01, respectively). However, the p-value for the 
CGDscore is 0.108 (Table 10.1, row 5, column 5), marginally insignificant at the 0.10 level.  
In contrast, the intercepts shows a coefficient of 1.376 (row 4, column 5), which are highly 
significant at 0.01 level. An intercept with such a significant level indicates that some 
omitted variables may be absent from the regression models. Hence, the results indicate 
that CGDscore by itself has very limited explanatory power to account for the market 
valuation Wq of the firms in the L+M+S sample.   
 
For the combined sample of LargeCap and MidCap firms (henceforth referred to as the 
L+M sample), Model 1.0_LM (Table 10.1, column 6) shows that the coefficient for the 
CGDscore is 0.002 and is not statistically significant (Table 10.1, row 5, column 6). The 
empirical results are similar to those for Model 1.0_LMS on the L+M+S sample. 
 
In contrast, for the sample of SmallCap firms (henceforth referred to as the S sample), 
Model 1.0_S (Table 10.1, column 4) shows that the coefficient for CGDscore is 0.007, 
which is statistically significant at 0.05 alpha level (row 5, column 4).  Comparing Model 
1.0_S with other models in Table 10.2, the coefficient on the CGDscore for the SmallCap 
firms in the S sample is much higher, and statistically more significant, than any other 
samples. Besides, the adjusted R2 of Model 1.0_S (row 6, column 4) is the largest amongst 
all models (Table 10.1, row 6). It indicates that the explanatory power provided by 
CGDscore for SmallCap firms is stronger than for any other firms. Voluntary CG 
disclosure, as measured by the CGDscore, has strong impact on market valuation for 
SmallCap firms. 
 
The impact on firm valuation is less obvious in a sample that is composed of mixed 
LargeCap and MidCap firms.  One possible explanation is that SmallCap firms may have 
an information environment which is different.  If SmallCap firms were pooled together 
with LargeCap and MidCap firms, the effect on market valuation of the CGDscore would 
be diluted. This is consistent with the findings of previous CG studies where the CG 
disclosure is not found to have impact on firm’s valuation for a pooled sample composed 
of firms with various sizes or market capitalizations.  Prior studies may have come to the 
erroneous conclusion that CG disclosure has no impact on firm’s valuation for any type of 
firms.  By applying the same simple regression to different groupings of firms, this study 
demonstrates that, when the sampled firms are only composed of SmallCap firms, 
voluntary CG disclosure has a statistically significant and positive impact on firm’s 
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valuation (Model 1.0_S), which is hidden when the sample firms are pooled with other 
firms with different market capitalizations.  Henceforth, this study adopts a compare-and-
contrast approach in testing SmallCap firms with models vis-a-vis other pooled groups of 
sample firms with various market capitalizations.  
 
Since the Intercepts in the models for all three partitioned samples (S, L+M+S, and L+M) 
are highly significant (Table 10.1, row 4, columns 4-6) at the 0.01 level, it seems that some 
variables may be missing in the models.  The results imply that more explanatory variables 
are needed to account for a firm’s valuation.  
 
In order to test sub-hypothesis H1b, Model 1.0 is extended by including additional 
variables to form two extended models, Model 1.1 and Model 1.2, as follows:   
(i) adding the Corporate Governance practice variables into Model 1.0 such as the 
Board Size (BoDsize), the Number of Independent Non-Executive Directors 
(NumINED), the percentage of INEDs on the board (INED%), the Director 
Ownership (Dir%Own), the Split Role of Chairman and CEO (SplitRole), and the 
Dual Listing (DualList) as the explanatory variables, as represented by Model 1.1; 
and 
(ii)  adding the Corporate Governance practice variables into Model 1.0 as stipulated in 
(i) above and the company characteristics (ComChar) variables such as the 
profitability in terms of Return on Equity (ROE), market strength in terms of Sales 
(LnSales), sustainable growth in terms of Sales Growth (W_SalGrow), the firm’s 
financial resources expressed in terms of total equity (LnEqty), and the leverage in 
terms of Debt/TA ratio (Debt/TA), as represented by Model 1.2.  
 
The regression results of these extended models, Model 1.1 and Model 1.2, are presented 
in Section 10.3 and Section 10.4 respectively below.   
 
10.3 Testing the effect of CG disclosure and CG variables on firm 
valuation   
 
Model 1.0 is extended with the addition of the Corporate Governance Practice variables for 
testing sub-hypothesis H1b, which is re-stated from Chapter 8 as follows: 
 
H1b: A firm’s market valuation as proxied by Wq is a function of its CG disclosure and 
CG practices. 
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In functional form, Model 1.1 is represented as follows: 
 
Wqi,t = β0 + β1 CGDscorei,t +  β2ΣCGpraci t + εi, t………………..(Model 1.1) 
 
where Wq is the approximation of Tobin’s q as defined in Section 8.2.1 and winsorized at 
5% and 95%. CGDscore is the firm’s score of CG disclosure, and ΣCGprac denotes a set 
of CG practices variables as mentioned in Section 10.2.2 above. β0 … β2 are the coefficients 
of the respective parameters; and ε, i, t are as defined previously. Results of Model 1.1 for 
all the sample groups are shown in Table 10.2 below. 
 
Table 10.2 Results of Wq regressed on CGDscore and CG Practices variables for the three 
samples. Dependent variable = Wq.  
 1 2 3 4 
1 Model 
 
1.1_LMS 1.1_LM 1.1_S 
2 Sample 
 
L+M+S L+M S 
3 Observations 
 
258 118 140 
4 Intercept 1.655* 
(0.014) 
1.714 
(0.280)
1.472*
(0.045)
5 CGscore 0.003 
(0.377) 
-0.001 
(0.854)
0.009*
(0.029)
6 BoDsize -0.042 
(0.432) 
-0.014 
(0.899)
-0.025
(0.718)
7 NumINED -0.037 
(0.821) 
-0.303 
(0.377)
-0.095
(0.660)
8 INED% 0.006 
(0.726) 
0.038 
(0.369)
0.005 
(0.773)
9 Dir%Own -0.001 
(0.650) 
-0.007 
(0.390)
-0.002
(0.515)
10 SplitRole 0.390* 
(0.012) 
0.707* 
(0.016)
0.019 
(0.911)
11 DualList 0.067 
(0.673) 
0.062 
(0.808)
0.029 
(0.884)
12 Adj. R2 
 
0.028 0.083 0.005 
13 Significance F 
 
0.047* 0.020* 0.367 
(Notes: P-values are shown in brackets.  Coefficients are bold if p-values < 0.10; * if p-values < 0.05; and ** 
if p-values < 0.01)  
 
It can be seen from Table 10.2 that, for the Model 1.1_LMS, the adjusted R2 increases to 
0.028 (row 12, column 2,) from 0.010 in Model 1.0_LMS (Table 10.1, row 6, column 5), 
after the CG practices variables have been included in the model.  Both the Intercept 
(Table 10.2, row 4, column 2) and SplitRole (row 10, column 2) are significant at the 0.05 
level. Other parameters are not significant, suggesting that those CG practices such as 
Board Size, the number of INEDs on the board, the percentage of the board being INEDs, 
and the status of dual listing do not have much impact on a firm’s valuation (Wq) for the 
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L+M+S sample. The overall model, however, is significant at the 0.05 level as shown by 
the F significance (Table 10.2, row 13, column 2).  
 
For Model 1.1_LM (Table 10.2, column 3), the adjusted R2 is 0.083 (row 12, column 3) 
which is much higher than that of Model 1.1_LMS (0.028). Unlike in the pooled sample, 
the Intercept is not significant at any reasonable level (row 4, column 3).  The results show 
that the explanatory power of Model 1.1_LM is higher than that of Model 1.1_LMS.   
SplitRole (0.707, as shown in row 10, column 3) is positive and significant at the 0.05 level, 
similar to the case of the pooled sample.  The result shows that firms that split the 
Chairman and CEO roles for large and medium size firms appear to have higher market 
valuation.  However, this is not the case for small size firms. 
  
For SmallCap firms, the regression results of Model 1.1_S (Table 10.2, column 4) show an 
adjusted R2 of 0.005 (row 12, column 4).  Nevertheless, the coefficient of CGDscore is 
positive (row 5) and highly significant (p-value = 0.029) at 0.05 level. Taking the findings 
of Model 1.0 and Model 1.1 together, the results suggest that a small firm’s voluntary 
disclosure is significant in determining its market valuation (Wq), before or after other CG 
practices variables are included in the regression model. The results seem to indicate that 
the market valuation of SmallCap firms is different from the market valuation of LargeCap 
or MidCap firms, controlling for variations in their CG practices.   
 
SplitRole is the only CG practices variable that has statistically significant impact on a 
firm’s valuation for LargeCap and MidCap firms (Table 10.2, row 10, column 3). No other 
CG practice variable has comparable significance. It may be interpreted that, firstly, the 
outside investors seem to value the splitting of the dual roles of the Chairman and CEO 
more importantly for larger firms than for small firms, probably because the concentration 
of power within the same individual for the two roles would lead to a more severe risk of 
expropriation of outside investors’ interests.  Secondly, splitting the dual roles of Chairman 
and CEO is considered the most important CG mechanism being installed within larger 
firms.  Hence, sub-hypothesis H1b, which states that a firm’s valuation is a function of its 
CG disclosure and its CG practices, is partially supported in the case of LargeCap firms 
and MidCap firms only. For the SmallCap firms, the CG practices variables have no 
impact on market valuation and hence H1b is not supported. 
 
The third sub-hypothesis, H1c (see section 10.4 below), postulates that a firm’s market 
valuation can also be affected by a firm’s specific financial characteristics such as sales 
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revenue, sales growth, profitability, assets size, and leverage.  These characteristics, known 
collectively as Company Characteristics (ComChar) variables in this study, are added into 
Model 1.1 to form Model 1.2, as discussed in the next section, Section 10.4.  
 
10.4 Testing the effect of CGDscore, corporate governance practices 
variables, and company characteristics on firm valuation    
 
Hypothesis H1c aims to test whether the CGDscore and CG practice variables affect a 
firm’s market valuation whilst controlling for the firm’s financial performance and 
characteristics such as its profitability, sustainable income, growth prospect, market 
strength, and leverage.  H1c is re-stated from Chapter 8 as follows: 
 
H1c: A firm’s valuation as proxied by Wq is a function of its CG disclosure and CG 
practices, controlling for company financial characteristics. 
 
This sub-hypothesis is tested by Model 1.2.  In this model, a firm’s market value (Wq) is 
regressed on its level of CG disclosure (CGDscore), CG Practices variables (CGprac), and 
Company Characteristics variables (ComChar). The model is presented in the condensed 
functional form as follows: 
 
Wqi,t = β0 + β1CGDscorei,t + β2ΣCGpraci t +  β3ΣComChari,t   
+β4 Dir%Own + εi, t      (Model 1.2) 
 
ΣCGprac denotes a set of CG practices variables as mentioned in Section 10.2.2.(i), and 
ΣComChar denotes a set of company characteristics that contains variables that control for 
a firm’s equity (LnEqty,  the natural log of equity), Sales (LnSales, the natural log of sales), 
return on equity (ROE), debt/asset ratio expressed in percentage (Debt/TA), and sales 
growth (W_SalGrow) expressed in percentage and winsorized at 5% and 95%;  β0 is the 
intercept;  β1, and β4 are the coefficients for the estimated parameters;  β2 and  β3  are 
vectors for the coefficients of the respective parameters; and the other variables and 
subscripts are as defined previously.  
 
Results of Model 1.2 for all the three sample groups are reported in Table 10.3 in the 
following page. 
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Table 10.3 Results of Wq regressed on CGDscore, CG Practices variables and Company 
Characteristics variables for the three samples. Dependent variable = Wq.  
 1 2 3 4 
1 Model 
 
1.2_LMS 1.2_LM 1.2_S 
2 Sample 
 
L+M+S L+M S 
3 Observations 
 
258 118 140 
4 Intercept 1.788
(0.190)
7.266**
(0.002)
7.900** 
(0.000) 
5 CGDscore -0.001
(0.821)
-0.007*
(0.025)
0.008* 
(0.030) 
6 BoDsize -0.021
(0.641)
-0.053
(0.397)
0.012 
(0.844) 
7 NumINED 0.034
(0.801)
0.002
(0.992)
-0.104 
(0.586) 
8 INED% -0.004
(0.770)
-0.001
(0.965)
0.001 
(0.963) 
9 Dir%Own 0.001
(0.666)
-0.001
(0.890)
-0.001 
(0.827) 
10 SplitRole 0.330**
(0.009)
0.385*
(0.019)
-0.042 
(0.779) 
11 DualList 0.056
(0.674)
0.327*
(0.026)
-0.042 
(0.816) 
12 ROE 0.021**
(0.0001)
0.027**
(0.0001)
0.013** 
(0.001) 
13 LnSales 0.302**
(0.0001)
0.440**
(0.0001)
0.029 
(0.694) 
14 W_SalGrow 0.000
(0.628)
-0.001
(0.421)
0.000 
(0.591) 
15 LnEqty -0.293**
(0.0001)
-0.605**
(0.0001)
-0.324** 
(0.0001) 
16 Debt/TA -0.023**
(0.0001)
-0.039**
(0.0001)
-0.017** 
(0.0001) 
17 Adj. R2 0.361 0.736 0.255 
18 Significance F 
 
0.0001** 0.0001** 0.0001** 
(Notes: P-values are shown in brackets.  Coefficients are bold if p-values < 0.10; * if p-values < 0.05; and ** 
if p-values < 0.01)  
 
The regression results in Table 10.3 show that, with the inclusion of variables on company 
characteristics as control variables into the model, the adjusted R2 has improved. For the 
pooled L+M+S sample (Table 10.3, column 2), Model 1.2_LMS shows the adjusted R2 has 
risen to 0.361 (row 17, column 2) from 0.028 in Model 1.1_LMS (Table 10.2). For the 
combined L+M sample (Table 10.3, row 17, column 3), Model 1.2_LM shows a rise in the 
adjusted R2 to 0.736 (row 17, column 3) from 0.083 in Model 1.1_LM (Table 10.2).  
Similarly, for the sample of SmallCap firms, there is a rise in the adjusted R2 to 0.255 (row 
17, column 4) from 0.005 in Model 1.1_S (Table 10.2).  The highest adjusted R2 is found 
in Model 1.2_LM which is applied to the L+M sample.  In sum, the regression results 
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show that it is the firm’s financial characteristics that mainly explain the levels of a firm’s 
market valuation, particularly in the combined sample of LargeCap and MidCap firms.  
 
In the pooled L+M+S sample, it is noted that the CGDscore is not significant at any 
reasonable level in explaining the market valuation Wq (Table 10.3, row 5, column 2).  In 
contrast, the CGDscore is highly significant at 0.05 level for the combined L+M sample 
(Table 10.3, row 5, column 3) and for the sample of SmallCap firms (row 5, column 4), 
though in opposite direction as indicated by the different signs.  This may have several 
interpretations.  First, the results suggest that, for the SmallCap firms in the S sample, a 
higher disclosure level enhances the firm’s valuation, controlling for similar company 
characteristics in terms of profitability, sales income, sales growth, and leverage. By being 
more transparent about its CG practices, a small firm stands to enjoy a higher market 
valuation than its counterparts with less CG transparency, ceteris paribus. This empirical 
evidence lends further support to the notion that, for the small firms, the information 
asymmetry between insiders and outsiders is such a major concern for the outside investors 
that any voluntary actions by the management in reducing the information gap will be 
appreciated and reflected in market value improvements. 
 
Second, for the L+M sample, the CGDscore affects the market valuation negatively, as the 
company characteristics variables are included in the model.  The evidence seems to 
suggest that, for a large or medium size firm, there appears to be an inverse relationship 
between firm value and voluntary governance disclosure, whereas the opposite is the case 
for a small firm. This may be due to the extent of information asymmetry prevalent in the 
two subgroups of firms.  It suggests that, as the information about small firms is relatively 
scarce, outsiders may welcome more information voluntarily disclosed about the CG by a 
small firm and thus react in a positive manner in terms of the firm’s market valuation.  In 
the case of L+M firms, however, the information set available to outsiders may be 
sufficiently large, so that more voluntary disclosure of CG information may not be new or 
novel to the outsiders. Furthermore, voluntary disclosure likely incurs more costs in 
preparation but may not be providing much incremental value-added information to the 
outsiders.   
 
Thirdly, the opposing effect of CGDscore on valuation for LargeCap/MidCap firms and for 
SmallCap firms may be attributable to the difference in the levels of insider ownership of 
the firm. As discussed in Chapter 9, SmallCap firms tend to have a predominant insider 
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ownership (the mean of the Dir%Own for the study period is 50.82% as per Table 9.8), 
which is higher than that for the LargeCap firms (45.54% as per Table 9.2) and also higher 
than that for the sample of LargeCap and MidCap firms combined2.   In circumstances 
where predominant ownership prevails (as in the case of SmallCap firms), more voluntary 
disclosure is a signal which indicates that insiders are more willing to share the information 
with outsiders.  
 
Finally, the collinearity issue offers another possible explanation for the opposing signs of 
the coefficients of CGDscore for the sample of L+M firms and the sample of S firms in 
Table 10.3 (column 3 and 4, respectively).  The CGDscore may be collinear to other 
explanatory variables, which may have different levels of impact on the dependent variable 
collectively, as well as on each other individually.  For SmallCap firms, the CGDscore is 
found to be significantly correlated with BoDsize (Table 9.9), but it is not the case for 
LargeCap firms (Table 9.3) or MidCap firms (Table 9.6).  Furthermore, the CGDscore is 
significantly correlated with SplitRole for SmallCap firms, but it is not so for MidCap 
firms and is only marginally significant for LargeCap firms.  As a result, the aggregate 
impact on the dependent variable may be manifested in opposing directions when the same 
explanatory variables are applied to different samples. 
 
Ideally, all explanatory variables in a regression model should not be correlated.  In reality, 
every multiple regression model will contain some degree of correlation among its 
explanatory variables (Asteriou and Hal, 2007, p. 89).  The issue at hand is to assess 
whether the degree of multi-collinearity in the model is sufficiently high as to create any 
problems in interpreting the findings in an appropriate manner.3
 
 Two other CG practice variables, the split of roles between Chairman and CEO (SplitRole) 
and dual listing (DualList), are also found to be significant for the larger firms (Table 10.3, 
row 10, columns 2 and 3;  and row 11, column 3) but not significant for the smaller firms. 
The evidence suggests that splitting the roles of Chairman and CEO is deemed to be a 
more important CG practice by investors for larger firms than for small firms, as such CG 
                                                 
2 The mean of the Dir%Own for the combined sample of LargeCap and MidCap firms can be directly 
computed by data extracted from Table 9.2 and Table 9.5: [(36x45.54%) + (82x52.06%)]/ (36+82) = 50.07%. 
3 Collinearity problem exists when one or more of the explanatory variables in a multiple regression are 
highly correlated with each other. In such situations, it becomes difficult to separate the effect of such 
variables on the dependent variable. One sign of collinearity problem is that when some explanatory 
variables are included in the model, the values of the regression coefficients for the correlated variables 
fluctuate drastically.  A multicollinearity analysis using Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) on Model 1.2_LM is 
presented in Appendix 6, which shows that NumINED are highly correlated with INED%. 
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practice enhances a larger firm’s valuation.  This is consistent with the view that, for larger 
firms with more complex business activities, insiders have more opportunities to 
expropriate outside investors’ wealth. 
 
Dual listing (DualList) is a significant factor in affecting the market value of a firm for the 
sample of L+M firms, when the ComChar variables are included in the model (Table 10.3, 
row 11, column 3). From the standpoint of corporate governance, by seeking dual listing, a 
firm is subject to the scrutiny of the regulations of an additional stock exchange.  It often 
results in improved internal corporate governance and higher accounting standards of the 
firm.  Minority shareholders would expect to find themselves better protected when 
investing in cross-listed firms, and they show their favourable sentiment towards those 
firms by according a higher market value to the firm.  In contrast, DualList is not found to 
be significant in value relevance for SmallCap firms (Table 10.3, row 11, column 4). The 
paucity of SmallCap firms that have dual listing status may be a reason why the statistical 
significance is meaningless. 
 
Three control variables within the Company Characteristics (ComChar) category, namely, 
the Return on Equity (ROE), the natural log of a firm’s equity (LnEqty), and the Debt to 
Total Assets ratio (Debt/TA), are found to be significant for the firms of both the L+M 
sample and the S sample (Table 10.3, and Model 1.2_LM and Model 1.2_S, respectively).  
For the ROE, the signs of the estimated coefficients are positive (row 12, column 3 and 4), 
indicating that a firm’s profitability is a key factor that determines its market valuation.  
For the LnEqty and Debt/TA, the signs of their coefficients are negative for both samples, 
implying that their impact on market valuation is in the same direction.   
 
However, another ComChar variable, LnSales, is found to be significant for the firms in 
the L+M+S sample and the L+M sample (Table 10.3, row 13, columns 2 and 3) but not for 
the sample of small firms.  It implies that sustainable income has more significant 
influence on a firm’s market valuation for larger firms than for smaller firms. 
   
The statistically significant variables of the extended models of Model 1.2 are summarized 
in Table 10.4 below. The signs of the coefficients are reported in brackets after the names 
of the variables that are statistically significant (with p-value < 0.10). 
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Table 10.4 Summary of statistically significant variables in Model 1.2.  Dependent variable = 
Wq. 
Model 
 
1.2_LMS 
 
1.2_LM 
 
1.2_S 
 
Sample 
 
L+M+S L+M S 
CGDscore 
 
 -- CGDscore    (-) CGDscore     (+) 
CG Practices variables:  
- DualList 
- SplitRole 
 
-- 
SplitRole      (+)
 
DualList       (+) 
SplitRole      (+)  
 
-- 
-- 
Company Characteristics  variables:
- ROE 
- LnSales 
- LnEqty 
- Debt/TA  
 
ROE             (+) 
LnSales        (+) 
LnEqty         (-) 
Debt/TA      (-)
 
ROE             (+)  
LnSales        (+)  
LnEqty         (-) 
Debt/TA       (-) 
 
ROE               (+) 
 -- 
LnEqty            (-)
Debt/TA          (-)
(Notes:  Variables that are found significant in any one of the three models are reported if their p-value <0.10, 
and are denoted by “-- ” if otherwise. The sign of the coefficient of the variable is shown in brackets) 
  
 
The summary presented in Table 10.4 shows that,  to a large extent, the Wq is influenced 
by a firm’s financial performance such as profitability (ROE), sustainable income 
(LnSales), and its capital structure (such as LnEqty and Debt/TA). Hence, Hypothesis H1c, 
which postulates that a firm’s q is affected by its CG disclosure and CG practices, 
controlling for company financial characteristics, is partially supported for LargeCap and 
MidCap firms, but not for SmallCap firms.   
 
As suggested in prior research studies, a firm’s ownership structure is a factor affecting a 
firm’s Wq. Agency theory also suggests that ownership structure is closely linked to the 
corporate governance of a firm. Therefore, a firm’s valuation can be affected by both its 
ownership structure and CG jointly, as stated in the sub-hypothesis H1d in Chapter 8. 
Model 1.3 in the following section sets out to test such hypothesis.  
 
10.5 Testing the effect of CG practices, company characteristics, and 
joint CG ranking with ownership structure on firm valuation  
 
As per Chapter 8, Hypothesis H1d postulates that the ranking of a firm’s CG and the level 
of insiders’ ownership can jointly affect a firm’s market valuation.  H1d is re-stated as 
follows: 
 
H1d: Low CG rank firms have lower q, controlling for the level of insiders’ ownership. 
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To test H1d using Model 1.3,  Wq is regressed on the firm’s CG practices (CGprac) 
variables, company characteristics (ComChar) variables, as well as dummy variables for its 
joint CG ranking and Director Ownership. The condensed functional form is given by: 
 
Wqi,t = β0 + β1ΣCGpraci,t +  β2 ΣComChari,t  + β3ΣCG_RankOwni,t + εi, t      (Model 1.3) 
 
Wq, ΣCGprac, and ΣComChar are as defined in previous sections above. CG_RankOwn is 
a variable expressed as a joint variable of CG ranking and director’s ownership of a firm, 
as defined in Section 8.8.3 in Chapter 8.  β0 is the intercept;  β1 …β3  are vectors for the 
coefficients of the respective parameters; and ε, i, t are as defined previously. Firms are 
firstly ranked into 2 classes by their CG disclosure with reference to their median: (i) Low 
CG_rank and (ii) High CG_rank, making reference to the median of the CGDscore of the 
sampling frame. The firms are then classified into 3 categories of Director Ownership 
(Dir%Own): (a) Low (if Dir%Own<25%); (b) Medium (if Dir%Own is 25-50%); and (c) 
Predominant (if Dir%Own>50%).  
 
A 2 x 3 matrix is constructed with six joint CG_Rank and Dir%Own Groups, with dummy 
variables assigned to each of the six joint CG_rank and Dir%Own Groups as discussed in 
Section 8.8.3 in Chapter 8.  For quick reference, these six joint groups as shown in Table 
8.3 are reproduced in Table 10.5 below: 
 
Table 10.5 A 2x3 matrix on CG ranking and Director’s Ownership of a firm 
 Director Ownership (Dir%Own)  
 
CG_rank 
(vs. median)  
Low 
(0-25%)
Medium 
(25-50%)
Predominant  
(50%+) 
High HL HM HP 
Low LL LM LP 
   
As previously discussed in Chapter 8, the High-CG_Rank-and-Low-Dir%Own (HL) group 
in Table 10.5 above is selected as the base category for comparison with the other five 
CG_RankOwn groups: HM, HP, LL, LM, and LP.  Five dummy variables are respectively 
assigned to them: DV_HM, DV_HP, DV_LL, DV_LM, and DV_LP. These dummy 
variables act as the explanatory variables to test the extent of the market valuation of a firm 
(Wq) being affected by the joint characteristics of CG ranking and Director Ownership.  
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Model 1.3 and its various specifications are then applied to the three partitioned samples of 
L+M+S, L+M, and S firms.  The regression results are shown in Table 10.6 below.  As 
discussed in Section 8.8.3, there is no entry for the variable DV_LL in the sample of 
combined L+M firms (Table 10.6, row 17, column 3) because there is no observation in 
the sample that fits in the category of Low CG rank and Low Directors’ Ownership. 
 
Table 10.6 Results of Wq regressed on CG Practices variables, Company Characteristics 
variables, and the joint CG_RankOwn dummy variables for the three samples. Dependent 
variable = Wq.  
 1 2 3 4 
1 Model 
 
1.3_LMS 1.3_LM 1.3_S 
2 Sample 
 
L+M+S L+M S 
3 Observations 
 
258 118 140 
4 Intercept 1.869
(0.176)
5.571*
(0.025)
8.016** 
(0.000) 
5 BoDsize -0.020
(0.648)
-0.014
(0.825)
0.022 
(0.720) 
6 NumINED 0.016
(0.905)
-0.152
(0.444)
-0.149 
(0.451) 
7 INED% -0.004
(0.791)
0.017
(0.500)
0.004 
(0.797) 
8 SplitRole 0.270*
(0.033)
0.346*
(0.037)
0.004 
(0.976) 
9 DualList 0.023
(0.866)
0.307
(0.034)
-0.081 
(0.658) 
10 ROE 0.020**
(0.0001)
0.025**
(0.001)
0.014** 
(0.0001) 
11 LnSales 0.297**
(0.000)
0.451**
(0.000)
0.036 
(0.638) 
12 W_SalGrow 0.000
(0.783)
-0.001
(0.638)
0.000 
(0.571) 
13 LnEqty -0.284**
(0.0001)
-0.583**
(0.0001)
-0.312** 
(0.001) 
14 Debt/TA -0.024**
(0.0001)
-0.040**
(0.0001)
-0.015** 
(0.002) 
15 DV_HM 0.106
(0.640)
0.229
(0.479)
-0.390 
(0.159) 
16 DV_HP -0.025
(0.904)
0.055
(0.864)
-0.289 
(0.184) 
17 DV_LL -0.371
(0.181)
n.a. -0.486 
(0.059) 
18 DV_LM 0.068
(0.753)
0.507
(0.126)
-0.452 
(0.055) 
19 DV_LP -0.128
(0.532)
0.082
(0.803)
-0.560* 
(0.016) 
20 Adj. R2 
 
0.363 0.735 0.248 
21 Significance F 
 
0.0001** 0.0001** 0.0001** 
(Notes: P-values are shown in brackets.  Coefficients are bold if p-values < 0.10; * if p-values < 0.05; and ** 
if p-values < 0.01)  
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For the pooled L+M+S sample (Table 10.6, column 2, Model 1.3_LMS), the CG Practices 
variable SplitRole (row 8, column 2), as well as four of the Company Characteristics 
variables (ROE, LnSales, LnEqty, and Debt/TA as shown respectively in rows 10, 11, 13, 
and 14, column 2, of Table 10.6), are found to be statistically significant in explaining the 
market valuation of a firm.  However, none of the joint CG_RankOwn dummy variables 
are significant (rows 15-19, column 2).  
 
Similar results are obtained for Model 1.3_LM for the L+M sample (Table 10.6, column 3).  
The same four Company Characteristics variables (i.e., ROE, LnSales, LnEqty, and 
Debt/TA) continue to be statistically significant in affecting a firm’s market valuation. In 
addition, dual listing (DualList) is also found to be significant in Model 1.3_LM (Table 
10.6, row 9, column 3).  Similar to the results of Model 1.3_LMS, none of the joint 
CG_RankOwn dummy variables are found to be significant  for Model 1.3_LM (rows 15-
19, column 3).  
 
A different empirical result is obtained from the Model 1.3_S on the sample of SmallCap 
firms (Table 10.6, column 4, Model 1.3_S).  Of the five dummy variables (DV_HM, 
DV_HP, DV_LL, DV_LM, and DV_LP) that investigate the joint effect of CG ranking and 
directors’ ownership for the firm, three of them are found to be significant at the 0.10 level 
(Table 10.6, rows 17 – 19, column 4).   Such phenomenon is not found for the other two 
samples.  Furthermore, all the variables of Low CG ranking (DV_LL, DV_LM, and 
DV_LP) have negative coefficients (rows 17-19, column 4), when compared to the base 
category of HL firms (characterized with High-in-CG ranking but Low-in-directors’ 
ownership). It implies that SmallCap firms with lower CG ranking are generally associated 
with a lower market valuation than that of high CG ranking firms.  
 
Although the coefficients on DV_HM and DV_HP in Model 1.3_S (Table 10.6, rows 15 
and 16, column 4) are also negative, they are not statistically significant.  Hence, the 
groups of HM and HP firms may not necessarily have exhibited a lower market valuation 
than the HL base group of SmallCap firms. 
  
Table 10.7 summarizes the coefficients of the various dummy variables of the joint 
CG_RankOwn groups for the sample of SmallCap firms:  
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Table 10.7 Summary of the coefficients of dummy variables of the CG_RankOwn groups of 
Small firms on Wq 
 Director Ownership (Dir%Own) 
CG_rank  Low 
(0-25%)
Medium 
(25-50%)
Predominant  
(50%+) 
High 0 -0.390
 (0.159)
-0.289  
(0.184) 
Low -0.486
(0.059)
-0.452
(0.055)
-0.560* 
(0.016) 
(Notes: P-values are shown in brackets.  Coefficients are bold if p-values < 0.10; * if p-values < 0.05; and ** 
if p-values < 0.01)  
 
    
Figure 10.2 below is a graphical presentation of Table 10.7 that offers several 
interpretations of these coefficients. The line above (in pink) denotes the firms with high 
CG ranking. The line below (in blue) denotes the firms with low CG ranking. The x-axis 
denotes the category of directors’ ownership (Dir%Own) from low, to medium, and to 
predominant level, whereas the y-axis denotes the coefficients of the dummy variables with 
reference to the firm’s market valuation Wq. 
 
Figure 10.2 Coefficients of dummy variable of CG rank and directors’ ownership on firm 
valuation for SmallCap firms.  Dependent variable = Wq. 
  
Firstly, as shown in Figure 10.2, there is a higher coefficient for market value (Wq) for 
high CG ranking firms than for low CG ranking firms across all levels of directors’ 
ownership (Dir%Own).  Stated differently, higher CG ranking firms are always associated 
with higher market valuation (Wq), compared to those firms with similar level of directors’ 
ownership but with a lower CG ranking (the pink line segment is always above the blue 
line segment in Figure 10.2).   
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 Secondly, the biggest gap between high CG ranking firms and low CG ranking firms in 
terms of the coefficient for market valuation is found where the level of directors’ 
ownership (Dir%Own) is low (i.e., < 25%). The difference of the coefficients between HL 
and LL firms is 0.486, which is the largest as compared with the same between HM and 
LM firms (0.062) and the same between HP and LP firms (0.271)4. It suggests that, for 
those small firms characterised with low insider ownership, more voluntary disclosure on 
the CG practices tends to bring about a big increase on the firm’s market valuation, ceteris 
paribus.   Therefore, if SmallCap firms are to change their disclosure behaviour about their 
CG practices, it is likely that their firms’ market valuation will be changed accordingly. 
The magnitude of the change in market valuation, however, will vary with the level of 
insiders’ ownership. 
  
Thirdly, it can be seen from Figure 10.2 that, for SmallCap firms with high CG ranking, 
there is a V-shaped relationship in terms of the coefficient of market valuation and 
directors’ ownership.  It seems to suggest that the relationship between market valuation 
(Wq) and insiders’ ownership is not linear. For high CG ranking small firms, the market 
value will firstly decrease with directors’ ownership and then increases when directors’ 
ownership reaches a level of 50% or above.  Investors, in general, seem to assign a higher 
market value to a small firm when there is a predominant shareholder, provided that it has 
a high CG disclosure ranking, than a small firm with a medium level of insider ownership.  
Presumably, the presence of a predominant shareholder adds more value to a small firm, 
provided the management is transparent (i.e., disclosing a high level of information) about 
its CG practices.   
 
Conversely, an inverted “V” shaped relationship is observed for those small firms with low 
CG ranking. The market valuation (Wq) of a small firm rises with insider ownership, but 
starts to decline when insider ownership reaches a level where entrenchment of managers 
would become a concern for the outside investors.  The relationship between Wq and 
Dir%Own for low CG ranking firms as depicted in Figure 10.2 seems to be consistent with 
the hypotheses as postulated by the classical agency theory in prior literature. 
 
In sum, the market valuation for small firms varies with the percentage of insider 
ownership. The pattern of valuation differs, depending jointly on the firm’s voluntary 
                                                 
4 The difference can be found by comparing the coefficients as stated in row 3 and row 4 of Table 10.7. 
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disclosure of its CG practises and its level of insider ownership.  If the firm has low level 
of insider ownership but is transparent in its CG disclosure, it is associated with a high 
market valuation.  However, if the firm has a predominant shareholder but is ranked poor 
in terms of CG disclosure, it has low market valuation. The above-mentioned relationships 
are found for sample firms in Hong Kong where there is strong legal protection of minority 
investors’ rights.  It suggests that, even if the strong legal protection is taken for granted, 
investors will still look for other indicators (such as the voluntary disclosure of CG 
information and director’s ownership) as a guide for seeking additional protection for their 
investment. If a firm tends to have entrenchment problems and low transparency about its 
CG practices, investors will not be expected to pay a high market price for its shares.  The 
aspirations of outside investors are reflected in a firm’s market valuation.  
 
The summarized results of the extended versions of Model 1.3 are tabulated in Table 10.8 
below.  
 
Table 10.8 Summary of statistically significant variables in Model 1.3.   
Dependent variable = Wq. 
Model 
 
1.3_LMS 
 
1.3_LM 
 
1.3_S 
 
Sample 
 
L+M+S L+M S 
CG Practices 
variables: 
- DualList 
- SplitRole  
 
 
-- 
SplitRole    (+) 
 
 
DualList     (+) 
SplitRole    (+)  
 
 
-- 
-- 
Company 
Characteristics  
variables 
- ROE 
- LnSales 
- LnEqty 
- Debt/TA  
 
 
 
ROE             (+)  
LnSales        (+)  
LnEqty         (-) 
Debt/TA      (-) 
 
 
 
ROE             (+)  
LnSales        (+)  
LnEqty         (-) 
Debt/TA       (-) 
 
 
 
ROE            (+)  
-- 
LnEqty         (-) 
Debt/TA       (-) 
Dummy variables 
- DV_LL 
- DV_LM 
- DV_LP 
 
-- 
-- 
-- 
 
-- 
-- 
-- 
 
DV_LL        (-)  
DV_LM       (-)  
DV_LP        (-) 
(Notes:  Variables that are found significant in any one of the three models are reported if their p-value <0.10, 
and are denoted by “-- ” if otherwise. The sign of the coefficient of the variable is shown in brackets) 
 
Generally speaking, SmallCap firms with a higher CG ranking are found to be related to a 
higher market valuation (Wq) than firms with a low CG ranking, across all levels of 
director’s ownership. For LargeCap and MidCap firms, however, the findings are not 
conclusive. All in all, Hypothesis H1d, which postulates that low CG rank firms have 
lower q, controlling for the level of insiders’ ownership, is strongly supported in the case 
of SmallCap firms. 
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To ascertain the outcome of the regression results obtained in Model 1.3, a robustness test 
is conducted with regard to the classification of SmallCap firms into 6 different joint 
categories of CG_RankOwn, using a non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis Rank Test. A further 
check on the regression results of Model 1.3 for the S sample and the L+M sample is 
performed through the plotting of scatter diagrams of Wq against Dir%Own, which are 
depicted as continuous variables rather than categorical variables.  The results of both 
robustness tests show the regression results of Model 1.3 are valid (see Section 10.10 in 
this Chapter). 
 
The following section, Section 10.6, discusses the empirical results of Model 2 and its 
extensions, using CG disclosure score (CGscore) as the dependent variable. 
 
10.6 Testing the effect of CG practices and company characteristics 
on CG disclosure    
 
As discussed in Chapter 6, Hypothesis 2 (H2) postulates that the level of voluntary CG 
disclosure by a firm is influenced by factors closely related to its CG practices, such as the 
number of INEDs on the board, the duality roles of Chairman and CEO, and the status of 
cross listing of the firm.  For quick reference, H2 is quoted from Chapter 6 as follows: 
 
H2: The level of voluntary CG disclosure is influenced by the CG practices within the firm 
and the level of insiders’ ownership whilst controlling for the firm’s performance and 
capital structure. 
 
To empirically test H2, it is necessary to decompose it into five supplementary hypotheses, 
as stated in Section 8.8.4 of Chapter 8, which are re-stated as follows: 
 
H2a: A firm’s voluntary CG disclosure is negatively related to the insiders’ ownership 
(Dir%Own). 
 
H2b: A firm’s voluntary CG disclosure is positively related to the number of INEDs 
(NumINED) and the percentage of INEDs (INED%) sitting on the board, 
ceteris paribus. 
 
H2c: A firm’s voluntary CG disclosure is positively related to the firm’s resources 
(LnTA), controlling for profitability, sales, and leverage. 
 
H2d:  Firms that are cross-listed voluntarily disclose more CG information. 
H2e: Firms that split the roles of Chairman and CEO have a higher voluntary CG 
disclosure. 
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Correspondingly, Model 2.0 (as stated in Chapter 8) is used to investigate as to whether the 
CG disclosure of a firm is affected by the CG practices and the company characteristics of 
a firm.  The variable representing CG disclosure, CGDscore, becomes the dependent 
variable.  The condensed functional form of Model 2.0 is stated as below: 
Model 2.0 
CGDscorei,t = β0 + β1ΣCGpraci,t +  β2ΣComChar2i,t  + εi,t………(Model 2.0) 
 
where ΣCGprac is the set of CG practice variables, ΣComChar2 is the set of company 
characteristics variables as defined in Section 10.4 (except that in Model 2.0, LnEqty is 
replaced by LnTA (the natural log of total assets)5. β0 is the intercept;  β1 …β3  are vectors 
for the coefficients of the respective parameters; and ε, i, t are as defined previously. The 
regression model is applied to the pooled L+M+S sample, the combined L+M sample, and 
the S sample. 
 
The distribution of the dependent variable, CGDscore, is preliminarily tested by the 3-
standard deviation rule to identify if there are any outliers.  No outlier is detected (mean = 
41.96, standard deviation = 21.59) in the L+M+S sample, L+M sample, or the sample of 
SmallCap firms.  Hence, no winsorization of CGDscores for any of the three samples of 
firms is required.  A visual inspection of the frequency distribution of CGDscore for the 
pooled L+M+S sample is presented in Figure 10.3 below: 
 
Figure 10.3 Frequency distribution of CGDscore for the pooled L+M+S sample.  
Sample size = 258. 
 
                                                 
5 Total Assets (TA) is a proxy for the resources under a firm’s control. By definition, TA will also 
incorporate two components, the liabilities and the equity of the firm.  The higher liabilities a firm has, the 
more likely the debt holders (who as stakeholders) may affect the management’s willingness for voluntary 
CG disclosure. If CGDscore is regressed on LnTA, it will be unclear whether the regression is attributed to 
the liabilities or the equity component.  Hence, it is preferably to use LnEqty to proxy for a firm’s resources 
as an explanatory variable in regression models where CGscore is the dependent variable. 
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 The regression results of Model 2.0 applied to the three samples are shown in Table 10.9. 
 
Table 10.9 Results of CGDscore regressed on CG Practices variables and Company 
Characteristics variables for the three samples of firms. Dependent variable = CGDscore.  
 1 2 3 4 
1 Model 2.0_LMS 2.0_LM 2.0_S
2 Sample 
 
L+M+S L+M S
3 Observations 
 
258 118 140
4 Intercept 0.118
(0.997)
-19.170
(0.804)
-41.005
(0.423)
5 BoDsize -0.198
(0.840)
-1.740
(0.368)
1.377
(0.346)
6 NumINED 3.064
(0.295)
6.481
(0.284)
0.910
(0.842)
7 INED% 0.061
(0.850)
-0.352
(0.639)
0.315
(0.434)
8 Dir%Own -0.160**
(0.005)
-0.047
(0.718)
-0.165*
(0.014)
9 SplitRole 10.873**
(0.0001)
8.577
(0.085)
13.191**
(0.0001)
10 DualList -1.010
(0.731)
-1.415
(0.750)
-1.567
(0.716)
11 ROE 0.272**
(0.002)
0.447*
(0.033)
0.236*
(0.014)
12 LnSales 1.304
(0.306)
0.298
(0.896)
1.755
(0.329)
13 W_SalGrow -0.012
(0.494)
-0.042
(0.216)
0.004
(0.835)
14 LnTA -0.169
(0.903)
2.108
(0.487)
0.505
(0.811)
15 Debt/TA 0.147
(0.075)
0.153
(0.234)
0.104
(0.394)
16 Adj. R2 
 
0.183 0.127 0.197
17 Significance F 
 
0.0001** 0.007** 0.0001**
(Notes: P-values are shown in brackets.  Coefficients are bold if p-values < 0.10; * if p-values < 0.05; and ** 
if p-values < 0.01)  
 
 
For the pooled L+M+S sample (Table 10.9, column 2, Model 2.0_LMS), the results 
indicate that splitting the roles of Chairman and CEO (SplitRole, as shown in row 9, 
column 2) is positively related to the level of CG disclosure (CGDscore) and is statistically 
significant at 0.01 level.   This is consistent with the hypothesis that splitting the dual roles 
of Chairman/CEO will provide checks and balance to the power distribution within the 
firm’s governance environment; hence leads to increases in the voluntary CG disclosure.  
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Results of Model 2.0_LMS also indicate a negative coefficient for Dir%Own (Table 10.9, 
row 8, column 2).  It suggests that the higher the insiders’ ownership, the lower is the 
voluntary disclosure of CG.  This is consistent with the notion that, within a firm with 
concentrated ownership, the owners tend to share the CG information with the insiders, 
and do not feel obliged to disclose such information to the outsiders.    
  
As regards the Company Characteristics (ComChar) variables, two control variables – 
Debt/Asset ratio (Debt/TA) and Return on Equity (ROE) – are found to be positively 
related to CGDscore and both are significant at the 0.10 level, suggesting that leverage and 
profitability are significant factors in voluntary governance disclosure. With a higher 
Debt/TA ratio in the firm, managers are expected to be more intensely monitored by the 
debt-holders; hence may feel obliged to voluntarily disclose more about the firm’s state of 
CG so as to put the debt-holders at ease. On the other hand, the association of higher 
profitability (represented by a higher ROE) with a higher disclosure of CG may reflect the 
high quality and business acumen of the firm’s management. Good quality managers tend 
to appreciate the importance of CG to their stakeholders and would not be afraid to 
disclose more.  
 
Comparing the results observed from the three samples in Table 10.9, it can be shown that 
the factors that are significant in affecting CGDscore are similar.  SplitRole and ROE are 
positively related to the CGDscore, while Dir%Own is negatively related to the CGDscore 
for SmallCap firms as well (Table 10.9, column 4).  It is noted that for the combined L+M 
sample (Table 10.9, column 3, Model 2.0_LM), the negative relationship between 
directors’ ownership and CG disclosure (row 8, column 3) does not seem to be significant 
at 0.10 level.  Yet, in the pooled L+M+S sample and in the SmallCap firms sample, the 
negative relationship is significant (row 8, column 2 and 4) at 0.05 level.  As such, it may 
be interpreted that the significant relationship between the two variables found in the 
L+M+S sample may be induced by the overwhelming proportion of SmallCap firms in the 
pooled sample.   
 
The significant results of Model 2.0 and its extended models are summarized and tabulated 
in Table 10.10 below. It can be seen from Table 10.10 that SplitRole is a governance factor 
that positively affects a firm’s voluntary CG disclosure.  Profitability of the firm, as 
proxied by the variable ROE, is yet another Company Characteristic factor that would 
affect positively a firm’s voluntary CG disclosure.   
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Table 10.10 Summary of statistically significant variables in Model 2.0. Dependent 
variable = CGDscore. 
Model 2.0_LMS 2.0_LM 2.0_S 
 
Sample 
 
L+M+S L+M S 
CG Practices 
variables: 
- SplitRole 
- Dir%Own 
 
 
SplitRole      (+) 
Dir%Own      (-) 
 
 
SplitRole       (+) 
--  
 
 
SplitRole       (+) 
Dir%Own       (-)  
Company 
Characteristics  
variables: 
- ROE 
- Debt/TA 
 
 
 
ROE              (+)  
Debt/TA        (+) 
 
 
 
ROE               (+)  
-- 
 
 
 
ROE               (+)  
-- 
(Notes:  Variables that are found significant in any one of the three models are reported if their p-value <0.10, 
and are denoted by “-- ” if otherwise. The sign of the coefficient of the variable is shown in brackets) 
 
The summary Table 10.10 shows that Director’s ownership (Dir%Own) is negatively 
associated with CGDscore for firms in the S sample and in the pooled sample. The result 
indicates that the higher the insider ownership, the lower is the voluntary CG disclosure. 
Hence, Hypothesis H2a, that states a firm’s voluntary CG disclosure is negatively related 
to the insiders’ ownership, is generally supported. 
                        
On the other hand, the number of INEDs sitting on the board of directors (NumINED) or 
the percentage of INEDs of the total number of directors (INED%) are not found to be 
significant at any reasonable level of confidence.  Hence, the hypothesis H2b, that suggests 
a firm’s voluntary CG disclosure is positively related to the number of INEDs (NumINED) 
and the percentage of INEDs (INED%) sitting on the board, ceteris paribus, is not 
supported.  
 
The variable, the natural log of total assets (LnTA), is not found to be significant at 0.10 
level in either the combined L+M sample or the sample of SmallCap firms (S). There is no 
evidence to support that a firm’s resources have an effect on the CG disclosure (CGDscore) 
of a firm. Hence, Hypothesis H2c that proposes a firm’s voluntary CG disclosure is 
positively related to the firm’s resources (LnTA), controlling for profitability, sales, and 
leverage, is not supported. 
  
The coefficient on cross listing (DualList) in Model 2.0_LMS, Model 2.0_LM or Model 
2.0_S is not statistically significant in the models. There is no variable in Model 2.0 and its 
extensions to suggest that a firm being cross-listed (DualList) is associated with the 
voluntary CG disclosure in the models. Hence, Hypothesis H2d, which states that cross-
listed firms voluntarily disclose more CG information, is not supported. 
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Finally, the split of roles of Chairman and CEO (SplitRole) is found to be statistically 
significant in the L+M sample as well as in the S sample. Hence, hypothesis H2e, which 
suggests that firms with split roles of Chairman and CEO have a higher voluntary CG 
disclosure, is supported. 
 
10.7 Testing systematic differences amongst the three samples     
 
In Chapter 8, Hypothesis 3 (H3) postulates that: 
 
Hypothesis 3 
H3:  There are systematic differences in the voluntary CG disclosure between LargeCap 
firms and SmallCap firms in both the level of disclosure and the value relevance of 
disclosure.   
 
A pair-wise t-test has already been conducted in Section 9.5 of Chapter 9 amongst different 
market capitalizations of firms, across the years, with respect to the key research variables 
such as CGDscore, q, DivPay, and Dir%Own. The preliminary results show that there are 
significant year-on-year differences (at the 0.05 level) within each capitalization group of 
firms in the CGDscore; and there are also some significant year-on-year differences (at the 
0.10 level) on DivPay (Table 9.10 in Chapter 9). As regards the pair-wise comparison 
between different capitalizations of firms, there are also significant differences (at the 0.10 
level) between MidCap firms and SmallCap firms in terms of CGDscore, q, and DivPay 
for various years (Table 9.11 in Chapter 9).   Only in terms of DivPay in year 2003 are 
significant differences (at the 0.05 level) found between LargeCap and SmallCap firms. 
 
Although a  t-test may be valid and sufficient for a pair comparison, in a family or group of 
pair comparisons, a t-test may be incapable of distinguishing a significant difference 
without jeopardizing the overall, group-wise, level of confidence. For instance, if a 0.05 
level is selected as the threshold for rejecting the null hypothesis, a series of pair 
comparisons between A and B, B and C, and A and C may show there is no significance at 
0.05 level separately, suggesting that A, B, C are not different from each other. However, 
the joint level of significance is lowered to 0.95 x 0.95 x 0.95 = 0.86, meaning that the 
threshold for rejecting the null hypothesis is relaxed to 1.00 – 0.86 = 0.14, which is far less 
stringent than the original 0.05 level.  In this section, an ANOVA test (which allows a 
group-wise t-test) is applied to the sample firms on three aspects: (i) the level of CG 
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disclosure, (ii) market valuation of firms as proxied by Tobin’s q, and (iii) the value 
relevance of disclosure, for these three groups of firms.  Hypothesis 3 is therefore to be 
tested by a model with 3 extensions:  
i) Model 3.0 tests the differences in the levels of CG disclosure;  
ii) Model 3.1 tests the differences in the level of Tobin’s q; and  
iii) Model 3.2 tests the strength of value relevance of disclosure. 
  
Model 3.2 is to be further subdivided into two versions. Model 3.2a for comparing 
LargeCap firms with MidCap firms and SmallCap firms; whereas Model 3.2b is used to 
compare the SmallCap firms with the other two types of firms with an interaction variable 
CG*DV_S (see section 10.7.3 below). If the ANOVA test results show that there is no 
significant difference between the three groups of firms, then the hypothesis can be 
rejected.  However, if the ANOVA results show evidence that there may be significant 
differences amongst the groups, a further post hoc test is conducted which can reveal 
which pair(s) of firm groups is different from the other, while keeping the overall 
significance level for the group-wise test unaltered at 0.05 level. The results of the tests are 
reported in the following subsections.  
 
10.7.1 Testing systematic differences in CG disclosure in Model 3.0 
 
Model 3.0 sets out to test hypothesis H3a, which is re-stated from Section 8.8.5 of Chapter 
8 as follows: 
Hypothesis H3a 
H3a: There are systematic differences in the voluntary CG disclosure of LargeCap firms, 
MidCap firms, and SmallCap firms.  
 
To specify the functional form of Model 3.0, a null hypothesis H0 can be set up which 
states that the mean CGDscore of all 3 groups are equal, and the alternate hypothesis that 
states otherwise:  
 
Model 3.0  
Testing the mean of CGDscores of 3 types of firms with the null hypothesis: 
 
H0: CGL = CGM = CGS
H1: At least one of them is different    (Model 3.0) 
 
where CGL is the mean CGD Score of LargeCap firms, CGM is the mean CGD Score of 
MidCap firms, and CGS is the mean CGD Score of SmallCap firms.  The results are shown 
in Table 10.11. 
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Table 10.11 ANOVA single factor test of mean CGDscore for LargeCap, MidCap, and 
SmallCap firms 
 
Summary 
Groups Count Sum Average Variance 
CGDscore L 36 1461.697 40.603 313.459 
CGDscore M 82 3758.298 45.833 596.608 
CGDscore S 140 5606.742 40.048 421.993 
ANOVA 
Source of Variation SS df MS F P-value F crit 
Between Groups 1807.991 2 903.996 1.954 0.144 3.031
Within Groups 117953.442 255 462.563    
Total 119761.434 257         
 
 
10.7.1.1 Result implications of Model 3.0 
The results of the ANOVA test in Table 10.11 show that the F statistic is 1.954 and has a 
p-value 0.144 which is not significant at the 0.05 level.  Therefore, in Model 3.0, the null 
hypothesis H0: CGL = CGM = CGS cannot be rejected. Over the 3-year study period, there 
may be differences in the mean CGDscores for the LargeCap firms, MidCap firms, and 
SmallCap firms; but their differences are not significantly different from one another at a 
group-wise 0.05 level.  Therefore, there is no evidence of systematic difference amongst 
the three groups of firms (i.e., LargeCap, MidCap, and SmallCap) in terms of their overall 
CGDscores during the 3-year period.  The differences in their CGDscore, if any, are not 
due to their market capitalization. 
 
10.7.2 Testing systematic differences in market valuation with Model 
3.1 
 
Model 3.1 sets out to test Hypothesis H3b, which is re-stated from Chapter 8 as follows: 
Hypothesis H3b 
H3b: There are systematic differences in the market valuation as proxied by q amongst 
the LargeCap, MidCap, and SmallCap firms.  
 
In this test, the q is not winsorized. ANOVA test is used to test the null hypothesis, which 
is stated together with the alternative hypothesis for a two-tailed test, subject to the degree 
of freedom offered by the sample size of LargeCap, MidCap, and SmallCap firms, as 
follows: 
Model 3.1a 
H0: QL  -  QM = 0 
H1: QL  -  QM ≠  0     (Model 3.1a) 
 323
 
Model 3.1b 
H0: QL  -  Qs = 0 
H1: QL  -  Qs ≠  0     (Model 3.1b) 
 
Model 3.1c 
H0: QM  -  QS = 0 
H1: QM  -  QS ≠  0     (Model 3.1c) 
 
where QL  is the mean q of L firms (sample size = 36), QM  is the mean q of M firms  
(sample size = 82), and QS is the mean q of S firms (sample size = 140). Results of the 
ANOVA test are shown in Table 10.12. 
 
Since the sample size changes in the years of study, the above-mentioned ANOVA test is 
applied across different groupings of firms on a year-by-year basis to see if there are any 
significant differences between the LargeCap, MidCap, and SmallCap firms.  
 
Table 10.12 ANOVA single factor test of mean q of LargeCap, MidCap, and SmallCap firms, 
2003-2005 
 
Summary 
Groups Count Sum Average Variance 
QL 36 50.258 1.396 0.587 
QM 82 157.982 1.949 2.362 
QS 140 198.964 1.421 0.920 
ANOVA 
Source of Variation SS df MS F P-value F crit 
Between Groups 15.925 2 7.963 5.977 0.003 3.031
Within Groups 339.695 255 1.332    
Total 355.620 257         
 
The ANOVA test shows that the F statistic has a p-value 0.003 which is significant at 0.05 
level. A further test, the Tukey-Kramer test of ANOVA6, is carried out to identify which 
pair(s) of firms show a significant difference in their mean q’s. The results are shown in 
Table 10.13. 
 
                                                 
6 Tukey-Kramer Test is one of the post hoc tests that is applied to compare all different combinations of 
groups. It is similar to performing a t-test on each pair of groups but it controls for the familywise error by 
correcting the level of significance for each test such that the overall type I error rate (α) across all 
comparisons remains at 0.05 (see Field (2000), p. 274). 
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Table 10.13 Tukey-Kramer Test of mean q of LargeCap, MidCap, and SmallCap firms, 2003-
2005 
 
Summary 
Level of sig. 0.05
Numerator d.f. 3
Denominator d.f. 255
MSW 1.332
Q Statistic 3.31
Tukey-Kramer Test  
Group 
Sample 
Mean 
Sample 
Size Comparison 
Abs. 
Diff. 
S.E. 
of 
Diff. 
Crit. 
Range Results 
QL 1.396 36 QL to QM 0.531 0.145 0.482 
Means are 
different 
QM 1.949 82 QL to QS 0.025 0.136 0.451 
Means are not 
different 
QS 1.421 140 QM to QS 0.555 0.102 0.336 
Means are 
different 
 
The Tukey-Kramer Test results in Table 10.10 show that, in terms of the mean q over the 
3-year study period, there is a difference between the LargeCap firms and the MidCap 
firms, which is statistically significant (the absolute difference, 0.531, is larger than the 
critical range 0.482). Similarly, a statistically significant difference is found between the 
MidCap firms and the SmallCap firms.  However, the difference between LargeCap firms 
and SmallCap firms are not significantly different. The empirical results suggest that 
market valuation of MidCap firms is quite different from that of LargeCap firms or 
SmallCap firms. This is consistent with the findings in the pair-wise t-tests between 
different types of firms with respect to q on year-to-year basis (as shown in Table 9.11 in 
Chapter 9).   
 
10.7.2.1 Result  implications of Model 3.1 
The ANOVA test results as reported in Table 10.12 indicate a very small p-value (0.003) 
for Model 3.1, which is highly significant at 0.05 level. After conducting the Tukey-
Kramer test, it is found that that there are systematic differences amongst LargeCap, 
MidCap, and SmallCap firms in terms of q over the 3-year study (as shown in Table 10.13). 
Hence, Hypothesis H3b, that postulates systematic differences in the market valuation 
(proxied by Tobin’s q) amongst LargeCap, MidCap, and SmallCap firms in the sample, 
cannot be rejected.  
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10.7.3 Testing value relevance of CG disclosure for SmallCap firms 
relative to other firms in Model 3.2a and Model 3.2b 
 
As mentioned earlier in Section 10.7, Model 3.2 has two versions, Models 3.2a and 3.2b, 
which are set out to test the third aspect of Hypothesis 3.  H3 is related to the strength of 
the relationship between CG disclosure and firm valuation for various firms.  It is 
hypothesized that, due to the differences in firms by market capitalization, the strength of 
the relationship between CG disclosure and firm valuation may differ across LargeCap, 
MidCap, and SmallCap firms.  Hence, it calls for a test to ascertain as to whether the 
strength differs systematically amongst them. As discussed in Section 8.8.5 in Chapter 8, 
the following three sub-hypotheses are postulated: 
 
H3c: There are systematic differences in the strength of relationship between voluntary CG 
disclosure and firm valuation of LargeCap firms and MidCap firms. 
 
H3d: There are systematic differences in the strength of relationship between voluntary 
CG disclosure and firm valuation of MidCap firms and SmallCap firms. 
 
H3e: There are systematic differences in the strength of relationship between voluntary CG 
disclosure and firm valuation of LargeCap firms and SmallCap firms. 
 
To test the systematic differences amongst the sample firms, an incremental-difference 
approach is used to test the above hypotheses (discussed in Section 8.8.5 of Chapter 8).  
Firstly, three dummy variables, DV_L, DV_M, and DV_S, are assigned as identifiers to 
each firm of the LargeCap-, MidCap-, and SmallCap sample respectively. A value ‘1’ is 
assigned to the dummy variable if the firm belongs to its respective group, and ‘0’ if 
otherwise. Then the CGDscore of each sample firm is multiplied by the value of its 
respective dummy variable to form three sets of interaction variables: CG*DV_L for 
LargeCap firms, CG*DV_M for MidCap firms, and CG*DV_S for SmallCap firms 
accordingly. These three sets of interaction variables demonstrate the joint outcome of 
market capitalization and the CGDscore for each sample firm. Compared to a pre-selected 
group of firms (the base group), a sample firm is considered to have a systematic 
difference from the base group if its joint outcome shows a statistically significant 
difference from that of the base group.  
 
To test whether there are systematic differences in the value relevance of voluntary 
disclosure of firms, a regression model is specified using Wq (i.e., winsorized q at 5% and 
95%) as the dependent variable, and using the joint outcome of market capitalization and 
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CGDscore as explanatory variable, controlling for other firm characteristics.  Selected 
LargeCap firms as the base group for comparison, two dummy variables (DV_M and 
DV_S) and two interaction variables (CG*DV_M and CG*DV_S) are included as 
explanatory variables in the regression model. The coefficients of DV_M and DV_S thus 
estimated from the model shall reflect the differences from the Intercept (i.e., 0, which 
represents the coefficient of the base group DV_L); thus the significance of their 
differences with respect to the base group (i.e., DV_L) can be tested. Similarly, the 
coefficients of the interaction variables (i.e., CG*DV_M and CG*DV_S) thus estimated 
will indicate the difference in the slope of the regression function for the MidCap and 
SmallCap firms as compared to the LargeCap firms. A t-test on these coefficients will 
indicate whether there are systematic differences across firms of different market 
capitalization groups in terms of the value relevance of their voluntary disclosure.   
 
Model 3.2a is therefore set up to test the value relevance of the joint disclosure with market 
capitalization for MidCap firms relative to LargeCap firms,  and that of SmallCap firms 
relative to LargeCap firms whilst controlling for CG practices variables and company 
characteristics variables. The model is given by the condensed functional form as follows:  
 
Model 3.2a 
Wqi,t  = β0 + β1CGscorei,t  + β2ΣCGpraci,t +  β3ΣComChari,t  +  β4DV_Mi,t + β5DV_Si,t 
            + β6CG*DV_Mi,t + β7CG*DV_Si,t  + εi, t    (Model 3.2a) 
 
where: 
Wq, CGDscore, CGprac, ComChar, DV_M, DV_S, CG*DV_M, and CG*DV_S are as 
previously defined; β0 is the intercept, β1, β4, β5, β6, and β7 are parameter estimates;  β2, β3 
are vectors; εt is the error term; subscript i denotes the firm i where i = 1,2, 3…, n; 
subscript t denotes fiscal year where t=1, 2, 3. 
 
While Model 3.2a compares MidCap firms and SmallCap firms individually to LargeCap 
firms, Model 3.2b is used to test the value relevance of CGD Score for the SmallCap firms 
relative to the combined group of LargeCap and MidCap (L+M) firms.  The dummy 
variables for the combined L+M firms are therefore set as zero.  Hence, Model 3.2b has the 
condensed functional form as follows:   
 
 Model 3.2b                    
Wqi,t  = β0 + β1 CGscorei,t  + β2ΣCGpraci,t +  β3ΣComChari t  +  β4DV_Si,t   
+ β5CG*DV_Si,t  + εi, t     (Model 3.2b) 
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where: 
Wq, CGDscore, CGprac, ComChar, DV_M, DV_S, CG*DV_M, and CG*DV_S are as 
previously defined; β0 is the intercept, β1, β4, and β5, are parameter estimates; β2, β3 are 
vectors; εt is the error term; subscript i denotes the firm i where i = 1, 2, 3…, n; subscript t 
denotes fiscal year where t=1, 2, 3.  Results of the Model 3.2a and Model 3.2b are shown 
in Table 10.14 on the next page. 
 
From Table 10.14, it can be seen that the results for both Model 3.2a (column 2) and 
Model 3.2b (column 3) are very similar.  Both models indicate that the dummy variables 
for the SmallCap firms (DV_S) have negative coefficients and are highly significant at 
0.01 level. In Model 3.2a, the coefficient on DV_S is -2.001 (row 18, column 2), 
suggesting that SmallCap firms have a lower mean q than that of the base group (LargeCap 
firms).   However, the joint variable CG*DV_S (row 20, column 2) is not significant. It 
implies that there is no systematic difference that is statistically significant in the strength 
of value relevance of CG disclosure, between SmallCap and LargeCap firms.  Also, the 
joint variable CG*DV_M in Model 3.2a has an insignificant coefficient (row 19, column 
2), indicating that the strength of the relationship for MidCap firms is not significantly 
different from that for the base group of LargeCap firms, thus affirming that the value 
relevance model can be equally applied to LargeCap firms, MidCap firms, and SmallCap 
firms alike. 
 
Company Characteristics variables (ComChar variables), comprised of Return on Equity 
(ROE), Sales Income (LnSales), Equity of the firm (LnEqty), and Debt/Asset ratio 
(Debt/TA), continue to be significant variables that affect a firm’s market value (Wq).  This 
is consistent with the findings from previous models that a firm’s market valuation is 
primarily driven by its financial performance and capital structure (R2 is about 0.47, 
meaning 47% of the variations of the dependent variable Wq can be explained by the 
variations of the explanatory variables in both models). 
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Table 10.14 Test results of value relevancy of the joint CG disclosure and market 
capitalization of firms. Dependent variable = Wq.  
 1 2 3 
1 Model 
 
3.2a 3.2b 
2 Firms 
 
L + M + S L + M + S
3 Observations 
 
258 258
4 Intercept 12.338**
(0.0001)
10.388**
(0.0001)
5 CGDscore -0.005
(0.597)
-0.004
(0.326)
6 BoDsize -0.067
(0.126)
-0.060
(0.168)
7 NumINED 0.061
(0.643)
0.078
(0.550)
8 INED% -0.013
(0.364)
-0.013
(0.354)
9 Dir%Own -0.001
(0.660)
-0.001
(0.566)
10 SplitRole 0.161
(0.195)
0.153
(0.220)
11 DualList 0.040
(0.766)
-0.099
(0.445)
12 ROE 0.020**
(0.0001)
0.020**
(0.0001)
13 LnSales 0.176**
(0.002)
0.195**
(0.001)
14 W_SalGrow -0.001
(0.448)
0.000
(0.520)
15 LnEqty -0.542**
(0.0001)
-0.497**
(0.0001)
16 Debt/TA -0.025**
(0.0001)
-0.025**
(0.0001)
17 DV_M -0.491
(0.257)
n.a.
18 DV_S -2.001**
(0.0001)
-1.519**
(0.0001)
19 CG*DV_M 0.002
(0.812)
n.a.
20 CV*DV_S 0.009
(0.301)
0.008
(0.131)
21 Adj. R2 
 
0.472 0.470
22 Significance F 
 
0.0001** 0.0001**
 
(Notes: P-values are shown in brackets.  Coefficients are bold if p-values < 0.10; * if p-values < 0.05; and ** 
if p-values < 0.01. Sample size= 258 firms-years from 2003-2005.)  
 
10.7.3.1 Result implications of Model 3.2a and Model 3.2b 
For Model 3.2a, firms that belong to the SmallCap category have a significantly lower q 
than those belong to the LargeCap and MidCap category. The interaction variables of 
CG*DV_M and CG*DV_S are not significant (Table 10.14, rows 19 and 20, column 2). 
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The results indicate that the slopes of the CG–and-market capitalization interaction 
variables for MidCap firms and SmallCap firms are not significantly different from the 
slope for LargeCap firms. Hence, there is no evidence to suggest that the value relevance 
of CGDscore differs amongst the 3 market capitalization groups of firms. Hypothesis H3c, 
that there are systematic differences in the strength of relationship between voluntary CG 
disclosure and market value (Wq) among LargeCap, MidCap, and SmallCap firms, is not 
supported. 
 
For Model 3.2b, amongst all the dummy variables, only the DV_S is significant, but 
negative (Table 10.14, row 18, column 3). The interaction variable CG*DV_S is not 
significant.  This is in comparison with the dummy variable DV_L+M and CG*DV_L+M, 
which are selected as the base categories. There is no evidence to support that the strength 
of value relevance of CG disclosure for S firms differs from the combined L+M firms. 
Hence, hypothesis H3c, that there are systematic differences in the strength of relationship 
between voluntary CG disclosure and market valuation (Wq) among LargeCap, MidCap, 
and SmallCap firms, is not supported. 
 
Because the interactive terms in Model 3.2a (namely, CG*DV_M and CG*DV_S) are not 
statistically significant, implying that the value relevancy of the CG disclosure has no 
statistical differences between LargeCap, MidCap, and SmallCap firms, a further 
robustness test based on the simple regression model using CGDscore (Model 1.0) is re-
estimated with the inclusion of these dummy variables DV_M, DV_S and the dummy joint 
variables CG*DV_M and CG*DV_S.   No other CGprac variables or ComChar variables 
are included.  The test results are shown in Table 10.15.   
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Table 10.15 Test results of value relevancy of the joint CG disclosure and market 
capitalization of firms using basic model. Dependent variable = Wq.  
 
 1 2 3 
1 Model 
 3.2c 
3.2d 
2 Firms 
 L+M+S 
 
L+M+S
3 Observations 
 258 
258 
4 
Intercept 1.587** (0.001)  
1.659**
(0.0001)
5 
CGDscore -0.005 (0.654)  
0.002 
(0.598) 
6 
DV_M 0.221 (0.678)  
n.a. 
7 
CG*DV_M 0.007 (0.530)  
n.a. 
8 
DV_S -0.406 (0.423)  
-0.478 
(0.117) 
9 
CG*DV_S 0.011 (0.318)  
0.004 
(0.501) 
10 Adj. R2 0.033 0.018 
11 Significance F 0.019* 0.057 
 
The outcome of Model 3.2c represents the test on the differential impact of CGDscore on 
Wq for the MidCap firms and for the SmallCap firms relative to LargeCap firms.  The two 
interactive terms, CG*DV_M (Table 10.15, row 7, column 2) and CG*DV_S (row 9, 
column 2) are not statistically significant.  Similar results are observed for the intercept and 
coefficients for Model 3.2d.  In sum, they are consistent with the results in the previous 
Models 3.2a and 3.2b as shown in Table 10.14.  Therefore, it can be concluded that the 
joint product of CG disclosure and market capitalization shows no statistical difference in 
explaining the market valuation of the firm. 
 
In conclusion, SmallCap firms have a distinctive market valuation q, which is significantly 
affected by their voluntary CG disclosure (as shown in the simple regression model, Model 
1.0_S in Table 10.1).  However, the joint product of CG disclosure and market 
capitalization shows no differentiation power in distinguishing SmallCap firms from 
LargeCap firms, suggesting no statistical difference in the value relevancy of their CG 
disclosure.  Therefore, the fact that SmallCap firms are different in terms of the impact of 
CGDscore on q may be attributable to some other characteristics that are specific to 
SmallCap firms but are not able to be reflected by the firms’ market capitalization.  
Information asymmetry faced by SmallCap firms, for instance, may be one of those 
candidates of characteristic that would be distinctly affecting the market valuation of a firm. 
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 Taking these findings together, the evidence suggests that voluntary CG disclosure level 
(from Model 3.0 above), and the value relevancy of the voluntary CG disclosure (from 
Models 3.2a - 3.2d), exhibit no systematic differences for LargeCap, MidCap, or SmallCap 
firms during the study period.  Therefore, combining LargeCap and MidCap firms into a 
merged L+M sample will not be expected to average out their essential characteristics 
(hence distort results of the regression models) but pooling LargeCap, MidCap, and 
SmallCap firms into an L+M+S sample may run the risk of averaging out the 
distinctiveness of SmallCap firms. To further ascertain the distinctiveness of SmallCap 
firms, a robustness test has been conducted using a non-parametric test, Rank Regression.  
The results of Rank Regression give the similar outcome as the Ordinary Least Square 
Regression.  The results obtained in Models 3.2a and 3.2b, therefore, appear to be robust 
(see Section 10.10.3).   
 
10.8 Testing the effect of CG disclosure on dividend payout  
 
Hypothesis 4 (H4) is set on the relationship between the dividend payout (DivPay) and the 
CG disclosure of a firm, which is tested with Model 4.0. Dividend Payout ratio (DivPay) 
becomes the dependent variable in the model.   
 
As previously defined in Section 7.2.2 of Chapter 7, Dividend Payout ratio (DivPay) is 
defined as the dividend per share (DPS) divided by earnings per share (EPS) expressed in 
percentage. By default, if there is a very small denominator, e.g., an EPS close to zero or a 
negative EPS, the value of dividend payout can be affected unduly.  For the purpose of 
analysis in this study, where DPS is paid in excess of EPS, the dividend payout ratio is 
capped at 100%. Where dividends are paid despite the fact that the firm suffers a loss, i.e. a 
negative EPS, the DivPay is assigned with the value of 100%. After applying this 
adjustment to the data, maximum DivPay is capped at 100%, with range of 0 – 100%. The 
frequency distribution of dividend payout for all firms in the study period is shown in 
Figure 10.4. It suggests a symmetrical distribution with DivPay for most firms, clustering 
around 31-50%. 
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Figure 10.4 Frequency distribution of Dividend Payout for Pooled Sample 
 
 
 
Model 4.0 is set up to test Hypothesis 4 (H4), which is quoted from Section 8.8.6 of 
Chapter 8 as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 4 
H4: Under a strong legal protection regime, high corporate governance ranking firms have 
lower dividend payout ratios, ceteris paribus, than low corporate governance ranking 
firms. 
 
Following the sequence of discussion of models in Chapter 8, three preliminary models are 
set up to test the relationship between DivPay and the CG disclosure, CG practices, and 
firm performances for the three samples, namely, the L+M+S sample, the L+M sample, 
and the S sample.  Dividend payout (DivPay) is regressed on CGDscore, CG Practices 
variables (CGprac) and Company Characteristics variables (ComChar). The functional 
form of Model 4.0 is as follows: 
 
Model 4.0 
DivPayi,t  = β0 + β1CGscorei,t  + β2ΣCGpraci,t +  β3ΣComChari,t  + εi t (Model 4.0) 
 
Where DivPay, CGDscore, CGprac are as previously defined; β0  is the intercept,  β1 is the 
parameter estimate; β2, β3 are vectors;  εt is the error term; subscript i denotes the firm i 
where i = 1,2, 3…,n; subscript t denotes fiscal year where t=1, 2, 3. 
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As discussed in Chapter 8, Model 4.0 will be applied to the similar groupings of sample 
firms as in the testing of Hypothesis 1, namely, the pooled L+M+S sample of all firms, the 
combined L+M sample of LargeCap and MidCap firms,  and  the S sample of Small firms.   
 
Hence, Model 4.0 has three extended models: (i) Model 4.0_LMS for the pooled L+M+S 
sample; (ii) Model 4.0_LM for the combined L+M sample, and (iii) Model 4.0_S for the S 
sample. Results of the regressions of all three models are presented in Table 10.16 on the 
following page. 
 
All three models are significant with F values less than 0.0001 (Table 10.16, row 18).  In 
the L+M+S sample (column 2, Model 4.0_LMS), Board Size (row 6, column 2) and 
Director Ownership (row 9, column 2) are the significant CG Practices variables that affect 
the Dividend Payout ratio. The same variables are also found to be significant for the L+M 
sample. However, they are not significant for the S sample (rows 6 and 9, column 4). 
 
For the L+M sample, results of Model 4.0_LM indicate that the number of INEDs and the 
level of directors’ ownership are significant factors that would negatively affect Dividend 
Payout (Table 10.16, rows 7 and 9, column 3).  It seems to suggest that the higher the level 
of insiders’ ownership and the more the INEDs on the board, the lower the dividend payout 
it will be for the firm.   
 
SmallCap firms seem to be different in terms of the relationship between their Dividend 
Payout ratio and their CG practices.  None of the CG Practices variables are significant at 
any reasonable level (Table 10.16, rows 5 – 11, column 4). Meanwhile, the Company 
Characteristics variables that are significantly related to Dividend Payout are similar to 
firms in the L+M+S sample or in the L+M sample.  The coefficient of the intercept (row 4, 
column 4) in Model 4.0_S is highly significant at the 0.01 level, suggesting that some 
explanatory variables may be missing from the model. 
 
All in all, the evidence from Model 4.0 and its extended versions indicate that, for 
SmallCap firms, the Dividend Payout is affected by factors that are different from those for 
the LargeCap and MidCap firms combined, or from those for a pooled sample composed 
of firms mixed with different market capitalization.   Hence, it is more appropriate to 
single out SmallCap firms for analysis. 
 
Another observation from the results of the models in Table 10.16 is that the CG disclosure, 
does not seem to have any significant impact on DivPay of the firms for all samples.   This 
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seems to be at odds with La Porta et al’s (2000b) conjecture, which posits that dividends 
have a monitoring role to play and are expected to be related to the state of a firm’s CG.  
Since the main channel of information about a firm’s CG is through the voluntary 
disclosure, by the management, in the firm’s annual reports, the CGDscore should be able 
to reflect – at least partially – some association with DivPay.   An exploration of any 
potential joint effect of CG ranking and insiders’ ownership appears to be worthwhile. This 
will be tested by Model 4.1 as specified in Chapter 8 and the empirical results will be 
further discussed in Section 10.9 of this Chapter.   
Table 10.16 Results of Dividend Payout regressed on CGDscore, CG Practices variables and 
Company Characteristics variables for the three samples. Dependent variable = DivPay.                      
 1 2 3 4 
1 Model 
 
4.0_LMS 4.0_LM 4.0_S  
2 Sample 
 
L+M+S L+M S 
3 Observations 
 
258 118 140 
4 Intercept 48.471
(0.214)
129.378
(0.100)
204.590** 
(0.004) 
5 CGDscore -0.067
(0.424)
-0.141
(0.183)
0.074 
(0.542) 
6 BoDsize 2.601*
(0.042)
4.874*
(0.022)
2.631 
(0.192) 
7 NumINED -2.596
(0.497)
-13.178
(0.046)
-1.302 
(0.836) 
8 INED% 0.447
(0.287)
1.743*
(0.033)
0.082 
(0.882) 
9 Dir%Own -0.200**
(0.009)
-0.499**
(0.001)
-0.113 
(0.227) 
10 SplitRole 4.912
(0.173)
9.057
(0.095)
-4.158 
(0.396) 
11 DualList -4.234
(0.271)
-3.212
(0.507)
-6.223 
(0.295) 
12 ROE -0.330**
(0.004)
-0.703**
(0.005)
-0.274* 
(0.042) 
13 LnSales 6.161**
(0.0001)
7.264**
(0.004)
1.826 
(0.461) 
14 W_SalGrow -0.065**
(0.004)
-0.058
(0.117)
-0.072** 
(0.012) 
15 LnEqty -6.593**
(0.000)
-11.306**
(0.000)
-9.322** 
(0.001) 
16 Debt/TA -0.259*
(0.011)
-0.209
(0.139)
-0.499** 
(0.001) 
17 Adj. R2 
 
0.158 0.230 0.216 
18 Significance F 
 
0.0001** 0.0001** 0.0001** 
(Notes: P-values are shown in brackets.  Coefficients are bold if p-values < 0.10; * if p-values < 0.05; and ** 
if p-values < 0.01)  
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10.9 Testing the joint effect of CG rank and directors’ ownership on 
dividend payout 
 
Model 4.1 sets out to test hypothesis H5 that under a strong legal protection regime, high 
corporate governance ranking firms have lower dividend payout ratios, ceteris paribus, 
than low corporate governance ranking firms.  The 2x3 matrix, used previously in Model 
1.3 and specifying  the CG_RankOwn Groups namely HL, HM, HP, LL, LM, and LP, is 
applied to the  pooled sample, the sample of LargeCap and MidCap firms combined (L+M), 
and the sample of SmallCap firms (see Table 10.17 below). Similar to Model 1.3, each 
CG_RankOwn Group is assigned with a dummy variable (DV_HL, DV_HM, DV_HP, 
DV_LL, DV_LM, and DV_LP) accordingly. The regression model for testing H5 is 
specified as follows: 
 
Model 4.1 
DivPayi,t = β0 + β1CGDscorei,t  +  β∑
=
k
j 1
jCGpraci,t + β∑
=
p
m 1
mComChari,t  
                      + β2DV_HMi,t + β3DV_HPi,t + β4DV_LLi,t + β5DV_LMi,t  
                      + β6DV_LPi,t  + εi,t                  (Model 4.1)  
where: 
DivPayi,t is the dividend payout ratio by firm i in year t; CGDscorei,t, CGpraci,t, are as 
previously defined; DV_HMi,t ,  DV_HPi,t , DV_LLi,t , DV_LMi,t , and DV_LPi,t  are 
dummy variables as defined in Model 1.3; ComChari,t denotes a set of company 
characteristic variables consisting of: 
ROEi,t    = return on equity; 
LnSalesi,t  = natural log of a firm’s sales; 
SalGrowi,t  = Sales growth over previous year; 
LnEqtyi,t   = natural log of a firm’s equity; 
Debt/TAi,t = debt ratio (i.e., Debt/Total Assets) expressed in percentage; 
 
β0 ,  β1…  β6 are parameter estimates;   βj, βm are vectors;  εi,t is the error term; subscript i 
denotes the firm i where i = 1,2, 3…,n; subscript t denotes fiscal year where t=1, 2, 3; 
subscript k = 1,2,…,5; and subscript p = 1,2,…,5. 
 
Before proceeding with the regression analysis, an inspection of the sampling frame of 
each sample (i.e. L+M+S firms, L+M firms, and S firms) is taken to evaluate if the sample 
size is adequate for each CG_RankOwn Group.  It is found that for the sample of L+M 
firms (as shown in Panel B, Table 10.17), there are only 7 firms in the low Director 
Ownership category. Of these 7 firms, none belongs to the low CG_Rank class.  The small 
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number of firms in this Low-CG-Rank-Low-Ownership group may pose some restraints on 
the interpretation of regression results. As discussed earlier, a small sample size may bias 
the results of a parametric analysis.  A non-parametric test (such as the Kruskal-Wallis 
Rank Test), on the contrary, may overcome the small sample size problem because 
inferences drawn from non-parametric tests are based on a test statistic whose sampling 
distribution does not depend on the specific distribution of the population (Gibbons, 1993, 
p.2). 
 
Table 10.17 Sampling frame for Model 4.1 
 Dir% Own Group  
 
CG_Rank 
Low  
(0-25%) 
Medium 
(25-50%)
Predominant 
(50%+) Total
Panel A: L+M+S firms (median CG = 34.43) 
High 31 40 58 129
Low 18 44 67 129
Total 49 84 125 258
Panel B: L+M firms (median CG = 42.15) 
High 7 24 28 59
Low 0 23 36 59
Total 7 47 64 118
Panel C: S firms (median CG = 31.68) 
High 24 14 32 70
Low 18 23 29 70
Total 42 37 61 140
 
A Kruskal-Wallis rank test is applied to the L+M sample (Panel B, Table 10.17) to test 
whether the CG_RankOwn groups in each sampling frame are significantly different in 
terms of their mean dividend payout (DivPay). The null hypothesis of the test is: 
Ho: DHL = DHM = DHP = DLL = DLM = DLP
where DHL…DLP are the mean DivPay of the CG_RankOwn groups HL…LP,  respectively. 
The results of the Kruskal-Wallis test are reported in Table 10.18. 
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Table 10.18 Kruskal-Wallis Rank Test for differences in DivPay of 5 CG_RankOwn Groups 
of firms in the L+M sample. Sample size = 118 
 
 
Group Sample Size Sum of Ranks Mean Ranks 
HL 7 593.5 84.79
HM 24 1688.0 70.33
HP 28 1141.0 40.75
LM 23 1515.5 65.89
LP 36 2083.0 57.86
Sum of Squared Ranks/Sample Size 435921.7
Sum of Sample Sizes 118
Number of Groups 5
H Test Statistic 15.530
Critical Value 9.488
p-Value 0.004
In Table 10.18, only five CG_OwnRank groups (i.e., HL, HM, HP, LM, and LP) are tested 
as the LL group has no entry. The p-value for the test statistics is 0.004 which is highly 
significant at 0.01 level.  Hence, the null hypothesis that the mean Dividend Payout is 
similar for all five CG_OwnRank groups of the sample L+M firms is rejected.7   
 
The Kruskal-Wallis Rank Test is also run on the S sample of SmallCap firms (Panel C, 
Table 10.17). The results are shown in Table 10.19 below. The p-value of the test statistic 
is 0.021, also significant at the 0.05 level. Therefore, the null hypothesis that the mean 
Dividend Payout is similar for all 6 CG_OwnRank groups of the sample of SmallCap firms 
is rejected.  In sum, splitting of sample firms into those different CG_RankOwn groups 
seems to be meaningful for both the L+M sample and the S sample. 
 
Table 10.19 Kruskal-Wallis Rank Test for differences in mean DivPay of 6 CG_RankOwn 
Groups of firms in the S sample, sample size = 140 
 
Group Sample Size Sum of Ranks Mean Ranks 
HL 24 2124.5 88.52
HM 14 612.5 43.75
HP 32 2102.0 65.69
LL 18 1420.5 78.92
LM 23 1436.5 62.46
LP 29 2174.0 74.97
Sum of Squared Ranks/Sample Size 717729.5
Sum of Sample Sizes 140
Number of Groups 6
H Test Statistic 13.310
Critical Value 11.070
p-Value 0.021
                                                 
7 As a rule of thumb, Kruskal-Wallis Rank Test requests a sample size of no less than 5 per group within each 
category (see Anderson, Sweeney, Williams, Freeman, and Shoesmith, (2007), p.741). In Panel B  the L+M 
sample, the HL group has 7 firms. The test result therefore may still be valid. To make a robustness check, a 
similar Kruskal-Wallis Rank Test is run on 4 groups only (i.e., HM, HP, LM, and LP). The H-statistic is 
11.82 and the p-value is 0.008. Hence, the null hypothesis based on 4 groups is also rejected.  
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A regression of DivPay on CGprac variables, ComChar variables, and the CG_RankOwn 
group variables is undertaken for Models 4.1_LMS, 4.1_LM and 4.1_S respectively.  The 
regression results are presented in Table 10.20. 
 
Table 10.20: Results of Dividend Payout regressed on CG Practices variables, Company 
Characteristics variables, and CG_Rank dummy variables for the 3 samples  
 1 2 3 4 
1 Model 
 
4.1_LMS 4.1_LM 4.1_S 
2 Sample 
 
L+M+S L+M S 
3 Observations 
 
258 118 140 
4 Intercept 45.555
(0.246)
74.718
(0.354)
207.433* 
(0.003) 
5 BoDsize 2.182
(0.088)
5.237*
(0.013)
2.318 
(0.247) 
6 NumINED -1.764
(0.641)
-15.635*
(0.017)
-0.716 
(0.910) 
7 INED% 0.340
(0.415)
2.101*
(0.012)
0.057 
(0.918) 
8 SplitRole 4.960
(0.166)
11.809*
(0.030)
-1.905 
(0.679) 
9 Dual List -3.668
(0.339)
-1.609
(0.732)
-4.134 
(0.478) 
10 ROE -0.353))
(0.002)
-0.800**
(0.001)
-0.280* 
(0.028) 
11 LnSales 6.218**
(0.0001)
8.178**
(0.001)
2.400 
(0.320) 
12 W_SalGrow% -0.073**
(0.002)
-0.066*
(0.076)
-0.083** 
(0.003) 
13 LnEqty -6.215**
(0.0001)
-10.691**
(0.0001)
-9.530** 
(0.001) 
14 Debt/TA -0.244*
(0.018)
-0.195
(0.167)
-0.397* 
(0.010) 
15 DV_HM -15.298*
(0.018)
-10.710
(0.313)
-27.885** 
(0.002) 
16 DV_HP -21.416**
(0.0001)
-35.323**
(0.001)
-16.785* 
(0.016) 
17 DV_LL -8.444
(0.285)
n.a. -7.289 
(0.371) 
18 DV_LM -14.499*
(0.019)
-14.967
(0.168)
-19.949** 
(0.008) 
19 DV_LP -11.434
(0.051)
-21.757*
(0.045)
-9.961 
(0.174) 
20 Adj. R2 
 
0.170 0.255 0.264 
21 Significance F 
 
0.0001** 0.0001** 0.0001** 
 
(Notes: P-values are shown in brackets.  Coefficients are bold if p-values < 0.10; * if p-values < 0.05; and ** 
if p-values < 0.01)  
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The results in Table 10.20 show that Model 4.1_LMS and Model 4.1_S are similar in terms 
of the coefficients of their dummy variables of the joint CG rank and Director Ownership 
groups. Of the coefficients of the five dummy variables for the CG_RankOwn groups, four 
of them are common in terms of significance and directions.  Furthermore, all coefficients 
of these variables are all negative. This implies that, when compared to the base group of 
HL (i.e., High CG_rank and Low Dir%Own), all other combination groups exhibit a lower 
Dividend Payout.  This result is observed in both samples of L+M+S firms as well as the S 
firms.  The next section, Section 10.9.1, presents a discussion on the empirical findings of 
Model 4.1_LMS, followed by Sections 10.9.2 and 10.9.3 on Model 4.1_LM and Model 
4.1_S, respectively. 
 
10.9.1 Result implications of Model 4.1_LMS 
The coefficients for the six CG_RankOwn groups for the L+M+S sample are extracted 
from Table 10.20 and re-arranged in Table 10.21 below for comparison purposes. 
 
Table 10.21: Coefficients of dummy variables of CG_RankOwn on Dividend Pay for the 
L+M+S sample.  Sample size = 258. 
 
 Director Ownership (Dir%Own) 
CG rank  Low  
(0-25%) 
Medium 
(25-50%)
Predominant 
(50%+)
High 0 -15.298* 
(0.018) 
-21.416** 
(0.0001) 
Low -8.444 
(0.285) 
-14.499* 
(0.019) 
-11.434 
(0.051) 
(Notes: P-values are shown in brackets.  Coefficients are bold if p-values < 0.10; * if p-values < 0.05; and ** 
if p-values < 0.01)  
 
 
The results at Table 10.21 show that when the coefficients of all other five CG_RankOwn 
groups (i.e., HM, HP, LL, LM, and LP) are compared with that of the base group (HL), the 
coefficients are negative (i.e., less than zero).  The differences are significant except for the 
Low CG-rank-Low Dir%Own (LL) group. In graphical display, Figure 10.5 below helps to 
illustrate the significant differences in these joint CG_RankOwn groups in comparison 
with the base HL group in terms of their coefficients on DivPay.  In Figure 10.5, the pink 
line segment represents the high CG_rank groups of sample firms, while the blue line 
segment represents the low CG_rank groups for the firms in the L+M+S sample. 
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Figure 10.5  Coefficients of  CG_RankOwn dummy variables on dividend payout for the 
L+M+S sample. Sample Size = 258. Dependent variable = DivPay. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10.5 offers several interpretations. First, for high CG ranking firms, dividend payout 
(DivPay) is significantly less than the base group when directors’ ownership is at medium 
level (25%-50%).  The DivPay is least, and is highly significant, when directors’ 
ownership reaches the predominant level (>50%).  The pattern seems to suggest that, 
generally speaking, a firm with high CG ranking but characterized with a predominant 
insider ownership tend to exhibit the lowest level of dividend payout, ceteris paribus.  The 
dividend payout level is significantly less than the same for a firm with high CG ranking 
but low insiders’ ownership. This evidence lends support to La Porta et al’s (2000b) notion 
that investors would allow a firm with good CG practices to distribute a lower rate of 
dividends, under a strong investor legal protection environment.  
 
Second, for low CG ranking firms, a ‘V’-shaped pattern is observed with regard to the 
coefficients of dividend payout.  A low CG ranking firm with medium insiders’ ownership 
(25%-50%) tend to have the lowest dividend payout, relative to similar (i.e., low) CG 
ranking firms with low insiders’ ownership (0 – 25%) or predominant insiders’ ownership 
(> 50%).  The evidence suggests that, when the firms are not disclosing their CG 
information as much as others, investors will demand more dividend payout if they suspect 
agency problems or entrenchment problems to be present within the firm.    
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A third interpretation of Figure 10.5 is that the coefficient of DivPay for high CG rank 
firms is always less than that for low CG rank firms, at medium (25%-50%) or 
predominant (>50%) level of directors’ ownership.  Furthermore, the difference between 
the high CG rank and low CG rank firms in terms of their DivPay coefficients is the largest 
(21.416 – 11.434 = 9.982) for the Predominant directors’ ownership category.   The 
dividend payout ratios for low CG ranking firms are in sharp contrast with those for high 
CG ranking firms. Therefore, there is empirical evidence suggesting that a substitution 
effect may be present between dividend payout and CG ranking for firms with a 
predominant director’s ownership.  
 
To further examine whether higher CG ranking of a firm may substitute for dividend 
payout, it is necessary to analyze the results of Model 4.1_LM on the L+M sample and 
Model 4.1_S on the S sample. They will be presented in the following sections. 
 
10.9.2 Result implications of Model 4.1_LM 
 
Table 10.22 below shows the coefficients on the dummy variables of the 5 CG_RankOwn 
groups for the L+M sample firms. The High-CG_Rank-Low-Dir%Own (HL) group is the 
base group, hence has a zero coefficient.  The Low-CG_Rank-Low-Dir%Own (LL) group 
has no applicable entries. All the rest of the coefficients for the HM, HP, LM, and LP 
groups have negative coefficients, meaning that all these groups of firms are paying lower 
DivPay than the base group of HL firms. However, the coefficients for the HM and LM 
groups (having medium level of director ownership) are statistically insignificant.  Only 
those coefficients for the HP and LP groups are statistically significant. 
 
Table 10.22 Coefficients of dummy variables of CG_RankOwn on Dividend Payout for the 
L+M sample. Sample size = 118. 
 
 Director’s Ownership (Dir%Own) 
CG rank  Low  
(0-25%) 
Medium 
(25-50%)
Predominant 
(50%+)
High 0 -10.710 
(0.313) 
-35.323** 
(0.001) 
Low n.a. -14.967 
(0.168) 
-21.757* 
(0.045) 
(Notes: P-values are shown in brackets.  Coefficients are bold if p-values < 0.10; * if p-values < 0.05; and ** 
if p-values < 0.01) 
 
As for Model 4.1_LM, a chart is used to illustrate the relative positions of dividend payout 
(DivPay) for the LP and HP groups of the L+M sample firms. The chart is presented at 
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Figure 10.6 below. The pink line segment denotes the high CG ranking firms.  The blue 
line segment denotes the low CG ranking firms. 
 
Figure 10.6 Coefficients of CG_RankOwn dummy variables on dividend payout for the L+M 
sample. Sample Size = 118. Dependent variable = DivPay. 
 
 
Figure 10.6 shows that, for firms with Predominant director’s ownership in the L+M 
sample, those with high CG rank (i.e. the HP group) are associated with a lower dividend 
payout than those with low CG rank (i.e., the LP group). Their dividend payout ratios are 
significantly less than that of the base group (i.e., the HL group).  The evidence suggests 
that the high CG ranking of a firm can act as a substitute for dividend, and that the 
difference in the coefficients is quite a sizeable one (35.323 – 21.757 = 13.566).  The 
implication is that investors can allow a LargeCap or MidCap firm to pay up to 13.57 
percent points of Dividend Payout less than its counterpart if it has a high CG disclosure 
ranking, controlling for the same, predominant, level of directors’ ownership.  Outsiders 
seem to have more trust in the management of a firm with higher transparency in its CG 
disclosure.  
 
10.9.3 Result implications of Model 4.1_S 
 
For the sample of SmallCap firms, the coefficients on the dummy variables for the joint 
CG_RankOwn Groups for Model 4.1_S are extracted from Table 10.20, and tabulated in 
Table 10.23 as follows: 
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Table 10.23: Coefficients of CG_RankOwn dummy variables on dividend payout (DivPay) 
for the S sample.  Sample size = 140. 
 Director’s Ownership (Dir%Own) 
CG rank  Low  
(0-25%) 
Medium 
(25-50%)
Predominant 
(50%+)
High 0 -27.885**
(0.002)
-16.785*
(0.016)
Low -7.289 
(0.371) 
-19.949**
(0.008)
-9.961
(0.174)
 
(Notes: P-values are shown in brackets.  Coefficients are bold if p-values < 0.10; * if p-values < 0.05; and ** 
if p-values < 0.01) 
 
 
Unlike the case for the L+M sample, the S sample has sufficient number of firms for each 
of the CG_RankOwn Groups (see Table 10.17 Sampling frames), which enables the 
regression results to be compared for all 5 groups (HM, HP, LL, LM, and LP) against the 
base HL group of SmallCap firms.  The coefficients on the dummy variables of Model 
4.1_S are illustrated in Figure 10.7 below. The pink line segment denotes the High CG 
rank groups and the blue line segment denotes the Low CG rank groups of SmallCap firms 
in the S sample. As the coefficients of the LL and LP groups are not significant, there are 
limitations in interpreting the results pertaining to these two groups of Low CG rank firms.    
 
Figure 10.7 Coefficients of CG_RankOwn dummy variables on Dividend Payout for the S 
sample.  Sample Size = 140. 
 
 
 
Figure 10.7 illustrates two V-shapes of DivPay coefficients for the High CG rank firms and 
the Low CG rank firms in the S sample. Both groups of firms have their lowest dividend 
payout ratios when the firms have the medium level of directors’ ownership (25% - 50%).  
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Compared to the Low CG rank firms, the High CG rank firms have a minimum payout that 
is even lower.  Amongst the six groups of SmallCap firms, the High CG_Rank and 
Medium Director Ownership group (HM) has the lowest dividend payout, which is the 
largest difference (27.89 percent points) from that of the base group (HL), and is 
statistically significant.  
 
The evidence suggests that, whilst SmallCap firms are likely to have agency problems (as 
reflected by low insiders’ ownership of equity 0 - 25%), or susceptible to entrenchment 
problems (as represented by predominant insiders’ ownership > 50%), they will offer 
higher dividend payout ratios relative to firms with a medium insiders’ ownership (25% - 
50%).  Firms that do not succumb to either problem (i.e. with insiders’ ownership at 25-
50%) can afford to pay a lower dividend payout. This V-shape dividend payout pattern 
applies to both High CG ranking firms and Low CG ranking firms.  If the SmallCap firm 
has a high CG disclosure ranking, it can afford to pay an even lower dividend payout ratio 
than its counterpart with low CG ranking, with similar level of insiders’ ownership.  
 
Prior studies have established that a greater information asymmetry normally exists 
between insiders and outsiders in small firms than in large firms.  The findings as 
presented above give evidence that voluntary disclosure of CG information helps in the 
reduction of such information asymmetry, to an extent that there appears to be a 
substitution effect of voluntary CG disclosure for dividend payout.  This effect seems to be 
more pronounced for small firms (as represented by the SmallCap sample firms in this 
study) than for large firms or medium firms.  This substitution effect is present even when 
the investors are under a strong, legal, investor protection regime such as Hong Kong. 
 
Because the coefficients for firms in the LL and LP categories of CG_RankOwn groups are 
not significant, it is not clear whether a V-shape of dividend payout truly exists for the 
Low CG ranking firms.  However, the coefficient for the LM group of firms is significant 
(p-value = 0.008).  It is lower than that for the base group HL, but higher than the HM 
group. The interpretation of this empirical evidence is that, even for firms that are less 
succumbing to agency problem or entrenchment problem, a firm with low CG ranking has 
still to offer a higher dividend payout than its high CG ranking counterpart does. It seems 
that the market can differentiate high CG ranking firms from low CG ranking firms in its 
expectation on dividend payout; and that firms of various levels of CG ranking respond by 
offering different dividend payout ratios accordingly. 
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10.9.4 Model 5.1 and Model 5.2 
 
Hypothesis 5 (H5) as stated in Section 6.3.5 in Chapter 6 postulates that firms with insider 
ownership of 25% - 50% exhibit the lowest dividend payout ratio. It is re-stated as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 5 
H5: Firms that have insider ownership of 25% - 50% exhibit the lowest dividend payout 
ratio, compared to firms that have insider ownership of 0-25% or over 50%, ceteris 
paribus. 
 
Correspondingly, two models, Model 5.1 and Model 5.2, have been set up in Chapter 8 to 
evaluate the coefficients of the dummy variables of the CG_RankOwn groups.  They are 
re-stated as below: 
 
Model 5.1 
The coefficient of the dummy variable DV_HM is less than that of DV_HL and DV_HP in 
Model 4.1. 
 
Model 5.2 
The coefficient of the dummy variable DV_LM is less than that of DV_LL and DV_LP in 
Model 4.1. 
 
The empirical results from Model 4.1_LMS (as shown in column 2 of Table 10.20), and 
from the summary Table 10.21 that features the coefficients of the dummy variables for 
firms in the L+M+S sample, provide empirical evidence to support Hypothesis 5.  The 
empirical results from Model 4.1_S (as shown in column 4 of Table 10.20), and from its 
corresponding summary Table 10.23 on the S sample of SmallCap firms, also provide 
empirical evidence to support Hypothesis 5.  Only in Model 4.1_LM where the sample 
consists of LargeCap and MidCap firms (but with incomplete sample data for regression) 
is the evidence not in support of such hypothesis. 
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10.10 Robustness Tests 
 
Robustness tests are conducted to ascertain the validity of the results of an empirical test. 
In this section, the results of some robustness tests on key models in this study are 
presented and discussed. 
 
10.10.1 Robustness test on Model 1.2 
 
Model 1.2 regresses a firm’s Wq on its CGscore, CGprac, and ComChar variables: 
 
Wq = β0 + β1 CGDscorei,t + β2 ΣCGpraci t +  β3ΣComChari, t  + ε i, t…… (Model 1.2) 
 
where Wq is the approximation of Tobin’s q as defined in Section 10.2.1 and winsorized at 
5% and 95%. CGscore is the firm’s score of CG disclosure. ΣCGprac denotes a set of CG 
practices variables as mentioned in Section 10.2 above. ComChar denotes a set of 
company characteristics including return on equity (ROE), the natural log of sales 
(LnSales), the percentage of sales growth winsorized at 5% and 95% (W_SalGrow%), the 
natural log of equity (LnEqty), and the Debt/Asset ratio (Debt/TA). β0 is the intercept; β1,  
β2 are the coefficients of their respective parameters; and ε is the error term with i = 1, 2, 
3 …, nth firm and t runs for year 2003, 2004, and 2005 respectively.  
 
Model 1.2 is an extended model of Model 1.1, by including Company Characteristics 
variables into the regression model.  When applied onto the sample of LargeCap and 
MidCap (L+M) firms, Model 1.2_LM show that the coefficient on CGDscore is negative 
(i.e., -0.007), and becomes statistically significant (p-value = 0.025), which is not the case 
for Model 1.1_LM.  It suggests that the inclusion of additional variables may have caused 
such a change of significance.  An investigation of robustness is therefore necessary.  
 
10.10.2 Possible areas for robustness check on Model 1.2_LM 
Generally, there are four areas where problems may arise that weaken the robustness of a 
regression model (Gujarati, 1995, p. 319). They are the problems related to:  
(i) heteroscedasticity; 
(ii)  multi-collinearity; 
(iii)  endogeneity, and 
(iv)  autocorrelation.   
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As auto-correlation is mainly concerned with variables with time-series analysis, it is not 
considered in the robustness test of Model 1.2_LM in this section.  
 
1. Heteroscedasticity problem
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression models assume that the error terms of the 
classical linear regression function are homoscedastic, that is, they all have the same 
variance.  To assess whether the error terms are homoscedastic, a residual plot is made on 
the CGDscore, ROE, and INED%.  These variables are chosen because they represent 
different combinations of attributes that are found in the explanatory variables: CGDscore 
has a negative coefficient and significant p-value; ROE has a positive coefficient and 
significant p-value; and INED% has a negative coefficient but insignificant p-value.  
 
The three residual plots for the CGDscore, ROE, and INED% are shown in Figure 10.8 -
10.10 respectively.  
 
Figure 10.8 Residual plot of CGDscore in Model 1.2_LM 
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Figure 10.9 Residual plot of ROE in Model 1.2_LM 
 
 
Comparing the three residual plots of CGDscore, ROE, and INED% of the same model 
1.2_LM, it can be seen that the variability of the residuals increases dramatically as ROE 
increases (Fig. 10.9), where no similar pattern is detected for CGDscore (Fig. 10.8) or 
INED% (Fig. 10.10).  The funnel-shape of residuals for ROE (Fig. 10.9) illustrates the lack 
of homogeneity in the variances of the dependent variable Wq at each level of ROE. The 
assumption of equal variance of residual (i.e., homoscedasticity) in a classical linear 
regression model has been violated for the variable ROE. 
 
Figure 10.10 Residual plot of INED% in Model 1.2_LM 
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2. Multi-collinearity problem 
Multi-collinearity between predictors makes it difficult to assess the individual importance 
of a predictor (Field, 2000, p.132). High levels of collinearity among the explanatory 
variables (i.e., predictors) will result in a high value of R2, which inflates the variance of 
the coefficients of the predictors in the regression model. The result of such high 
collinearity among the explanatory variables produces high standard errors on the partial 
regression coefficients.  Sometimes, an abnormally high standard error is sufficiently large 
to cause the calculated t-statistic to be smaller than the critical t-statistic, hence failing to 
reject the null hypothesis which should have been rejected. High collinearity increases the 
probability that a good predictor of the outcome will be found non-significant and rejected 
from the regression model (i.e., a type II error).  Accordingly, the regression result may be 
mistakenly interpreted as showing no relationship between the independent variable and 
the dependent variable where in fact there is a relationship.  
 
The validity of a multiple regression model may be affected by the presence of high 
collinearity in 4 ways: (i) the adjusted R2 size may be limited because an additional 
predictor may account for little more variance than is the case without it; (ii) it is difficult 
to delineate each predictor’s importance in accounting for the variance of the regression 
outcome; and (iii) the estimated values of the regression coefficients (i.e., the β values) will 
be unstable from sample to sample; (iv) the signs of the estimated coefficients can be the 
opposite of those expected because multi-collinearity affects not only the variances of the 
ordinary least square (OLS) estimators but the covariances as well. In sum, a high level of 
collinearity (i.e., imperfect multi-collinearity) among the predictors will diminish the 
precision of the estimated coefficients, enlarge their standard errors, hence increases 
uncertainty about the true parameter values (Asteriou and Hall, 2007). 
 
Nevertheless, in reality almost every multiple regression equation will contain some degree 
of correlation among its explanatory variables (Asteriou and Hall, 2007, p. 88). In 
accounting data analyses, it is almost inevitable that multi-collinearity exists among the 
explanatory variables in one form or another. It is therefore not a question to prevent multi-
collinearity but a question to identify how serious it is in affecting the statistical 
relationship under study. Some statisticians suggest deleting one predictor if it has a 
correlation coefficient value of +/- 0.9 with another predictor. Some researchers suggest 
+/- 0.8. For some, the cut-off for high correlation is a value +/- 0.6 (Eastman, 1984).  
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If R = 0.6 is set to be the threshold for high or low correlation, then it can be seen from 
Table 10.25 that there are only 3 pairs of explanatory variables for Model 1.2_LM that 
have a correlation value larger than 0.6, namely,: 
(i) ROE vs. Wq (R = 0.650, p-value = 0.000); 
(ii) LnEqty vs. Wq (R= 0.612, p-value =0.000); and 
(iii) INED% vs. NumINED (R= 0.729, p-value = 0.000). 
 
As ROE and LnEqty are the control variables in Model 1.2_LM and they are commonly 
accepted as the explanatory variables that explain a firm’s valuation, they are retained in 
the Model. 
 
As regards INED% and NumINED, a robustness test is taken: (i) the explanatory variable 
NumINED is removed from the model and the regression is re-estimated again as Model 
1.2_LM (rev 1) , and (ii) both INED% and NumINED are removed from the model and 
then the regression is re-estimated as Model 1.2_LM (rev. 2). The purpose of so doing is to 
compare the original Model 1.2_LM with the two revised models Model 1.2_LM (rev 1) 
and Model 1.2_LM (rev 2) to see whether other explanatory variables will be significantly 
changed (in terms of signs and significance). 
 
Regression diagnostics reveal that multi-collinearity could be a problem in the regressions 
since the NumINED and INED% have a variance inflation factor (VIF) value 25.99 and 
26.47 respectively. The variance inflation factor (VIF) is often used as one form of 
diagnostics to detect whether multi-collinearity is present because it indicates whether an 
explanatory variable has a strong linear relationship with the other explanatory variables.  
 
Using the variance inflation factor (VIF) to detect multi-collinearity in Model 1.2_LM, 
three explanatory variables (BoDSize, NumINED, and INED%) are found to have a VIF 
value larger than 10 (see Table 10.24). Field (2003) comments that if a VIF has a value 
greater than 10, then there should be some concern for multi-collinearity. His comments 
are based on Myer’s research8. Field also suggests running a correlation matrix of all the 
explanatory variables to identify any variable which has a correlation of above 0.80 or 0.90, 
which is a good ball park figure for indication of potential collinearity problem.  Table 
10.24 presents the VIF values of the explanatory variables in Model 1.2_LM. 
 
                                                 
8 Myers (1990) suggests a threshold of 10 in the VIF value for multi-collinearity to become a problem. 
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Table 10.24 Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) of the explanatory variables for Model 1.2_LM 
 
 1 2 
1 Variable VIF
2 CGscore 1.259
3 BoDSize 13.672
4 NumINED 25.985
5 INED% 26.468
6 Dir%Own 1.364
7 SplitRole 1.204
8 DualList 1.263
9 ROE 2.106
10 LnSales 1.706
11 W_SalGrow% 1.119
12 LnEqty 2.449
13 Debt/TA 1.366
 
It can be seen from Column 2 of Table 10.24 that the VIF of BoDSize, NumINED, and 
INED% are larger than 10. Each of these 3 explanatory variables may be contributing to 
each other’s variance, as well as the variance of the dependent variable Wq. Putting all 
three explanatory variables into the same regression model may therefore make the 
estimated coefficients uncertain and imprecise (due to a larger standard error of 
coefficient). It will be difficult to disentangle their separate influences on the dependent 
variable.  
 
There is no readily made solution to this multi-collinearity problem. Some econometricians 
(e.g., Field, 2003; Asteriou & Hall, 2007) suggest deleting one or all highly collinear 
variables from the regression model although they admit there is no established statistical 
theory to determine which collinear variable(s) to drop. Other econometricians (e.g., 
Gujarati, 1995) caution that dropping a variable from a model which is theoretically 
relevant in explaining the relationship may lead to a specification bias problem. Multi-
collinearity may not necessarily bad if the purpose of the regression analysis is prediction, 
not seeking for reliable estimation of the parameters in the population (Gujarati, 1995, p. 
341-345). The general rule of thumb is to delete those correlated variables whose relevant 
information is already reflected (at least partially if not entirely) in those variables that stay 
in the regression model.  
 
To determine which variables are correlated to each other, a Pearson correlation analysis is 
hence carried out amongst those explanatory variables and dependent variable in Model 
1.2_LM for the L+M sample set. The results are presented in Table 10.25. The results 
indicate that NumINED and INED% are highly correlated with each other (correlation 
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coefficient r = 0.729) but not as critically correlated as Field (2003) has cautioned. Other 
variables that are highly correlated with Wq are ROE (r = 0.650) and LnEqty (r = -0.612).  
Their p-values are also statistically significant.   
 
Multi-collinearity is an econometric issue that often arises in corporate governance studies 
(e.g., Cheng and Courtenay, 2006). Researchers often make efforts to contain its impact on 
the validity of their analysis rather than eliminate it entirely from their analytical model. 
When the VIF of some of the explanatory variables approaches ten, or the Pearson 
Correlation between the problematic variables is high (e.g., approaching 0.8 or above), 
there is indication of multi-collinearity. 
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Table 10.25 Correlation matrix of the variables in Model 1.2_LM  
 
  Wq CGDscore BoDSize NumINED INED% Dir%Own 
Split 
Role DualList ROE LnSales W_SalGrow LnEqty
CGscore   0.041
(0.657) 
           
BoDSize -0.270** 
(0.003) 
-0.037 
(0.688) 
         
NumINED         -0.041
(0.662) 
  0.292**  
(0.001) 
 0.305** 
(0.001) 
INED%          0.154
(0.096) 
 0.277** 
(0.002) 
-0.397** 
(0.000) 
0.729** 
(0.000) 
Dir%Own         -0.111
(0.232) 
-0.197* 
(0.032) 
-0.007 
(0.944) 
-0.345** 
(0.000) 
-0.294** 
(0.001) 
SplitRole  0.184* 
(0.047) 
 0.184* 
(0.046) 
 0.130 
(0.160) 
 0.161 
(0.081) 
 0.030 
(0.744) 
-0.185* 
(0.045) 
     
DualList      -0.042
(0.651) 
-0.014 
(0.878) 
 0.190*  
(0.039) 
-0.006 
(0.950) 
-0.135 
(0.146) 
-0.180 
(0.051) 
-0.088 
(0.342) 
ROE  0.650** 
(0.000) 
 0.241** 
(0.009) 
-0.176 
(0.057) 
 0.026 
(0.778) 
 0.148 
(0.110) 
-0.118 
(0.204) 
 0.059 
(0.526) 
-0.039 
(0.674) 
   
LnSales     0.087
(0.350) 
 0.129 
(0.162) 
 0.053 
(0.565) 
 0.055 
(0.552) 
-0.041 
(0.661) 
 0.089 
(0.340) 
-0.052 
(0.574) 
 0.199* 
(0.031) 
 0.163 
(0.078) 
W_SalGrow   -0.015
(0.873) 
 -0.068 
(0.466) 
-0.169 
(0.067) 
-0.052 
(0.579) 
 0.056 
(0.544) 
 0.131 
(0.158) 
 0.095 
(0.308) 
-0.146 
(0.116) 
 0.019 
(0.839) 
 0.099 
(0.288) 
LnEqty -0.612** 
(0.000) 
-0.125 
(0.178) 
 0.361** 
(0.000) 
 0.171 
(0.064) 
-0.105 
(0.256) 
 0.082 
(0.378) 
-0.125 
(0.179) 
 0.242** 
(0.008) 
-0.599** 
(0.000) 
 0.236** 
(0.010) 
-0.009 
(0.924) 
 
Debt/TA -0.385** 
(0.000) 
 0.079 
(0.394) 
-0.062 
(0.503) 
-0.155 
(0.094) 
-0.142 
(0.126) 
 0.085 
(0.361) 
-0.108 
(0.242) 
 0.136 
(0.142) 
-0.059 
(0.529) 
 0.385** 
(0.000) 
 0.089 
(0.340) 
 0.007 
(0.939) 
(Cell contents: Pearson correlation. p-value in bracket. 
* :  p-value < 0.05 are bold 
**:  p-value < 0.01 are bold)
 
Because NumINED and INED% are highly correlated and both of them have a very large 
VIF, they are deleted from the set of explanatory variables and the regression is re-
estimated in Model 1.2_LM (rev 2). The regression results of such revised models are 
presented under Column 3 and Column 4 in Table 10.26 (For comparison purposes, the 
results of the original Model 1.2_LM are also shown under Column 2 in Table 10.26). 
 
Table 10.26 Wq regressed on CGscore, CGprac variables, and ComChar variables. 
Definitions of the variables are stated under model 1.2 in Section 10.4. 
  
 1 2 3 4 
1 Model 
 
1.2_LM 1.2_LM(rev 1) 1.2_LM(rev 2)
2 Firms 
 
L+M L+M L+M 
3 Intercept  7.266* 
(0.002) 
7.268** 
(0.0001) 
 7.264** 
(0.0001) 
4 CGscore -0.007* 
(0.025) 
-0.007* 
(0.024) 
 -0.007* 
(0.030) 
5 BoDsize -0.053 
(0.397) 
-0.048* 
(0.020) 
 -0.048* 
(0.011) 
6 NumINED  0.002 
(0.992) 
n.a.  n.a.  
7 INED% -0.001 
(0.965) 
0.000 
(0.955) 
 n.a. 
8 Dir%Own -0.001 
(0.890) 
0.000 
(0.918) 
 0.000 
(0.928) 
9 SplitRole  0.385* 
(0.019) 
0.366* 
(0.020) 
 0.366* 
(0.019) 
10 DualList  0.327* 
(0.026) 
0.314* 
(0.027) 
 0.315* 
(0.024) 
11 ROE  0.027** 
(0.0001) 
0.025** 
(0.001) 
 0.025** 
(0.001) 
12 LnSales  0.440** 
(0.0001) 
0.437** 
(0.0001) 
 0.437** 
(0.0001) 
13 W_SalGrow -0.001 
(0.421) 
-0.001 
(0.411) 
 -0.001 
(0.407) 
14 LnEqty -0.605** 
(0.0001) 
-0.607** 
(0.0001) 
-0.608** 
(0.0001) 
15 Debt/TA -0.039** 
(0.0001) 
-0.038** 
(0.0001) 
-0.038** 
(0.0001) 
16 Adj. R2  0.736 
 
0.739  0.741 
17 Significance F 
 
 0.0001** 0.0001**  0.0001** 
18 Observations 
 
118 118 118 
(Notes: p-value < 0.10 are bold. p-values are shown in brackets; ** if p-value < 0.01; * if p-value < 
0.05)  
 
From Column 4, Table 10.26, it can be seen that the adjusted R2 (row 16) does not change 
drastically, meaning that the revised model does not contribute significant improvement in 
explaining the level of Wq when the correlated variables NumINED and INED% are 
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removed from the original regression model 1.2_LM.  The board size variable (BoDsize), 
however, becomes statistically significant at 0.05 level. (A change in significance in the 
explanatory variable(s) is one of the many symptoms of a multi-collinearity problem.)  
 
Previous research has suggested that board size is associated with significantly lower debt 
financing costs; and a larger board of directors provides greater monitoring of the financial 
accounting process (Anderson, Mansi, & Reeb, 2004; Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 2008). 
There is reason to expect that board size to be associated with a firm’s market valuation 
and related to the firm’s corporate governance. Therefore, it is economically relevant to 
retain the BoDsize variable in the regression model. Furthermore, the objective of this 
study is to investigate whether a relationship exists between the firm’s market valuation 
and the CG variables; not to estimate the true parameters of the population. Dropping the 
two most correlated explanatory variables (i.e. NumINED and INED%) and retaining the 
BoDsize variable are hence adequate to tackle the multi-collinearity problem for this model, 
while acknowledging the possibility that the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) estimate of the 
intercept is biased; but the slope coefficient estimates are unaffected (Kennedy, 1992, p. 
110). 
 
3. Endogeneity problem 
 
It is often argued that studies in CG disclosure and market valuation may suffer from the 
reverse causation flavour of endogeneity. It is possible for firms with high Tobin’s q to 
choose good governance practices because this will further enhance their market value 
(Black, Jang, and Kim, 2006).  Gillan, Hartzell, and Starks (2003) test a reverse causation 
model in which Tobin’s q is an explanatory variable to predict governance for U.S. firms. 
Durnev and Kim (2005) develop a model in which a firm’s choice of CG is endogenously 
related to investment opportunities, need for external financing, and inside ownership.  
Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia (1999) discuss the possibility of unobserved determinants 
of Tobin’s q that are also determinants of insider ownership. In that case, insider ownership 
may spuriously appear to be a determinant of q. 
 
Standard econometric procedures for addressing endogeneity suggest the use of an 
instrument variable for the potentially problematic endogenous variable (i.e., the 
CGDscore in this study). The criteria for an ideal instrumental variable are that it should be 
exogenous and not be influenced by the dependable variable of interest (i.e., Tobin’s q); 
that it should be correlated with CGDscore (to preserve regression power) but should 
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predict the dependent variable q only indirectly through its effect on CGDscore, not 
directly (Black, Jang, and Kim, 2006, p. 384). However, such an ideal instrumental 
variable is difficult, if not impossible, to find (Ittner and Larcker, 2001; Larcker, 2003); 
and even if it is found, it may be a weak instrument (Borsch-Supan and Koke, 2002).  
Furthermore, Larcker and Rusticus (2005) show that the instrumental variable estimators 
are unlikely to be preferred over the OLS estimators as “this solution to the endogeneity 
problem is worse than the problem itself if the instrument is weak (i.e., low relevance) and 
endogenous” (Chenhall and Moers, 2007a, p.189).  The general conclusion from the 
discussion by these researchers is that endogeneity can never be entirely solved, and that 
econometrics cannot solve the problem of endogeneity.  Using theory, logic, and common 
sense to explain the relationships between the variables in the structural model is the best 
strategy to address the endogeneity issue (Chenhall and Moers, 2007b, p. 219). 
 
In conclusion, Model 1.2_LM may have violated some the OLS assumptions, to such an 
extent that the coefficients on the intercepts in the model are biased; but the coefficients of 
the slope estimates are not affected. For highly correlated explanatory variables that are 
present in Model 1.2_LM, removing some of the correlated variables do not significantly 
change the results of regression models (e.g. Model 1.2_LM (rev 1) and Model 1.2_LM 
(rev 2)) in terms of the signs and p-values of the coefficients. Furthermore, the choice of 
the explanatory variables that are included in Model 1.2_LM is explained by theories, 
which are developed and tested upon by previous researchers.  Therefore, it is concluded 
that the problems of multicollinearity and endogeneity in this model are acknowledged, 
with maintaining the status quo as the recommended solution.  
 
10.10.3 Robustness tests on Model 1.3  
 
In this section, robustness tests have been conducted for the following purposes: 
(i) to ascertain the outcome of the regression results obtained in Model 1.3 when the 
effect of CG Practices variables, Company Characteristics variables and the joint 
effect of CG ranking and director’s ownership of a firm on the market value of a 
firm is examined; 
(ii) to check whether there is a systematic difference in the relationship between q and 
the market capitalization group to which a firm attaches.   
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Model 1.3 tests the effect of CG practices, company characteristics, and the joint 
CG_Rank-Director-Ownership of a firm on its valuation (Wq).  Six joint CG_RankOwn 
groups are formed, and their assigned variable names are stated in brackets as follows:  
(i) High CG Rank and Low Directors’ Ownership (HL); 
(ii) High CG Rank and Medium Directors’ Ownership (HM); 
(iii) High CG Rank and Predominant Directors’ Ownership(HP); 
(iv) Low CG Rank and Low Directors’ Ownership (LL); 
(v) Low CG Rank and Medium Directors’ Ownership (LM); and 
(vi) Low CG Rank and Predominant Directors’ Ownership (LP). 
 
The HL group is selected as the base group for comparison with the other five 
CG_RankOwn groups: HM, HP, LL, LM, and LP. Correspondingly, five dummy variables 
are assigned to them: DV_HM, DV_HP, DV_LL, DV_LM, and DV_LP, respectively. 
These dummy variables act as explanatory variables in Model 1.3 to test if Wq is affected 
by the joint characteristics of CG ranking and Director’s Ownership.  
 
The regression results in Table 10.6 show that, for the S sample of SmallCap firms (Model 
1.3_S), the coefficients in all five dummy variables DV_HM, DV_HP, DV_LL, DV_LM, 
and DV_LP are negative.  This is not found in the other two samples.  To ascertain the 
outcomes of the regression results, robustness tests are conducted. 
 
Firstly, a robustness test with regard to the classification of SmallCap firms into 6 different 
joint categories of CG_RankOwn using a non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis Rank Test is 
conducted.  Kruskal-Wallis test is derived from the F-test (which is the classical test under 
normality) by replacing the actual observations by their ranks (Neave and Worthington, 
1992). It does not require the assumption of normally distributed populations. The theory 
of the Kruskal-Wallis test is based on a specific null hypothesis, namely, that the 
populations are identically distributed. The requirements for the validity of the test are that 
the samples are independent of each other and that the populations are continuously 
distributed. The null hypothesis to be tested is: 
 
 Ho: QHL = QHM = QHP = QLL = QLM = QLP
where QHL…QLP are the median Wq for the CG_RankOwn groups of HL…LP, 
respectively.  
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If the null hypothesis H0 is not rejected, then the ranks of those observations should be 
randomly distributed between the 6 separate groups, i.e., each group should have its fair 
share of low, medium and high ranks. Thus, if H0 is true, the mean of the ranks assigned to 
one group should not differ much from the mean of the ranks for any other group. The H 
test statistic is based on comparing each group’s mean rank with the mean of all the ranks, 
adjusted by the effect of unequal sample sizes.  Table 10.27 shows the results of the 
Kruskal-Wallis rank test. 
 
Table 10.27 Kruskal-Wallis rank test on mean Wq of 6 CG_RankOwn Groups 
 
Group Sample Size Sum of Ranks Mean Ranks 
HL 24 2422 100.917
HM 14 882 63.000
HP 32 2196 68.625
LL 18 1207 67.056
LM 23 1459 63.435
LP 29 1704 58.759
Sum of Squared Ranks/Sample Size 724298.8
Sum of Sample Sizes 140
Number of Groups 6
H Test Statistic 17.303
Critical Value 11.070
p-Value 0.004
 
From Table 10.27, it can be seen that the Kruskal-Wallis Rank Test shows an H statistic 
with a p-value of 0.004, which is highly significant. Hence the null hypothesis is rejected. 
It implies that the six CG_RankOwn groups do not have the same mean of market value 
(Wq). Hence, the formation of these six CG_RankOwn groups in the regression Model 
1.3_S appears to be robust.9
 
A further check on the robustness of the regression results of Model 1.3_S is provided by 
plotting a scatter diagram of Wq against Dir%Own for the SmallCap firms that have a high 
CG_Rank. Using EXCEL trend-line function (polynomial), a U-shape curve can be fitted 
into the data (Figure 10.11). It suggests that a non-linear relationship exists between a 
firm’s market valuation (Wq) and its director’s ownership (Dir%Own).    
 
                                                 
9 Similar Kruskal-Wallis Rank Test is also applied to the L+M subgroup. The p-value is 0.393. The null 
hypothesis cannot be rejected at 0.05 significance level. Hence, the mean Wq’s of the different 
CG_RankOwn groups within the L+M subgroup are not significantly different from each other. 
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Figure 10.11 Scatter diagram of Wq of High CG_Rank SmallCap firms 
 
 
In contrast, using the same function to plot a polynomial trend-line in the scatter diagram 
of Wq for the SmallCap firms with low CG_rank, a slightly upward trend along Wq = 1.2 is 
obtained as directors’ ownership (Dir%Own) increases (Figure 10.12). 
 
Figure 10.12 Scatter diagram of Wq of Low CG_Rank SmallCap firms 
 
 
Comparing Figure 10.11 with Figure 10.12, it can be seen that the pattern of Wq for high 
CG_Rank firms is different from that for low CG_Rank firms.  Thus splitting SmallCap 
firms into groups of high CG_Rank and low CG_Rank appears to be meaningful.  For 
firms with high CG_Rank, Wq decreases first with increasing level of director’s ownership 
and then increases gradually when directors’ ownership increases to a predominant level.  
A slightly U- shaped pattern therefore appears (Figure 10.11).   
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 Scatter diagrams on the combined L+M sample of LargeCap and MidCap firms are also 
plotted for comparison (Figures 10.13 and 10.14).  The scatter diagrams reveal a pattern 
which is different from that for the SmallCap firms.   For high CG ranking firms in the 
L+M sample, there is a decreasing trend of market valuation (Wq) as directors’ ownership 
(Dir%Own) increases (Figure 10.13).  The presence of three outliers of Wq (which is q 
after winsorization already) on the upper part of the scatter diagram may be causing a 
disproportionate influence on the negative slope of the trend line. 
 
 
Figure 10.13 Scatter diagram of Wq of High CG_Rank L+M firms 
 
 
 
For low CG ranking firms, the decrease in Wq is more rapidly with increasing level of 
ownership, as demonstrated in a steeper downward slope of Wq (Figure 10.14).  It suggests 
that, in a sample composed of LargeCap and MidCap firms, the higher the director’s 
ownership (Dir%Own) in a firm, the lower is its market valuation (Wq). The evidence is 
consistent with the hypothesis that entrenchment problem, as represented by high directors’ 
ownership, is a major concern for investors in valuating a LargeCap or MidCap firm if the 
firm is not transparent in their CG disclosure. The results of robustness tests conducted 
above for Model 1.3 support the validity of the findings of the regression models. 
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Figure 10.14 Scatter diagram of Wq of Low CG_Rank L+M firms10
 
(Note: There is no firm that falls in the category of Low CG_Rank that has also a Low Dir%Own(0-25%), 
hence, the trend line appears to be truncated.) 
 
10.10.3 Robustness test on Model 3.2a using Rank Regression 
 
A robustness test is conducted on Model 3.2a to determine if systematic differences exist 
in the relationship between q and the grouping of firms by their market capitalization.  A 
non-parametric test, Rank Regression, is undertaken.  Comparing with a least-square 
regression, a rank regression is less affected by extreme values or outliers in both the 
dependent variable and the independent variables. Model 3.3 sets out to test the variables 
used in Model 3.2a by means of a Rank Regression.  The results are shown in Table 10.28. 
 
Model 3.3: Testing the value relevance of the Firm Group and interaction with  
                     CGDscore using rank regression, based on 258 samples. 
 
Rank_q  = β0 + β1 Rank(CGscore)  + β2Σ Rank(CGprac i, t )+  β3Σ Rank(ComChar i, t )  
                      + β4 Rank(DV_M)+ β5 Rank(DV_S) + β6 Rank(CG*DV_M)  
                      + β7 Rank(CG*DV_S)  + ε i, t……………………………..  (Model 3.3) 
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Table 10.28 Results of the Rank Regression of Model 3.3 
 Coefficient Std Error t-stat 
Predictor           
Rank 
Reg  
Least-sq 
Reg  
Rank 
Reg
Least-sq 
Reg
Rank 
Reg 
Least-sq 
Reg
Intercept           10.787 12.338 1.709 2.086 6.31 5.91
CGscore            -0.002 -0.005 0.007 0.009 -0.29 -0.56
BoDSize           -0.020 -0.067 0.036 0.044 -0.56 -1.52
NumINED        0.014 0.061 0.107 0.131 0.13 0.47
INED_%           -0.006 -0.013 0.012 0.014 -0.50 -0.93
Dir%Own         -0.003 -0.001 0.002 0.003 -1.50 -0.33
SplitRole  0.021 0.161 0.102 0.124 0.21 1.30
DualList      -0.058 -0.040 0.110 0.134 -0.53 -0.30
ROE           0.017 0.020 0.003 0.004 5.67 5.00
LnSales             0.168 0.176 0.047 0.058 3.57 3.03
W_SalGrow%  -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.001 -1.00 -1.00
LnEqty              -0.501 -0.542 0.057 0.069 -8.79 -7.86
Debt/TA%        -0.017 -0.025 0.003 0.003 -5.67 -8.33
DV_M              -0.445 -0.491 0.354 0.433 -1.26 -1.13
DV_S                -1.662 -2.001 0.377 0.460 -4.41 -4.35
CG*DV_M       0.001 0.002 0.007 0.009 0.14 0.22
CG*DV_S        0.006 0.009 0.007 0.009 0.86 1.00
Hodges-Lehmann estimate of tau = 0.8548    Least-squares S = %2 
 
It can be seen from Table 10.28 (under the column ‘t-stat’) that the t-statistics of the 
coefficients under the rank regression (Rank Reg) are similar to those under the least-
square regression (Least-sq Reg). They are similar in signs and sizes. Those explanatory 
variables that are significant in the least-square regression are also found to be significant 
in the rank regression.  As the tests of rank regression and of the least-square regression 
give the same outcome, the least-square regression at Model 3.2a is robust. 
 
10.11 Summary 
 
This Chapter focuses on describing the test results of the models based on Chapter 8, and 
discusses the outcomes of the models in light of the five key hypotheses developed in 
Chapter 6.  The models are tested with reference to the three samples representative of (i) a 
mixture of firms at various levels of market capitalization that most prior research has been 
using in studying the effect of corporate governance on the value of a firm; (ii) firms of 
large market capitalization; and (iii) firms of small market capitalization.   
 
Hypothesis H1 states that firms that voluntarily disclose more information about their CG 
practices have higher market valuation than firms that disclose less, ceteris paribus. Test 
results of the models support this hypothesis for the sample of S (i.e., SmallCap) firms.  At 
a low, medium, or predominant level of directors’ equity ownership, a SmallCap firm that 
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discloses more CG information (and thus attains a higher CG ranking) is often associated 
with a higher market valuation q.  This finding is different from that of prior research in 
which no conclusive relationship has been found between market valuation and CG 
disclosure.  Other governance aspects such as the split roles of Chairman and CEO, and 
cross listing, are found to be positively related to a firm’s market value for the pooled 
sample of L+M+S (i.e., LargeCap, MidCap, and SmallCap) firms and the combined 
sample of L+M (i.e., LargeCap and MidCap) firms, controlling for the firm’s financial 
performance (proxied by sales and return on equity) and its capital structure (proxied by 
equity and leverage).    
 
Hypothesis H2 postulates that the level of voluntary CG disclosure by a firm is affected by 
factors including: insiders’ ownership; the number of independent executive directors 
(INED) on the board; a firm’s resource availability; the status of cross listing of the firm; 
and, the split roles of Chairman and CEO, as suggested by extant researchers (in Chapter 3 
and Chapter 4 of this study).  The test results show that directors’ ownership has a negative 
impact on disclosure for the pooled L+M+S sample and the S sample.  The higher the 
insider ownership, the lower is the voluntary CG disclosure made by the firm. This finding 
is in line with the findings by Eng and Mak (2003) that lower managerial ownership is 
associated with increased voluntary disclosure.  
 
The test results also show that two aspects, namely the performance of a firm (as proxied 
by return on equity (ROE)), and the split roles of Chairman and CEO, are found to be 
positively related to the level of voluntary CG disclosure for all L+M+S, L+M, and S 
samples.  It can be concluded that firms with better performance tend to disclose more CG 
information voluntarily, and that where the roles of Chairman and CEO are held by two 
separate persons, more CG information is voluntarily disclosed.  The test results do not 
show any evidence to support the hypothesis that CG disclosure is related to the number of 
Independent Non-Executive Directors (INEDs) in a firm, the percentage of INEDs on the 
board, the availability of resources (proxied by LnTA) to a firm, or the status of cross-
listing of a firm, as conjectured in prior research. 
   
Hypothesis H3 hypothesizes that there are systematic differences in the voluntary CG 
disclosure between LargeCap firms, MidCap firms, and SmallCap firms.  There are 
hypothesized differences in the market valuation as proxied by q, the level of CG 
disclosure, and the value relevance of the CG disclosure.  The ANOVA test results show 
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that there are statistically significant differences in terms of q; but no such difference is 
observed in the voluntary CG disclosure of the three capitalizations of firms.  Nor do these 
firms systematically differ from one another in terms of the value relevance of CG 
disclosure.   
 
The findings suggest that any different effect of CG disclosure by firms on their market 
valuation may not be necessarily attributable to their difference in market capitalization.  
The findings lay the foundation for interpreting the results of further hypothesis testing of 
this study.  The test results do indicate that there are systematic differences in the market 
valuation q amongst the three groups of firms.  This finding is not unexpected, as apart 
from the non-financial information such as CG disclosure of a firm, investors would 
consider other factors including the financial strength of a firm, the historical performance 
of a firm etc., in arriving at a market valuation.  With the different characteristics inherent 
in LargeCap firms, MidCap firms and SmallCap firms, it is not surprising to find that 
systematic differences may exist among the firms that are not capable of being reflected by 
their respective capitalization.   
 
Hypothesis H4 relates to the relationship between the dividend payout (DivPay) and the 
CG disclosure of a firm. The test results show that DivPay is not directly affected by 
CGDscore, but is primarily driven by other variables relating to the financial performance 
of a firm.  For LargeCap firms and MidCap firms, the CG practices variables are found to 
impact on DivPay, but no such impact is found for the SmallCap firms.  The test results 
suggest that there may be other explanatory variables not captured in the model to account 
for the level of dividend payout for SmallCap firms.   
 
Further tests are conducted to investigate, under a strong legal protection regime, if high 
CG ranking firms would have lower dividend payout ratios, ceteris paribus, than low CG 
ranking firms, at comparable level of directors’ ownership.  The hypothesis is supported by 
evidence found in the S sample as well as the pooled L+M+S sample.  For SmallCap firms 
in the S sample, high CG ranking firms are found to have a lower dividend payout than low 
CG ranking firms, if the level of directors’ ownership is medium (i.e., 25% - 50%).   
Furthermore, in the L+M+S sample, high CG ranking firms are often found to have a lower 
dividend payout than low CG ranking firms, if their directors’ ownership level is medium 
(25% - 50%) or predominant (i.e., > 50%).  Hence, CG ranking has a role to play in 
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mitigating the dividend payout ratio of a firm, even under a strong investor protection 
regime.  
 
Hypothesis H5 postulates that firms with insiders’ ownership of 25% - 50% exhibit the 
lowest dividend payout ratio, ceteris paribus, on the belief that the probability of agency 
problem and of the entrenchment problem occurring is likely to be the lowest at this range 
of insider ownership (as explained in Section 6.3.5 in Chapter 6).  The hypothesis is 
supported by the findings from Model 4.1_S in the S sample (as illustrated in Table 10.20) 
for both high CG ranking and low CG ranking firms. It is also supported by the evidence 
found from Model 4.1_LMS for the L+M+S sample with the low CG ranking firms.  Thus, 
there is evidence that dividend payout can be jointly affected by voluntary disclosure of 
CG information (as proxied by CG ranking in Model 4.1) and insiders’ ownership.   
 
While some findings of this study echo those of prior research, other findings of this study 
are new, such as the relationship between CG disclosure and market value for small firms, 
and the voluntary disclosure of CG information as a substitute for dividend.  The 
contributions and implications of the findings of this study, and suggestions for further 
research, will be addressed in the next chapter, Chapter 11.    
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Chapter 11:  Discussion, Contributions & Limitations of 
the Study, and Conclusion 
 
11.1 Summary of thesis 
 
This thesis examines the relationship between voluntary disclosure of corporate 
governance, firm valuation, and dividend payout.  It hypothesizes that voluntary disclosure 
and firm valuation are positively related.  Using the disclosure data of 258 firm-years 
observations for listed firms in Hong Kong over the 2003-2005 period, this study examines 
the impact of a firm’s voluntary corporate governance (CG) disclosure on firm valuation 
proxied by the approximation of Tobin’s q.  The empirical findings indicate that voluntary 
CG disclosure has a statistically significant and positive effect on q for small firms, but not 
for the large- or medium-size firms. Small firms with lower ranking of voluntary CG 
disclosure have a lower market valuation.  These findings are robust after taking into 
account of various firm-specific characteristics variables such as profitability, leverage, 
and sales growth. 
 
Another key finding of this study is that voluntary CG disclosure can be a substitute for 
dividend payouts.  Firms with higher voluntary CG disclosure are often the firms which 
offer lower dividend payouts, after controlling for profitability, leverage, and sales growth 
of the firm. In particular, small firms with medium level of insiders’ ownership are also 
found to be those with the lowest dividend payout, when compared to other levels of 
insiders’ ownership. 
 
These empirical findings are observed from firms operating in Hong Kong, a business 
environment that is characterised with high concentration of insiders’ ownership under a 
strong legal investor protection regime.  The findings appear to suggest that, even if there 
is a strong legal systems to protect investors’ interests, investors still rely on a firm’s 
corporate governance disclosure to enhance their investment protection.  If the corporate 
governance is not up to the investors’ expectations, the market valuation of the firm will be 
lower and investors will demand high dividend payout. The implication is that, by 
voluntarily disclosing more CG information to investors, managers can enjoy a double 
benefit of enhancing the firm’s market valuation and reducing the dividend payout.     
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The methodology used in this thesis involves coding the sample firms’ CG practices and 
information that are disclosed in the firms’ annual reports for fiscal year 2003-2005.  The 
coding is based on a checklist derived from Appendix 23 of the Listing Rules of the Hong 
Kong Exchange (HKEx), 2005.  The checklist contains 66 single-barrel questions, each of 
which can be answered by a ‘Yes’ if the information is disclosed, ‘No’ if there is no 
disclosure, or ‘Not Applicable’ if the question does not apply to the firm.  A Corporate 
Governance Disclosure Score (CGDscore), which is the number of  ‘Yes’ answers divided 
by the net number of applicable questions and multiplied by 100, is constructed.  
Following similar treatment by previous researchers in constructing a disclosure index, all 
questions in the checklist are assigned with equal weighting.  
 
Sample firms are drawn from the constituent stocks of the Hang Seng Hong Kong 
Composite Index (HSHKCI), which classifies Hong Kong listed firms into LargeCap (L), 
MidCap (M), and SmallCap (S) firms according to the ranking of their market 
capitalization.  The composition of the HSHKCI is determined by the company that 
prepares the Hang Seng Index for the Hong Kong Exchange.  The sample firms are 
selected as at September 2005 when the data collection of this study began.  The firm 
valuation is proxied by an approximation of Tobin’s q. Market performance and financial 
performance data such as profitability, total sales, and leverage are collected from 
Datastream.   
 
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 11.2 examines the key empirical results of this 
study in relation to previous research literature. Section 11.3 evaluates the significance of 
the findings and their implications, and concludes the entire thesis.  Section 11.4 highlights 
the contributions of this study to the knowledge in Corporate Governance research. It also 
discusses the limitations of this study. Finally, Section 11.5 proffers some suggestions for 
further research. 
 
11.2 Discussion 
 
This study primarily investigates whether or not firms that disclose larger voluntary 
corporate governance (CG) information benefit from higher firm valuation than firms with 
less voluntary disclosure of CG. The results of the statistical tests performed in this study,  
support the general hypothesis that voluntary disclosure of CG practices have value 
relevance for small firms. A SmallCap firm’s valuation can be positively and significantly 
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enhanced if it is more transparent in its disclosure. For example, in Model 1.0_S, the CG 
disclosure score (CGDscore) has a coefficient of 0.007 and is statistically significant in 
explaining a SmallCap firm’s q. If the CGDscore rises by one standard deviation (20.54) 
from the mean (40.05) to 60.59, the market valuation q, ceteris paribus, can be expected to 
increase by 0.14 (i.e. 0.007 x 20.54). Since q is a ratio that clusters around the mean 1.42 
for SmallCap firms, a 0.14-point increase will enhance firm valuation by an economically 
significant 9.9%. However, such value relevance of voluntary CG disclosure does not seem 
to be present for the pooled sample of LargeCap and MidCap firms (Model 1.0_LM in 
Chapter 10, which denotes Model 1.0 applied onto the combined sample of LargeCap and 
MidCap firms). The following discussion aims at explaining this paradox.  
 
11.2.1 Voluntary CG disclosure affects firm valuation of Smallcap firms 
which have less communication channels 
 
The empirical result of this study shows that disclosure of CG information affects a firm’s 
market valuation positively for SmallCap firm, but not so much for the LargeCap or 
MidCap firms. This finding is consistent with the prediction of some previous voluntary 
disclosure theories. Firstly, Verrecchia (1983) proposes that higher quality information is 
accompanied by more voluntary disclosure by managers. He argues that information of 
higher quality implies a lower threshold level of disclosure, and therefore a greater 
probability of disclosure. It implies that, if managers withhold information of higher 
quality, “the market discounts the value of the asset (i.e., the firm) further than it would 
otherwise” (ibid, 1983, p.375).  By the same reasoning, managers are expected to 
voluntarily disclose more if they believe that their corporate governance is of a higher 
quality than their competitors’.  It sets the background that, for the sample firms in this 
study that had engaged in voluntary CG disclosure, the managers presumably would have 
to be convinced that their disclosure is of higher quality than their competitors’; otherwise, 
they would not have disclosed voluntarily. Thus, the content of disclosure is deemed to be 
truthful and credible.  
 
Secondly, analysts tend to focus more on LargeCap and MidCap firms. Lang and 
Lundholm (1993) point out that more analysts tend to follow large firms than small firms, 
and therefore large firms may be subjected to a greater demand for information. Hossain, 
Perera and Rahman (1995) find empirical evidence in their study on 55 New Zealand firms 
that voluntary financial disclosure levels vary with firm size; and that “firm size 
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contributed most to explaining the variability in disclosure level” (ibid, 1995, p. 81). Their 
findings are consistent with another empirical study by Lang, Lins, and Miller (2004), who 
conclude that the larger the firm size is, the higher is the analysts’ coverage. Firm size, 
therefore, accounts for the differences in the variety of communication channels as well as 
the amount of information to be disseminated to the financial markets. 
 
Thirdly, it has been found that for economic reasons, analysts tend to pay lesser attention 
to SmallCap firms.  The aggregate demand for analyst services increases with firm size 
because of increased benefits of private information for larger firms (Bhushan, 1989a). 
King, Pownall, and Waymire (1990) offer a transactions cost hypothesis which predicts 
that disclosure increases with firm size because the incentives for private information 
acquisition are greater for large firms where the profit to trading on private information is 
much higher. Their hypothesis finds support in Lev and Penman’s (1990) empirical study 
that shows more earnings forecasts are reported in the financial press for large firms than 
for small firms. This leads to a higher cost of disseminating disclosures for small firms 
because the news media are more likely to carry stories about large firms and that analysts 
are more likely to attend their meetings (Lang and Lundholm, 1993). These findings 
indicate that, generally speaking, small firms cannot expect to receive equal attention from 
media as large firms do in terms of communicating high quality information to outside 
investors.  
 
The above-mentioned studies tend to agree that the communication channels available to 
large firms and small firms are very different.  Large firms attract institutional investors, 
international blockholders, and very often have more analysts’ following because of their 
sheer size, their resources put into investor relations (e.g., frequent road shows and 
presentations1 to analysts), and their long working relationship with investment bankers, 
brokers, and financial intermediaries. As a result, large firms are more likely than small 
firms to carry out more frequently private meetings and/or video conferencing between the 
insiders and these outside stakeholders. Information about a firm’s CG practices may be 
communicated through these face-to-face discussions without necessarily being disclosed 
in a written medium such as annual reports or press releases. They need not be confined to 
annual reports or quarterly reports only. 
 
                                                 
1 Francis, Hanna and Philbrick (1998) point out that presentations to analysts have more advantages over 
other forms of voluntary disclosure. Face-to-face presentations offer broader scope, higher flexibility, and 
greater credibility because the analysts can affect the content of managements’ disclosure during the 
presentation which differs from press releases where management determines what matters are addressed. 
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In contrast, small firms’ managers face more challenges even if they are eager and willing 
to disclose more and highly trustworthy information. Small firms have fewer resources; 
and disclosure of information is often costly (Verrecchia, 1983; Dye, 1986; Wagenhofer, 
1990). Compared to larger firms, the communication channels available to small firms are 
limited.  
 
The empirical results of this study indicate that small firms with more voluntary 
disclosures of their CG are associated with a higher market valuation, whereas large or 
medium firms are not. This is also consistent with the findings by previous researchers on 
small firms and family firms. It is very likely that managers of LargeCap and MidCap 
firms in Hong Kong have at their disposal a wider variety of channels to reach the 
outsiders (e.g., annual and quarterly reports, press releases, conferences with blockholders 
and institutional investors, interviews with business reporters and editors, and financial 
analysts meetings) than those of SmallCap firms. Larger firms also have a larger set of 
information to disseminate to the investors, and to capture the attention of analysts and 
other potential capital providers. Compared with large firms, the information set faced by 
small firms is smaller and the interest levels accrued to small firms lower.  
 
Compared with other types of communication channels, annual reports are the most 
official, credible (because they are audited), and cost-efficient vehicle to reach all the 
shareholders, bondholders, and other stakeholders alike. Managers of small firms with 
limited resources tend to rely upon annual reports in their voluntary disclosure of quality 
information in a credible manner. Correspondingly, outside investors also tend to depend 
upon the information disclosed in the annual reports to re-adjust their investment decisions 
for the small firms. Hence, more voluntary disclosure in the annual reports by the small 
firms has a more direct and positive effect in their market valuation; whereas the same for 
the large or medium firms is not that pronounced, probably because the same information 
may have already been disclosed through other channels. 
 
As such, it is sensible and justifiable for those SmallCap firms with better CG structure and 
practices than their peers to voluntarily disclose more CG information in order to stand out 
from the rest, using a credible channel of communication such as the annual reports. On 
the one hand, investors demand information, both financial and non-financial, to assess the 
uncertainty and risks of their investment in a firm so that they may adjust their investment 
strategy accordingly. They need information to determine the intrinsic value of the 
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investment (Singhvi and Desai, 1971) and to assuage their concerns for potential 
expropriation by insiders (Johnson, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 2000). 
Companies satisfy this demand in part by supplying voluntary information on their CG. On 
the other hand, managers are concerned with how voluntary disclosures of non-financial 
information impinge on their firms’ reputations, influence their firms’ relations with their 
stakeholders, affect their firms’ negotiations with regulatory bodies, or change the 
behaviour of their competitors (Dye, 1986).  Unlike proprietary information which may 
reduce the present value of cash flows of the firm if disclosed to a strategic opponent 
(Wahenhofer, 1990), information on CG is non-proprietary and is unlikely to add 
competitive advantages to a strategic opponent. Therefore, there is good incentive for a 
value-maximizing manager to voluntarily disclose credible, non-proprietary, information to 
the market (Dye, 1986). By voluntarily disclosing more information on their CG practices, 
these firms are signalling to the market that they have less to hide about their state of CG.  
When such signals are credibly disseminated and correctly interpreted, investors will 
favour the stock of these good CG firms with a higher market value or a lower cost of 
capital. Under such scenario, voluntary disclosure of CG by the SmallCap firms works 
positively towards reduction of the information gap, provides more assurance to outsiders 
about their true state of corporate governance, thereby enhances investors’ confidence in 
the management of the SmallCap firms. The empirical findings (e.g., Model 1.0_S) of this 
study provide evidence that those SmallCap firms employing such signals are recognised 
by the market with a higher market valuation. 
 
11.2.2 More voluntary disclosure is more credible, hence can proxy for 
better quality disclosure 
 
The findings of this study also lend support to the theoretical arguments by Lang and 
Lundholm (1993) in affirming that more voluntary disclosure can proxy for better quality 
disclosure. According to Lang and Lundholm (1993), there are three main motivations for 
voluntary disclosure: (i) to overcome adverse selection; (ii) to reduce transaction costs in 
the market; and (iii) to reduce expected legal costs by pre-empting large negative stock 
price responses to earnings announcements (ibid, 1993, p.247). The reason for voluntary 
disclosure of CG falls mainly under the first motivation: namely, to overcome adverse 
selection.  
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Past literature has pointed out that adverse selection in information asymmetry can lead to 
market failure (Akerlof, 1970). Information asymmetry would promote unwillingness to 
trade among buyers and sellers. It would increase the cost of capital as investors “price 
protect” against potential losses from trading with better-informed market participants 
(Bhattacharya and Spiegel, 1991). To improve their access to capital markets, managers of 
good CG small firms need to take initiatives to reduce the information asymmetry between 
outsiders (investors) and insiders so as to differentiate themselves from those firms of 
lower CG quality.  Failure to do so may cause the outsiders to believe that they are no 
different from other firms with poor CG and refuse to invest or to demand a higher rate of 
return, leading to a reduction in the company’s share price.  In contrast, managers of large 
or medium firms have no such urgency for taking initiative to reduce the information 
asymmetry through CG disclosure in the annual report, given all the other channels of 
communication with investors open to such companies. 
 
This need for distinguishing the good CG firms from the bad CG firms is also in line with 
the “screening” rationale for voluntary disclosure of non-proprietary information as put 
forward by Dye (1985) and Lev and Penman (1990).  Dye (1985) assumes that virtually 
every firm will disclose completely its non-proprietary information to distinguish itself 
from other firms with worse information. Lev and Penman (1990) hypothesize that 
investors will consider those managers of non-disclosing firms as withholding information 
that would imply a market value below an average valuation of all firms. Such non-
proprietary information disclosure theories can be extended to voluntary CG disclosure.  If 
investors know that some CG practices are implemented in the firm about which the 
manager has information but has not released, they will infer that the current market price 
of the firm overstates the firm’s values, based on the unfavourable information withheld by 
the manager (Dye, 1985). Accordingly, investors will revise downwards their demands for 
the firm’s shares, and the share price of the firm will fall precipitously until the price drops 
to a level similar to those of firms practising equally bad CG. Any downward price 
revision of poor CG-disclosure firms will, in turn, encourage those with good CG to screen 
themselves out of the group by voluntarily disclosing more. By this reasoning, more 
voluntary CG disclosure will be deemed to be more credible, and tend to be a proxy for a 
firm’s CG quality.   
 
The empirical findings of this study do find evidence to support this screening-out 
argument. Small firms with lower voluntary CG disclosure (i.e., below median) are indeed 
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associated with lower market valuation (Model 1.3_S in Chapter 10 refers). And the lowest 
market valuation is associated with a low CG ranking small firm with predominant insider 
ownership (>50%) highly susceptible to entrenchment problems. This result is consistent 
with the hypothesis by Claessens and Fan, (2002), which suggests that a higher confidence 
in a firm’s CG leads to a smaller discount in the share price that investors would be willing 
to pay for the firm’s stock. The test result of Model 1.3_S in Chapter 10 of this study 
agrees with the conjectures by Sengupta (1998), who posits that firms that consistently 
make timely and informative disclosures are perceived to have a lower likelihood of 
withholding value-relevant unfavourable information.  As a result these firms are charged a 
lower risk premium, hence leading to a higher market value. 
 
In Hong Kong, SmallCap firms have a higher concentration of ownership than LargeCap 
firms (the mean percentage of equity ownership by directors, Dir%Own, is 50.82% for the 
SmallCap firms; compared to 45.54% for the LargeCap firms as reported in Chapter 9).  
Fan and Wong (2002) show that high ownership concentration in Asian firms (including 
Hong Kong firms) is associated with opacity and low informativeness in their disclosure of 
accounting information. Such assertion can be substantiated from the findings of Model 
2.0_S of Chapter 10 in this study. The findings show that the level of voluntary CG 
disclosure decreases as the percentage of insider ownership (Dir%Own) increases for the 
SmallCap firms. The same negative relationship also holds for the Large and MidCap 
(L+M) sample firms although the relationship is not as much statistically significant as in 
the SmallCap sample. As SmallCap firms are less likely to be cross-listed (19% of the 
SmallCap sample firms in this study have dual listing, as compared to 41% of the 
LargeCap and MidCap sample firms as reported in Chapter 9), Smallcap firms are 
therefore less likely to receive as much attention from international investors and analysts 
as much as LargeCap or MidCap firms do. The information asymmetry between outsiders 
(i.e. investors) and insiders (i.e. managers) for the SmallCap firms seems likely to be 
greater. 
 
Because less transparency means higher risks to outsider investors, the investors are not 
willing to pay a high price for the stock unless their concerns for potential exploitation by 
the insiders are allayed and their fear for tunnelling by the majority shareholders are 
alleviated (Verrecchia, 1983, 1990; Claessens and Fan, 2002). Thus, for those SmallCap 
firms that have been facing an information asymmetry relatively bigger than that facing the 
LargeCap and MidCap firms, more voluntary CG disclosure can proxy for better quality of 
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CG, create a stronger impact on outsiders, and lead to a higher market valuation, ceteris 
paribus. This may explain why the value relevance effect of voluntary CG disclosure is 
stronger for the SmallCap firms but less prominent for the LargeCap and MidCap firms in 
this study. 
 
11.2.3 Joint effect of voluntary CG disclosure and insider ownership 
on market valuation of SmallCap firms 
 
Another key findings of this study is that, among those SmallCap firms with low voluntary 
CG disclosure, firms with a medium level of insiders’ ownership (25%-50% Dir%Own) 
are associated with the highest market valuation (Fig.10.2 in Chapter 10), as compared to 
small firms with other levels of insiders’ ownership.  This is consistent with the predictions 
offered by agency theory and entrenchment theory.  In agency theory, it is predicted that at 
low level of insiders’ ownership (e.g., 0-25% Dir%Own for firms in this study), agency 
problems are expected to arise as the interests of manages are not aligned with the interests 
of the shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  On the other hand, in entrenchment 
theory, it is predicted that at high level of insiders’ ownership (i.e., over 50% Dir%Own for 
firms in this study), the managers well entrenched because of their equity ownership 
become difficult to remove.  The expropriation of minority shareholders by the 
predominant insiders becomes a distinct possibility (Claessens, Djankov, and Lang, 2000; 
Cheung, Rau and Stouraitis, 2006).  Outside investors will discount the share prices for the 
shares of those firms if there is inadequate assurance that their investment is in good hands 
of management.  A low level of voluntary CG disclosure does not seem to be able to 
deliver such assurance to the minority shareholders.  
 
The empirical results of Model 1.3_S in Chapter 10 indicate that firms susceptible to 
potential risks of expropriation by insiders (i.e., firms with predominant insiders’ 
ownership) are associated with the lowest market valuation.  The coefficient on the dummy 
variable for the LP group of firms (DV_LP), with joint Low-CG_ranking-and-Predominant 
Dir%Own, is -0.56, compared to zero for the base group of HL firms (i.e., High-
CG_rankinig-and-Low-Dir%Own).  Comparatively, firms prone to have agency problems 
(i.e., firms with low insiders’ ownership) are assigned with a low but slightly higher 
market valuation (the coefficient on the dummy variable being -0.49).  These results 
suggest that, under a legal regime which is renowned for strong investor protection such as 
Hong Kong, investors are comparatively more sceptical about the danger of tunnelling and 
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expropriation by insiders more than the risk of non-alignment of interests of the agent and 
the principal. This sentiment of investor fear is understandable because minority outsiders 
may face a total loss of their investment should expropriation by the predominant 
shareholder take place; whereas the agency problems arising from the traditional agency-
principal conflict of interest could be ameliorated by resorting to remedial external 
governance mechanisms such as market for corporate control (Jensen and Ruback, 1983) 
and proxy contests (Pound, 1988) in a strong legal protection environment.    
 
11.2.4 Effect of splitting the dual role of Chairman/CEO is significant in 
enhancing market valuation for LargeCap and MidCap firms 
 
It is also found in this study that splitting the role of the Chairman and CEO is significant 
in enhancing market valuation for the LargeCap and MidCap firms (Model 1.1_LM).  
However, the relationship is not significant at all for the SmallCap firms (Model 1.1_S). 
This can be attributable to the differences in complexity and the business nature of the 
firms.   
 
For SmallCap firms in Hong Kong, the roles of the Chairman and CEO are usually 
performed by the same person (Cheung, Stouraitis, and Wong, 2005, p. 527). Descriptive 
statistics reported in Chapter 9 of this study show that 51% of the SmallCap firms have 
dual roles of Chairman/CEO performed by the same person; whereas only 25% of the 
LargeCap and MidCap firms have duality. The high proportion of small firms having 
duality is probably because the Chairman is often the founder of the firm who is likely to 
be the most experienced manager to become the CEO of the enterprise.  
 
If the firm is at a growing stage (as SmallCap firms likely are), or operating within a 
relatively less complex business environment (i.e., not as many market/product segments 
as in the case of LargeCap or MidCap firms), a duality in Chair/CEO may be beneficial 
because it speeds up the decision-making process, cuts short the bureaucracy within the 
firm’s organizational structure, and promotes audacity in formulating and implementing 
competitive business strategies. However, vesting the dual roles of Chairman and CEO in 
one person will empower an individual with unchecked authority in the day-to-day 
management of the firm, which is hazardous to the principles of good corporate 
governance (OECD, 2004; Cadbury Report, 1992). 
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LargeCap and MidCap firms often operate in a more diverse and complex business 
environment than SmallCap firms do. Their businesses cover a wider spectrum of 
products/markets. Also, larger firms tend to employ more people, including professional 
CEOs to manage, control, and coordinate their business activities.  Large firms have more 
resources, operate in multiple markets, and are involved in a variety of products.  The scale 
of operation requires delegation of job responsibility and exacts performance 
accountability from all executives within the hierarchy of the firm. Opportunity for 
shirking and rent-seeking behaviour tends to arise if an effective internal control system is 
not installed or, is not operating properly.  Therefore, an effective monitoring system is 
needed to provide check-and-balance on the responsibilities and authorities of various 
decision-makers at all levels, including the Chairman and the CEO for LargeCap and 
MidCap firms.  
 
For larger and more complex firms, splitting the roles of Chairman and CEO becomes 
justifiable because the potential benefits of guarding against self-interest aggrandizement 
would outweigh the costs of power sharing between two individuals.  The disclosure of 
role splitting is a significant CG practice to inform the outside investors that a monitoring 
control has been officially installed in the highest hierarchy of the company.  Outsiders can 
be assured that their interests will be more protected than is the case when the two roles are 
merged into one and taken up by the same individual. Where the roles are split, and if the 
CEO is found to be pursuing his/her own interests above the company’s interests, investors 
still have a last resort to appeal to the Chairman for monitoring and disciplining the CEO. 
A clear separation of the two roles made known to the outsiders reinforces such assurance 
that a separation of decision management and decision control is practised (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983b), and serves as a signal that the board is effectively exercising its 
governance role (Pfeffer, 1981). When the corporate governance is properly carried out, 
firm valuation is positively affected, as the concerns of the outsiders are addressed. 
 
 
Splitting the roles of the Chairman and CEO, however, is not the panacea to firm 
performance problems across all sizes of firms (Baliga, Moyer, and Rao, 1996, p. 51). For 
the small firms, role splitting may create unnecessary bureaucracy or internal power strife 
in a relatively simple organizational structure dysfunctional to the firms’ performance.  
With a relatively smaller product range and/or markets to deal with, a small firm with 
limited resources needs flexibility, quick response to market opportunities, and the ability 
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to control costs in order to survive and flourish.  The administrative costs and financial 
costs of splitting the two roles of Chairman and CEO may outweigh the benefits for a small 
firm. 
 
There are research studies showing that insider owners who are also managers can help 
enhance the market value of a firm.  Villalonga and Amit (2006) find empirical evidence 
that family firms have a premium in market valuation q when the founder manages the 
business.  However, when the family firm is not managed by the founder (i.e., split roles of 
Chairman and CEO), the premium turns into a discount. Their findings are contrasted with 
the observations by Miller, Le Breton-Miller, Lester, and Cannella (2007) who find that 
only family business with a lone founder and no other relatives serving as owners or 
managers outperform other non-family owned business in their market valuation q.  Their 
findings are based on a sample of 896 U.S. firms selected from Fortune 1000 companies 
from 1996 to 2000. 
 
As the research objective of this study is not on the influence of founder-manager, or the 
number of members of the same family, on firm’s valuation, this aspect has not been 
investigated.  Nevertheless, the presence of family members on the board of directors may 
be a plausible factor mitigating the level of voluntary disclosure of CG information, thus 
causing a limitation to this study.  As revealed from previous studies, in Hong Kong, firms 
of varied sizes are characterised with high concentration ownership by the insiders or 
members of the same family2. 
 
11.2.5 The joint effect of splitting the duality of Chairman/CEO and 
having a predominant shareholder on voluntary disclosure 
 
Classical agency theory regards managers as agents, and shareholders as principal of the 
firm (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, Fama and Jensen, 1983a, 1983b). Managers are held 
accountable for their decisions to the shareholders, whose representatives are elected to the 
board of directors. The CEO is therefore accountable to the board, which is being led by 
the Chairman. If the roles of CEO and Chairman are assumed by the same person, other 
directors may be subject to undue pressure to endorse the decisions made and/or plans 
proposed by the executives. On the other hand, if the role of Chairman is separate from the 
                                                 
2 The survey by the Corporate Governance Working Group of the Hong Kong Society of Accountants 
(HKSA) reported  that over half of the Hong Kong listed firms in 1996 had a majority shareholder either by a 
family or an individual (HKSA, 1997). 
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CEO, it is more likely that the board of directors can fulfil its duties in monitoring the 
executives. Therefore, splitting the roles of Chairman and CEO is a symbolic way of 
‘signalling’ that the board of directors is effectively exercising its governance role (Pfeffer, 
1981). Managers tend to be more conscientious of the impact of their actions on the 
shareholders’ perception, leading to more voluntary disclosure.  
 
The empirical findings in this study find support to the above theories. The test results of 
Models 2.0_S and 2.0_LMS (which test the relationship between CGDscores and the CG 
practices and company characteristics for SmallCap firms, and for the pooled sample of 
LargeCap, MidCap and SmallCap firms, respectively) in Chapter 10 show that splitting the 
dual roles is associated with a higher level of voluntary CG disclosure level for all firms. 
This is consistent with the principles of good corporate governance as suggested by OCED. 
 
Previous research using samples of Hong Kong firms of various sizes has obtained similar 
findings. Gul and Leung (2004) find that the Chairmen/CEO duality is associated with 
lower voluntary disclosures, based on a sample of 385 non-financial firms of all sizes listed 
on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange in 1996. Their study, however, did not differentiate the 
small firms from the large firms; and their sheer sample size also suggests the possibility 
that the empirical result is susceptible to the predominant influence of small firms in their 
sample. 
 
This study goes further than that of Gul and Leung (2004) by conducting the empirical 
tests on three groupings of sample firms of different levels of market capitalization.  By 
comparing and contrasting the results from three samples, this study is able to discern that 
split roles of Chairman/CEO has statistically significant impact on voluntary CG disclosure 
for small firms, but not for large- and medium-sized firms (Model 2.0_LM and Model 
2.0_S).  The findings of this study further suggest that such a difference does not seem to 
arise from the firm’s financial characteristics such as profitability, sales, growth, total 
assets or leverage.  
 
Test results of Model 2.0_S in this study also indicate that higher insiders’ ownership 
(Dir%Own) significantly decreases the level of voluntary CG disclosure for the small firms. 
This finding also corroborates with similar studies on small firms in other strong legal 
investor-protection countries. In Canada, Wu, Hedges and Zhang (2007) find creditors 
incur high monitoring costs on small firms that have concentrated ownership with duality 
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in owner-manager. Wu et al attribute this to the more serious informational asymmetry 
problems in such highly ownership-concentrated small firms. In the U.S., Ali, Chen, and 
Radhakrishnan (2007) document evidence that family firms in the S&P 500 make less 
voluntary disclosure about CG practices in their regulatory filings than non-family firms. 
They argue that maintaining a lack of transparency of CG practices may facilitate getting 
family members on board without much interference from non-family shareholders (ibid, 
2007, p.245). Their findings support previous research by Anderson and Reeb (2003), who 
find that family firms among the S&P 500 companies from 1992-1999 tend to have 
substantial family members’ representation on the board.  Anderson and Reeb (2003) state 
that the non-controlling shareholders’ concern for the lack of transparency in CG practices 
would be reduced only if such family firms deliver superior performance.  Higher insiders’ 
ownership, therefore, appears to be associated with lower voluntary disclosure, and is 
closely related to the lower transparency of a firm’s CG.  
 
In summary, splitting the role of Chairman and CEO is statistically significant and 
positively related to voluntary CG disclosure for the SmallCap firms. But the level of 
disclosure is also negatively related to the level of insider ownership (Dir%Own). 
Regression results of Model 2.0_LMS, Model 2.0_LM, and Model 2.0_S as reported in 
Chapter 10 indicate that higher Dir%Own reduces the voluntary CG disclosure.  
 
To test whether the duality role (SplitRole) or insider ownership (Dir%Own) has a bigger 
impact on voluntary CG disclosure (CGDscore), a standardized regression is estimated on 
Model 2.0_S for which the coefficients on SplitRole and Dir%Own are both significant 
and yet with opposite signs3, as shown in Table 11.1 below: 
                                                 
3 Similar standardized regression can also be re-estimated on Model 2.0_LM for LargeCap and MidCap 
sample as the coefficients on SplitRole and Dir%Own also have opposing signs. However, the coefficient on 
SplitRole is not statistically significant (Model 2.0_LM in Chapter 10 refers), hence re-estimating the 
standardized regression on Model 2.0_LM may not yield meaningful analysis. 
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Table 11.1 Standardized coefficients of Model 2.0_S.  Dependent variable = Standardized 
CGDscore.  
 
 1 2 3 4 5 
1 
 
 Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value
2 Intercept 0.000 0.076 0.000 1.000 
3 BoDsize 0.172 0.182 0.945 0.346 
4 NumINED 0.042 0.211 0.199 0.842 
5 INED_% 0.184 0.234 0.785 0.434 
6 Dir%Own -0.207 0.083 -2.486 0.014* 
7 SplitRole  0.322 0.082 3.931 0.0001** 
8 DualList -0.030 0.083 -0.364 0.716 
9 ROE 0.206 0.083 2.493 0.014* 
10 LnSales 0.083 0.085 0.979 0.329 
11 W_SalGrow 0.017 0.081 0.209 0.835 
12 Ln(TA) 0.023 0.095 0.239 0.811 
13 Debt/TA 0.082 0.096 0.855 0.394 
(Note: p-value are bold if <0.10; * if <0.05 ; ** if <0.01. Explanatory variables are standardized 
CGprac variables and ComChar variables. Sample size= 140.) 
 
The standardized regression (Field, 2000, p. 74) is estimated as follows: first, the mean and 
standard deviation are computed for the dependent variable and all the independent 
variables individually. Then each variable is standardized by subtracting its mean and then 
divided by its own standard deviation. Finally, the standardized dependent variable is 
regressed on all the standardized independent variables. The coefficients thus estimated 
from this regression are called the standardized coefficients. The absolute value of the 
standardized coefficient for each independent variable indicates its impact on the standard 
deviation change of the dependent variable, holding other independent variables constant. 
Therefore, the explanatory power of the independent variables can be compared with each 
other on common unit of measurement. The significance and signs of all standardized 
coefficients remain unchanged as those obtained under the Ordinary Least Square 
regression model.  
 
When Model 2.0_S is re-estimated using regression analysis based on standardized 
variables, the standardized coefficient for SplitRole is 0.322 (Table 11.1, row 7, column 2) 
and the standardized coefficient for Dir%Own is –0.207 (row 6, column 2). It means that 
changing the SplitRole by one standard deviation while holding other variables constant 
would change the CGDscore by 0.322 standard deviations. On the other hand, changing the 
insider ownership (Dir%Own) by one standard deviation, holding other variables constant, 
would change CGDscore by -0.207 standard deviations.   For Hong Kong SmallCap firms, 
splitting the roles of Chairman and CEO has a bigger impact in absolute terms than 
insiders’ ownership has on the level of voluntary CG disclosure.  
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Results of this standardized regression suggest that, within a strong legal investor-
protection regime such as Hong Kong, splitting the Chairmen/CEO duality has a bigger 
impact on voluntary CG disclosure. This finding is of particular relevance to SmallCap 
firms which are characterized with high insider ownership (mean Dir%Own =50.82%, 
Table 9.8, Chapter 9). Small firms in Hong Kong typically have higher insider ownership 
than large firms (as reported in the Descriptive Statistics of Chapter 9 in this study). When 
insider ownership predominates, a small firm with split roles of Chairman and CEO can 
ameliorate the adverse effect of high insiders’ ownership on the firm’s disclosure, and 
presents a strong signal to the outsiders that there is a check-and-balance mechanism 
installed inside the firm.  It indicates that the CEO is subject to the monitoring by the board 
of directors (which in turn is led by the Chairman) and is no longer left with a free hand. 
More disclosure on a firm’s CG practices is therefore to be expected. 
 
11.2.6 Voluntary CG disclosure can substitute for dividend payout for 
the SmallCap firms 
 
Another objective of this study is to determine the extent voluntary CG disclosure affects a 
firm’s dividend payout.  The results from Model 4.1_S (which tests the relationship 
between DivPay and the joint CG_Rank-and-Dir%Own for SmallCap firms) of Chapter 10 
in this study show that, for the SmallCap firms, the higher-CG ranking firms are often 
associated with lower dividend payout. The relationship is statistically significant at the 
medium insider ownership (25-50%) and the predominant insider ownership (>50%) levels. 
In contrast, firms with lower-CG ranking are often higher dividend payout firms. It appears 
that voluntary CG disclosure and dividend payouts are substitutes, and that insiders’ 
ownership has a mitigating effect on the substitution effect between disclosure and 
dividend payouts. 
 
If dividend payout is construed as a response to investors’ demand for a return on their 
investment, then the reported results in this study show that voluntary CG disclosure can 
be a substitute for dividend payout. By voluntarily disseminating more CG information to 
the market, a SmallCap firm can achieve two objectives at the same time.  First, it can 
reduce its dividend payout.  Second, it can enhance its market valuation. Such a 
substitution effect is present for the SmallCap firms but not so prominent for the subgroup 
of LargeCap and the MidCap firms (see Model 4.1_LM). This finding has significant 
meaning in relation to the agency models of dividends as proposed by La Porta, Lopez-de-
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Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (LLSV, 2000b).  It is also consistent with the findings by 
Schooley and Barney (1994), which will be discussed in turn in the paragraphs that follow. 
 
LLSV (2000b) propose two agency models of dividends: the outcome model and the 
substitute model. According to the outcome model, dividends are an outcome of an 
effective system of legal protection of shareholders. When the legal environment provides 
a strong protection to investors, the outsiders can rely on their rights of voting for directors 
to put their representatives on the board, force the board to a high dividend payout to 
protest against wealth expropriation by the controlling shareholder. Dividends are paid 
because minority shareholders pressure the insiders to disgorge cash. As such, dividends 
are an outcome of strong legal protection system. 
 
LLSV (2000b) also argue for a substitute model which operates in a weak legal investor-
protection system. The substitute model states that firms needing external capital will pay 
dividends to establish a reputation for moderation in expropriating shareholders. A 
reputation for good treatment of shareholders is worth the most in countries with weak 
legal protection of minority shareholders, who have little else to rely on. In contrast, the 
need for a fair-dealing reputation is weaker in countries with stronger investor protection. 
This substitute model of dividends implies that dividend payout ratios should be higher in 
weak legal protection regimes than in those with strong protection. Therefore, dividends 
act as a substitute for corporate governance. 
 
This study provides empirical evidence showing that higher dividend is offered by firms 
with lower CG disclosure.   For the pooled sample of L+M+S firms, the result of Model 
4.1_LMS shows that low CG ranking firms pay higher dividend than high CG ranking 
firms, both at the medium and at the predominant level of insiders’ ownership.  For the 
combined sample of L+M firms, the result of Model 4.1_LM shows that low CG ranking 
firms pay higher dividend at the predominant level of insiders’ ownership.  Similarly, for 
SmallCap firms, the result of Model 4.1_S also show that low CG ranking firms pay higher 
dividend than high CG ranking firms at medium and predominant levels of insiders’ 
ownership.  All these results indicate that firms with high CG ranking offer a dividend 
payout lower than firms with low CG ranking, controlling for the level of insiders’ 
ownership.  Hence, investors seem to be willing to accept a lower dividend payout rate if 
the firm has a high CG disclosure ranking. Otherwise, they would expect the firm to pay a 
higher dividend. 
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The empirical results of Models 4.1 in this study also suggest that the level of dividend 
payout is related to the level of insiders’ ownership.  In both the pooled sample of L+M+S 
firms and the sample of SmallCap firms, a ‘V’-shaped relationship between dividend and 
insiders’ ownership is observed for the low CG ranking firms (Figure 10.5 and Figure 10.7 
in Chapter 10), showing that firms with medium insiders’ ownership (25%-50%) are 
offering the lowest dividend payout, as compared to other levels of ownership.   As firms 
with low levels of insiders’ ownership are prone to agency problems and those with 
predominant levels of insiders’ ownership are susceptible to entrenchment problems, 
outside investors may feel insecure, hence demand more dividend, from firms at these 
insiders’ ownership levels.   
 
The same ‘V’-shaped dividend payout pattern with insiders’ ownership is also observed for 
the high CG ranking SmallCap firms (Fig. 10.7 of Chapter 10), suggesting that outside 
investors would use the level of insiders’ ownership as a guide to assess the potential risks 
of their investment likely to be expropriated by insiders.  If the expropriation risk is 
relatively low, investors are contended with a lower level of dividend payout, provided that 
the SmallCap firm has a high CG ranking.   
 
Both the high CG-ranking and low CG-ranking SmallCap firms exhibit a ‘V’-shaped 
dividend payout pattern with insiders’ ownership (Fig. 10.7 of Chapter 10), but high CG 
ranking firms can offer a dividend payout ratio even lower than that by the low CG ranking 
firms.4   Given that insider ownership of firms does not change drastically over time (Zhou, 
2001; also see the descriptive statistics shown in Chapter 9 of this study), the implication 
for such a ‘V’-shape pattern is that firms can lower investors’ expectation on dividend 
payout by being more transparent in their CG disclosure. 
 
The theoretical underpinning between CG and dividends can be found in the work by Core, 
Holthausen, and Larcker (1999), LLSV (2000b), and Core (2001), who point out that firms 
with weaker CG have greater agency problems.  When investors find themselves faced 
with greater agency problems either in the form of non-alignment of interests, or insiders 
entrenchment, they will demand higher dividend payout (LLSV, 2000b).  Paying dividends 
would remove corporate resources from the control of insiders (Faccio, Lang, and Young, 
2001).  This is relevant to outside investors in particular to firms providing a CG disclosure 
                                                 
4 In the low insider ownership (0-25% Dir%Own) category, SmallCap firms with a high CG-ranking offer 
higher dividend payouts than low CG-ranking firms. However, the coefficient on DivPay in the regression 
model is not statistically significant. Hence, no definitive conclusion can be drawn on the relationship for this 
category of SmallCap firms. 
 384
which is lower than the average.  The behaviour of demanding more dividend payment is 
also in accord with the “bird in the hand” notion of dividends theory as advanced by 
Bhattacharya (1979) and LLSV (2000b), which states that the shorter is the investors’ 
planning horizon, or the higher the investor’s urgency to realize wealth for consumption, 
the higher is the equilibrium dividend payout demanded of the firm.  Only when the 
concern about agency problems is alleviated would the investors agree to a lower dividend 
payout. 
 
Conversely, even though a higher dividend payout may not result from more voluntary CG 
disclosure, a firm with good CG practices that discloses more is perceived as taking 
positive steps to reduce the information asymmetry between the insiders and the investors. 
A lower cost of capital should, paribus ceteris, is expected to result because more investors 
are willing to subscribe to the firms’ shares. When a firm is able to have access to cheaper 
capital, it is more likely to have more leeway to improve its profitability. Botosan (1997) 
finds a negative association between the disclosure measure and the cost of equity capital 
for firms with low analyst following, but the results did not extend to firms with high 
analyst following. Botosan explains that the relationship between a firm’s disclosure and 
its cost of equity capital can differ, depending upon the information set already available to 
outside investors. Previous literature often regards the number of analysts following as a 
proxy for the extent of information asymmetry that exists between insiders and outsiders of 
a firm. As small firms may not often attract as many analysts’ following as the large or 
medium firms do, the information set is smaller when compared with the large firms. As 
such, the value of disclosure for the small firms tends to have a bigger impact on the cost 
of capital. Therefore, when a small firm discloses more information voluntarily and 
credibly, it appears more likely to be rewarded by the market with more access to a low 
cost of capital reflected by a lower rate of dividend payout and/or a higher market 
valuation. 
 
The empirical relationship between dividend payouts, voluntary CG disclosure, and insider 
ownership identified in this study is also consistent with previous empirical research. 
Schooley and Barney (1994) find a parabolic relation between insider ownership and 
dividend payout. Based on 235 large, industrial, U.S. firms in 1980, they present empirical 
evidence that show dividend payout decreases when CEO ownership increases over the 
low levels of ownership, but increases when CEO ownership reaches a high level. Their 
empirical results reveal the same curvilinear relationship and similar level of statistical 
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significance when the dependent variable is changed from dividend payout to dividend 
yield, although the coefficient of determination of their revised model is larger. The 
difference between Schooley and Barney’s study and this study is that their findings are 
based on large firms in the U.S. where diffuse ownership prevails. When ownership is 
diffuse, insiders need not attain a predominant level of shareholding (i.e. over 50%) before 
entrenchment creeps in.5 Consistent with the findings of this study, firms of low insider 
ownership as well as high insider ownership in Schooley and Barney’s sample have to pay 
a relatively higher dividend payout.  
 
The ‘V’-shaped relationship identified in this study on dividend payout and insiders’ 
ownership is also corroborated by Faccio, Lang, and Young (2001)’s study, which finds 
that Asian firms with a shareholder holding more than 20% of voting rights pay higher 
dividends. Faccio et al interpret their results as showing that shareholders demand higher 
payouts because management is entrenched. Similarly, Chen, Cheung, Stouraitis, and 
Wong (2005) also find that the dividend yield for Hong Kong small firms show a negative 
relation with insider family ownership up to 10%, and a positive relation from 10% to 35%.  
Beyond 35% family ownership, the relation returns to negative although the coefficient is 
not statistically significant. However, when the dividend yield is replaced by dividend 
payout ratio in their regression model, no such ‘V-shaped’ pattern is observed between 
dividend payout and family ownership whatsoever. No explanation for such inconsistency 
is offered as no linkage to the firms’ corporate governance has been examined either.  
Another caveat for their study is that their small firm sample is not officially defined by is 
only conveniently determined by the researchers6.  
 
Taking together the findings from prior research literatures, the empirical results in this 
study suggest that voluntary disclosure of CG influences the firm valuation and the 
dividend payout. The effects of voluntary disclosure of CG are more far-reaching than a 
focus on legal protection issues alone could reveal. 
 
                                                 
5 Weston (1979) observes that hostile takeovers are often blocked in U.S. firms in which directors own 30% 
or more of the equity. Farinha (2003) find critical entrenchment levels for his sample firms change in 2 
periods – 32% equity ownership in the sample of U.K. firms in 1991, and 25% equity ownership in the 
sample firms in 1996. He concludes that entrenchment level slightly above 30% ownership by the insiders is 
a constant feature for large firms. 
6Chen et al collected data on 412 listed firms in Hong Kong during 1995-1998. They divided the sample into 
three equal sub-samples, based on stock market capitalization ranking. Their small firms sample comprised 
the lowest one third of the firms by market capitalization.  
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11.2.7 Non-Executives Directors have no impact on voluntary 
disclosure 
 
The empirical evidence of this study (Model 2.0) shows that neither the number nor the 
proportion of Independent Non-Executive Directors (INEDs) on the board has any 
significant impact on the level of voluntary CG disclosure. This is intuitively at odds with 
the theories of CG researchers who advocate the importance of having INEDs on the board 
(e.g., Fama and Jensen, 1983b, p. 314-315). Nevertheless, the finding is consistent with 
some previous empirical studies. For example, Forker (1992) argues that the presence of 
non-executive directors on the board reduces the benefits of withholding information for 
managers. It therefore gives managers incentive to disclose more information and, as the 
variance about the firm’s uncertainty is reduced, better quality financial disclosures should 
result. Forker (1992) thus conjectures that the presence of INEDs is one of the means to 
attenuate agency costs; and therefore should be positively associated with a firm’s financial 
disclosure. However, his study does not find significant empirical statistical support for his 
hypothesis.  
 
In Asian country, Cheng and Courtenay (2006) find that board size and CEO duality are 
not associated with the level of voluntary disclosure based on a study of 104 listed firms 
selected from the Singapore Stock Exchange in 2000. They also document evidence that 
boards dominated by a majority of executive directors are associated with lower levels of 
voluntary disclosure, although the result is not statistically significant. They conclude that 
the level of board independence (33%) suggested by the Singaporean regulator does not 
appear to be high enough to provide a monitoring capacity that is supportive of higher 
levels of voluntary disclosure (ibid, p. 286). 
 
One possible reason for the weak relationship between the INEDs and the firm’s disclosure 
is that Hong Kong listed firms are only complying with the regulatory requirements rather 
than taking initiatives to seek more experienced candidates to serve as INEDs on their 
boards. Hong Kong listed firms were required to have at least two INEDs on their boards 
by December 31, 1994 (Chen and Jaggi, 2000, p. 297; Ho and Wong, 2001, p. 142; Chen, 
Cheung, Stouraitis, and Wong, 2005). Since then, there had been long discussion between 
the HKEx and its listed member firms to raise the minimum number of INEDs from two to 
three, which finally became a mandatory requirement in the Listing Rules in 2005. 
Between 2003 and 2005, the average number of INEDs for the LargeCap, MidCap, and the 
SmallCap firms in Hong Kong is 4.64, 3.65, and 3.09 respectively (see Chapter 9 
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Summary Statistics). Judging from such a small average number of INEDs above the 
minimum requirement, it can be seen that Hong Kong listed firms are not too keen on 
expanding the number of INEDs on their board voluntarily. 7
 
Another study of Hong Kong firms by Chen and Jaggi (2000) finds that the ratio of INEDs 
to the total number of directors on the board is positively associated with the 
comprehensiveness of financial disclosures. However, their sampling period is from 1993-
1994 and covers the 100 largest firms (effective sample size: 87) based on the book value 
of total assets in 1994. Chen and Jaggi (2000) also point out that in 1993, there were 21 
firms (= 24%) in their sample which had fewer than two INEDs sitting on the board. 
Apparently, both the number of INEDs and the percentage of their representation on the 
board increased as a result of compliance with the Hong Kong Exchange’s requirements 
(ibid, 2000, p. 298).  
 
A third Hong Kong-based study by Ho and Wong (2001) hypothesizes that firms with a 
higher proportion of INEDs are more likely to have a higher extent of voluntary disclosure. 
Using a checklist developed by a Big-5 accounting firm (Ernst & Young) and a self-
developed importance-adjusted relative disclosure index, Ho and Wong (2001) do not find 
any empirical evidence to support such a hypothesis. They conclude that the INEDs in 
Hong Kong firms are “likely to ensure that the company has complied with mandatory 
disclosure requirements”, and are “still not actively pressing the company to disclose more 
non-mandatory information.” (ibid, 2001, p.151). Hence, Ho and Wong (2001) remain 
sceptical as to the independence of the INEDs in Hong Kong and their effectiveness as a 
monitoring device because many INEDs are appointed by the CEO or the board chairman.  
 
Their scepticism is shared by other researchers on Hong Kong firms (e.g., Chen, Cheung, 
Stouraitis, and Wong, 2005) and corroborated with prior survey on ownership 
concentration. The second report of Hong Kong Society of Accountants’  (HKSA) 
Corporate Governance Working Group already confirmed that over half of the Hong Kong 
listed firms are majority-owned by a family or an individual (HKSA, 1997). With a highly 
concentrated family-ownership of all firms (the ten wealthiest families in Hong Kong 
owned 46.8% of the total market capitalization of the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong in 
1996 – HKSA, 1997), the INEDs’ impact on voluntary disclosure can be severely curtailed. 
                                                 
7 Chen, Cheung, Stouraitis, and Wong (2005) examine the number of INEDs in 412 Hong Kong listed firms 
during 1995-1998. They observe, on average, there are 2.8 INEDs on their sample boards. They state that 
“even this number probably overstates the proportion of really independent directors, since the corporate 
sector in Hong Kong is small and it may be difficult to recruit true outsiders” (ibid, 2005, p. 436).  
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 The findings on INEDs in this study are consistent with those from prior research. The 
implications are that there is still much room for improvement for Hong Kong firms if the 
INEDs are to serve their purpose in reinforcing corporate governance of the firm, as 
encouraged and expected by the Hong Kong Exchange and other regulatory bodies. 
 
11.2.8 Other findings 
a) Board size and firm valuation 
This study finds that large firms tend to have larger board size. As discussed in Chapter 9 
(Descriptive Statistics), the mean board size is 15.31 members for the LargeCap firms, 
11.35 for the MidCap firms and 9.61 for the SmallCap firms. Furthermore, the empirical 
regression results of Model 1.2_LM in Chapter 10 show that board size is negatively 
related to market valuation proxied by q for LargeCap/MidCap firms, although the 
coefficients are not statistically significant. This is consistent with the study by Yermack 
(1996) who finds a significant negative relation between board size and Tobin’s q for large 
U.S. industrial corporations between 1984 and 1991. Yermack argues that even if boards’ 
capacities for monitoring increase with board size, the benefits are outweighed by other 
costs such as slower decision-making, less candid discussions of managerial performance, 
and biases against risk-taking. Nevertheless, he acknowledges that ‘the negative relation 
between board size and firm value attenuates as boards become large’ (ibid, 1996, p. 186). 
 
The empirical results of Model 1.2_S in Chapter 10 show that board size is positively 
related to market valuation for the SmallCap firms, although the coefficient is not 
statistically significant either. As noted in Chapter 9 (Descriptive Statistics), there is a 
higher percentage of SmallCap firms with duality of Chairman and CEO than in the other 
two samples. With the Chairman and CEO vested in the same person, a larger number of 
directors sitting on the board of SmallCap firms may be helpful in countering the 
omnipotence of the dual Chairman and CEO.  More directors may also provide the 
diversity needed to secure critical resources and networking, enrich the business 
experiences of decision-makers; and improve the quality of monitoring and decision-
making processes of the board of directors (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006).  Hence, SmallCap 
firms tend to benefit from a larger board size.  
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b) Dual listing is  positively associated with market valuation for LargeCap and MidCap 
firms  
The empirical findings of Model 1.2_LM in Chapter 10 indicate that the status of dual 
listing is significantly and positively associated with a LargeCap or MidCap firm’s market 
valuation. Cross listing on a more stringent stock exchange has been associated with 
providing extra protection for minority shareholders (Reese and Weisbach, 2002), and 
signalling on the quality of the firm (Fuerst, 1998). Under Hong Kong laws, investors of 
the LargeCap and MidCap firms have already enjoyed the level of investor protection 
similar to that available to investors of other firms. By dual listing on other stock 
exchanges (mainly on stock exchanges in the U.S. which practise even stricter regulations 
than the Hong Kong Exchange), firms are signalling to the investors that they are willing to 
expose themselves to more scrutiny under an additional legal regime; thereby reinforcing 
investors’ confidence in their governance quality.  
 
Dual listing is also costly to insiders.  By deliberately accepting additional regulatory 
exposure to investor protection at extra costs, managers convey credibly their commitment 
to a higher level of disclosure and scrutiny associated with cross-listing (Fernanades and 
Ferreira (2008) to their investors.  This study provides evidence that the cross listing status,  
which is symbolic of a more stringent level of corporate governance status of a firm, is 
able to provide more confidence to investors who are then willing to put a higher market 
value on the dual-listed LargeCap and MidCap firms.  
   
It is also found in this study (Model 1.2_S in Chapter 10) that dual listing for a small firm 
has a negative relationship with a firm’s market valuation, although the relationship is not 
statistically significant. The small number and a low percentage (19%) of dual-listed firms 
in the SmallCap sample (as compared to 42% for LargeCap/MidCap firms8 ) may be 
accountable for the inconclusive result between dual listing and market valuation q for 
SmallCap firms.  There is a possibility that the additional costs involved in dual listing are 
found not justifiable for a SmallCap firm by the investors who then accord a lower market 
value to those firms consequently. 
 
This subsection has summarized and elaborated the empirical findings of this study. The 
implications of the findings are to be discussed in Section 11.3 below. 
 
                                                 
8 Between 2003 and 2005, 75% of LargeCap firms and 26% of MidCap firms were dual-listed. See Chapter 9 
Descriptive Statistics for details. 
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11.3 Conclusions and implications 
This study examines the relationship between voluntary disclosure of corporate governance 
(CG) practices and the market valuation of the firm under a strong legal investor-protection 
regime in a market with highly concentrated ownership. The findings of this study indicate 
that voluntary disclosure is useful in enhancing market valuation of a firm with a high 
concentration of insider ownership. 
 
The findings of this study have implications to various stakeholders of the firm: the 
managers, the outsider minority shareholders, and the regulators. Fund suppliers such as 
institutional investors and investment bankers; financial intermediaries such as credit rating 
agencies and analysts; and regulators and accounting researchers will also find the 
empirical results useful in their own respective fields. These implications are discussed in 
turn as follows.  
11.3.1 Voluntary disclosure and market valuation 
One implication of the findings in this report is that, under a strong legal protection regime, 
minority investors would still make reference to a firm’s level of voluntary disclosure on 
its CG to assess their risks of expropriation by the controlling insider. Investors would 
have grave concern about a firm that is not transparent in corporate governance, and are 
not likely to support a firm’s share price where predominant insider ownership exists. 
Conversely, they are much more willing to invest in a firm by subscribing or holding on to  
its shares where they perceive a low likelihood for agency problems. It is therefore 
necessary for the managers to take steps to address the concerns of the investors by 
reducing the information asymmetry and improving the information environment for their 
firms, through the release of genuine and credible CG information in addition to the 
mandatory financial information to the investors.   
 
For more voluntary disclosure of CG information to impact positively on a firm’s market 
valuation, there is a premise that the CG practices have to be well-designed, the CG 
structure properly in place, and the CG mechanisms truthfully implemented. With a 
continuous and stronger enforcement of the Listing Rules 2005 by the HKEx, a time will 
come when all the listed firms have installed the required CG mechanisms and implement 
the practices as prescribed by the Listing Rules 2005.  By then, investors may not be able 
to distinguish the ‘good’ CG firms from the ‘bad’ CG firms based on the CG mechanisms 
installed and practised by a firm.  Therefore, it is advisable for managers of the good CG 
firms to provide to the market more qualitative indicators, rather than quantitative metrics, 
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about their CG, in order that their firms can  stand out as truly ‘good’ CG firms from all 
other firms that are merely complying with the regulations. Such qualitative indicators may 
include, among others, disclosure of the rationale for appointing an INED to the board, the 
criteria for determining the executives’ compensation packages, the explanation for a 
strategic decision made, and the response time to investors’ queries to the board, etc. At 
present, no qualitative indicators are mandated by the Listing Rules of HKEx. Voluntary 
disclosure of indicators as to the quality of CG practices will therefore provide a great aid 
to the outsiders in evaluating how fairly the minority shareholders are treated. 
 
11.3.2 Investor protection 
In the presence of a high concentration of ownership and/or a predominant shareholder 
cum manager in a firm, protection of minority shareholders may be at risk. No active 
market for corporate control may discipline incapable managers who are well-entrenched. 
Dissatisfied minority shareholders can only resort to selling their shares than to exercising 
their limited votes on the firm’s annual meetings, knowing that both inside and outside 
monitoring mechanisms can fail in providing adequate shareholder protection (Haniffa and 
Hudaib, 2006).  Selling a firm’s shares will precipitate a lower market value, leading to a 
higher cost of capital for the firm and hence making the prospect of the long-term 
profitability of the firm dubious.  
 
Investors can be better protected from insiders’ expropriation if they are aware of the 
inadequacy of the firm’s corporate governance. Poor CG firms are not likely to voluntarily 
disclose more information about their CG practices.  If they disclose some CG practices 
which in reality are not implemented, it will be tantamount to misrepresentation. Therefore, 
the regulatory body should monitor that any CG disclosure made has to be genuinely true; 
and that legal liability is to be imposed on the firm for any misrepresented disclosure in its 
corporate governance report (currently the HKEx does not require the CG report to be 
affirmed by auditors with regard to its truthfulness). Only when any voluntary disclosure is 
linked to legal liability can firms be expected to be cautious in their disclosure. In so doing, 
any voluntary disclosure in addition to the mandatory requirements will serve as a more 
effective indicator as to the true state of CG  of a  firm, adding more discriminating 
prowess between good CG firms and bad CG firms, and resulting in  more investor 
protection to the outside investors. 
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 11.3.3 Voluntary CG disclosure as substitute for dividend payout  
This empirical study has shown that a higher CG ranking firm can make a lower dividend 
payout without adversely affecting the firm’s market valuation. Previous research literature 
has shown that investors are often sceptical about low dividend-payout firms due to the 
tunnelling and expropriation risks associated with the presence of a predominant 
shareholder. In the case of SmallCap firms of predominant insider ownership, they are 
characterised by duality of Chairman and CEO. Duality of the two roles implies a higher 
risk for the board to be dominated by the CEO, which lowers the firm’s credit rating 
(Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, and LaFond, 2006) and leads to a higher cost of capital. 
Managers of small firms therefore can make use of voluntary CG disclosure as a tool to 
lower the outsiders’ scepticism on the firm’s CG, to upgrade the credit ratings for the firm, 
and at the same time to be able to save  a higher  proportion of earnings that will otherwise 
be distributed as dividend  as reserves for future investment opportunities. Voluntary 
disclosure is a signal. By credibly disclosing a signal that a strong, effective, CG system 
has been established within the firm, the managers can provide assurances that the 
outsiders’ assets are safeguarded, bondholders’ interests well-served, and insiders’ 
perquisites closely curtailed. The benefits of voluntary CG disclosure far outweigh the 
costs involved in practising them. 
 
11.3.4 Firm valuation, ownership structure, and voluntary CG 
disclosure 
Accounting and Finance researchers are often interested in the relationship between firm 
valuation, ownership structure and the corporate governance of a firm. Many empirical 
studies have been carried out but the results are unclear. Cross-countries studies tend to 
focus on the large firms and compare the results of one country with the others. Single-
country studies tend to study large, medium, and small firms as a pool and treat them as a 
homogenous group. The empirical results of this study show that small firms are different 
from firms of larger market capitalization in many ways, including the factors affecting 
their CG disclosure, the factors affecting  market valuation, the effect of CG disclosure on 
the firm’s market valuation,  and the dividend payout with regard to CG disclosure ranking 
and insider ownership structure etc. Furthermore, the significance of some CG mechanisms 
(e.g., splitting the roles of the Chairman from CEO; dual-listing) may have a different 
impact in the case of small firms.  The causes of such differences may be due to the limited 
ability of disclosing the CG information to the outside investors relative to large firms, the 
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much fewer choices of communication channels, and the much limited resources in 
communicating their CG information to the outside investors, and of a much lower interest 
level to financial intermediaries.  The implication of this empirical study is that it is 
desirable to study the small firms separately from the large firms/medium firms to unveil 
more interesting findings.  Accounting researchers may wish to take into account the innate 
differences between small firms and large/medium firms in conducting their studies.   
 
This concludes the discussion and the implications of the findings in this study. The 
following section presents the contributions and limitations of this research. 
 
11.4 Contributions and limitations of the study and future research 
11.4.1 Contributions 
 
Previous research literature relates firm valuation with a firm’s ownership structure and 
residual claims (e.g., Fama and Jensen, 1983a; Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Morck, Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1988; McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia, 1999). 
Based on the argument derived from agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), these 
researchers postulate that firm valuation is associated with ownership structure. Many 
empirical tests were carried out but the relationship found was not clear (i.e., monotonic, 
non-linear, and no relationship could be found at all). The findings of this study, among 
other similar work, suggest that these researchers have overlooked the role of corporate 
governance (CG) in the firm’s valuation. 
 
Since mid-1990s, other researchers focus on the relation between firm value and corporate 
governance. Several corporate governance mechanisms were employed in their studies, for 
instance: board size (Yermack, 1996); shareholder rights (Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, 
2003); market for corporate control (Cremers and Nair, 2005); overall corporate 
governance index (Black, Jang, and Kim, 2006), or an entrenchment index (Bebchuk, 
Cohen, and Ferrel, 2008);   However, these studies did not link up ownership structure with 
corporate governance in the determination of market valuation. Neither did they 
distinguish small firms from large firms, thus leading to their inconclusive research 
findings.  
 
This study contributes to this line of CG value relevance research in two ways: (i) it 
separates the small firms from the pooled sample of large, medium, and small firms; and (ii) 
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it identifies a joint effect of ownership structure and the voluntary disclosure of CG on the 
market valuation of a firm. The empirical test results of this study demonstrate that, when 
large, medium, and small firms are pooled together, the CGDscore shows no significant 
effect on firm valuation.  Only when the small firms are studied separately is the impact on 
firm valuation unveiled (an increase of 0.008 in q for one point increase in CGDscore).  
This study hence provides strong support to Kole’s (1995) argument that the conflicting 
findings of Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) and McConnell and Servaes (1990) on the 
relationship between market-to-book ratio (which is essentially close to Tobin’s q) and 
managerial ownership are due to the differences in the size of sample firms, rather than 
induced by the differences in insider ownership.  
 
Second, this study also demonstrates that a combination of insider ownership and CG-
ranking has a significant impact on firm valuation. A worst-to-best change in the joint CG-
rank and ownership group predicts a 0.56 increase in Tobin’s q (the coefficient on the 
dummy variable for Low-CG-Prominent-Ownership is –0.56, compared with the 
coefficient, 0, for the base case of High-CG-Low-Ownership). Even if the level of insider 
ownership is kept unchanged, a higher CG ranking predicts a minimum 0.10 increase in q 
(for the medium ownership range) and a maximum 0.49 increase in q (for the low 
ownership range).  CG ranking does impact on a firm’s valuation, and that the impact on 
firm’s valuation differs across different levels of insider ownership. 
 
Third, this study contributes further evidence that dividend payout is a joint function of the 
insider’s voluntary CG disclosure and the firm’s ownership structure. Previous similar 
studies on the relationship between ownership structure and dividend policy using Hong 
Kong firms seem to have overlooked the nature of small firms, or to have underestimated 
the joint impact of corporate governance mechanism and ownership structure on a firm’s 
dividend policy. For example, Chen, Cheung, Stouraitis, and Wong (2005) find little 
relationship between family ownership and dividend policy9.  They conclude that dividend 
payout of small firms is neither sensitive to firm performance nor to internal corporate 
governance mechanisms such as the percentage of INEDs on the board and the presence of 
audit committee (ibid, 2005, p. 431). 
 
                                                 
9 Chen, Cheung, Stouraitis, and Wong (2005), however, find a significant ‘V-shape’ relationship between 
dividend payout and family ownership for their sub-sample of small firms – dividend payout is decreasing 
when family ownership increases (up to 10%) and increasing when family ownership further rises (from 10% 
to 35%).  Nevertheless, they did not find similar pattern in the pooled sample of 412 Hong Kong firms. No 
explanation is provided in their study. 
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Fourth, this study shows that dividend payout can be a substitute for investors’ demand for 
good corporate governance, in that higher dividend payout is found for firms of low CG 
ranking.  Conversely, if the corporate governance of a firm is above average, the dividend 
payout can be lower.  This substitution effect is stronger for the small firms than for the 
pooled sample of firms of various levels of market capitalization. Investors appear to take a 
firm’s relative corporate governance into consideration in their expectations on a firm’s 
dividend payout. In this respect, outside investors are actively seeking additional 
information, and mechanisms, to help protect their investments from potential 
expropriation by the insiders.  
 
Finally, this study contributes to the debate on LLSV’s (2000b) agency models theory of 
dividends. It finds evidence that the substitution model of dividends operates not only in a 
weak investor-protection regime but also in a strong investor-protection environment such 
as Hong Kong where a high concentration of insider ownership prevails. Concentrated 
shareholdings are common in Asian countries (except Japan) as well as in European 
countries (except U.K.). In Hong Kong, highly concentrated ownership is the norm rather 
than the exception (e.g., Chen, Cheung, Stouraitis and Wong (2005) report that 61% of 
their Hong Kong sample firms have a family controlling at least 30% of the voting rights). 
Despite a strong legal protection regime (Hong Kong practises the Anglo-Saxon common 
law system), the presence of concentrated ownership poses a major concern for minority 
shareholders who seek higher dividend payout from firms with predominant insider 
ownership. To the outside investors, a Common Law legal regime does not appear to be 
strong enough to allay the fear of expropriation by entrenched insiders.  
 
The above discussion sums up the key contributions of this study. In the following 
subsection 11.4.2, the limitations of this research are presented, followed by subsection 
11.4.3 in which some suggestions for further study are outlined.  
 
11.4.2 Limitations 
The interpretation of the empirical results reported in this study is subject to several 
caveats and limitations. For instance, while a census rather than a sample is included in the 
LargeCap category, the small sample size of LargeCap firms (number of firm-years is 36) 
limits the power of the tests for differences across different market capitalization strata.  
For this reason, it has been necessary to combine the LargeCap firms with the MidCap 
firms in the analysis.  Secondly, the insider ownership thresholds of 0-25%, 25-50% and 
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over 50% are in a way arbitrarily categorized, although this method of classification has 
been adopted in prior studies and is found appropriate in view of the actual position of 
insider ownership structure of the sample firms.  Finally, the quantitative metric CGDscore 
may arguably be an acceptable measure at best to reflect the genuine state or quality of 
corporate governance practices of a firm. These limitations are discussed in turn as follows: 
a) Sample size and sample selection 
One limitation of this study is that the samples selected represent a group of firms 
conventionally defined as LargeCap, MidCap, and SmallCap firms; and pre-selected as 
constituent stocks of the Hang Seng Hong Kong Composite Index. These firms are 
therefore unlikely to be a random sample of all the firms listed on the Hong Kong 
Exchange (e.g., some firms domiciled in China and listed on the HKEx are not represented 
in the sample in this study). Consequently, the sample may have suffered from a self-
selection bias and exhibited a systematic resistance to, or preference for, voluntary 
corporate governance disclosure, thereby reducing the within-sample cross-sectional 
variations on this dimension.  
 
The limited sample size of LargeCap firms, which is predetermined ex ante by the index-
making company HSICO, also imposes restrictions on the construction of sub-samples for 
follow-on analysis. For instance, there is nil entry for the joint category of Low-CG-and-
Low-Dir%Own firms of the Kruskal-Wallis Rank Test of Model 4.1 in Chapter 10.  The 
lack of qualified samples in this category weakens the explanatory power of Model 
4.1_LM for the LargeCap and MidCap firms. Subsequently, the comparison between 
Model 4.1_S on SmallCap firms with Model 4.1_LM on the effect of dividend payout of 
joint CG-ownership cannot be carried out category by category or contrasted with each 
other to the fullest extent.  It would have been preferable to have a more varied sample of 
firms as well as a wider range of insider ownership is available for study. Had there been 
some large or medium firms that could qualify for that category, the explanatory power of 
the two models could have been enhanced considerably. 
 
b) Insider ownership thresholds are arbitrary  
A second limitation on this study is that the ownership structure is only arbitrarily 
classified into 3 categories: (i) low ownership (i.e. 0-25%); (ii) medium ownership (i.e.25-
50%); and (iii) predominant ownership (i.e. > 50%) to proxy for a firm’s propensity to 
agency problems or entrenchment problems. Although this is following similar approach 
by previous researchers, there is far from consensus among researchers on a proper 
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methodology of ownership categorization, and each researcher has his/her own personal 
view of what constitutes a ‘low’ or ‘medium’ level of insider ownership.  
 
For instance, Chau and Leung (2006) define shareholding of 0-5% as low level of 
ownership, 5-25% as medium level, and 25%-or-more as high level in their empirical study 
of 397 Hong Kong listed firms. They find that convergence-of-interest effect is dominant 
at the medium level and entrenchment effect is present at the high ownership level.  Their 
ownership thresholds follow the classification by Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) 
whose study is based on Fortune 500 firms in the U.S. In contrast, Chau and Gray (2002) 
divide the outsider ownership into quartiles (1-25%, 26-50%, 51-75%, and 76-100%) to 
test for its relationship with the voluntary disclosure of strategic information, non-financial 
information, and financial information for listed firms in Hong Kong and Singapore. They 
report that outsider ownership is positively related to the extent of voluntary disclosure 
regardless of the level of ownership. 
 
In Hong Kong, the HKEx requires 25% or more of the issued share capital of listed 
companies to be held by “unconnected persons” (those have no family relationships with 
members of a firm’s board of directors) and the general public (Phenix, 1994; Chau and 
Gray, 2002; HKEx, 200510). Therefore, in order to exercise unchallenged control over a 
firm, the amount of stock owned by a majority shareholder will have to exceed 50% but 
may not exceed 75% of the equity holding either. In the extreme case, a shareholder with 
25% equity ownership may still be considered as a minority shareholder if the majority 
shareholder owns 75%.  The classification of low, medium, and predominant ownership is 
therefore arbitrarily set at 0-25%, 25-50%, and above 50% in this study. Except for the 
present research, this tripartite classification has not been tested by economic theories and 
therefore an analysis based on such classification on ownership structure may produce 
different analytical results if the thresholds are altered considerably. 
 
c) Measurement of CGDscore may not reflect the quality of the CG practices of a firm  
A third limitation of this study is on the measurement of CG disclosure (CGDscore). 
Following Meek, Roberts, and Gray (1995), Botosan (1997), Haniffa and Cooke (2002), 
and Gul and Leung (2004), this study adopts a dichotomous approach in scoring the CG 
                                                 
10 Rule 8.08(1) of the Listing Rules provides that there must be an open market in the securities of an issuer 
and that this will normally mean that at least a prescribed percentage (normally 25%) of any class of listed 
securities must at all times be held by the public. 
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disclosure of a firm: according to the checklist prepared on the Appendix 23 of HKEx 
Listing Rules, an item scores one if disclosed and zero if it is not. The CGDscore is the 
summation of the scores scaled by the total number of applicable answers to the checklist. 
The CGDscore in this study measures whether a particular CG mechanism or practice is 
disclosed, instead of evaluating the quality of the disclosure itself. It does not indicate 
whether a particular governance mechanism is optimal either.  
 
Though it is commonly accepted to use a quantitative metric (e.g., an index) to measure 
disclosure, such metric does not reflect the true state of affairs of the company. It is often 
argued that more disclosures do not equate more quality disclosures (e.g., Ho and Wong, 
2001; Khanna, Palepu, and Srinivasan, 2004). It should be cautioned that the disclosure 
score in this study is a quantitative assessment of the voluntary disclosure practices of a 
firm, hence a proxy for the firm’s willingness to be transparent about its CG practices.  It is 
not a qualitative indicator of the value of that information, or does it imply that a disclosure 
score of one firm twice as much as another firm’s would infer that the CG practice of the 
former is twice as good as the latter’s. 
 
Finally, the CGDscore in this study is purely based on the CG information that is disclosed 
in the annual reports of the firms.  It does not include or assess any information 
communicated to investors through other possible means of communication such as the 
world-wide web, road-shows, and direct contact with shareholders by the firm’s investor 
relations/corporate affairs department.  The amount of CG information disclosed through 
these channels, though not necessarily audited by external auditors or formally recorded in 
the Corporate Governance Report, may also shape investors’ perception of the quality of 
CG practices within the firm.      
 
11.5 Suggestions for further studies 
Corporate governance (CG) research is important not only to academics but also to 
practitioners like accountants, auditors, investors and regulators. Recent financial crises 
such as the Asian stock markets crash (1997), collapses of Enron (2001), WorldCom 
(2002), Lehman Brothers (2008), and the global credit crunch in 2008 have amply 
illustrated that demise of corporations has its roots in corporate governance failures. 
Investors have the right to know to what extent their investments are being protected not 
only by external corporate governance mechanisms but also by internal corporate 
governance mechanisms of the firm. They need additional information, to which the 
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insiders have access, on top of the mandatory financial and non-financial disclosure to 
revise their investment strategies. Voluntary corporate governance disclosure by the firm 
can effectively reduce the information asymmetry that exists between the outsiders and 
insiders. 
 
This empirical study has shown that voluntary CG disclosure has stronger value relevance 
to SmallCap firms vis-à-vis LargeCap or MidCap firms; and proposes that the reason being 
the information landscape and communication channels faced by the small firms are 
different from those of large/medium firms. Further research can be carried out in this 
regard to investigate how information technology (IT) can help a firm with restrained 
resources to reduce the information gap between the firm itself and outsider investors, to 
arouse higher interests from the financial intermediaries’ interests in the firm, and to feed 
potential fund-providers with timely and credible information economically. 
 
One potentially fruitful extension of this study would be to investigate how the quality of 
voluntary disclosure can be enhanced.  As pointed out in Subsection 11.4.2 (Limitations) 
of this Chapter, the metric of voluntary disclosure in this study is a quantitative measure. It 
does not necessarily equate the quality of the corporate governance that is practised within 
the firm. Further research can explore into the ways that the quality of corporate 
governance can be credibly communicated to the outsiders by the firms.  
 
This study is based on the voluntary disclosure data of firms in a period when the 
disclosure of CG information required by the Listing Rules has not been made compulsory 
for the listed firms in Hong Kong.  To complement the arguments provided by this study, 
future research in this area may be conducted on the disclosure made by the same set of 
firms from 2006 onwards in order to evaluate the efficacy of value relevance of voluntary 
CG disclosure. A comparison between pre-event and post-event analysis can shed light on 
how effective a firm’s voluntary CG disclosure can affect firm valuation. 
 
Future study can also investigate into other variables that might influence the interaction 
between disclosure practices, information asymmetry, and market characteristics. The 
research into these areas should prove helpful to further the understanding of the impact of 
voluntary disclosure of non-financial information other than CG practices (such as the 
intangible assets, sustainability of business, and social responsibility reports) on firm 
market valuation under different kinds of ownership environments.  
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Appendix 1: Hang Seng Hong Kong Composite Index constituent firms (as at 5 September 2005)
Panel A: Samples of Non-Financial Firms
No.
HKEx
Code Market
Cap Company Name
Cross-listed
Exchanges
Fiscal 2003
ARR date
Fiscal 2004
ARR date
Fiscal 2005
ARR date
1 293 L Cathay Pacific Airways 25/3/2004 8/4/2005 30/03/2006 
2 001 L Cheung Kong (Holdings) 2/4/2004 22/4/2005 20/04/2006
3 267 L CITIC Pacific ADR 6/4/2004 30/3/2005 10/4/2006
4 002 L CLP Holdings ADR 10/3/2004 14/3/2005 14/3/2006
5 012 L Henderson Land Development ADR, TSE 27/10/2003 27/10/2004 27/10/2005
6 003 L Hong Kong and China Gas 26/3/2004 30/3/2005 25/4/2006
7 006 L Hongkong Electric Holdings ADR 13/4/2004 7/4/2005 10/4/2006
8 013 L Hutchison Whampoa ADR, LSE 2/4/2004 8/4/2005 20/4/2006
9 066 L MTR Corporation ADR 17/3/2004 16/3/2005 18/4/2006
10 016 L Sun Hung Kai Properties ADR 10/10/2003 11/10/2004 5/10/2005
11 019 L Swire Pacific, ‘A’ ADR 14/4/2004 19/4/2005 6/4/2006
12 087 L Swire Pacific, ‘B’ ADR 14/4/2004 19/4/2005 6/4/2006
13 004 L Wharf (Holdings) 26/4/2004 22/4/2005 26/4/2006
1 522 M ASM Pacific Technology 11/3/2004 11/3/2005 3/4/2006
2 1038 M Cheung Kong Infrastructure Holdings 24/3/2004 1/4/2005 6/4/2006
3 688 M China Overseas Land & Investment 28/4/2004 12/4/2005 2/5/2006
4 291 M China Resources Enterprises 23/4/2004 21/4/2005 2/5/2006
5 330 M Esprit Holdings LSE 22/10/2003 30/9/2004 19/10/2005
6 2038 M Foxconn International Holdings N.A. 3/5/2005 2/5/2006
7 053 M Guoco Group 29/10/2003 22/9/2004 23/9/2005
8 010 M Hang Lung Group 22/10/2003 1/11/2004 14/10/2005
9 101 M Hang Lung Properties 22/10/2003 1/11/2004 14/10/2005
10 097 M Henderson Investment 27/10/2003 27/10/2004 27/10/2005
11 388 M Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing 5/3/2004 9/3/2005 24/3/2006
12 045 M Hongkong & Shanghai Hotels 12/3/2004 16/3/2005 13/4/2006
13 054 M Hopewell Holdings ADR 23/9/2003 21/9/2004 23/9/2005
14 2332 M Hutchison Telecom International ADS, NYSE N.A. 11/4/2005 24/4/2006
15 014 M Hysan Development Co ADR 24/3/2004 31/3/2005 31/3/2006
16 179 M Johnson Electric Holdings ADR 19/6/2003 23/6/2004 30/6/2005
17 683 M Kerry Properties 24/3/2004 24/3/2005 10/4/2006
18 062 M Kowloon Motor Bus Holdings 13/4/2004 1/4/2005 25/4/2006
19 494 M Li & Fung 7/4/2004 7/4/2005 20/4/2006
20 017 M New World Development Co 30/10/2003 29/10/2004 31/10/2005
21 659 M NWS Holdings 30/10/2003 27/10/2004 28/10/2005
22 316 M Orient Overseas (International) 6/4/2004 30/3/2005 27/3/2006
23 008 M PCCW ADR 19/3/2004 13/4/2005 13/4/2006
24 069 M Shangri-La Asia 13/4/2004 15/4/2005 8/5/2006
25 083 M Sino Land Co ADR 7/10/2003 7/10/2004 14/10/2005
26 669 M Techtronic Industries Co ADR 21/4/2004 25/4/2005 26/4/2006
27 511 M Television Broadcasts 31/3/2004 6/4/2005 12/04/2006
28 020 M Wheelock and Co 28/7/2003 19/7/2004 20/7/2005
29 551 M Yue Yuen Industrial (Holdings) 30/1/2004 31/1/2005 26/01/2006
Notes: 
L = LargeCap; M = MidCap; S = SmallCap.
ADR = American Depositary Receipts; ADS = American Depositary Shares.
LSE = London Stock Exchange; NYSE = New York Stock Exchange; TSE = Tokyo Stock Exchange.
Only non-financial firms' stocks are included in the sample. Financial firms' stock are shown in Panel B.
LargeCap
MidCap 
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 No.
HKEx
Code
Market
Cap Company Name
Cross-listed
exchanges
Fiscal 2003
ARR date
Fiscal 2004
ARR date
Fiscal 2005
ARR date
1 373 S Allied Group 5/5/2004 28/4/2005 3/5/2006
2 341 S Café de Coral Holdings 1/8/2003 28/7/2004 25/7/2005
3 057 S Chen Hsong Holdings 30/7/2003 23/7/2004 28/7/2005
4 165 S China Everbright 14/4/2004 6/5/2005 2/5/2006
5 1110 S China National Aviation Co 19/4/2004 21/4/2005 2/5/2006
6 127 S Chinese Estates Holdings 14/4/2004 26/4/2005 4/5/2006
7 035 S Far East Consortium International 31/7/2003 2/8/2004 27/7/2005
8 142 S First Pacific Co ADR 31/3/2004 6/5/2005 20/4/2006
9 641 S Fong’s Industries Co 30/4/2004 26/4/2005 27/4/2006
10 420 S Fountain Set (Holdings) 30/12/2003 29/12/2004 29/12/2005
11 709 S Giordano International 31/3/2004 4/4/2005 4/4/2006
12 393 S Glorious Sun Enterprises ADR 26/4/2004 20/4/2005 27/4/2006
13 041 S Great Eagle Holdings 23/3/2004 11/4/2005 26/4/2006
14 480 S HKR International 7/7/2003 9/7/2004 1/8/2005
15 044 S Hong Kong Aircraft Engineering ADR 24/3/2004 8/4/2005 29/3/2006
16 050 S Hong Kong Ferry (Holdings) Co 30/3/2004 29/3/2005 4/4/2006
17 715 S Hutchison Harbour Ring 31/3/2004 25/4/2005 11/4/2006
18 1097 S I-Cable Communications ADR 20/4/2004 13/4/2005 25/4/2006
19 167 S IDT International 3/7/2003 11/6/2004 28/6/2005
20 027 S K. Wah Construction Materials ADR 30/4/2004 15/4/2005 2/5/2006
21 173 S K. Wah International Holdings ADR 30/4/2004 15/4/2005 28/4/2006
22 034 S Kowloon Development Co 7/4/2004 12/4/2005 11/4/2006
23 1212 S Lifestyle International Holdings N.A. 1/4/2005 31/3/2006
24 194 S Liu Chong Hing Investment 29/3/2004 24/3/2005 30/3/2006
25 311 S Luen Thai Holdings N.A. 3/5/2005 2/5/2006
26 200 S Melco International Development 3/5/2004 18/4/2005 26/4/2006
27 071 S Miramar Hotel & Investment 8/7/2003 13/7/2004 14/7/2005
28 282 S Next Media 30/6/2003 28/6/2004 21/6/2005
29 018 S Oriental Press Group 26/6/2003 13/7/2004 12/7/2005
30 2343 S Pacific Basin Shipping N.A. 1/4/2005 15/3/2006
31 078 S Regal Hotels International Holdings 5/5/2004 21/4/2005 9/5/2006
32 178 S Sa Sa International Holdings 15/7/2003 13/7/2004 13/7/2005
33 583 S SCMP Group 15/4/2004 18/4/2005 26/4/2006
34 983 S Shui On Construction and Materials 4/8/2003 2/8/2004 28/7/2005
35 242 S Shun Tak Holdings ADR 19/4/2004 28/4/2005 9/5/2006
36 716 S Singamas Container Holdings 7/4/2004 14/4/2005 13/4/2006
37 1221 S Sino Hotels (Holdings) 7/10/2003 6/10/2004 14/10/2005
38 315 S SmarTone Telecom Holdings 8/10/2003 30/9/2004 3/10/2005
39 2878 S Solomon Systech (International) N.A. 17/3/2005 24/3/2006
40 321 S Texwinca Holdings 30/7/2003 30/7/2004 28/7/2005
41 1192 S Titan Petrochemicals Group 15/4/2004 12/4/2005 27/4/2006
42 903 S TPV Technology 1/6/2004 11/5/2005 20/4/2006
43 732 S Truly International Holdings 16/4/2004 14/4/2005 12/4/2006
44 710 S Varitronix International ADR 5/5/2004 29/4/2005 27/4/2006
45 2317 S Vedan International (Holdings) 16/4/2004 14/4/2005 6/4/2006
46 345 S Vitasoy International Holdings 24/7/2003 28/7/2004 18/7/2005
47 303 S Vtech Holdings ADR 10/7/2003 9/7/2004 6/7/2005
48 049 S Wheelock Properties 25/7/2003 15/7/2004 15/7/2005
Notes: ARR date = Annual Report Release date. Dates are stated in dd/mm/yyyy.
SmallCap
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Panel B: Financial firms (as at 5 September 2005)
1 2388 L Bank of China Hong Kong (Holdings)
2 011 L Hang Seng Bank
3 005 L HSBC Holdings plc
4 023 M Bank of East Asia
5 183 M CITIC International Financial Holdings
6 2356 M Dah Sing Banking Group
7 440 M Dah Sing Financial Holdings
8 302 M Wing Hang Bank
9 096 M Wing Lung Bank
10 331 S China Resources Peoples Telephone Co
11 636 S Fubon Bank (Hong Kong)
12 349 S Ind and Com Bank of China (Asia)
13 626 S JCG Holdings
HSHKCI constituent stocks that are not included in this study 
14 1111 S Liu Chong Hing Bank
15 065 S Pacific Century Insurance Holdings
16 432 S Pacific Century Premium Developments
 4 
Page  1 
a. Corporate governance practices Yes No Not Appl.
1
2
3
b. Directors' securities transactions
1. Has the co. adopted a code of conduct on terms no less exacting than the App. 10 Model Code? 4
2. Have the directors complied with the standard set out in the App. 10 Model Code? 5
3. If there is non-compliance, any details and explanation of remedial steps provided? 6
c. Board of directors
1. Is the composition of board disclosed by categories, number in each category,  and by name?
7
--Executive directors 8
--Non-executive directors 9
--Independent non-executive directors 10
2. How many board meetings were held during the financial year? 11
3. How frequent is the attendance of each individual director, on a named basis, at the board meetings? 12
4. Is there a statement of how the board operates? 13
5. Details of non-compliance with Rule 3.10(1) & (2), if any, and an explanation of the remedial steps taken. 14
6. Reasons why an independent non-executive director is considered independent 15
     where that persons fails to meet the independence reqirements state in Rule 3.13?
7. Relationship (e.g. financial, business, family, or any material/relevant types) among board members 16
   and between the Chairman and the Chief Executive Officer, if any, has been disclosed?
17
2. Are the roles of the Chairman and CEO segregated and not exercised by the same person? 18
e. Non-executive directors
1. The term of appointment of non-executive directors. 19
f. Remuneration of directors 20
1. The role and function of the remuneration committee, if any. 21
2. The composition of the remuneration committee, if any, including names and identity, esp. the committee chairman's. 22
Committee chairman's name disclosed? 23
Is there a remuneration committee?
--Chairman
d. Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
1. The identity of the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer disclosed?
Appendix 2: Check List on CGDscore (source: HKEx 2005 Listing Rule, Appendix 23)
1. Is there a statement indicating the co. has applied the principles in the App.14 Code?
2. Is there a statement as to whether the co. meets the code provisions in the App. 14 Code?
3. If there is any deviation from the App. 14 Code, any details provided for deviation?
 Page  2 
Yes No Not Appl.
3. The no. of meetings held, 24
the record of individual attendance of members, on a named basis, at meetings. 25
4. A summary of work, including determining the remun. policy of EDs,  terms of service contracts of EDs. 26
g. Nomination of directors
1. The role and function of the nomination committee, if any. 27
2. The composition of the nomination committee, if any, on a name basis;  28
2.a and the identity of the com. chairman. 29
3. The nomination procedures, process, & criteria to select candidates for directorship. 30
4. A summary of work, including the determination of nomination policy, of the nomination committee. 31
5. The no. of meetings held by the nomination committee, and the record of named individual attendance. 32
1. Remuneration analysis of the auditors' audit and non-audit services, including details of the service nature and fees paid. 33
1. The role, function, and composition of the committee, by names, and the identity of the com. chairman. 34
Committee chairman's name disclosed? 35
2. The no. of audit com. meetings held, 36
and the attendence record of members on a named basis. 37
3. A report on the work performed by the audit committee on its duties set out in the App. 14 Code. 38
4. Details of non-compliance with Rule 3.21, if any, and explanation of the remedial steps taken. 39
Additional disclosure on the App. 14 Code provisions expected in the Corporate Governance Report:
1. Acknowledgement from the directors of responsibility to prepare the accounts, 40
  and a statement by the auditors about their reporting responsibilites (App. 14 Code C.1.2). 41
2. Report on material uncertainties, if any, relating to doubts of the firm's going conern (App. 14 Code C.1.2). 42
3. A statement that the board has reviewed the effectiveness of the internal control system. 43
4. In case of different view from the board, the audit committee should issue a statement explaining 44
  its recommendation and explanation regarding the selection, appointment, resignation or dismissal
  of the external auditors (App. 14 Code 3.5.).
Recommended disclosures (not mandatory or exhaustive)
a. Share interests of senior management
1. The no. of shares held by senior management. 45
h. Auditors' remuneration
i. Audit committee
5  
7  
Page  3 
b. Shareholders' rights Yes No Not Appl.
1. The way shareholders can convene an Extraordinary General Meeting. 46
47
  and sufficient contact details for such enquiries to be properly directed.
3. The procedures for putting forward proposals at shareholders' meetings and contact details. 48
c. Investor relations
1. Any significant changes in the company's Articles of Association. 49
2. Details of shareholders by type and aggegate shareholding. 50
3. Details of last shareholders' meeting: time, venue, major items discussed, voting particulars. 51
52
5. Public float capitalisation as at the end of the year. 53
d. Internal controls
1. Where a review of the internal control system has been conducted, the company should disclose:
54
1.2 The procedures and internal controls to handle and disseminate price sensitve information; 55
1.3 Whether the company has an internal audit function; 56
1.4 How often internal controls are reviewed; 57
1.5 A statement that the directors have reviewed the internal control system's effectiveness and  58
1.6 Criteria to assess the effectiveness of the internal control system; 59
1.7 The period which the review covers; 60
1.8 Details of any significant areas of concern which may affect shareholders; 61
1.9 Significant views or porposals put forward by the Audit Committee; 62
1.10 Where there has not been a review, an explanation why the company has not done so. 63
2. A statement of how the company has complied with the internal control provisions set in App. 14 Code C.2.3. 64
3. The outcome of the annual review by the company without an internal audit function. 65
e. Management functions
1. The divisions of rersponsibility between the board and management. 66
Total Count: (= 66)
2. The procedures any enquiries may be put to the board, 
4. Indication of important shareholders' dates in the coming financial year.
1.1 How the internal control system is defined;
        whether they consider the system effective and adequate;  
 
Appendix 3 
Figure A1.1 Frequency distribution of q for LargeCap firms, 2003-2005 
 
 
 
Figure A1.2 Frequency distribution of q for MidCap firms, 2003-2005 
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Figure A1.3 Frequency distribution of q for SmallCap firms, 2003-2005 
 
 
 
Figure A2.1 Frequency distribution of CGDscores for LargeCap firms, 2003-2005 
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Figure A2.2 Frequency distribution of CGDscores for MidCap firms, 2003-2005 
 
 
 
Figure A2.3 Frequency distribution of CGDscores for SmallCap firms, 2003-2005 
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Figure A3.1 Frequency distribution of Dir%Own for LargeCap firms, 2003-2005 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A3.2 Frequency distribution of Dir%Own for MidCap firms, 2003-2005 
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Figure A3.3 Frequency distribution of Dir%Own for SmallCap firms, 2003-2005 
 
 
 
 
Figure A4.1 Frequency distribution of DivPay for LargeCap firms, 2003-2005 
 
 
 
 
Figure A4.2 Frequency distribution of DivPay for MidCap firms, 2003-2005 
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 Figure A4.3 Frequency distribution of DivPay for SmallCap firms, 2003-2005 
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